On Apr 2, 2:12 pm, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> On Apr 2, 6:02 pm, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
> > On Apr 2, 12:03 pm, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
> > > On 4/2/2012 7:14 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> > > >>> If all movement was involuntary in the
> > > >>> > > first place then there would be no significant difference
> > > >>> > between
> > > >>> > > passively watching yourself move and passively watching
> > > >>> > yourself not
> > > >>> > > move
> > > >>> > > If we had no free will, our belief about it should have no
> > > >>> > effect on
> > > >>> > > the actual ability to execute our wishes though our motor
> > > >>> > cortex.
> > > >> > Non sequitur.
> > > > Why? If you program a machine to believe that it has free will, how
> > > > would such a belief have any effect on its behavior? How could it
> > > > improve its performance in any way?
> > > If you program a machine to form explanatory and predictive models of the
> > > world, then it
> > > will try to form a model of itself. But it would be difficult and
> > > extremely wasteful,
> > > from a survival standpoint, to provide it the introspective data
> > > necessary to model its
> > > own physical internal decision processes. Failing to have this
> > > introspection it may come
> > > to foolishly believe in something it calls 'free will'.
> > Why would there be an experience associated with any decision
> > processes and how would that experience not be free will?
> It *could* not be free will because FW is a capacity, not a feeling,
> and feeling you have the capacity doens;t mean you actually
> have. Feelings can be wrong.
We may interpret the meanings of our feelings as right or wrong, but
the experience that we can feel at all cannot be wrong. My argument
has never been that since we feel that we have free will that must
reflect an objective truth. My argument is that the existence of the
feeling of free will alone, whether it is 'true' or not is enough to
falsify any worldview which is purely deterministic. There is no
mechanical reason that a machine should have any kind of experience at
all, let alone an experience that allows it to conceive of something
like 'control'. The fact that we can conceive of free will in any way
doesn't make sense in a universe that lacks the possibility of it.
> > If I have an experience of making decisions, then how would believing
> > that experience is real or an illusion have the effect that we see on
> > readiness?
> huh? readiness?
Yes, it's the measurement used in the Libet Task
The experiment that I'm talking about showed that the Libet Task was
influenced by exposure to anti-free will ideas.
> > Readiness is measurable. Being influenced by the nonsense idea of
> > illusory free will impacts performance negatively. If free will were
> > truly an illusion, there could be no possibility of our belief in it
> > (belief being something which is only meaningful if it pertains to
> > contributing to making choices using free will)
> So you say. Beliefs can influence deterministic decisions.
It's the published study that is saying it. If there were no free
will, beliefs would be determined so it wouldn't make sense to say
that they could influence anything. Belief could only be an
> You might
> want to call that "meaningless", but that is just your juedgment.
Your choice to deny free will is an assertion of your power to choose
freely what to deny and what to accept.
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