Dear Roger,
Wrong. Computation is involved in the act of "seeing".
Identification is a computational act. Any transformation of information
(difference that makes a difference) is, by definition, a computation.
On 8/29/2012 11:15 AM, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Alberto G. Corona
Awareness = I see X.
or I am X.
or some similar statement.
There's no computer in that behavior or state of being.
Roger Clough, [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>
8/29/2012
Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so
everything could function."
----- Receiving the following content -----
*From:* Alberto G. Corona <mailto:[email protected]>
*Receiver:* everything-list <mailto:[email protected]>
*Time:* 2012-08-29, 09:34:22
*Subject:* Re: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary
Roger,
I said that the awareness functionalty can be computable, that is
that a inner computation can affect an external computation which
is aware of the consequences of this inner computation.
like in the case of any relation of brain and mind, I do not
say that this IS the experience of awareness, but given the
duality between mind and matter/brain, it is very plausible that
the brain work that way when, in the paralell word of the mind,
the mind experiences awareness
2012/8/29 Roger Clough <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>>
Hi Alberto G. Corona
What sort of an output would the computer give me ?
It can't be experiential, 0or if it is, I know of no
way to hook it to my brain.
Roger Clough, [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>
8/29/2012
Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him
so everything could function."
----- Receiving the following content -----
*From:* Alberto G. Corona <mailto:[email protected]>
*Receiver:* everything-list
<mailto:[email protected]>
*Time:* 2012-08-29, 08:21:27
*Subject:* Re: No Chinese Room Necessary
Hi:
Awareness can be functionally (we do not know if
experientially) computable. A program can run another
program (a metaprogram) and do things depending on its
results of the metaprogram (or his real time status). This
is rutine in computer science and these programs are
called "interpreters".
The lack of understanding, of this capability of
metacomputation that any turing complete machine has, is
IMHO the reason why it is said that the brain-mind can
do things that a computer can never do. We humans can
manage concepts in two ways : a direct way and a
reflective way. The second is the result of an analysis of
the first trough a metacomputation.
For example we can not be aware of our use of category
theory or our intuitions because they are hardwired
programs, not interpreted programs. We can not know our
deep thinking structures because they are not exposed as
metacomputations. When we use metaphorically the verb
"to be fired" to mean being redundant, we are using
category theory but we can not be aware of it. Only
after research that assimilate mathematical facts with the
observable psichology of humans, we can create an
awareness of it by means of an adquired metacomputation.
The same happens with the intuitions. We appreciate the
beauty of a woman for adaptive reasons, but not the
computation that produces this intuition. In the other
side, we can appreciate the fact that the process of
diagonalization by G del makes the Hilbert program
impossible, That same conclusion can be reached by a
program that metacomputes a constructive mathematical
program. (see my post about the G del theorem).
Again, I do not see COMP a problem for the Existential
problem of free will nor in any other existential question.
2012/8/29 Roger Clough <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>>
Hi Craig Weinberg
I agree.
Consciousness is not a monople, it is a dipole:
Cs = subject + object
The subject is always first person indeterminate.
Being indeterminate, it is not computable.
QED
Roger Clough, [email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>
8/29/2012
Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to
invent him so everything could function."
----- Receiving the following content -----
*From:* Craig Weinberg <mailto:[email protected]>
*Receiver:* everything-list
<mailto:[email protected]>
*Time:* 2012-08-28, 12:19:50
*Subject:* No Chinese Room Necessary
This sentence does not speak English.
These words do not ‘refer’ to themselves.
s l u ,u s
If you don't like Searle's example, perhaps the
above can help illustrate that form is not
inherently informative.
The implication here for me is that comp is a red
herring as far as ascertaining the origin of
awareness.
Either we view computation inherently having
awareness as a meaningless epiphenomenal byproduct
(yay, no free will), or we presume that
computation can and does exist independently of
all awareness but that a particular category of
meta-computation is what we call awareness.
Even with the allowances that Bruno includes (or
my understanding of what Bruno includes) in the
form of first person indeterminacy and/or non comp
contents, Platonic number dreams, etc - all of
these can only negatively assert the completeness
of arithmetic truth. My understanding is that G
del (and others) are used to support this negative
assertion, and I of course agree that indeed it is
impossible for any arithmetic system to be
complete, especially in the sense of defining
itself completely. I suspect that Bruno assumes
that I don't have a deep enough understanding of
this, but I think that what understanding I do
have is enough to persuade me that this entire
line of investigation is a dead end as far as
explaining consciousness. It only works if we
assume consciousness as a possibility a priori and
independently of any arithmetic logic.
Nowhere do I find in any AI/AGI theory any
positive assertion of awareness. It is not enough
to say /*that*/ awareness fits into this or that
category of programmatic interiority or logically
necessary indeterminacy when the question of
*what* awareness is in the first place and *why*
is has not been addressed at all.
As I demonstrate in the three lines at the top,
and Searle tried to demonstrate, awareness does
not follow automatically from a negative assertion
of computability. I bring up the example of
cymatics on another thread. Scooping salt into a
symmetrical-mandala pattern does not conjure up an
acoustic vibration associated with that pattern.
Qualia does not follow from quanta.
Quanta, however, could and I think does follow
from qualia as a method of sequestering
experiences to different degrees of privacy while
retaining shared sense on more primitive 'public'
levels. These methods would necessarily be
construed as automatic to insulate crosstalk
between channels of sense - to encourage the
coherence of perceptual inertial frames to develop
unique significance rather than to decohere into
the entropy of the totality.
Does anyone have any positive assertion of
consciousness derived from either physics or
arithmetic? Any need for actual feelings and
experiences, for direct participation?
Craig
--
Onward!
Stephen
http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
[email protected].
For more options, visit this group at
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
