Hi Alberto G. Corona 

Subjectivity has nothing to do with morality or evolution, it is simply the 
private of personal state of a perceiver (of some object), ie it is experience. 

Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
8/29/2012 
Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything 
could function."
----- Receiving the following content ----- 
From: Alberto G. Corona 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-08-29, 09:08:43
Subject: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary


Craig:


I just wanted to summarize the evolutionary reasons why idividuality exist, (no 
matter if individuality is a cause or an effect of phisical laws).  I did an 
extended account of this somewhere else in this list.
I do not accept normative as distinct from objective. this is the fallacy of 
the naturalistic fallacy. 


Psychopathy (not in the abstract sense, but in the real sense with wich it 
appear in humans)  exist just because exist morality. It is an exploitation of 
morality for selfish purposes. Therefore it can be considered a morality 
effect. it would be non adaptive, and therefore unexistent, if there were no 
moral beings.



2012/8/29 Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com>



On Wednesday, August 29, 2012 8:44:40 AM UTC-4, Alberto G.Corona wrote:
the subject  is preceived as singular because it has memory. It has memory 
because it is intelligent and social. thereforre it is moral. therefore it 
needs memory to give and take account of its debts and merits with others. 

What you are talking about is all a-posterior to objectivity. In a dream whole 
ensembles of 'memories' appear and disappear. It is possible to be intelligent 
and social and not be moral (sociopaths have memory). I think you are making 
some normative assumptions. When we generalize about consciousness we should 
not limit it to healthy-adult-human waking consciousness only.
 



This singularity is by definition because no other lived the same life of 
ourselves. But up to a point it is not essential. We can be made accustomed to 
other ourselves.  Most twins consider each other another self. We  could come 
to consider normal to say hello to our recently created clones. Although this 
probably will never happen.


In the story I read on brain conjoined twins, the sisters consider themselves 
both the same person in some contexts and different in others. They live the 
same life in one sense, different lives in another (life on the right side is 
not life on the left side...one girl's head is in a more awkward position than 
the other, etc).
 



2012/8/29 Stephen P. King <step...@charter.net>

On 8/29/2012 7:38 AM, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Craig Weinberg 
 
I agree.
 
Consciousness is not a monople, it is a dipole:
 
Cs = subject + object
 
The subject is always first person indeterminate.
Being indeterminate, it is not computable.
 
QED
Hi Roger,

    It is not a dipole in the normal sense, as the object is not restricted to 
being singular. The subject is always singular (necessity) while the object is 
possibly singular. 


 
 
Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
8/29/2012 
Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything 
could function."
----- Receiving the following content ----- 
From: Craig Weinberg 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-08-28, 12:19:50
Subject: No Chinese Room Necessary


This sentence does not speak English.
These words do not ‘refer’ to themselves.
s     l u     ,u     s   


If you don't like Searle's example, perhaps the above can help illustrate that 
form is not inherently informative.
The implication here for me is that comp is a red herring as far as 
ascertaining the origin of awareness. 

Either we view computation inherently having awareness as a meaningless 
epiphenomenal byproduct (yay, no free will), or we presume that computation can 
and does exist independently of all awareness but that a particular category of 
meta-computation is what we call awareness.
Even with the allowances that Bruno includes (or my understanding of what Bruno 
includes) in the form of first person indeterminacy and/or non comp contents, 
Platonic number dreams, etc - all of these can only negatively assert the 
completeness of arithmetic truth. My understanding is that G del (and others) 
are used to support this negative assertion, and I of course agree that indeed 
it is impossible for any arithmetic system to be complete, especially in the 
sense of defining itself completely. I suspect that Bruno assumes that I don't 
have a deep enough understanding of this, but I think that what understanding I 
do have is enough to persuade me that this entire line of investigation is a 
dead end as far as explaining consciousness. It only works if we assume 
consciousness as a possibility a priori and independently of any arithmetic 
logic.
Nowhere do I find in any AI/AGI theory any positive assertion of awareness. It 
is not enough to say *that* awareness fits into this or that category of 
programmatic interiority or logically necessary indeterminacy when the question 
of *what* awareness is in the first place and *why* is has not been addressed 
at all.
As I demonstrate in the three lines at the top, and Searle tried to 
demonstrate, awareness does not follow automatically from a negative assertion 
of computability. I bring up the example of cymatics on another thread. 
Scooping salt into a symmetrical-mandala pattern does not conjure up an 
acoustic vibration associated with that pattern. Qualia does not follow from 
quanta.
Quanta, however, could and I think does follow from qualia as a method of 
sequestering experiences to different degrees of privacy while retaining shared 
sense on more primitive 'public' levels. These methods would necessarily be 
construed as automatic to insulate crosstalk between channels of sense - to 
encourage the coherence of perceptual inertial frames to develop unique 
significance rather than to decohere into the entropy of the totality.

Does anyone have any positive assertion of consciousness derived from either 
physics or arithmetic? Any need for actual feelings and experiences, for direct 
participation?
Craig



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Onward!

Stephen

http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html
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