On Sat, May 19, 2012 at 1:03 AM, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
>> You haven't understood a basic point, which is important independently
>> of the current discussion. This point is that if we live in a
>> perfectly deterministic multiverse, our subjective experience will be
>> probabilistic. This is because it is impossible for a being embedded
>> in the multiverse to know in which branch he will end up. The
>> impossibility is logical, not merely empirical.
> If I decide to type this sentence, the probability of both of us
> ending up in a branch of the multiverse in which this sentence appears
> before you on your screen is close to 100%. How does that work
> Since I know that it will appear in both of our universes, not merely
> logically or empirically but intuitively and unquestionably, does that
> mean that MWI is cannot be viable?
In a branching multiverse where all possibilities happen at a decision
point, some versions of you decide to type the sentence and others do
not. This could be completely deterministic for the multiverse as a
whole: x versions of you will definitely type it, y versions of you
will definitely not. However, from your point of view, you don't know
which version of you you will experience, so your future is
indeterminate / random / probabilistic, not deterministic. It's
impossible - logically impossible, impossible even if you know every
deterministic detail of the multiverse's future history - for you to
know which version will be the "real" you, since all versions have
equal claim to being the "real" you. This is a quite simple, but
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