On Apr 2, 9:39 pm, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote: > On Apr 2, 2:12 pm, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > On Apr 2, 6:02 pm, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote: > > > > On Apr 2, 12:03 pm, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: > > > > > On 4/2/2012 7:14 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > > > >>> If all movement was involuntary in the > > > > >>> > > first place then there would be no significant difference > > > > >>> > between > > > > >>> > > passively watching yourself move and passively watching > > > > >>> > yourself not > > > > >>> > > move > > > > > >>> > > If we had no free will, our belief about it should have no > > > > >>> > effect on > > > > >>> > > the actual ability to execute our wishes though our motor > > > > >>> > cortex. > > > > > >> > Non sequitur. > > > > > Why? If you program a machine to believe that it has free will, how > > > > > would such a belief have any effect on its behavior? How could it > > > > > improve its performance in any way? > > > > > If you program a machine to form explanatory and predictive models of > > > > the world, then it > > > > will try to form a model of itself. But it would be difficult and > > > > extremely wasteful, > > > > from a survival standpoint, to provide it the introspective data > > > > necessary to model its > > > > own physical internal decision processes. Failing to have this > > > > introspection it may come > > > > to foolishly believe in something it calls 'free will'. > > > > Why would there be an experience associated with any decision > > > processes and how would that experience not be free will? > > > It *could* not be free will because FW is a capacity, not a feeling, > > and feeling you have the capacity doens;t mean you actually > > have. Feelings can be wrong. > > We may interpret the meanings of our feelings as right or wrong, but > the experience that we can feel at all cannot be wrong. My argument > has never been that since we feel that we have free will that must > reflect an objective truth. My argument is that the existence of the > feeling of free will alone, whether it is 'true' or not is enough to > falsify any worldview which is purely deterministic.
The correct logic would be that it falsifies any worldview, deterministic or not, that is not able to account for feelings. >There is no > mechanical reason that a machine should have any kind of experience at > all, let alone an experience that allows it to conceive of something > like 'control'. The fact that we can conceive of free will in any way > doesn't make sense in a universe that lacks the possibility of it. It makes perfect sense, since we can obviously conceive of things that aren't possible. But you are shifting around between determinism, feelings/qualia and concepts here. > > > > If I have an experience of making decisions, then how would believing > > > that experience is real or an illusion have the effect that we see on > > > readiness? > > > huh? readiness? > > Yes, it's the measurement used in the Libet Task > > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin_Libet#Volitional_acts_and_readi... > > The experiment that I'm talking about showed that the Libet Task was > influenced by exposure to anti-free will > ideas.http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/21515737 > > http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-btvqkJpN24s/TdTMLu2VNpI/AAAAAAAAB4o/215peLP... > > > > > > Readiness is measurable. Being influenced by the nonsense idea of > > > illusory free will impacts performance negatively. If free will were > > > truly an illusion, there could be no possibility of our belief in it > > > (belief being something which is only meaningful if it pertains to > > > contributing to making choices using free will) > > > So you say. Beliefs can influence deterministic decisions. > > It's the published study that is saying it. If there were no free > will, beliefs would be determined so it wouldn't make sense to say > that they could influence anything. It would, but not the same kind of sense. One cogwheel can determine another...but not freely determine another. > Belief could only be an > epiphenomenon. So? > > You might > > want to call that "meaningless", but that is just your juedgment. > > Your choice to deny free will is an assertion of your power to choose > freely what to deny and what to accept. i don't deny FW. But if I did, I might be doing so deterministically. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to email@example.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.