On May 21, 7:44 pm, Stathis Papaioannou <stath...@gmail.com> wrote: > On Sun, May 20, 2012 at 4:00 AM, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote: > >> In a branching multiverse where all possibilities happen at a decision > >> point, some versions of you decide to type the sentence and others do > >> not. This could be completely deterministic for the multiverse as a > >> whole: x versions of you will definitely type it, y versions of you > >> will definitely not. > > > I understand the theory, but my example shows how that appears not to > > be the case, since my experience of intending to do something almost > > always results in an experience where I do what I intended. I can > > control the probability range that it will happen through the strength > > of my motive and the clarity of my sense. > > >> However, from your point of view, you don't know > >> which version of you you will experience, so your future is > >> indeterminate / random / probabilistic, not deterministic. > > > So you say. How much do you want to bet that I'm going to sleep in my > > bed tonight? How about for the rest of my life not including > > vacations? That's a lot of universe where I sleep under a bush or on > > the roof or in Jellystone Park. > > There is obviously at least a small probability that you will decide > to sleep under a bush tonight.
Only because of how we have defined probability and our assumptions about what it possible. There is nothing to say those definitions and assumptions relate to something real. > You would have to admit that under your > concept of free will, otherwise in a deterministic single universe you > would be compelled to sleep in your bed, which I don't have a problem > with but you do. In a deterministic multiverse, you will definitely > sleep in your bed in most universes (loosely "most" if they are > infinite in number) and definitely sleep under a bush in a few. You > can't be sure in which type of universe you will end up in so the > future is indeterminate. I understand the theory, and it would be interesting if we were in a theoretical universe, but ultimately it's absurd. It's Horton Hears A Who on crack. There would be a quintillion universes for every dust mite's turd's journey through the bed sheets. All it accomplishes is to find a way of arguing a way that everything in the universe is real except our own will is real. Somehow our ordinary experience is a magical exception because the idea of our decision making power makes us uncomfortable to explain. > > > > > > > > > > >> It's > >> impossible - logically impossible, impossible even if you know every > >> deterministic detail of the multiverse's future history - for you to > >> know which version will be the "real" you, since all versions have > >> equal claim to being the "real" you. This is a quite simple, but > >> counterintuitive idea. > > > No I understand the idea completely, I just think it's an obvious plug > > for the inconsistencies of QM. Like Dark matter dark energy, > > superposition, emergence, and entanglement. It's all phlogiston, > > libido, elan vital, animal magnetism, etc. It's quite nice in theory, > > but it sodomizes one side of Occam's Razor with the other. It's > > counter intuitive because it's an absurd way of explaining the > > universe in terms of nearly infinite nearly nonsensical universes. > > Every grain of sand on every planet in the cosmos having it's own set > > of universes customized to fit every pebble collision and sea tousled > > movement? Seriously? With sense as a primitive you don't need any of > > that. The universe is one thing with different views of itself. Each > > view doesn't need to be a creator of literal separate universes. > > Whether it's true or not is a separate question but it does allow for > your future to be truly indeterminate in a deterministic multiverse. > The teleportation thought experiments we often talk about here model > this in a simpler way. But it does it by neutralizing any significance of one outcome over another. Why do we care about determining anything if we have no power to change it? Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
