On Sat, May 19, 2012 at 1:03 AM, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
>> You haven't understood a basic point, which is important independently >> of the current discussion. This point is that if we live in a >> perfectly deterministic multiverse, our subjective experience will be >> probabilistic. This is because it is impossible for a being embedded >> in the multiverse to know in which branch he will end up. The >> impossibility is logical, not merely empirical. > > If I decide to type this sentence, the probability of both of us > ending up in a branch of the multiverse in which this sentence appears > before you on your screen is close to 100%. How does that work > exactly? > > Since I know that it will appear in both of our universes, not merely > logically or empirically but intuitively and unquestionably, does that > mean that MWI is cannot be viable? In a branching multiverse where all possibilities happen at a decision point, some versions of you decide to type the sentence and others do not. This could be completely deterministic for the multiverse as a whole: x versions of you will definitely type it, y versions of you will definitely not. However, from your point of view, you don't know which version of you you will experience, so your future is indeterminate / random / probabilistic, not deterministic. It's impossible - logically impossible, impossible even if you know every deterministic detail of the multiverse's future history - for you to know which version will be the "real" you, since all versions have equal claim to being the "real" you. This is a quite simple, but counterintuitive idea. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
