Dear Roger,

Wrong. Computation is involved in the act of "seeing". Identification is a computational act. Any transformation of information (difference that makes a difference) is, by definition, a computation.

On 8/29/2012 11:15 AM, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Alberto G. Corona
Awareness = I see X.
 or I am X.
or some similar statement.
There's no computer in that behavior or state of being.
Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net <mailto:rclo...@verizon.net>
8/29/2012
Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function."

    ----- Receiving the following content -----
    *From:* Alberto G. Corona <mailto:agocor...@gmail.com>
    *Receiver:* everything-list <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>
    *Time:* 2012-08-29, 09:34:22
    *Subject:* Re: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary

    Roger,
    I said that the awareness functionalty can be computable, that is
    that a inner computation can affect an external computation which
    is aware of the consequences of this inner computation.

      like in the case of any relation of brain and mind, I do not
    say that this IS  the experience of awareness, but given the
    duality between mind and matter/brain, it is very plausible that
    the brain work that way when, in the paralell word of the mind,
    the mind experiences awareness

    2012/8/29 Roger Clough <rclo...@verizon.net
    <mailto:rclo...@verizon.net>>

        Hi Alberto G. Corona
         
        What sort of an output would the computer give me ?
        It can't be experiential, 0or if it is, I know of no
        way to hook it to my brain.
         
         
        Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net <mailto:rclo...@verizon.net>
        8/29/2012
        Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him
        so everything could function."

            ----- Receiving the following content -----
            *From:* Alberto G. Corona <mailto:agocor...@gmail.com>
            *Receiver:* everything-list
            <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>
            *Time:* 2012-08-29, 08:21:27
            *Subject:* Re: No Chinese Room Necessary

            Hi:

            Awareness can  be functionally (we do not know if
            experientially)  computable. A program can run another
            program (a metaprogram) and do things depending on its
            results of the metaprogram (or his real time status). This
            is rutine in computer science and these programs are
            called "interpreters".

             The lack of  understanding, of this capability of
            metacomputation that any turing complete machine has, is
            IMHO the reason why  it is said that the brain-mind can
            do things that a computer can never do.  We humans can
            manage concepts in two ways : a direct way and a
            reflective way. The second is the result of an analysis of
            the first trough a metacomputation.

            For example we can not be aware of our use of category
            theory or our intuitions because they are hardwired
            programs, not interpreted programs. We can not know  our
            deep thinking structures because they are not exposed as
            metacomputations. When we use metaphorically the verb
            "to be fired"  to mean being redundant, we are using
            category theory but we can not be aware of it.  Only
            after research that assimilate mathematical facts with the
            observable psichology of humans, we can create an
            awareness of it by means of an adquired metacomputation.

            The same happens with the intuitions. We appreciate the
            beauty of a woman for adaptive reasons, but not the
            computation that produces this intuition. In the other
            side, we can appreciate the fact that the process  of
            diagonalization by G del  makes the Hilbert program
            impossible, That same conclusion can be reached by a
            program that metacomputes a constructive mathematical
            program. (see my post about the G del theorem).


            Again, I do not see COMP a problem for the Existential
            problem of free will nor in any other existential question.

            2012/8/29 Roger Clough <rclo...@verizon.net
            <mailto:rclo...@verizon.net>>

                Hi Craig Weinberg
                 
                I agree.
                 
                Consciousness is not a monople, it is a dipole:
                 
                Cs = subject + object
                 
                The subject is always first person indeterminate.
                Being indeterminate, it is not computable.
                 
                QED
                 
                 
                Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
                <mailto:rclo...@verizon.net>
                8/29/2012
                Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to
                invent him so everything could function."

                    ----- Receiving the following content -----
                    *From:* Craig Weinberg <mailto:whatsons...@gmail.com>
                    *Receiver:* everything-list
                    <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>
                    *Time:* 2012-08-28, 12:19:50
                    *Subject:* No Chinese Room Necessary

                    This sentence does not speak English.

                    These words do not ‘refer’ to themselves.

                    s     l u     ,u     s   


                    If you don't like Searle's example, perhaps the
                    above can help illustrate that form is not
                    inherently informative.

                    The implication here for me is that comp is a red
                    herring as far as ascertaining the origin of
                    awareness.

                    Either we view computation inherently having
                    awareness as a meaningless epiphenomenal byproduct
                    (yay, no free will), or we presume that
                    computation can and does exist independently of
                    all awareness but that a particular category of
                    meta-computation is what we call awareness.

                    Even with the allowances that Bruno includes (or
                    my understanding of what Bruno includes) in the
                    form of first person indeterminacy and/or non comp
                    contents, Platonic number dreams, etc - all of
                    these can only negatively assert the completeness
                    of arithmetic truth. My understanding is that G 
                    del (and others) are used to support this negative
                    assertion, and I of course agree that indeed it is
                    impossible for any arithmetic system to be
                    complete, especially in the sense of defining
                    itself completely. I suspect that Bruno assumes
                    that I don't have a deep enough understanding of
                    this, but I think that what understanding I do
                    have is enough to persuade me that this entire
                    line of investigation is a dead end as far as
                    explaining consciousness. It only works if we
                    assume consciousness as a possibility a priori and
                    independently of any arithmetic logic.

                    Nowhere do I find in any AI/AGI theory any
                    positive assertion of awareness. It is not enough
                    to say /*that*/ awareness fits into this or that
                    category of programmatic interiority or logically
                    necessary indeterminacy when the question of
                    *what* awareness is in the first place and *why*
                    is has not been addressed at all.

                    As I demonstrate in the three lines at the top,
                    and Searle tried to demonstrate, awareness does
                    not follow automatically from a negative assertion
                    of computability. I bring up the example of
                    cymatics on another thread. Scooping salt into a
                    symmetrical-mandala pattern does not conjure up an
                    acoustic vibration associated with that pattern.
                    Qualia does not follow from quanta.

                    Quanta, however, could and I think does follow
                    from qualia as a method of sequestering
                    experiences to different degrees of privacy while
                    retaining shared sense on more primitive 'public'
                    levels. These methods would necessarily be
                    construed as automatic to insulate crosstalk
                    between channels of sense - to encourage the
                    coherence of perceptual inertial frames to develop
                    unique significance rather than to decohere into
                    the entropy of the totality.

                    Does anyone have any positive assertion of
                    consciousness derived from either physics or
                    arithmetic? Any need for actual feelings and
                    experiences, for direct participation?

                    Craig



--
Onward!

Stephen

http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html

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