On Apr 3, 4:54 pm, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Apr 3, 5:04 am, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
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> > On Apr 2, 9:39 pm, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
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> > > On Apr 2, 2:12 pm, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> > > > On Apr 2, 6:02 pm, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > > > > On Apr 2, 12:03 pm, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
>
> > > > > > On 4/2/2012 7:14 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> > > > > > >>> If all movement was involuntary in the
> > > > > > >>> >  >  first place then there would be no significant difference 
> > > > > > >>> > between
> > > > > > >>> >  >  passively watching yourself move and passively watching 
> > > > > > >>> > yourself not
> > > > > > >>> >  >  move
>
> > > > > > >>> >  >  If we had no free will, our belief about it should have 
> > > > > > >>> > no effect on
> > > > > > >>> >  >  the actual ability to execute our wishes though our motor 
> > > > > > >>> > cortex.
>
> > > > > > >> >  Non sequitur.
> > > > > > > Why? If you program a machine to believe that it has free will, 
> > > > > > > how
> > > > > > > would such a belief have any effect on its behavior? How could it
> > > > > > > improve its performance in any way?
>
> > > > > > If you program a machine to form explanatory and predictive models 
> > > > > > of the world, then it
> > > > > > will try to form a model of itself.  But it would be difficult and 
> > > > > > extremely wasteful,
> > > > > > from a survival standpoint, to provide it the introspective data 
> > > > > > necessary to model its
> > > > > > own physical internal decision processes.  Failing to have this 
> > > > > > introspection it may come
> > > > > > to foolishly believe in something it calls 'free will'.
>
> > > > > Why would there be an experience associated with any decision
> > > > > processes and how would that experience not be free will?
>
> > > > It *could* not be free will because FW is a capacity, not a feeling,
> > > > and feeling you have the capacity doens;t mean you actually
> > > > have. Feelings can be wrong.
>
> > > We may interpret the meanings of our feelings as right or wrong, but
> > > the experience that we can feel at all cannot be wrong. My argument
> > > has never been that since we feel that we have free will that must
> > > reflect an objective truth. My argument is that the existence of the
> > > feeling of free will alone, whether it is 'true' or not is enough to
> > > falsify any worldview which is purely deterministic.
>
> > The correct logic would be that it falsifies any worldview,
> > deterministic or not, that is not able to account for
> > feelings.
>
> That too, but specifically the feeling of free will is impossible to
> account for in a purely deterministic universe.

No. In a deterministic universe that can account for feelings,
you can have any feeling, including a feeling of FW.

>"I feel like I am
> choosing what to write here" cannot be expressed in a d-universe. What
> is 'I feel'? What is 'choosing'? It is to suggest that you feel you
> are always drawing circles in a strictly rectilinear universe. Even
> the suggestion of a circle is impossible, whether or not the circle
> can be drawn.
>
>
>
> > >There is no
> > > mechanical reason that a machine should have any kind of experience at
> > > all, let alone an experience that allows it to conceive of something
> > > like 'control'. The fact that we can conceive of free will in any way
> > > doesn't make sense in a universe that lacks the possibility of it.
>
> > It makes perfect sense, since we can obviously conceive of
> > things that aren't possible.
>
> We can't conceive of a square circle.

Which is a logical impossibiility. But
we can conceive of natural impossibilities,
like perpetual motion machines.

> We can't conceive of the
> opposite of fghwiortjy4p5oyj. We can conceive of things that are, to
> our knowledge not physically possible,

So returning to:
"The fact that we can conceive of free will in any way
 doesn't make sense in a universe that lacks the possibility of it."
what you meant was: We can conceive of FW,so FW is conceivable.
However, that doesn;t mean it is "possible in OUR universe" becuase
"possible in OUR universe" means "possible according to OUR laws
of nature". FW might be a liogical possibility but natural
impossibility, like a perpetual motion machine.

> but we cannot conceive of
> anything which is inconceivable - which is what free will would be in
> a deterministic universe.

No, that doesn't follow at all. A deterministic universe
is one where indeterministic free will is naturally impossible.
THat has nothing to do with conceivability.

>That is what awareness would be to a
> mechanistic universe.
>
> > But you are shifting around between
> > determinism,
> > feelings/qualia and concepts here.
>
> How so?

Re-read what you wrote.

>
> > > > > If I have an experience of making decisions, then how would believing
> > > > > that experience is real or an illusion have the effect that we see on
> > > > > readiness?
>
> > > > huh? readiness?
>
> > > Yes, it's the measurement used in the Libet Task
>
> > >http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin_Libet#Volitional_acts_and_readi...
>
> > > The experiment that I'm talking about showed that the Libet Task was
> > > influenced by exposure to anti-free will 
> > > ideas.http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/21515737
>
> > >http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-btvqkJpN24s/TdTMLu2VNpI/AAAAAAAAB4o/215peLP...
>
> > > > > Readiness is measurable. Being influenced by the nonsense idea of
> > > > > illusory free will impacts performance negatively. If free will were
> > > > > truly an illusion, there could be no possibility of our belief in it
> > > > > (belief being something which is only meaningful if it pertains to
> > > > > contributing to making choices using free will)
>
> > > > So you say. Beliefs can influence deterministic decisions.
>
> > > It's the published study that is saying it. If there were no free
> > > will, beliefs would be determined so it wouldn't make sense to say
> > > that they could influence anything.
>
> > It would, but not the same kind of sense. One cogwheel
> > can determine another...but not freely determine another.
>
> But why would it serve any cogwheel to believe that it was freely
> determining another,

It wouldn't have to "serve" it. It would deteminsitically
believe what it was determined to believe.

> and how could such a belief measurably improve
> its performance in actually determining another?

One mechanism can do someting to another
that improves its performance. A oil-dispenser
could automatically lubricate a piece of clockwork.

>You are focusing on
> the 'free' part of FW - which is beside the point.

Clearly not, or there would be no problem with
determinism.

> It's the 'will'
> part that violates determinism from the beginning. 'Free' is merely a
> qualitative extension of will - a description of the extent to which
> the self experiences or senses the potential for its own autonomy.

So you say. A lot of peopel think it means actual indterministic
freedom.

> Just as technology may hold tremendous promise for intelligence, human
> potential may hold equally tremendous promise toward something
> approximating 'truly free' will.

????

> > > Belief could only be an
> > > epiphenomenon.
>
> > So?
>
> So how could epiphenomenal beliefs impact performance on the Libet
> Tasks?

Their realisers could.

> > > > You might
> > > > want to call that "meaningless", but that is just your juedgment.
>
> > > Your choice to deny free will is an assertion of your power to choose
> > > freely what to deny and what to accept.
>
> > i don't deny FW. But if I did, I might be doing so deterministically.
>
> Why would you be determined to have an opinion one way or another
> about something that would be inconceivable?

It wouldn't be inconceivable, just naturally impossible.

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