On 27 Mar 2012, at 06:14, John Clark wrote:

On Sun, Mar 25, 2012 at 10:07 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

>> Give me a example of 2 conscious beings that are identical by what you call "3-view" but NOT identical by what you call "1-view", show they deserve different names, do that and I might get a idea what you're talking about; but don't give me that diaries business, if the diaries are different a third party can see that just as well as the individuals who wrote them. Just one clear non mystical example where objectively 2 things are identical but subjectively they are not, that's all I ask and I don't think it's a unreasonable request as your proof depends on there being such a difference.

> You ask me something impossible

I agree it is impossible, so this distinction between "3-view" and "1-view" that is so important in your proof turns out to be rather silly.

How does this follows?

What you say amounts to the following fact on which we both agree:

3-Body(A) is sufficiently similar to 3-Body(B) entails that (1-view-A = 1-view-B)

And we also agree that the reverse is false: (1-view-A = 1-view-B) does not make (3-Body(A) similar to 3-Body(B)).

Many posts you sent illustrates that you agree with this, and so you do get the point of the difference of the 3-view and the 1-view, so I fail to see any problem in the use of those notions.

> They are different because one live in W and the other live in W.

I previously said that it is probably meaningless to talk about the position of a consciousness and you agreed with me, so all the above means is that one consciousness forms memories caused by images of Moscow the other forms memories caused by images of Washington, the images are different so the memories are different, so the consciousness of the two is different so they become different people.


The thing that differentiates the minds is not position but different memories, if Washington and Moscow were identical cities then there would still be just one consciousness, but the cities are very different so the two minds are two. Everybody agrees that if 2 minds are different then there are 2 different minds, but I insist that if 2 minds are identical then there is really only one mind (not to be confused with brains)

Yes. Note that later we might still say one mind, but put different weight on them. This will lead to open questions, and they are premature here. So I agree with you, but warn that we can add some nuances which might play a role in the comp 1-indeterminacy measure problem. But I agree with all what you have said up to here, except the wrong attribution.

while your proof is built on the assumption that if 2 minds are identical they are still distinguishable at least to themselves,

Like this for example. That's non sense. I have never said that, nor does that play any role in the 1-indeterminacy. The 1-indeterminacy bears explicitly on the future different experiences. That should be obvious: if the experiences reains the same, the probability question cannot even be asked.

and that is the reason I don't think its productive to study your proof after that point.

... because you attribute me an idea I have never asserted, and which would already contradict the definition I gave for comp.

> No 1-view can be duplicated.

Why the hell not?

Exactly for the reason you insist yourself so much on. The 1-view is always one mind, which is identical with itself from his 1-pov.

> Both people in the two cities feel one and entire.

Both people will feel IDENTICALLY until differences between Moscow and Washington cause them to form different memories.

Exactly, and that is what gives sense to the question in Helsinki: "where will I feel to be tomorrow?". The question makes sense because comp makes you surviving the duplication, one and entire, somewhere.

All what you say entails that in Helsinki the guy can understand that there is some certainties, like "I will feel to be in M or in W", and "I will not feel to be in the two places simultaneously", "If I say that I will feel in W, then the "me" in M will rightly consider that I was wrong", etc. Then, with this precise protocol, or its iteration, you can deduce that the guy is maximally ignorant on "W or M", and can put a uniform measure of probability on the set {W, M}. That is P = 1/2.

>>> There is a sense for the guy in W to say that he has been annihilated in Helsinki and reconstituted in W.

>> Then you get annihilated every time you get on a bus going from point A to point B. Do you really want to say that?

> That will be indeed a consequence of comp. It can be said that quantum mechanics, which I do not assume, *confirms* that aspect of comp. Good point.

So you have redefined the word "annihilated" so that it now means pretty much nothing at all, and thus we will need to invent a new word if we wish to communicate the old meaning of "annihilated".

