On 8/29/2012 7:38 AM, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Craig Weinberg
I agree.
Consciousness is not a monople, it is a dipole:
Cs = subject + object
The subject is always first person indeterminate.
Being indeterminate, it is not computable.
QED
Hi Roger,

It is not a dipole in the normal sense, as the object is not restricted to being singular. The subject is always singular (necessity) while the object is possibly singular.

Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net <mailto:rclo...@verizon.net>
8/29/2012
Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function."

    ----- Receiving the following content -----
    *From:* Craig Weinberg <mailto:whatsons...@gmail.com>
    *Receiver:* everything-list <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>
    *Time:* 2012-08-28, 12:19:50
    *Subject:* No Chinese Room Necessary

    This sentence does not speak English.

    These words do not ‘refer’ to themselves.

    s     l u     ,u     s   


    If you don't like Searle's example, perhaps the above can help
    illustrate that form is not inherently informative.

    The implication here for me is that comp is a red herring as far
    as ascertaining the origin of awareness.

    Either we view computation inherently having awareness as a
    meaningless epiphenomenal byproduct (yay, no free will), or we
    presume that computation can and does exist independently of all
    awareness but that a particular category of meta-computation is
    what we call awareness.

    Even with the allowances that Bruno includes (or my understanding
    of what Bruno includes) in the form of first person indeterminacy
    and/or non comp contents, Platonic number dreams, etc - all of
    these can only negatively assert the completeness of arithmetic
    truth. My understanding is that G del (and others) are used to
    support this negative assertion, and I of course agree that indeed
    it is impossible for any arithmetic system to be complete,
    especially in the sense of defining itself completely. I suspect
    that Bruno assumes that I don't have a deep enough understanding
    of this, but I think that what understanding I do have is enough
    to persuade me that this entire line of investigation is a dead
    end as far as explaining consciousness. It only works if we assume
    consciousness as a possibility a priori and independently of any
    arithmetic logic.

    Nowhere do I find in any AI/AGI theory any positive assertion of
    awareness. It is not enough to say /*that*/ awareness fits into
    this or that category of programmatic interiority or logically
    necessary indeterminacy when the question of *what* awareness is
    in the first place and *why* is has not been addressed at all.

    As I demonstrate in the three lines at the top, and Searle tried
    to demonstrate, awareness does not follow automatically from a
    negative assertion of computability. I bring up the example of
    cymatics on another thread. Scooping salt into a
    symmetrical-mandala pattern does not conjure up an acoustic
    vibration associated with that pattern. Qualia does not follow
    from quanta.

    Quanta, however, could and I think does follow from qualia as a
    method of sequestering experiences to different degrees of privacy
    while retaining shared sense on more primitive 'public' levels.
    These methods would necessarily be construed as automatic to
    insulate crosstalk between channels of sense - to encourage the
    coherence of perceptual inertial frames to develop unique
    significance rather than to decohere into the entropy of the totality.

    Does anyone have any positive assertion of consciousness derived
    from either physics or arithmetic? Any need for actual feelings
    and experiences, for direct participation?

    Craig


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Onward!

Stephen

http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html

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