On Tue, Mar 27, 2012  Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

> so you do get the point of the difference of the 3-view and the 1-view,

Truer words were never spoken. If 2 different consciousnesses can not be
distinguished in my symmetrical room from the first person point of view or
from the third person point of view then it seems pointless to insist that
there are really 2 and not just one mind involved.

>> If this thing you call "1-comp indeterminacy" were untrue then we would
>> always know what the environment was going to throw at us next and we could
>> always predict our actions,
> > This does not follow logically.
> Of course it follows logically! All "1-comp indeterminacy" means is you
never know what's coming next, a fact that is as true as it is trivial.

>> very obviously this is untrue so of course "1-comp indeterminacy" is not
>> controversial. It's not new or deep either.
> > You fail to give me the reference,

Reference? How can I give a reference when the term "1-comp indeterminacy"
is your own invention? The only reference I can give you is Forest Gump,
"life is like a box of chocolates, you never know what you're going to get".

> he usual coin is indeterminate by classical ignorance, but not for the
Laplacean God.

It's irrelevant if the coin is deterministic or not because either way I
don't know what the coin is going to do so the best I can do is use

>> but so does the copy (or maybe he really is the original and you are the
>> copy), you raise your right hand and you see on the video monitor the both
>> images do too, you jump up and down but you see both images jump up and
>> down. Not only can't you tell if you are the copy or the original you can't
>> even tell which image on that video screen is you and which is the other
>> fellow. If subjectively there is no difference and objectively there is no
>> difference then there is no difference between "3-you" and "1-you".
> > OK. Here you are clearly wrong, and this by your own argument. An
> outside observer can see that there are two bodies

Yes two bodies, but we're not talking about bodies, we were talking about
points of view and consciousness.

> where the 1-view is unique, as you insist (and are right). So, there are
> two "3-you", and only one "1-you", and this makes them obviously different
> notion.

But you can see there are 2 bodies of Bruno Marchal just as well as the
outside observer, and you can not tell which one is you any better than the
outside observer can! The third party sees the 2 bodies behave and answer
questions in exactly the same way, the third party can not distinguish
between the 2 consciousness, so it would make it meaningless to say there
are two; the observer sees 2 chunks of matter but they are both behaving in
a Brunomarchalian way. And you Bruno Marchal can not determine which of the
2 bodies is you either, if I instantly exchanged the position of the 2
bodies you would not notice the slightest change, nor could the very
universe itself. None of this should be surprising if we understand that
Bruno Marchal is not a noun but a adjective.

> The difference between the 1-view and the 3-view is the difference
> between a body and the private experience of the owner of that body, or
> bodies in case of identical bodies.

The outside observer can not distinguish 2 conscious beings inside that
cylindrical symmetrical room but only one, and the exact same thing is true
of you Bruno Marchal, looking at the live video from the camera in the
center of the ceiling of that room you can not distinguish which body is
you nor could you be expected to as both chunks of matter are behaving in a
Brunomarchalian way.

>> This thing you call "first person indeterminacy" just means a person
>> doesn’t always know what they will see or what they will do next, that's
>> it; and people had discovered this fact of life many thousands of years
>> before Heisenberg or Godel or Turing or you were born.
> > You betray yourself here. You are telling me that you would have
> rejected the work of Gödel and Turing by telling them that we know
> indeterminacy before so that they have discovered nothing.

The fact that human beings don't know everything and cannot infallibly
predict the future is simply not a new discovery, even ignoring Quantum
Mechanics they generally don't know the initial conditions of things well
enough and even if they did humans don't have access to enough
computational resources to make good predictions about what will happen
next. What was discovered in the 20'th century was that we can't even in
theory know the position and momentum or the energy and time of something
to arbitrary precision. The discovery that there are things that are true
but can not be proven is also new. This thing you call "first person
indeterminacy" tells us nothing new.

>> If they are in a different sensory environments then they have different
>> memories and are no longer identical,
> > Here you contradict yourself.

Did I? Oh dear that's not good, I hate contradictions.

> You have already agree that the guy in W and the guy in M are the same
> individual as the guy in Helsinki.

Yes, the Washington guy and the Moscow guy are the Helsinki guy and the
Moscow guy is not the Washington guy. But where did I contradict myself?

> You forget that you said yes to the digitalist surgeon.

I guess I did because I even forgot what the hell a "digitalist surgeon" is
so I don't know what you're talking about.

> In the simple teleportation without duplication, the probability is one
> (assuming comp and the default hypotheses 'course). So the probability is
> 1/2,

Huh? Probability of what?

> You manifestly continue to oscillate between "non sense" and "I already
> knew".

Yes, and I will continue to do so if your statements continue to oscillate
between trivial, false, and meaningless.

>> I don't understand what you want me to predict. I can predict with 100%
>> certainty that IF I see images of Moscow
> > But this is not the question. I have emphasized the "IF" in the quote
> above. There is no such "IF" in the question I asked.

You want to know what is the probability you will become the Moscow man,
but the only way that can happen is if you see images of Moscow, that's
what being the Moscow man means. If this answer is unsatisfactory I'm sorry
but all I can do is repeat I don't understand what you want me to predict.

> The question was about how to evaluate in Helsinki the
possibility/probability that you will see W.

Exactly the same as the probability you will see Moscow, 100%.

John K Clark

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