On May 17, 9:50 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> On 17 May 2012, at 14:21, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> > On May 17, 5:49 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> >> On 16 May 2012, at 17:37, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> >>> On May 16, 10:41 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> >>>> On 15 May 2012, at 19:44, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> >>>>> On May 15, 1:03 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> >>>>>>>> But a deterministic world, if rich enough to add and multiply,
> >>>>>>>> and
> >>>>>>>> thus to contain universal internal observers,  leads already to
> >>>>>>>> indeterminist first person realities (even without comp,
> >>>>>>>> although
> >>>>>>>> it
> >>>>>>>> is simpler to use comp to justify this).
> >>>>>>> If a wave washes one pile of sand onto another, thereby 'adding'
> >>>>>>> them
> >>>>>>> together, why does that generate universal internal observers?
> >>>>>> Adding is not enough. You need multiplication, and iteration.
> >>>>>> Then universal digital creatures appear, by logical consequences,
> >>>>>> and,
> >>>>>> as always, reflect themselves and all universal creatures,
> >>>>>> digital,
> >>>>>> and non digital, which leads them to harder and harder problems
> >>>>>> and
> >>>>>> questions.
> >>>>> Even if that's true, from where do they appear? To say they appear
> >>>>> is
> >>>>> to admit that they are not themselves contained within addition or
> >>>>> multiplication.
> >>>> They are. Anything Turing emulable appears, and reappears in
> >>>> arithmetic, related to bigger and bigger natural numbers.
> >>> The appearance is contingent though, upon something being able to
> >>> recognize the pattern which is appearing to them.
> >> That's correct. It is contingent of the universal number, and the
> >> universal numbers making the first one more relatively probable. But
> >> all that exist in arithmetic.
> > What are the properties of arithmetic contingent on?
> The idea is that such properties are not contingent.

That's still an idea though, ie sense. Sense doesn't need that
property since it can't be explained any other way. I can explain
arithmetic sense as a category of sense, but I can't explain sense as
a category of arithmetic unless you just tack it on and say it must be
part of the package inherently.

> You could take any universal system, instead of arithmetic. From the
> computability perspective, they are equivalent.

You can run over anything with a large enough steam roller and it will
be flat. If you don't use a computability perspective, they aren't

> >>> That pattern
> >>> recognition is not automatically guaranteed by any arithmetic logic.
> >> In your non-comp theory.
> >>> We need a physical machine that remembers that it can remember,
> >> That's "Bp -> BBp". Universal machine are like that.
> > Those are just letters and symbols. What or who makes them mean
> > something and why?
> Bp means that some universal machine utters p. Absolutely.
> Independently of you and me.

But not independently of the universal machine's sense-motive
experience. It has to be able to tell the difference between p and
something else and characterize the nature of that difference. It has
to have the motive power to 'utter', and something has to have the
sense receptivity to detect that something might have been uttered.
Otherwise there is no uttering.

> BBp means that the same universal machine now utters Bp.
> For any arithmetic (or equivalent) proposition, Bp > BBp, means that
> if that machine utters p, it will soon or later utters Bp.

So if I utter 'Toast is square', that means that eventually I will
utter 'I utter Toast is square' and then 'I utter I utter I utter I
utter Toast is squalre'?

> And that is
> a theorem of arithmetic, making it true independently of you and me.

I never argue that sense is dependent on human consciousness at all.
Sense is universal and literally older than time itself.

> >>> and
> >>> can experience that memory as an event. It needs to know what
> >>> kinds of
> >>> strings of remembered digits constitute a meaningful pattern, or
> >>> that
> >>> there could even be such a thing as a pattern. To say that patterns
> >>> appear and reappear in arithmetic takes the appearance of pattern
> >>> itself for granted, then usurps the primacy of the sense experience
> >>> which provides it.
> >> Not really, for it appears and reappears only in the mind of
> >> universal
> >> numbers. It makes sense for them, and indeed they will be astonished
> >> that apparent material can lead to that sense. But although locally
> >> true, this is globally wrong. Sense is necessarily a first person
> >> notion, and relies on the abstract but real configuration involving
> >> infinities of arithmetical relations.
> > I don't think sense is a first person notion, it is the very capacity
> > to define first person and third person as separate (opposite) on one
> > level, and united on another. Sense creates the arithmetical
> > relations, but not infinitely. Arithmetical relations are derived a
> > posteriori of sense embodiments.
> You confuse arithmetic and the human's apprehension of arithmetic.

