On 27 Mar 2012, at 06:14, John Clark wrote:
On Sun, Mar 25, 2012 at 10:07 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
wrote:
>> Give me a example of 2 conscious beings that are identical by
what you call "3-view" but NOT identical by what you call "1-view",
show they deserve different names, do that and I might get a idea
what you're talking about; but don't give me that diaries business,
if the diaries are different a third party can see that just as well
as the individuals who wrote them. Just one clear non mystical
example where objectively 2 things are identical but subjectively
they are not, that's all I ask and I don't think it's a unreasonable
request as your proof depends on there being such a difference.
> You ask me something impossible
I agree it is impossible, so this distinction between "3-view" and
"1-view" that is so important in your proof turns out to be rather
silly.
How does this follows?
What you say amounts to the following fact on which we both agree:
3-Body(A) is sufficiently similar to 3-Body(B) entails that (1-view-A
= 1-view-B)
And we also agree that the reverse is false: (1-view-A = 1-view-B)
does not make (3-Body(A) similar to 3-Body(B)).
Many posts you sent illustrates that you agree with this, and so you
do get the point of the difference of the 3-view and the 1-view, so I
fail to see any problem in the use of those notions.
> They are different because one live in W and the other live in W.
I previously said that it is probably meaningless to talk about the
position of a consciousness and you agreed with me, so all the above
means is that one consciousness forms memories caused by images of
Moscow the other forms memories caused by images of Washington, the
images are different so the memories are different, so the
consciousness of the two is different so they become different people.
Yes.
The thing that differentiates the minds is not position but
different memories, if Washington and Moscow were identical cities
then there would still be just one consciousness, but the cities are
very different so the two minds are two. Everybody agrees that if 2
minds are different then there are 2 different minds, but I insist
that if 2 minds are identical then there is really only one mind
(not to be confused with brains)
Yes. Note that later we might still say one mind, but put different
weight on them. This will lead to open questions, and they are
premature here. So I agree with you, but warn that we can add some
nuances which might play a role in the comp 1-indeterminacy measure
problem. But I agree with all what you have said up to here, except
the wrong attribution.
while your proof is built on the assumption that if 2 minds are
identical they are still distinguishable at least to themselves,
Like this for example. That's non sense. I have never said that, nor
does that play any role in the 1-indeterminacy. The 1-indeterminacy
bears explicitly on the future different experiences. That should be
obvious: if the experiences reains the same, the probability question
cannot even be asked.
and that is the reason I don't think its productive to study your
proof after that point.
... because you attribute me an idea I have never asserted, and which
would already contradict the definition I gave for comp.
> No 1-view can be duplicated.
Why the hell not?
Exactly for the reason you insist yourself so much on. The 1-view is
always one mind, which is identical with itself from his 1-pov.
> Both people in the two cities feel one and entire.
Both people will feel IDENTICALLY until differences between Moscow
and Washington cause them to form different memories.
Exactly, and that is what gives sense to the question in Helsinki:
"where will I feel to be tomorrow?". The question makes sense because
comp makes you surviving the duplication, one and entire, somewhere.
All what you say entails that in Helsinki the guy can understand that
there is some certainties, like "I will feel to be in M or in W", and
"I will not feel to be in the two places simultaneously", "If I say
that I will feel in W, then the "me" in M will rightly consider that I
was wrong", etc. Then, with this precise protocol, or its iteration,
you can deduce that the guy is maximally ignorant on "W or M", and can
put a uniform measure of probability on the set {W, M}. That is P = 1/2.
>>> There is a sense for the guy in W to say that he has been
annihilated in Helsinki and reconstituted in W.
>> Then you get annihilated every time you get on a bus going from
point A to point B. Do you really want to say that?
> That will be indeed a consequence of comp. It can be said that
quantum mechanics, which I do not assume, *confirms* that aspect of
comp. Good point.
So you have redefined the word "annihilated" so that it now means
pretty much nothing at all, and thus we will need to invent a new
word if we wish to communicate the old meaning of "annihilated".
