On Apr 3, 4:54 pm, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Apr 3, 5:04 am, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> > On Apr 2, 9:39 pm, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
> > > On Apr 2, 2:12 pm, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> > > > On Apr 2, 6:02 pm, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
> > > > > On Apr 2, 12:03 pm, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
> > > > > > On 4/2/2012 7:14 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> > > > > > >>> If all movement was involuntary in the
> > > > > > >>> > > first place then there would be no significant difference
> > > > > > >>> > between
> > > > > > >>> > > passively watching yourself move and passively watching
> > > > > > >>> > yourself not
> > > > > > >>> > > move
> > > > > > >>> > > If we had no free will, our belief about it should have
> > > > > > >>> > no effect on
> > > > > > >>> > > the actual ability to execute our wishes though our motor
> > > > > > >>> > cortex.
> > > > > > >> > Non sequitur.
> > > > > > > Why? If you program a machine to believe that it has free will,
> > > > > > > how
> > > > > > > would such a belief have any effect on its behavior? How could it
> > > > > > > improve its performance in any way?
> > > > > > If you program a machine to form explanatory and predictive models
> > > > > > of the world, then it
> > > > > > will try to form a model of itself. But it would be difficult and
> > > > > > extremely wasteful,
> > > > > > from a survival standpoint, to provide it the introspective data
> > > > > > necessary to model its
> > > > > > own physical internal decision processes. Failing to have this
> > > > > > introspection it may come
> > > > > > to foolishly believe in something it calls 'free will'.
> > > > > Why would there be an experience associated with any decision
> > > > > processes and how would that experience not be free will?
> > > > It *could* not be free will because FW is a capacity, not a feeling,
> > > > and feeling you have the capacity doens;t mean you actually
> > > > have. Feelings can be wrong.
> > > We may interpret the meanings of our feelings as right or wrong, but
> > > the experience that we can feel at all cannot be wrong. My argument
> > > has never been that since we feel that we have free will that must
> > > reflect an objective truth. My argument is that the existence of the
> > > feeling of free will alone, whether it is 'true' or not is enough to
> > > falsify any worldview which is purely deterministic.
> > The correct logic would be that it falsifies any worldview,
> > deterministic or not, that is not able to account for
> > feelings.
> That too, but specifically the feeling of free will is impossible to
> account for in a purely deterministic universe.
No. In a deterministic universe that can account for feelings,
you can have any feeling, including a feeling of FW.
>"I feel like I am
> choosing what to write here" cannot be expressed in a d-universe. What
> is 'I feel'? What is 'choosing'? It is to suggest that you feel you
> are always drawing circles in a strictly rectilinear universe. Even
> the suggestion of a circle is impossible, whether or not the circle
> can be drawn.
> > >There is no
> > > mechanical reason that a machine should have any kind of experience at
> > > all, let alone an experience that allows it to conceive of something
> > > like 'control'. The fact that we can conceive of free will in any way
> > > doesn't make sense in a universe that lacks the possibility of it.
> > It makes perfect sense, since we can obviously conceive of
> > things that aren't possible.
> We can't conceive of a square circle.
Which is a logical impossibiility. But
we can conceive of natural impossibilities,
like perpetual motion machines.
> We can't conceive of the
> opposite of fghwiortjy4p5oyj. We can conceive of things that are, to
> our knowledge not physically possible,
So returning to:
"The fact that we can conceive of free will in any way
doesn't make sense in a universe that lacks the possibility of it."
what you meant was: We can conceive of FW,so FW is conceivable.
However, that doesn;t mean it is "possible in OUR universe" becuase
"possible in OUR universe" means "possible according to OUR laws
of nature". FW might be a liogical possibility but natural
impossibility, like a perpetual motion machine.
> but we cannot conceive of
> anything which is inconceivable - which is what free will would be in
> a deterministic universe.
No, that doesn't follow at all. A deterministic universe
is one where indeterministic free will is naturally impossible.
THat has nothing to do with conceivability.
>That is what awareness would be to a
> mechanistic universe.
> > But you are shifting around between
> > determinism,
> > feelings/qualia and concepts here.
> How so?
Re-read what you wrote.
> > > > > If I have an experience of making decisions, then how would believing
> > > > > that experience is real or an illusion have the effect that we see on
> > > > > readiness?
> > > > huh? readiness?
> > > Yes, it's the measurement used in the Libet Task
> > >http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin_Libet#Volitional_acts_and_readi...
> > > The experiment that I'm talking about showed that the Libet Task was
> > > influenced by exposure to anti-free will
> > > ideas.http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/21515737
> > >http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-btvqkJpN24s/TdTMLu2VNpI/AAAAAAAAB4o/215peLP...
> > > > > Readiness is measurable. Being influenced by the nonsense idea of
> > > > > illusory free will impacts performance negatively. If free will were
> > > > > truly an illusion, there could be no possibility of our belief in it
> > > > > (belief being something which is only meaningful if it pertains to
> > > > > contributing to making choices using free will)
> > > > So you say. Beliefs can influence deterministic decisions.
> > > It's the published study that is saying it. If there were no free
> > > will, beliefs would be determined so it wouldn't make sense to say
> > > that they could influence anything.
> > It would, but not the same kind of sense. One cogwheel
> > can determine another...but not freely determine another.
> But why would it serve any cogwheel to believe that it was freely
> determining another,
It wouldn't have to "serve" it. It would deteminsitically
believe what it was determined to believe.
> and how could such a belief measurably improve
> its performance in actually determining another?
One mechanism can do someting to another
that improves its performance. A oil-dispenser
could automatically lubricate a piece of clockwork.
>You are focusing on
> the 'free' part of FW - which is beside the point.
Clearly not, or there would be no problem with
> It's the 'will'
> part that violates determinism from the beginning. 'Free' is merely a
> qualitative extension of will - a description of the extent to which
> the self experiences or senses the potential for its own autonomy.
So you say. A lot of peopel think it means actual indterministic
> Just as technology may hold tremendous promise for intelligence, human
> potential may hold equally tremendous promise toward something
> approximating 'truly free' will.
> > > Belief could only be an
> > > epiphenomenon.
> > So?
> So how could epiphenomenal beliefs impact performance on the Libet
Their realisers could.
> > > > You might
> > > > want to call that "meaningless", but that is just your juedgment.
> > > Your choice to deny free will is an assertion of your power to choose
> > > freely what to deny and what to accept.
> > i don't deny FW. But if I did, I might be doing so deterministically.
> Why would you be determined to have an opinion one way or another
> about something that would be inconceivable?
It wouldn't be inconceivable, just naturally impossible.
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