On Apr 4, 6:09 am, 1Z <[email protected]> wrote: > On Apr 3, 4:54 pm, Craig Weinberg <[email protected]> wrote:
> > > That too, but specifically the feeling of free will is impossible to > > account for in a purely deterministic universe. > > No. In a deterministic universe that can account for feelings, > you can have any feeling, including a feeling of FW. What makes you think that you can have any feeling? How can a deterministic universe account for feelings at all? > > > > > > > > > > >"I feel like I am > > choosing what to write here" cannot be expressed in a d-universe. What > > is 'I feel'? What is 'choosing'? It is to suggest that you feel you > > are always drawing circles in a strictly rectilinear universe. Even > > the suggestion of a circle is impossible, whether or not the circle > > can be drawn. > > > > >There is no > > > > mechanical reason that a machine should have any kind of experience at > > > > all, let alone an experience that allows it to conceive of something > > > > like 'control'. The fact that we can conceive of free will in any way > > > > doesn't make sense in a universe that lacks the possibility of it. > > > > It makes perfect sense, since we can obviously conceive of > > > things that aren't possible. > > > We can't conceive of a square circle. > > Which is a logical impossibiility. But > we can conceive of natural impossibilities, > like perpetual motion machines. That's my point, in a deterministic universe, free will is a logical impossibility; even more inconceivable than a square circle since with free will not existing at all, there could be no alternative to the square at all. > > > We can't conceive of the > > opposite of fghwiortjy4p5oyj. We can conceive of things that are, to > > our knowledge not physically possible, > > So returning to: > "The fact that we can conceive of free will in any way > doesn't make sense in a universe that lacks the possibility of it." > what you meant was: We can conceive of FW,so FW is conceivable. > However, that doesn;t mean it is "possible in OUR universe" becuase > "possible in OUR universe" means "possible according to OUR laws > of nature". FW might be a liogical possibility but natural > impossibility, like a perpetual motion machine. Right. But the fact that it is a logical possibility would make no sense in a deterministic universe. > > > but we cannot conceive of > > anything which is inconceivable - which is what free will would be in > > a deterministic universe. > > No, that doesn't follow at all. A deterministic universe > is one where indeterministic free will is naturally impossible. > THat has nothing to do with conceivability. Why not? > > >That is what awareness would be to a > > mechanistic universe. > > > > But you are shifting around between > > > determinism, > > > feelings/qualia and concepts here. > > > How so? > > Re-read what you wrote. I don't need to. I know that I'm not shifting anything around. If you can't defend your accusation then I'm not interested in it. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > If I have an experience of making decisions, then how would > > > > > > believing > > > > > > that experience is real or an illusion have the effect that we see > > > > > > on > > > > > > readiness? > > > > > > huh? readiness? > > > > > Yes, it's the measurement used in the Libet Task > > > > >http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin_Libet#Volitional_acts_and_readi... > > > > > The experiment that I'm talking about showed that the Libet Task was > > > > influenced by exposure to anti-free will > > > > ideas.http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/21515737 > > > > >http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-btvqkJpN24s/TdTMLu2VNpI/AAAAAAAAB4o/215peLP... > > > > > > > Readiness is measurable. Being influenced by the nonsense idea of > > > > > > illusory free will impacts performance negatively. If free will were > > > > > > truly an illusion, there could be no possibility of our belief in it > > > > > > (belief being something which is only meaningful if it pertains to > > > > > > contributing to making choices using free will) > > > > > > So you say. Beliefs can influence deterministic decisions. > > > > > It's the published study that is saying it. If there were no free > > > > will, beliefs would be determined so it wouldn't make sense to say > > > > that they could influence anything. > > > > It would, but not the same kind of sense. One cogwheel > > > can determine another...but not freely determine another. > > > But why would it serve any cogwheel to believe that it was freely > > determining another, > > It wouldn't have to "serve" it. It would deteminsitically > believe what it was determined to believe. Why would it believe anything? > > and how could such a belief measurably improve > > its performance in actually determining another? > > One mechanism can do someting to another > that improves its performance. A oil-dispenser > could automatically lubricate a piece of clockwork. But the beliefs or an oil dispenser cannot influence its performance. > > >You are focusing on > > the 'free' part of FW - which is beside the point. > > Clearly not, or there would be no problem with > determinism. Not sure what you mean. > > > It's the 'will' > > part that violates determinism from the beginning. 'Free' is merely a > > qualitative extension of will - a description of the extent to which > > the self experiences or senses the potential for its own autonomy. > > So you say. A lot of peopel think it means actual indterministic > freedom. I agree, but I don't think that. > > > Just as technology may hold tremendous promise for intelligence, human > > potential may hold equally tremendous promise toward something > > approximating 'truly free' will. > > ???? Machines improve, so we improve ourselves by using them. What is the point ultimately of any machine other than to free our will to pursue more voluntary pursuits? > > > > > Belief could only be an > > > > epiphenomenon. > > > > So? > > > So how could epiphenomenal beliefs impact performance on the Libet > > Tasks? > > Their realisers could. Not sure what you mean. Either a person's beliefs can change their behavior or not. Since we know that they can, that means that the semantic content of a person's mind is causally efficacious, and not just a spectatorship that seems like it is participatory (for some unexplainable reason). > > > > > > You might > > > > > want to call that "meaningless", but that is just your juedgment. > > > > > Your choice to deny free will is an assertion of your power to choose > > > > freely what to deny and what to accept. > > > > i don't deny FW. But if I did, I might be doing so deterministically. > > > Why would you be determined to have an opinion one way or another > > about something that would be inconceivable? > > It wouldn't be inconceivable, just naturally impossible. Someone on Quora put it nicely: "Acceptance requires free will. Non acceptance requires free will. Any argument for determinism is a performative contradiction since argumentation presupposes a preference for truth over falsehood and is aimed at the acceptance of truth." Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