Well, perhaps not. We might just discover that we cannot be 1-
annihilated. When I said that the guy is annihilated in Helsinki, I
was alluding to the fact that in this protocol the body of the copied
guy was annihilated in the usual third person sense of the word. He is
burned at 1000 degrees celsius for example.
> The 1-comp indeterminacy is not controversial
If this thing you call "1-comp indeterminacy" were untrue then we
would always know what the environment was going to throw at us next
and we could always predict our actions,
This does not follow logically. It is not because one form of
indeterminacy is not correct that some other form would be non correct.
very obviously this is untrue so of course "1-comp indeterminacy" is
not controversial. It's not new or deep either.
You fail to give me the reference, and you seem to confuse the
phenomenological indeterminacy with the third person communicable
explanation of that indeterminacy.
The usual coin is indeterminate by classical ignorance, but not for
the Laplacean God. The quantum indeterminacy is explained differently
by many people. The 1-comp indeterminacy is explainable entirely
classically from self-duplication, and that's new, and is usually
criticized only by the kind of scientists and philosophers who believe
that 1-view, consciousness, mind are uninteresting notions from the
human science.
At least I already know that you believe in "consciousness", so I
still fail to see the reason why you stop at the step 3.
> The quantum indeterminacy is controversial,
The explanation for quantum indeterminacy is controversial but the
fact that we observe quantum indeterminacy is not.
> Indeed in most textbooks that indeterminacy is still explained by
the collapse of the wave, etc.
The Copenhagen theory does explain it. And the non-local hidden
variable pilot wave theory explains it. And the Many Worlds theory
explains it. We have too many explanations, and although they are
very different at least so far they all predict the same
experimental results. I admit to having a personal preference for
Many Worlds but that's not how truth is determined, the Universe
doesn't care if I approve of it or not.
So you should have less problem than others. Some criticized my work
for the only reason that it predicts many-worlds, which looks too much
sc.fic. to them. They were not aware of Everett, and when I mention
it, told me that all that quantum interpretation stuff was non sense.
I just show that if comp is true, we have to make Everett's move on
the sigma_1 arithmetic, not just on the universal wave. But we are not
yet at that point.
>> "you" have been duplicated
> The "3-you" has been duplicated. Not the 1-you.
Right there is the key to our disagreement. In my symmetrical
duplicating room thought experiment even the "1-you" can not tell
the difference between the "3-you" and the "1-you"! The copy appears
back to back with the original a equal distance from the center of
the room, both are watching a video display from a camera in the
center of the ceiling of the cylindrical room. You insist that you
are the original
Where did I ever assert this. You disagree with what you imagine me
saying, despite it directly contradicts the definition of comp.
but so does the copy (or maybe he really is the original and you are
the copy), you raise your right hand and you see on the video
monitor the both images do too, you jump up and down but you see
both images jump up and down. Not only can't you tell if you are the
copy or the original you can't even tell which image on that video
screen is you and which is the other fellow. If subjectively there
is no difference and objectively there is no difference then there
is no difference between "3-you" and "1-you".
OK. Here you are clearly wrong, and this by your own argument. An
outside observer can see that there are two bodies, where the 1-view
is unique, as you insist (and are right). So, there are two "3-you",
and only one "1-you", and this makes them obviously different notion.
If you were able to progress a little bit, such facts become even more
obvious in the next steps. At step seven we understand that if the
universe run a UD, then we have infinities of identical bodies at each
instant, and yet only one 1-view, before and after differentiation.
> you just show that you miss or avoid the difference between the 1-
view and the 3-view.
Between IDENTICAL beings you bet I can't see the difference between
the 1-view and the 3-view! And you can't explain why there should be
a difference either.
The difference between the 1-view and the 3-view is the difference
between a body and the private experience of the owner of that body,
or bodies in case of identical bodies.
>>> It might be phenomenologically identical with other
indeterminacy, but it has a simpler explanation
>> It can't explain why you can't know the momentum and position of
a particle with arbitrary precision
> You don't know that. That's an open problem.
I know that you can not explain how "1-indeterminacy" brings that
about, nor can it explain why you can not know the amount of energy
something has and the amount of time it has it with arbitrary
precision, so it is NOT a open question, we know for certain that
this thing you call "1- indeterminacy" cannot explain physical
indeterminacy, and in fact can explain nothing at all. There is only
regular old indeterminacy.