Not at all. You are assuming that arithmetic is conceivable outside of
some kind of sense faculty and I don't see any reason to agree with
that. It doesn't have to be human apprehension at all, it could be
anything from a single atom to the totality of all mass-energy of the
cosmos as a single unit...or even some other sensible-but-real entity
beyond our ability to conceive through human sense. All of it has to
make sense in some way to some thing. Something has to detect

> > Sense generates the capacities,
> > intentions, symmetries, and rhythms that underlie recursive
> > enumeration, as well as frames the context of all sequence and
> > consequence. It all has to make sense.
> We need only the idea that a reality can exists beyond human sensing.

I'm fine with that, but no reality can exist beyond sense. Realism is
nothing but a category of sense.

> This is what I assume by making explicit the arithmetical realism, and
> that can be shown enough when we assume that we work locally as
> machine, at some description level.

Its circular reasoning though. If I assume I'm a machine, then I
define everything I do as being mechanical. So what? If I define
myself as a spirit, then I define the universe as a spiritual journey.
What's the difference? They are both equally tautological.

> As I already told you, to make this false, you need to build an
> explicit non computable and non Turing recoverable function having a
> genuine role for the mind.

I don't need to build it, I am living in it already, you just aren't
admitting that it is the case.

> This unfortunately only makes more complex
> both mind and matter, making your non-comp hypothesis looking like a
> construct for making impossible to reason in that field.

I would not even say I have a non-comp hypothesis, I have a meta-comp
conjecture :)

I don't disagree that it might make it impossible to reason in that
field, and because of that, we need other inside-out and upside-down
models (anthropomorphic, mechanemorphic, logomorphic, technemorphic)
to get to our blind spot, but that doesn't change the absolute truth
value of the sense model that encompasses them all, as well as the
relations among them.

> > Not everything has to make
> > numbers. Dizzy doesn't make numbers, but it makes sense.
> But numbers does not make only numbers. They make and develop sense
> for many things far more complex than numbers, that is the point.

How does it follow from numbers though that they necessarily develop
anything at all? You are suggesting that bytes are alive and do things
on their own, yet we have never seen that to be the case nor does it
make intuitive sense. If that were true, we should see that Bugs Bunny
is having new adventures behind our back on 60 year old celluloid
reels by now. The internet would be haunted by autonomous entities
that we should be looking for like SETI.

> Arithmetical truth itself is far beyond of numbers,

Why should that be and how could that be the case? At what point can
numbers no longer tolerate being numbers and suddenly become...what?
>From where?

> yet numbers can
> relatively develop some intuition about those kind of things.
> You just seems stuck in a reductionist conception of numbers and
> machines. We know such conception are wrong.

You confuse your conception of numbers with the reality of (non-human)
sense in general.

> > It is a
> > sensation that makes sense to an embodied animal, but not to a
> > computer.
> How could we know that? Why should we believe that?

Because we know that we have different channels of sense and we know
that it is not necessary for a computer to have multiple sense
channels, and that in fact, all data must be compiled into a one
dimensional binary stream. Our senses multiply the richness of our
experience, and even simple sensations like a circle quickly invite
imaginative elaboration. If a person is dizzy, they will complain. A
computer will never complain even if it is inside of a washing machine
that never turns off.

> >>>>> To say they are creatures implies a creation.
> >>>> Why not. You could say that they are created by the addition and
> >>>> multiplication laws. You need only to bet that 1+1=2 and alike does
> >>>> not depend on us.
> >>> Because there's no mathematical logic to how or why that creation
> >>> could occur.
> >> But there is.
> > What is it?
> That the existence of universal numbers, and their many dreams, is a
> consequence of logic and arithmetic.

Which is a consequence of sense and motive.

> >>> If we posit a universe of arithmetic realism, how can we
> >>> accept that it falls off a cliff when it comes to the arithmetic of
> >>> it's own origins? What makes 1+1=2? Sense.
> >> Truth.
> > Truth requires sense.
> Why?

How can something be determined to be true without something else
making sense of it as being true? It's like asking why water can't be
completely dehydrated and still feel wet.

> > Not everything that makes sense is true (fiction
> > for example), but everything that is true makes sense.
> For who?

For anyone or anything that can in some way experience it as true.

