On Apr 2, 9:39 pm, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Apr 2, 2:12 pm, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> > On Apr 2, 6:02 pm, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
> > > On Apr 2, 12:03 pm, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
> > > > On 4/2/2012 7:14 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> > > > >>> If all movement was involuntary in the
> > > > >>> > > first place then there would be no significant difference
> > > > >>> > between
> > > > >>> > > passively watching yourself move and passively watching
> > > > >>> > yourself not
> > > > >>> > > move
> > > > >>> > > If we had no free will, our belief about it should have no
> > > > >>> > effect on
> > > > >>> > > the actual ability to execute our wishes though our motor
> > > > >>> > cortex.
> > > > >> > Non sequitur.
> > > > > Why? If you program a machine to believe that it has free will, how
> > > > > would such a belief have any effect on its behavior? How could it
> > > > > improve its performance in any way?
> > > > If you program a machine to form explanatory and predictive models of
> > > > the world, then it
> > > > will try to form a model of itself. But it would be difficult and
> > > > extremely wasteful,
> > > > from a survival standpoint, to provide it the introspective data
> > > > necessary to model its
> > > > own physical internal decision processes. Failing to have this
> > > > introspection it may come
> > > > to foolishly believe in something it calls 'free will'.
> > > Why would there be an experience associated with any decision
> > > processes and how would that experience not be free will?
> > It *could* not be free will because FW is a capacity, not a feeling,
> > and feeling you have the capacity doens;t mean you actually
> > have. Feelings can be wrong.
> We may interpret the meanings of our feelings as right or wrong, but
> the experience that we can feel at all cannot be wrong. My argument
> has never been that since we feel that we have free will that must
> reflect an objective truth. My argument is that the existence of the
> feeling of free will alone, whether it is 'true' or not is enough to
> falsify any worldview which is purely deterministic.
The correct logic would be that it falsifies any worldview,
deterministic or not, that is not able to account for
>There is no
> mechanical reason that a machine should have any kind of experience at
> all, let alone an experience that allows it to conceive of something
> like 'control'. The fact that we can conceive of free will in any way
> doesn't make sense in a universe that lacks the possibility of it.
It makes perfect sense, since we can obviously conceive of
things that aren't possible. But you are shifting around between
feelings/qualia and concepts here.
> > > If I have an experience of making decisions, then how would believing
> > > that experience is real or an illusion have the effect that we see on
> > > readiness?
> > huh? readiness?
> Yes, it's the measurement used in the Libet Task
> The experiment that I'm talking about showed that the Libet Task was
> influenced by exposure to anti-free will
> > > Readiness is measurable. Being influenced by the nonsense idea of
> > > illusory free will impacts performance negatively. If free will were
> > > truly an illusion, there could be no possibility of our belief in it
> > > (belief being something which is only meaningful if it pertains to
> > > contributing to making choices using free will)
> > So you say. Beliefs can influence deterministic decisions.
> It's the published study that is saying it. If there were no free
> will, beliefs would be determined so it wouldn't make sense to say
> that they could influence anything.
It would, but not the same kind of sense. One cogwheel
can determine another...but not freely determine another.
> Belief could only be an
> > You might
> > want to call that "meaningless", but that is just your juedgment.
> Your choice to deny free will is an assertion of your power to choose
> freely what to deny and what to accept.
i don't deny FW. But if I did, I might be doing so deterministically.
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