You don't know that, and actually the whole UDA will refute you on
this. UDA explains that the laws of physics (all of them) are entirely
deducible from number's self-reference. But you have to understand
step 4, 5, ... before. So it is premature to discuss this now.
> you remain quite vague if you accept the first person
indeterminacy or not.
Vague? I thought I was quite clear. This thing you call "first
person indeterminacy" just means a person doesn’t always know what
they will see or what they will do next, that's it; and people had
discovered this fact of life many thousands of years before
Heisenberg or Godel or Turing or you were born.
You betray yourself here. You are telling me that you would have
rejected the work of Gödel and Turing by telling them that we know
indeterminacy before so that they have discovered nothing. But both
the unsolvability of the halting problem, the deterministic chaos, and
the quantum indeterminacy have been rightly consider as important new
results.
The comp-1-indeterminacy is also new and simpler. Someone called it
the Columbus-Egg of indeterminacy.
If you read the next steps, you will eventually understand that,
despite its simplicity and obviousness, it will force us to radically
change the big picture (radical with respect to the common
Aristotelian conception of reality), or to abandon comp.
> In the WM experience(s), what causes the first person difference
is the first person differentiation, into living in W and living in M.
Yes, but then the 2 will have different experiences and have
different memories and their brain would be physically different.
Exactly. If not, the question of P(M) and P(W) would not make any
sense at all.
> The 1-indeterminacy comes only from the fact that those identical
brain will be running in different environment.
If they are in a different sensory environments then they have
different memories and are no longer identical,
Here you contradict yourself. You have already agree that the guy in W
and the guy in M are the same individual as the guy in Helsinki. If
not, indeed, there would be no point in saying "yes" to a digitalist
surgeon.
and all "1-indeterminacy" means is different things are different. I
already knew that.
You forget that you said yes to the digitalist surgeon. In the simple
teleportation without duplication, the probability is one (assuming
comp and the default hypotheses 'course). So the probability is 1/2,
and this is far more precise that the unusable tautological "different
things are different".
If you already knew everything up to step 3, step four should only be
more easy and obvious. So what?
You manifestly continue to oscillate between "non sense" and "I
already knew".
> The point is that in Helsinki you are given all the 3-p
description of the experiment, and despite this, from all your
possible future 1-points of view, none where specifically
predictable, not even by a God.
I don't understand what you want me to predict. I can predict with
100% certainty that IF I see images of Moscow
But this is not the question. I have emphasized the "IF" in the quote
above. There is no such "IF" in the question I asked.
I will become the Moscow man and if I see images of Washington I
will become the Washington man.
The question was about how to evaluate in Helsinki the possibility/
probability that you will see W. Not the trivial point of the
probability that IF you see W you are the guy in W. This is 100%
indeed, but it was not the question asked.
Why isn't the Moscow man the Washington man? Because he saw Moscow
not Washington. The indeterminacy comes entirely from the
unpredictable nature of their environment,
If that was the case, then you will have trouble in step six, where
the W and M environment are virtual, and the result of purely
deterministic computations. This can be used to make invalid your
present point.
The P=1/2 in the WM-duplication has just nothing to do with the
unpredictable nature of the environment. The first one is not
predictable by an omniscient being, the second one is. You confuse the
nature of the indeterminacies, or you assume QM, Everett, which is not
part of the comp theory.
you don't know if it will be more like Washington or more like
Moscow, just as you don't know if a electron will go through slot X
or slot Y.
That means only that such indeterminacies are phenomenologically
equivalent, not that they have the same explanation/theory.
In particular the comp-1-indeterminacy does not assume any result or
experiment or theory in physics. It is very fundamentally different,
as you should better understand if you were able to show some
willingness to continue the reasoning.
Bruno
PS I just see that Brent has seen all the mistakes I'm pointing too.
I still sent my post, in case it might provide some additional help.
You might read Kent indeed, who is a long lasting opponent to Everett,
and who reintroduced in that paper the usual selection crap (making
God playing dice).
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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