On 8/29/2012 8:34 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
Hi Stephen,

Actually what you're saying makes me think of something new. Maybe the assumed singularity of the subject comes only through objectivity. Think of the dreamstate, or dementia, or infancy, where subjectivity is most directly exposed. The nature of the subject by itself is neither one nor many but orthogonal to quantity. It is a non-specific quasi-multiplicity/singularity of possible qualities and experiences.

Hi Craig,

Exactly! In the cases of dreamstate, dementia, infancy and equivalent (multiple personality disorder?) there is no singular subject that is invariant on a sequence of states. This is the same as saying that there is no self-narrative.


It is the experience of objects that divides the self into a hypothetical 'one' as it internalizes its own place in the world of discrete objects.

    Right! That is how naming occurs.

Deprive it of sleep or give it a good movie to watch in a dark theater and the subject goes right back to (non-zero/non-infinity).

    Right, self-identification is lost in those cases.

This affirms my sense of quantity on the outside, quality on the inside.

    Indeed!


Craig

On Wednesday, August 29, 2012 8:23:59 AM UTC-4, Stephen Paul King wrote:

    On 8/29/2012 7:38 AM, Roger Clough wrote:
    Hi Craig Weinberg
    I agree.
    Consciousness is not a monople, it is a dipole:
    Cs = subject + object
    The subject is always first person indeterminate.
    Being indeterminate, it is not computable.
    QED
    Hi Roger,

        It is not a dipole in the normal sense, as the object is not
    restricted to being singular. The subject is always singular
    (necessity) while the object is possibly singular.

    Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net <javascript:>
    8/29/2012
    Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so
    everything could function."

        ----- Receiving the following content -----
        *From:* Craig Weinberg <javascript:>
        *Receiver:* everything-list <javascript:>
        *Time:* 2012-08-28, 12:19:50
        *Subject:* No Chinese Room Necessary

        This sentence does not speak English.

        These words do not ‘refer’ to themselves.

        s     l u     ,u     s   


        If you don't like Searle's example, perhaps the above can
        help illustrate that form is not inherently informative.

        The implication here for me is that comp is a red herring as
        far as ascertaining the origin of awareness.

        Either we view computation inherently having awareness as a
        meaningless epiphenomenal byproduct (yay, no free will), or
        we presume that computation can and does exist independently
        of all awareness but that a particular category of
        meta-computation is what we call awareness.

        Even with the allowances that Bruno includes (or my
        understanding of what Bruno includes) in the form of first
        person indeterminacy and/or non comp contents, Platonic
        number dreams, etc - all of these can only negatively assert
        the completeness of arithmetic truth. My understanding is
        that G del (and others) are used to support this negative
        assertion, and I of course agree that indeed it is impossible
        for any arithmetic system to be complete, especially in the
        sense of defining itself completely. I suspect that Bruno
        assumes that I don't have a deep enough understanding of
        this, but I think that what understanding I do have is enough
        to persuade me that this entire line of investigation is a
        dead end as far as explaining consciousness. It only works if
        we assume consciousness as a possibility a priori and
        independently of any arithmetic logic.

        Nowhere do I find in any AI/AGI theory any positive assertion
        of awareness. It is not enough to say /*that*/ awareness fits
        into this or that category of programmatic interiority or
        logically necessary indeterminacy when the question of *what*
        awareness is in the first place and *why* is has not been
        addressed at all.

        As I demonstrate in the three lines at the top, and Searle
        tried to demonstrate, awareness does not follow automatically
        from a negative assertion of computability. I bring up the
        example of cymatics on another thread. Scooping salt into a
        symmetrical-mandala pattern does not conjure up an acoustic
        vibration associated with that pattern. Qualia does not
        follow from quanta.

        Quanta, however, could and I think does follow from qualia as
        a method of sequestering experiences to different degrees of
        privacy while retaining shared sense on more primitive
        'public' levels. These methods would necessarily be construed
        as automatic to insulate crosstalk between channels of sense
        - to encourage the coherence of perceptual inertial frames to
        develop unique significance rather than to decohere into the
        entropy of the totality.

        Does anyone have any positive assertion of consciousness
        derived from either physics or arithmetic? Any need for
        actual feelings and experiences, for direct participation?

        Craig


    --


--
Onward!

Stephen

http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html

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