> >> Why do you want someone to assess the truth for something being
> >> true. That is anthropomorphic.
> > It's ontologically necessary. What is a truth without it being
> > detectable in some way to something?
> It is an unknown truth.

Unknown to us, but not unknown to its own context.

> A billion digit numbers can be prime without
> us being able to know it.

Sure, but if nothing is ever able to know it, then it isn't something
real, it's only an idea of what could be real.

> Some universal machine does not stop on some
> argument without anyone being able to prove or know it. Some pebble on
> some far away planet can be eroded without anyone knowing it.

Yes, I'm not talking about human knowledge. My hypothesis is
panexperiential. We see a pebble but what it is without us is a group
of atoms holding onto each other. It could be a purely tactile-kinetic-
acoustic awareness, or it could be an omniscient state of zen
paralysis. Maybe they experience something only when the status of
that holding changes, so a billion years goes by in ten seconds to
them, who knows. Maybe the pebble is only a fragment of star and the
whole solar system is the entity that lives a billion years in each
second. Lots of possibilities we can't even imagine...

> >> Th greek get well that point, and
> >> originate the whole scientific enterprise from there, as in the
> >> conclusion of this video:
> >>http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=69F7GhASOdM
> > Great video, but now you are the one anthropomorphizing. Just because
> > the released man doesn't create the outside world by seeing it doesn't
> > mean that the outside world can exist without being held together by
> > experienced sense relations on every level. My computer doesn't create
> > the internet, but that doesn't mean that the internet isn't created on
> > computers.
> But where the first observer come from?

"First" and "come from" are aspects of observerness. Observer is
primordial and absolute (totality/singularity).

> >> If not, it is the whole idea of a reality which makes no more sense,
> >> and we get solipsist or anthropomorphic.
> > That's where sense comes in. Sense divides the totality into
> > solipsistic/anthropomorphic and objective/mechanemorphic on one level,
> > but bleeds through that division on another level, thus creating a
> > diffracted continuum that oscillates through time but remains
> > continuous across space (and vice versa).
> Time and space, looks concrete, thanks to millions years of evolution,
> but are much more sophisticated notion than elementary addition and
> multiplication to me.

I use time and space to keep it simple. It is really the sense of
continuity and oscillating discontinuity itself which, when multiplied
by many subjects experiencing themselves objectively, gives rise to
the abstractions of space and time.

> > Numbers are a synthetic
> > analysis of that process, distilled to a nearly meaningless but nearly
> > omnipotent extreme of universality (qualitative flatness). Numbers are
> > the opposite of the solipsistic personal experience (qualitative depth
> > asymptotic to 'Selfness' itself). They are the least appropriate tools
> > to describe feeling.
> Atoms, fields, space, time seems as much.

I agree, but the ability to experience any of them, including numbers,
is more primitive.

> >>> Not primitive sense either,
> >>> but high order cognitive abstraction. There is no '1' or '2'
> >>> literally, they are ideas about our common sense - what we have in
> >>> common with everything. Numbers are literally 'figures', symbols
> >>> which
> >>> can be applied mentally to represent many things,
> >> No. That's number description. Not numbers.
> > I'm not talking about the characters "1" or "2", I'm talking about
> > what they represent. The concept of numbers defines them as figurative
> > entities, but you make them literal. That's ok with me if you are
> > doing that for mathematical purposes since it is a powerful way to
> > approach it, through the negative symmetry, but just as you might
> > trace a picture better if it's upside down, eventually you should turn
> > it right side up when you finish. To say that numbers literally exist
> > but matter does not is the logo-morphic position, orthogonal to both
> > anthropomorphic and mechanemorphic, but it is still as pathologically
> > unreal if taken literally. Again, thats ok with me, we need
> > surrealists too, I'm just saying, when the rubber hits the road, it's
> > not sanity.
> Hmm...
> >>> and to deploy
> >>> orderly control of some physical systems - but not everything can be
> >>> reduced to or controlled by numbers.
> >> But that's what number can discover by themselves.
> > In your logopomorphic theory of comp.
> Be polite!
> :)

Hah. I wasn't trying to be pejorative, just saying that your view
makes sense in my view but my view doesn't make sense in yours.

> >> Once you are at the
> >> treshold of numbers, the complexity of the relations (even just
> >> between numbers) get higher than what you can describe with numbers.
> >> the numbers already know that, with reasonable account of what is
> >> knowledge.
> > If the complexity exceeds the capacity of numbers, then you need to
> > invoke even more complexity in the form of additional forms of
> > expression of that complexity...out of thin air?
> It develops from intuition.

