Craig: I just wanted to summarize the evolutionary reasons why idividuality exist, (no matter if individuality is a cause or an effect of phisical laws). I did an extended account of this somewhere else in this list. I do not accept normative as distinct from objective. this is the fallacy of the naturalistic fallacy.
Psychopathy (not in the abstract sense, but in the real sense with wich it appear in humans) exist just because exist morality. It is an exploitation of morality for selfish purposes. Therefore it can be considered a morality effect. it would be non adaptive, and therefore unexistent, if there were no moral beings. 2012/8/29 Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> > > > On Wednesday, August 29, 2012 8:44:40 AM UTC-4, Alberto G.Corona wrote: >> >> the subject is preceived as singular because it has memory. It has >> memory because it is intelligent and social. thereforre it is moral. >> therefore it needs memory to give and take account of its debts and merits >> with others. > > > What you are talking about is all a-posterior to objectivity. In a dream > whole ensembles of 'memories' appear and disappear. It is possible to be > intelligent and social and not be moral (sociopaths have memory). I think > you are making some normative assumptions. When we generalize about > consciousness we should not limit it to healthy-adult-human waking > consciousness only. > > >> >> This singularity is by definition because no other lived the same life of >> ourselves. But up to a point it is not essential. We can be made accustomed >> to other ourselves. Most twins consider each other another self. We could >> come to consider normal to say hello to our recently created clones. >> Although this probably will never happen. >> > > In the story I read on brain conjoined twins, the sisters consider > themselves both the same person in some contexts and different in others. > They live the same life in one sense, different lives in another (life on > the right side is not life on the left side...one girl's head is in a more > awkward position than the other, etc). > > >> >> 2012/8/29 Stephen P. King <step...@charter.net> >> >>> On 8/29/2012 7:38 AM, Roger Clough wrote: >>> >>> Hi Craig Weinberg >>> >>> I agree. >>> >>> Consciousness is not a monople, it is a dipole: >>> >>> Cs = subject + object >>> >>> The subject is always first person indeterminate. >>> Being indeterminate, it is not computable. >>> >>> QED >>> >>> Hi Roger, >>> >>> It is not a dipole in the normal sense, as the object is not >>> restricted to being singular. The subject is always singular (necessity) >>> while the object is possibly singular. >>> >>> >>> >>> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net >>> 8/29/2012 >>> Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so >>> everything could function." >>> >>> ----- Receiving the following content ----- >>> *From:* Craig Weinberg >>> *Receiver:* everything-list >>> *Time:* 2012-08-28, 12:19:50 >>> *Subject:* No Chinese Room Necessary >>> >>> This sentence does not speak English. >>> >>> These words do not ‘refer’ to themselves. >>> >>> s l u ,u s >>> >>> >>> If you don't like Searle's example, perhaps the above can help >>> illustrate that form is not inherently informative. >>> >>> The implication here for me is that comp is a red herring as far as >>> ascertaining the origin of awareness. >>> >>> Either we view computation inherently having awareness as a meaningless >>> epiphenomenal byproduct (yay, no free will), or we presume that computation >>> can and does exist independently of all awareness but that a particular >>> category of meta-computation is what we call awareness. >>> >>> Even with the allowances that Bruno includes (or my understanding of >>> what Bruno includes) in the form of first person indeterminacy and/or non >>> comp contents, Platonic number dreams, etc - all of these can only >>> negatively assert the completeness of arithmetic truth. My understanding is >>> that G del (and others) are used to support this negative assertion, >>> and I of course agree that indeed it is impossible for any arithmetic >>> system to be complete, especially in the sense of defining itself >>> completely. I suspect that Bruno assumes that I don't have a deep enough >>> understanding of this, but I think that what understanding I do have is >>> enough to persuade me that this entire line of investigation is a dead end >>> as far as explaining consciousness. It only works if we assume >>> consciousness as a possibility a priori and independently of any arithmetic >>> logic. >>> >>> Nowhere do I find in any AI/AGI theory any positive assertion of >>> awareness. It is not enough to say **that** awareness fits into this or >>> that category of programmatic interiority or logically necessary >>> indeterminacy when the question of *what* awareness is in the first place >>> and *why* is has not been addressed at all. >>> >>> As I demonstrate in the three lines at the top, and Searle tried to >>> demonstrate, awareness does not follow automatically from a negative >>> assertion of computability. I bring up the example of cymatics on another >>> thread. Scooping salt into a symmetrical-mandala pattern does not conjure >>> up an acoustic vibration associated with that pattern. Qualia does not >>> follow from quanta. >>> >>> Quanta, however, could and I think does follow from qualia as a method >>> of sequestering experiences to different degrees of privacy while retaining >>> shared sense on more primitive 'public' levels. These methods would >>> necessarily be construed as automatic to insulate crosstalk between >>> channels of sense - to encourage the coherence of perceptual inertial >>> frames to develop unique significance rather than to decohere into the >>> entropy of the totality. >>> >>> Does anyone have any positive assertion of consciousness derived from >>> either physics or arithmetic? Any need for actual feelings and experiences, >>> for direct participation? >>> >>> Craig >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.**com. >>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-li...@** >>> googlegroups.com. >>> >>> For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/** >>> group/everything-list?hl=en<http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en> >>> . >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> Onward! >>> >>> Stephen >>> http://webpages.charter.net/**stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html >>> <http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.**com. >>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-li...@** >>> googlegroups.com. >>> >>> For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/** >>> group/everything-list?hl=en<http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en> >>> . >>> >> >> -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/AQOANUvnFz4J. > > To post to this group, send email to email@example.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.