On 22 Sep 2012, at 23:04, meekerdb wrote:
On 9/22/2012 10:53 AM, John Clark wrote:
On Thu, Sep 13, 2012 at 3:03 PM, Craig Weinberg <[email protected]
> wrote:
> If anyone is not familiar with David Chalmers "Absent Qualia,
Fading Qualia, Dancing Qualia" You should have a look at it first.
It's some reductio arguments in favor of functionalism (i.e. comp).
To save time in reply against comp, I define comp as the existence of
a level where functionalism apply. Putnam and orther's functionalism
usually are ambiguous on the level, and take it usually as being given
by the neural net in the biological brain.
Comp is "It exists a level n such that functionalism is correct at
level n", meaning that at such a level, you can make the digital
functional substitution.
This makes the comp I talk about, much weaker logically that the one
commonly described in the literature. It can be important as we cannot
know our substitution level.
It prevents the environment-argument, or the quantum machine-argument
against "classical" comp.
Bruno
I find these arguments convincing. So in building an intelligent
robot it is almost certain that a sufficiently high level of
intelligence we will have created a conscious robot. But I don't
think it follows that the robot's consciousness will be the same as
ours - because it's not the same even between different human
beings. In particular I refer to synasthesia and certain
mathematical savants who seem to have some different consciousness
than I do. So for me the interesting question is how to build a
robot with different consciousness in prespecified ways?
Brent
I confess I have not read it because I have little confidence it's
any better than the Chinese Room. Well OK I exaggerate, it's
probably better than that (what isn't) but there is something about
all these anti AI thought experiments that has always confused me.
Let's suppose I'm dead wrong and Chambers really has found
something new and strange and maybe even paradoxical about
consciousness, what I want to know is why am I required to explain
it if I want to continue to believe that a intelligent computers
would be conscious? Whatever argument Chambers has it could just as
easily be turned against the idea that the intelligent behavior of
other people indicates consciousness, and yet not one person on
this list believes in Solipsism, not even the most vocal AI
critics. Why? Why is it that I must find the flaws in all these
thought experiments but the anti AI people feel no need to do so?
In the extraordinarily unlikely event that Chambers has shown that
consciousness is paradoxical (and its probably just as childish as
all the others) I would conclude that he just made an error
someplace that nobody has found yet. When Zeno showed that motion
was paradoxical nobody thought that motion did not exist but that
Zeno just made a mistake, and he did, although the error wasn't
found till the invention of the Calculus thousands of years later.
John K Clark
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