On Apr 3, 4:54 pm, Craig Weinberg <[email protected]> wrote: > On Apr 3, 5:04 am, 1Z <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > On Apr 2, 9:39 pm, Craig Weinberg <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Apr 2, 2:12 pm, 1Z <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > > On Apr 2, 6:02 pm, Craig Weinberg <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > > > On Apr 2, 12:03 pm, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > > > > On 4/2/2012 7:14 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > > > > > >>> If all movement was involuntary in the > > > > > > >>> > > first place then there would be no significant difference > > > > > > >>> > between > > > > > > >>> > > passively watching yourself move and passively watching > > > > > > >>> > yourself not > > > > > > >>> > > move > > > > > > > >>> > > If we had no free will, our belief about it should have > > > > > > >>> > no effect on > > > > > > >>> > > the actual ability to execute our wishes though our motor > > > > > > >>> > cortex. > > > > > > > >> > Non sequitur. > > > > > > > Why? If you program a machine to believe that it has free will, > > > > > > > how > > > > > > > would such a belief have any effect on its behavior? How could it > > > > > > > improve its performance in any way? > > > > > > > If you program a machine to form explanatory and predictive models > > > > > > of the world, then it > > > > > > will try to form a model of itself. But it would be difficult and > > > > > > extremely wasteful, > > > > > > from a survival standpoint, to provide it the introspective data > > > > > > necessary to model its > > > > > > own physical internal decision processes. Failing to have this > > > > > > introspection it may come > > > > > > to foolishly believe in something it calls 'free will'. > > > > > > Why would there be an experience associated with any decision > > > > > processes and how would that experience not be free will? > > > > > It *could* not be free will because FW is a capacity, not a feeling, > > > > and feeling you have the capacity doens;t mean you actually > > > > have. Feelings can be wrong. > > > > We may interpret the meanings of our feelings as right or wrong, but > > > the experience that we can feel at all cannot be wrong. My argument > > > has never been that since we feel that we have free will that must > > > reflect an objective truth. My argument is that the existence of the > > > feeling of free will alone, whether it is 'true' or not is enough to > > > falsify any worldview which is purely deterministic. > > > The correct logic would be that it falsifies any worldview, > > deterministic or not, that is not able to account for > > feelings. > > That too, but specifically the feeling of free will is impossible to > account for in a purely deterministic universe.
No. In a deterministic universe that can account for feelings, you can have any feeling, including a feeling of FW. >"I feel like I am > choosing what to write here" cannot be expressed in a d-universe. What > is 'I feel'? What is 'choosing'? It is to suggest that you feel you > are always drawing circles in a strictly rectilinear universe. Even > the suggestion of a circle is impossible, whether or not the circle > can be drawn. > > > > > >There is no > > > mechanical reason that a machine should have any kind of experience at > > > all, let alone an experience that allows it to conceive of something > > > like 'control'. The fact that we can conceive of free will in any way > > > doesn't make sense in a universe that lacks the possibility of it. > > > It makes perfect sense, since we can obviously conceive of > > things that aren't possible. > > We can't conceive of a square circle. Which is a logical impossibiility. But we can conceive of natural impossibilities, like perpetual motion machines. > We can't conceive of the > opposite of fghwiortjy4p5oyj. We can conceive of things that are, to > our knowledge not physically possible, So returning to: "The fact that we can conceive of free will in any way doesn't make sense in a universe that lacks the possibility of it." what you meant was: We can conceive of FW,so FW is conceivable. However, that doesn;t mean it is "possible in OUR universe" becuase "possible in OUR universe" means "possible according to OUR laws of nature". FW might be a liogical possibility but natural impossibility, like a perpetual motion machine. > but we cannot conceive of > anything which is inconceivable - which is what free will would be in > a deterministic universe. No, that doesn't follow at all. A deterministic universe is one where indeterministic free will is naturally impossible. THat has nothing to do with conceivability. >That is what awareness would be to a > mechanistic universe. > > > But you are shifting around between > > determinism, > > feelings/qualia and concepts here. > > How so? Re-read what you wrote. > > > > > > If I have an experience of making decisions, then how would believing > > > > > that experience is real or an illusion have the effect that we see on > > > > > readiness? > > > > > huh? readiness? > > > > Yes, it's the measurement used in the Libet Task > > > >http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin_Libet#Volitional_acts_and_readi... > > > > The experiment that I'm talking about showed that the Libet Task was > > > influenced by exposure to anti-free will > > > ideas.http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/21515737 > > > >http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-btvqkJpN24s/TdTMLu2VNpI/AAAAAAAAB4o/215peLP... > > > > > > Readiness is measurable. Being influenced by the nonsense idea of > > > > > illusory free will impacts performance negatively. If free will were > > > > > truly an illusion, there could be no possibility of our belief in it > > > > > (belief being something which is only meaningful if it pertains to > > > > > contributing to making choices using free will) > > > > > So you say. Beliefs can influence deterministic decisions. > > > > It's the published study that is saying it. If there were no free > > > will, beliefs would be determined so it wouldn't make sense to say > > > that they could influence anything. > > > It would, but not the same kind of sense. One cogwheel > > can determine another...but not freely determine another. > > But why would it serve any cogwheel to believe that it was freely > determining another, It wouldn't have to "serve" it. It would deteminsitically believe what it was determined to believe. > and how could such a belief measurably improve > its performance in actually determining another? One mechanism can do someting to another that improves its performance. A oil-dispenser could automatically lubricate a piece of clockwork. >You are focusing on > the 'free' part of FW - which is beside the point. Clearly not, or there would be no problem with determinism. > It's the 'will' > part that violates determinism from the beginning. 'Free' is merely a > qualitative extension of will - a description of the extent to which > the self experiences or senses the potential for its own autonomy. So you say. A lot of peopel think it means actual indterministic freedom. > Just as technology may hold tremendous promise for intelligence, human > potential may hold equally tremendous promise toward something > approximating 'truly free' will. ???? > > > Belief could only be an > > > epiphenomenon. > > > So? > > So how could epiphenomenal beliefs impact performance on the Libet > Tasks? Their realisers could. > > > > You might > > > > want to call that "meaningless", but that is just your juedgment. > > > > Your choice to deny free will is an assertion of your power to choose > > > freely what to deny and what to accept. > > > i don't deny FW. But if I did, I might be doing so deterministically. > > Why would you be determined to have an opinion one way or another > about something that would be inconceivable? It wouldn't be inconceivable, just naturally impossible. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
