On Apr 4, 6:09 am, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> On Apr 3, 4:54 pm, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
> > That too, but specifically the feeling of free will is impossible to
> > account for in a purely deterministic universe.
> No. In a deterministic universe that can account for feelings,
> you can have any feeling, including a feeling of FW.
What makes you think that you can have any feeling? How can a
deterministic universe account for feelings at all?
> >"I feel like I am
> > choosing what to write here" cannot be expressed in a d-universe. What
> > is 'I feel'? What is 'choosing'? It is to suggest that you feel you
> > are always drawing circles in a strictly rectilinear universe. Even
> > the suggestion of a circle is impossible, whether or not the circle
> > can be drawn.
> > > >There is no
> > > > mechanical reason that a machine should have any kind of experience at
> > > > all, let alone an experience that allows it to conceive of something
> > > > like 'control'. The fact that we can conceive of free will in any way
> > > > doesn't make sense in a universe that lacks the possibility of it.
> > > It makes perfect sense, since we can obviously conceive of
> > > things that aren't possible.
> > We can't conceive of a square circle.
> Which is a logical impossibiility. But
> we can conceive of natural impossibilities,
> like perpetual motion machines.
That's my point, in a deterministic universe, free will is a logical
impossibility; even more inconceivable than a square circle since with
free will not existing at all, there could be no alternative to the
square at all.
> > We can't conceive of the
> > opposite of fghwiortjy4p5oyj. We can conceive of things that are, to
> > our knowledge not physically possible,
> So returning to:
> "The fact that we can conceive of free will in any way
> doesn't make sense in a universe that lacks the possibility of it."
> what you meant was: We can conceive of FW,so FW is conceivable.
> However, that doesn;t mean it is "possible in OUR universe" becuase
> "possible in OUR universe" means "possible according to OUR laws
> of nature". FW might be a liogical possibility but natural
> impossibility, like a perpetual motion machine.
Right. But the fact that it is a logical possibility would make no
sense in a deterministic universe.
> > but we cannot conceive of
> > anything which is inconceivable - which is what free will would be in
> > a deterministic universe.
> No, that doesn't follow at all. A deterministic universe
> is one where indeterministic free will is naturally impossible.
> THat has nothing to do with conceivability.
> >That is what awareness would be to a
> > mechanistic universe.
> > > But you are shifting around between
> > > determinism,
> > > feelings/qualia and concepts here.
> > How so?
> Re-read what you wrote.
I don't need to. I know that I'm not shifting anything around. If you
can't defend your accusation then I'm not interested in it.
> > > > > > If I have an experience of making decisions, then how would
> > > > > > believing
> > > > > > that experience is real or an illusion have the effect that we see
> > > > > > on
> > > > > > readiness?
> > > > > huh? readiness?
> > > > Yes, it's the measurement used in the Libet Task
> > > >http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin_Libet#Volitional_acts_and_readi...
> > > > The experiment that I'm talking about showed that the Libet Task was
> > > > influenced by exposure to anti-free will
> > > > ideas.http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/21515737
> > > >http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-btvqkJpN24s/TdTMLu2VNpI/AAAAAAAAB4o/215peLP...
> > > > > > Readiness is measurable. Being influenced by the nonsense idea of
> > > > > > illusory free will impacts performance negatively. If free will were
> > > > > > truly an illusion, there could be no possibility of our belief in it
> > > > > > (belief being something which is only meaningful if it pertains to
> > > > > > contributing to making choices using free will)
> > > > > So you say. Beliefs can influence deterministic decisions.
> > > > It's the published study that is saying it. If there were no free
> > > > will, beliefs would be determined so it wouldn't make sense to say
> > > > that they could influence anything.
> > > It would, but not the same kind of sense. One cogwheel
> > > can determine another...but not freely determine another.
> > But why would it serve any cogwheel to believe that it was freely
> > determining another,
> It wouldn't have to "serve" it. It would deteminsitically
> believe what it was determined to believe.
Why would it believe anything?
> > and how could such a belief measurably improve
> > its performance in actually determining another?
> One mechanism can do someting to another
> that improves its performance. A oil-dispenser
> could automatically lubricate a piece of clockwork.
But the beliefs or an oil dispenser cannot influence its performance.
> >You are focusing on
> > the 'free' part of FW - which is beside the point.
> Clearly not, or there would be no problem with
Not sure what you mean.
> > It's the 'will'
> > part that violates determinism from the beginning. 'Free' is merely a
> > qualitative extension of will - a description of the extent to which
> > the self experiences or senses the potential for its own autonomy.
> So you say. A lot of peopel think it means actual indterministic
I agree, but I don't think that.
> > Just as technology may hold tremendous promise for intelligence, human
> > potential may hold equally tremendous promise toward something
> > approximating 'truly free' will.
Machines improve, so we improve ourselves by using them. What is the
point ultimately of any machine other than to free our will to pursue
more voluntary pursuits?
> > > > Belief could only be an
> > > > epiphenomenon.
> > > So?
> > So how could epiphenomenal beliefs impact performance on the Libet
> > Tasks?
> Their realisers could.
Not sure what you mean. Either a person's beliefs can change their
behavior or not. Since we know that they can, that means that the
semantic content of a person's mind is causally efficacious, and not
just a spectatorship that seems like it is participatory (for some
> > > > > You might
> > > > > want to call that "meaningless", but that is just your juedgment.
> > > > Your choice to deny free will is an assertion of your power to choose
> > > > freely what to deny and what to accept.
> > > i don't deny FW. But if I did, I might be doing so deterministically.
> > Why would you be determined to have an opinion one way or another
> > about something that would be inconceivable?
> It wouldn't be inconceivable, just naturally impossible.
Someone on Quora put it nicely:
"Acceptance requires free will. Non acceptance requires free will. Any
argument for determinism is a performative contradiction since
argumentation presupposes a preference for truth over falsehood and is
aimed at the acceptance of truth."
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