Well, perhaps not. We might just discover that we cannot be 1- annihilated. When I said that the guy is annihilated in Helsinki, I was alluding to the fact that in this protocol the body of the copied guy was annihilated in the usual third person sense of the word. He is burned at 1000 degrees celsius for example.

> The 1-comp indeterminacy is not controversial

If this thing you call "1-comp indeterminacy" were untrue then we would always know what the environment was going to throw at us next and we could always predict our actions,

This does not follow logically. It is not because one form of indeterminacy is not correct that some other form would be non correct.

very obviously this is untrue so of course "1-comp indeterminacy" is not controversial. It's not new or deep either.

You fail to give me the reference, and you seem to confuse the phenomenological indeterminacy with the third person communicable explanation of that indeterminacy.

The usual coin is indeterminate by classical ignorance, but not for the Laplacean God. The quantum indeterminacy is explained differently by many people. The 1-comp indeterminacy is explainable entirely classically from self-duplication, and that's new, and is usually criticized only by the kind of scientists and philosophers who believe that 1-view, consciousness, mind are uninteresting notions from the human science. At least I already know that you believe in "consciousness", so I still fail to see the reason why you stop at the step 3.

> The quantum indeterminacy is controversial,

The explanation for quantum indeterminacy is controversial but the fact that we observe quantum indeterminacy is not.

> Indeed in most textbooks that indeterminacy is still explained by the collapse of the wave, etc.

The Copenhagen theory does explain it. And the non-local hidden variable pilot wave theory explains it. And the Many Worlds theory explains it. We have too many explanations, and although they are very different at least so far they all predict the same experimental results. I admit to having a personal preference for Many Worlds but that's not how truth is determined, the Universe doesn't care if I approve of it or not.

So you should have less problem than others. Some criticized my work for the only reason that it predicts many-worlds, which looks too much sc.fic. to them. They were not aware of Everett, and when I mention it, told me that all that quantum interpretation stuff was non sense.

I just show that if comp is true, we have to make Everett's move on the sigma_1 arithmetic, not just on the universal wave. But we are not yet at that point.

>> "you" have been duplicated

> The "3-you" has been duplicated. Not the 1-you.

Right there is the key to our disagreement. In my symmetrical duplicating room thought experiment even the "1-you" can not tell the difference between the "3-you" and the "1-you"! The copy appears back to back with the original a equal distance from the center of the room, both are watching a video display from a camera in the center of the ceiling of the cylindrical room. You insist that you are the original

Where did I ever assert this. You disagree with what you imagine me saying, despite it directly contradicts the definition of comp.

but so does the copy (or maybe he really is the original and you are the copy), you raise your right hand and you see on the video monitor the both images do too, you jump up and down but you see both images jump up and down. Not only can't you tell if you are the copy or the original you can't even tell which image on that video screen is you and which is the other fellow. If subjectively there is no difference and objectively there is no difference then there is no difference between "3-you" and "1-you".

OK. Here you are clearly wrong, and this by your own argument. An outside observer can see that there are two bodies, where the 1-view is unique, as you insist (and are right). So, there are two "3-you", and only one "1-you", and this makes them obviously different notion.

If you were able to progress a little bit, such facts become even more obvious in the next steps. At step seven we understand that if the universe run a UD, then we have infinities of identical bodies at each instant, and yet only one 1-view, before and after differentiation.

> you just show that you miss or avoid the difference between the 1- view and the 3-view.

Between IDENTICAL beings you bet I can't see the difference between the 1-view and the 3-view! And you can't explain why there should be a difference either.

The difference between the 1-view and the 3-view is the difference between a body and the private experience of the owner of that body, or bodies in case of identical bodies.

>>> It might be phenomenologically identical with other indeterminacy, but it has a simpler explanation

>> It can't explain why you can't know the momentum and position of a particle with arbitrary precision

> You don't know that. That's an open problem.

I know that you can not explain how "1-indeterminacy" brings that about, nor can it explain why you can not know the amount of energy something has and the amount of time it has it with arbitrary precision, so it is NOT a open question, we know for certain that this thing you call "1- indeterminacy" cannot explain physical indeterminacy, and in fact can explain nothing at all. There is only regular old indeterminacy.

