On Apr 4, 8:43 pm, Stathis Papaioannou <stath...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Wed, Apr 4, 2012 at 1:54 AM, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
> > That too, but specifically the feeling of free will is impossible to
> > account for in a purely deterministic universe. "I feel like I am
> > choosing what to write here" cannot be expressed in a d-universe. What
> > is 'I feel'? What is 'choosing'? It is to suggest that you feel you
> > are always drawing circles in a strictly rectilinear universe. Even
> > the suggestion of a circle is impossible, whether or not the circle
> > can be drawn.
> Your claim that it is impossible to feel in a deterministic universe
> is unjustified. It's simply an idea you have taken a fancy to.
I don't claim that it is impossible to feel in a deterministic
universe, but I suspect that is the case since there is no
deterministic justification for or mechanism of 'feeling' of any kind.
We would have to imagine that there is some mysterious deterministic
purpose for it, otherwise there should be no possibility of feeling,
and a deterministic universe should really be pretty parsimonious when
it comes to allowing for mysterious purposes if it is to be logically
consistent. So there is a completely logical basis for suspecting that
feeling is impossible in a deterministic universe that has nothing to
do with taking a fancy to the idea. I don't care one way or another,
I'm only following the logic where it leads. What would determine that
feeling should exist?
My claim is that the feeling of free will is a special case that goes
beyond this because even the suggestion of free will is inconceivable
in a universe defined a priori as being deterministic. It would be
like saying we could imagine what the 500th dimension or a new primary
color is like.
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at