On Apr 4, 6:09 am, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> On Apr 3, 4:54 pm, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:

>
> > That too, but specifically the feeling of free will is impossible to
> > account for in a purely deterministic universe.
>
> No. In a deterministic universe that can account for feelings,
> you can have any feeling, including a feeling of FW.

What makes you think that you can have any feeling? How can a
deterministic universe account for feelings at all?

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> >"I feel like I am
> > choosing what to write here" cannot be expressed in a d-universe. What
> > is 'I feel'? What is 'choosing'? It is to suggest that you feel you
> > are always drawing circles in a strictly rectilinear universe. Even
> > the suggestion of a circle is impossible, whether or not the circle
> > can be drawn.
>
> > > >There is no
> > > > mechanical reason that a machine should have any kind of experience at
> > > > all, let alone an experience that allows it to conceive of something
> > > > like 'control'. The fact that we can conceive of free will in any way
> > > > doesn't make sense in a universe that lacks the possibility of it.
>
> > > It makes perfect sense, since we can obviously conceive of
> > > things that aren't possible.
>
> > We can't conceive of a square circle.
>
> Which is a logical impossibiility. But
> we can conceive of natural impossibilities,
> like perpetual motion machines.

That's my point, in a deterministic universe, free will is a logical
impossibility; even more inconceivable than a square circle since with
free will not existing at all, there could be no alternative to the
square at all.

>
> > We can't conceive of the
> > opposite of fghwiortjy4p5oyj. We can conceive of things that are, to
> > our knowledge not physically possible,
>
> So returning to:
> "The fact that we can conceive of free will in any way
>  doesn't make sense in a universe that lacks the possibility of it."
> what you meant was: We can conceive of FW,so FW is conceivable.
> However, that doesn;t mean it is "possible in OUR universe" becuase
> "possible in OUR universe" means "possible according to OUR laws
> of nature". FW might be a liogical possibility but natural
> impossibility, like a perpetual motion machine.

Right. But the fact that it is a logical possibility would make no
sense in a deterministic universe.

>
> > but we cannot conceive of
> > anything which is inconceivable - which is what free will would be in
> > a deterministic universe.
>
> No, that doesn't follow at all. A deterministic universe
> is one where indeterministic free will is naturally impossible.
> THat has nothing to do with conceivability.

Why not?

>
> >That is what awareness would be to a
> > mechanistic universe.
>
> > > But you are shifting around between
> > > determinism,
> > > feelings/qualia and concepts here.
>
> > How so?
>
> Re-read what you wrote.

I don't need to. I know that I'm not shifting anything around. If you
can't defend your accusation then I'm not interested in it.

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> > > > > > If I have an experience of making decisions, then how would 
> > > > > > believing
> > > > > > that experience is real or an illusion have the effect that we see 
> > > > > > on
> > > > > > readiness?
>
> > > > > huh? readiness?
>
> > > > Yes, it's the measurement used in the Libet Task
>
> > > >http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin_Libet#Volitional_acts_and_readi...
>
> > > > The experiment that I'm talking about showed that the Libet Task was
> > > > influenced by exposure to anti-free will 
> > > > ideas.http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/21515737
>
> > > >http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-btvqkJpN24s/TdTMLu2VNpI/AAAAAAAAB4o/215peLP...
>
> > > > > > Readiness is measurable. Being influenced by the nonsense idea of
> > > > > > illusory free will impacts performance negatively. If free will were
> > > > > > truly an illusion, there could be no possibility of our belief in it
> > > > > > (belief being something which is only meaningful if it pertains to
> > > > > > contributing to making choices using free will)
>
> > > > > So you say. Beliefs can influence deterministic decisions.
>
> > > > It's the published study that is saying it. If there were no free
> > > > will, beliefs would be determined so it wouldn't make sense to say
> > > > that they could influence anything.
>
> > > It would, but not the same kind of sense. One cogwheel
> > > can determine another...but not freely determine another.
>
> > But why would it serve any cogwheel to believe that it was freely
> > determining another,
>
> It wouldn't have to "serve" it. It would deteminsitically
> believe what it was determined to believe.

Why would it believe anything?

> > and how could such a belief measurably improve
> > its performance in actually determining another?
>
> One mechanism can do someting to another
> that improves its performance. A oil-dispenser
> could automatically lubricate a piece of clockwork.

But the beliefs or an oil dispenser cannot influence its performance.

>
> >You are focusing on
> > the 'free' part of FW - which is beside the point.
>
> Clearly not, or there would be no problem with
> determinism.

Not sure what you mean.

>
> > It's the 'will'
> > part that violates determinism from the beginning. 'Free' is merely a
> > qualitative extension of will - a description of the extent to which
> > the self experiences or senses the potential for its own autonomy.
>
> So you say. A lot of peopel think it means actual indterministic
> freedom.

I agree, but I don't think that.

>
> > Just as technology may hold tremendous promise for intelligence, human
> > potential may hold equally tremendous promise toward something
> > approximating 'truly free' will.
>
> ????

Machines improve, so we improve ourselves by using them. What is the
point ultimately of any machine other than to free our will to pursue
more voluntary pursuits?

>
> > > > Belief could only be an
> > > > epiphenomenon.
>
> > > So?
>
> > So how could epiphenomenal beliefs impact performance on the Libet
> > Tasks?
>
> Their realisers could.

Not sure what you mean. Either a person's beliefs can change their
behavior or not. Since we know that they can, that means that the
semantic content of a person's mind is causally efficacious, and not
just a spectatorship that seems like it is participatory (for some
unexplainable reason).

>
> > > > > You might
> > > > > want to call that "meaningless", but that is just your juedgment.
>
> > > > Your choice to deny free will is an assertion of your power to choose
> > > > freely what to deny and what to accept.
>
> > > i don't deny FW. But if I did, I might be doing so deterministically.
>
> > Why would you be determined to have an opinion one way or another
> > about something that would be inconceivable?
>
> It wouldn't be inconceivable, just naturally impossible.

Someone on Quora put it nicely:
"Acceptance requires free will. Non acceptance requires free will. Any
argument for determinism is a performative contradiction since
argumentation presupposes a preference for truth over falsehood and is
aimed at the acceptance of truth."

Craig

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