You don't know that, and actually the whole UDA will refute you on this. UDA explains that the laws of physics (all of them) are entirely deducible from number's self-reference. But you have to understand step 4, 5, ... before. So it is premature to discuss this now.

> you remain quite vague if you accept the first person indeterminacy or not.

Vague? I thought I was quite clear. This thing you call "first person indeterminacy" just means a person doesn’t always know what they will see or what they will do next, that's it; and people had discovered this fact of life many thousands of years before Heisenberg or Godel or Turing or you were born.

You betray yourself here. You are telling me that you would have rejected the work of Gödel and Turing by telling them that we know indeterminacy before so that they have discovered nothing. But both the unsolvability of the halting problem, the deterministic chaos, and the quantum indeterminacy have been rightly consider as important new results.

The comp-1-indeterminacy is also new and simpler. Someone called it the Columbus-Egg of indeterminacy. If you read the next steps, you will eventually understand that, despite its simplicity and obviousness, it will force us to radically change the big picture (radical with respect to the common Aristotelian conception of reality), or to abandon comp.

> In the WM experience(s), what causes the first person difference is the first person differentiation, into living in W and living in M.

Yes, but then the 2 will have different experiences and have different memories and their brain would be physically different.

Exactly. If not, the question of P(M) and P(W) would not make any sense at all.

> The 1-indeterminacy comes only from the fact that those identical brain will be running in different environment.

If they are in a different sensory environments then they have different memories and are no longer identical,

Here you contradict yourself. You have already agree that the guy in W and the guy in M are the same individual as the guy in Helsinki. If not, indeed, there would be no point in saying "yes" to a digitalist surgeon.

and all "1-indeterminacy" means is different things are different. I already knew that.

You forget that you said yes to the digitalist surgeon. In the simple teleportation without duplication, the probability is one (assuming comp and the default hypotheses 'course). So the probability is 1/2, and this is far more precise that the unusable tautological "different things are different". If you already knew everything up to step 3, step four should only be more easy and obvious. So what?

You manifestly continue to oscillate between "non sense" and "I already knew".

> The point is that in Helsinki you are given all the 3-p description of the experiment, and despite this, from all your possible future 1-points of view, none where specifically predictable, not even by a God.

I don't understand what you want me to predict. I can predict with 100% certainty that IF I see images of Moscow

But this is not the question. I have emphasized the "IF" in the quote above. There is no such "IF" in the question I asked.

I will become the Moscow man and if I see images of Washington I will become the Washington man.

The question was about how to evaluate in Helsinki the possibility/ probability that you will see W. Not the trivial point of the probability that IF you see W you are the guy in W. This is 100% indeed, but it was not the question asked.

Why isn't the Moscow man the Washington man? Because he saw Moscow not Washington. The indeterminacy comes entirely from the unpredictable nature of their environment,

If that was the case, then you will have trouble in step six, where the W and M environment are virtual, and the result of purely deterministic computations. This can be used to make invalid your present point.

The P=1/2 in the WM-duplication has just nothing to do with the unpredictable nature of the environment. The first one is not predictable by an omniscient being, the second one is. You confuse the nature of the indeterminacies, or you assume QM, Everett, which is not part of the comp theory.

you don't know if it will be more like Washington or more like Moscow, just as you don't know if a electron will go through slot X or slot Y.

That means only that such indeterminacies are phenomenologically equivalent, not that they have the same explanation/theory.

In particular the comp-1-indeterminacy does not assume any result or experiment or theory in physics. It is very fundamentally different, as you should better understand if you were able to show some willingness to continue the reasoning.


PS I just see that Brent has seen all the mistakes I'm pointing too. I still sent my post, in case it might provide some additional help. You might read Kent indeed, who is a long lasting opponent to Everett, and who reintroduced in that paper the usual selection crap (making God playing dice).


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