On 26 Sep 2012, at 06:38, Jason Resch wrote:
On Sep 25, 2012, at 10:20 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
Hi Roger Clough
Hi Bruno Marchal
Do you believe that a computer has a physical mind
that can be conscious ?
My personal beliefs are private.
With comp a computer (universal machine/number) has no physical
mind, nor a primitive physical body. But it has an infinity of non
physical bodies. It is bizarre, and I am not sure this can be
understood without taking the comp first person indeterminacy into
account. Knowing the work of Everett in QM can help to illustrate,
but QM is not assumed in comp.
The immanent is that which is in spacetime, is extended and
physical.
The transcendent is that which is outside of spacetime, is not
extended and is nonphysical.
I can be OK with that vocabulary.
Platonia is transcendent, numbers are transcendent, arithmetic is
transcendent.
OK. Although I am myself using transcendent in a more restricted
form, but I can be OK with this for awhile.
Yet you seem to believe that mind is immanent, not transcendent.
The mind of the universal machine is transcendent, and it obeys
transcendental laws, but my particular mind yesterday when
listening to music and drinking coffee was immanent. The mind has
the two aspects, as it is transcendent, but from its perspective it
has, most of the time, immanent aspect. In fact, that is what
consciousness does all the time: connecting transcendence and
immanence, through self-dfferentiation. The physical has those two
aspects too (with comp): it connects the universal physical laws
with the geographical particular local and relative reality.
Isn't there a conflict in such an understanding ?
You tell me.
In idealism the ideal world is the reflection of the actual world,
That might not exist, even in Platonia. With comp, we can take a
very little Platonia (arithmetical truth, or even a tiny part of it).
Note that comp is neutral monist. The transcendental truth is very
simple, and entirely delimited by the laws of addition and
multiplication (or anything Turing equivalent). The rest are
digital machines (or relative number) psychological projections:
they are lawful too.
so that the material brain is reflected in the ideal mind,
but one critical difference.
Thought requires that somewhere there's a someone or something
in the driver's seat. I can't imagine a material self, it has
to be mental-- transcendent, in Platonia or the mind.
It is what causes motion and makes decisions.
No problems here, except that there is no physical brain in
Platonia, nor really (primitive) physical brain on earth, unless
you redefine "physical" explicitly through the coherence conditions
on the possible computations/dreams by numbers. Those coherence
conditions cannot be imposed on the theory. They have to be
extracted from the logics of (machine) self-reference.
Platonia always rules !
OK, but like Plotinus and the neoplatonists, even Platonia is just
a "servant of God" or an "emanation of God", who or which is the
reason why Platonia "exists".
The advantage of comp is that it explains the origin of the "three
gods" from arithmetic, in the sense that almost all numbers will
believe correctly in three "objects/subjects"
Bruno,
I am curious, what are the three gods?
Are these explained in your Plotinus paper?
Yes.
The three (neoplatonist) gods are:
1) the outer god, or truth, for Plato. It is simple, but has no name,
nor description. With comp, we can take arithmetical truth.
2) the Noùs, or Platonia, the realm of the ideas, or the intelligible.
In arithmetic it is played by Bp, and it splits into what the machine
can say about it, G, and what is true about it, G*.
3) the inner god. It is the conjunct of the two preceding gods:
provability and truth: Bp & p. It has no name, but acts like the
machine. It Plato's universal soul, the theaetetus knower. In
arithmetic, it is played by the modal box of the S4Grz modal logic.
Then you have the intelligible matter (Bp & Dt), and the sensible
matter (Bp & Dt & p). The Dt conditions makes it into a probability
one on the computations (obtained by restricting the arithmetical
interpretation of the sentence letter, p, q, ..., on the sigma_1
sentences (this tranlates comp in arithmetic).
More on this when I have more time. Someday I will give you the
enunciation of Solovay theorem, which is the key here.
verifying most discourses made about them by mystics and open
minded rationalists Indian, Chinese and Greeks. You can take a look
at my "Plotinus" paper for more on this.
Like the neoplatonists, comp leads to a form of platonist
pythagoreanism.
My main point is not a defense of that idea, but that such theory
(mainly comp + classical theory of knowledge) is empirically
testable.
It is hard to imagine a more testable theory, as the whole of
physics is derivable from arithmetic in a precise way. Only local
geographies and local histories are not derivable, not even by a god.
Do you consider different geographies to include different places
with different particles or different dimensions of space time, or
do you think comp implies a single physics for all observers. One
like that of our standard model?
Comp implies the same physics for all universal machines. Physics is
really a collection of theorems in elementary arithmetic, or of true
but unprovable (by fixed machine) arithmetical sentences (but this
will concerned more sensible matter than intelligible matter). This
helps to separate the quanta and the qualia. If the mass of the
electron is not derivable from arithmetic, it will mean that it is
geographical, and that we can access to physical realities where
electron will have other mass. Thanks to S4Grz1, Z1* and X1*, we know
already that physics does not collapse into classical logic. In such a
case, physics would have been shown trivial, and all "phsyical laws"
would be local, or geographical.
Bruno
Jason
Bruno
Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
9/25/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-09-24, 10:45:01
Subject: Re: questions on machines, belief, awareness, and knowledge
On 24 Sep 2012, at 16:39, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 9/24/2012 9:34 AM, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi meekerdb
The computer can mechanically prove something,
but it cannot know that it did so. It cannot
sit back with a beer and muse over how smart it is.
Hi Roger,
What you are considering that a computer does not have is the
ability to model itself within its environment and compute
optimizations of such a model to guide its future choices. This can
be well represented within a computational framework and it is
something that Bruno has worked out in his comp model. (My only
beef
with Bruno is that his model is so abstract that it is completely
disconnected from the physical world and thus has a "body"
problem.)
But that is the "scientific success" of the comp theory (not
"model") : it reduces the mind body problem to a body problem, in a
precise realm, with a technic to extract the "laws of bodies",
making
comp an utterly scientific, in Popper sense, theory. You still miss
the point. The body problem is not a defect, it is the main
success of
comp.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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