That's sense!

> Numbers, relatively to universal numbers,
> can develop intuition, due to the true relation existing between
> numbers, including the truth that they cannot rationally justified. So
> it comes from truth.

Truth goes along with what I'm trying to say about quanta being the
flattest and most universal qualia. Absolute truth means true for all
entities on all sense channels, so that necessarily requires that it
be absolutely flat qualitatively (otherwise you are dependent upon
some particular category of conditions, making it a relative truth
rather than absolute).

Under this criteria, numbers are an excellent candidate for universal
truth - almost. Numbers are so qualitatively flat that they act like a
skeleton key, sliding into every form and structure, but it also makes
it too easy to mistake the user of the key for the key itself since
the flattening dis-qualifies non-arithmetic realities. This is what
counting is; an abstraction layer which we use to identify or mention
*that* things are, but it doesn't address the actual experience of
what it is to be presented with those things. We count five apples but
the number five tells us nothing about apples.

What the logomorphic perspective does is invite an elevation of truth
values and universality at the direct expense of qualitatively rich
experience and specificity. It amputates the protocol stack of humans,
animals, organisms, chemicals, even physics and leaves only a
mathematical stump. The assumption is that using the splinters of the
stump, we must be able to build the entire tree, but what keeps
happening is that we get only a Turing Frankentree and splinters in
our hands. The danger is that rather than seeing this a sign to
understand the tree as a unique top-down event in the cosmos as well
as a bottom up assembled machine, we become even more fascinated by
the challenge of transmuting AI gold from leaden code and pursue it
even more avidly and obsessively. This is what is going on in Big
Physics (mechanemorphism) now as well, and in fundamentalist revivals
(Big Religion, anthropomorphism) around the world and Big Business
(technemorphism). All four points on the compass are hyperextended
into pathology until unity can be reconciled.

> > With sense,
> > complexity is generated recursively from bottom up entropy, while
> > simplicity pulls from the top down toward unity as significance.
> > Evolution is the interference pattern between them.
> >>>>> What
> >>>>> necessary logic turns a nuclear chain reaction (addition and
> >>>>> multiplication) into a nursery for problem solving sentience?
> >>>> The same logic making tiny system Turing universal. Usually some
> >>>> small
> >>>> part of classical logic is enough.
> >>> Why would any kind of universality or logic entail the automatic
> >>> development of sentience? What is logical about sentience?
> >> The illogicality of sentience. From the point of view of numbers,
> >> when
> >> they look at themselves, they discover, for logical reason, that
> >> there
> >> is something non logical about them.
> > If there is something non logical about numbers (which are really the
> > embodiment of pure logic), why does that truth have to be 'discovered'
> > by them?
> Because truth extend logics, and number are constrained by truth,
> before what they can believe.

I get that truth extends logic, and that numbers are constrained by
truth (which I say is lowest common denominator sense) but I don't get
the last part. Why does truth have to discover itself?

> > In our development as children, do we not discover logic out
> > of the chaos of infancy rather than the other way around? Do we not
> > learn numbers rather than learn feelings?
> Because we have brains which sum up millions years of teaching in nine
> month, making us believe that walking and seeing is simpler than
> trigonometry. Later we can understand that is the contrary.

You are right in one sense, but that sense doesn't exist until
'later'. Trigonometry is indeed simpler mathematics than the
mathematics underlying human walking and seeing, but the sense
underlying trigonometry is even simpler. That sense is the same common
denominator that makes us a single walking seeing person - it's the
absolute common denominator, simplicity itself - unity, totality,
wholeness, being. It makes no distinction between now and forever,
between everything and nothing. It is the greatest and least inertial
frame possible. For this not to be the case, there would have to be
something preventing it. Some limitation inherent that does not allow
everything to be one thing on some level. Sense does this temporarily,
I think literally, it does it through time.

> >> Then the comp act of faith
> >> appears to be the simplest way to restore logic, except for that act
> >> of faith and the belief in addition and multiplication.
> > What kind of faith does a Turing machine have?
> If she is correct, it looks like it is plotinian sort of faith. But a
> machine can also develop a faith in mechanism, by surviving back-up,
> and be led, with occam, to a more pythagorean sort of faith.

Sounds like a very Greco-Anglican faith. Where are the Vedic machines?


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