On 27 Sep 2012, at 13:24, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Bruno Marchal

I was thinking of a computer as a monad,
but whether it can think or not would
have to be an assumption (that it contains
an intellect).

I don't think you have to assume this, unless you propose some magical theory of an intellect. Computers, notably the Löbian computer have already an intellect, making them possible to reason and access to the intelligible realm. They can't avoid having beliefs.

And, if you agree with Theaetetus definition of knowledge, and Plotinus definition of the universal soul, computers have a soul too.




I forgot that inanimate matter
does not have an intellect.

I agree with this. With comp, there are may be inanimate numbers, but no primitively real inanimate matter. That is dreamed projection.



So I have to retract
that statement. Sorry.

I knew it was to beautiful to be true, but may be you will change again your mind. This illustrates that you search, and have no certainty in the matter, and that is the wise (scientific, doubting) attitude.



This may be another mistake or be trivial, as I am
not a mathematician,but studying his causation
theory again suggests that Leibniz's preestablished
harmony might be a
special case of the Turing machine. It would be
more applicable to man and life in that
Leibniz allows for Aristotle's end-causation as well
as the traditional 'efficient causation".

I think comp implies a sort of end-causation too, but it has weird properties. It is a complex subject matter. I have to think more on that. Even Darwinian evolution can be said to have an end-causation, from the points of view of the survivors. But the notion of "causation" is itself fuzzy, especially in the "natural" realm.

Bruno




Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
9/27/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen


----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-09-26, 06:48:13
Subject: Re: WHOA! A reassessment of my position that computers cannot bealive, conscious, or intelligent


Hi Roger Clough,

Hi Bruno Marchal

I'm still trying to digest it, but Leibniz' principles that

a) every explanation is a cause,

and

b) every substance can be causative

and

c) every substance is alive (and presumably intelligent)


Allow the possibility of computers being conscious.
And alive. And intelligent. At least in the Leibnizian sense
that all substances are alive, etc. I had been thinking in
conventional ways that according to Leibniz are wrong.

I have not much time to comment. If Leibniz helped you to open your
mind to the idea that computer can think, that is good news (for you
and Leibniz, and our fellows the machines).

Note that "computer can think" is an abbreviation for "computer (the
material object) can support a thinking entity relatively to some
other universal environment. The material object does not really think
per se, be it brain or computer, nor does it really exists at the base
level. It is more a projected information pattern.

I try to avoid the term "substance", as in occident it means often
"primitive matter", but if you use it in the greek sense (hypostase)
as I think you do, I can make some sense of what you say. To be sure I
am not sure "alive", or "causative" have clear referents. Those are
epistemological concepts. Yet I makes sense of the idea that
explanation have a causal feature, but I can't explain what I mean by
this now.
Basically you can see a program as a cause for a universal machine to
act in some way, like the sign put on the Golem forehead :)

You might elaborate on how Leibniz made your mind change on this
capital point.

Bruno





Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
9/26/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen


----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-09-25, 11:20:17
Subject: Re: questions on machines, belief, awareness, and knowledge


Hi Roger Clough

Hi Bruno Marchal

Do you believe that a computer has a physical mind
that can be conscious ?

My personal beliefs are private.

With comp a computer (universal machine/number) has no physical mind,
nor a primitive physical body. But it has an infinity of non physical
bodies. It is bizarre, and I am not sure this can be understood
without taking the comp first person indeterminacy into account.
Knowing the work of Everett in QM can help to illustrate, but QM is
not assumed in comp.

The immanent is that which is in spacetime, is extended and physical.
The transcendent is that which is outside of spacetime, is not
extended and is nonphysical.

I can be OK with that vocabulary.



Platonia is transcendent, numbers are transcendent, arithmetic is
transcendent.

OK. Although I am myself using transcendent in a more restricted form,
but I can be OK with this for awhile.


Yet you seem to believe that mind is immanent, not transcendent.

The mind of the universal machine is transcendent, and it obeys
transcendental laws, but my particular mind yesterday when listening
to music and drinking coffee was immanent. The mind has the two
aspects, as it is transcendent, but from its perspective it has, most
of the time, immanent aspect. In fact, that is what consciousness does
all the time: connecting transcendence and immanence, through self-
dfferentiation. The physical has those two aspects too (with comp): it
connects the universal physical laws with the geographical particular
local and relative reality.


Isn't there a conflict in such an understanding ?


You tell me.

In idealism the ideal world is the reflection of the actual world,

That might not exist, even in Platonia. With comp, we can take a very
little Platonia (arithmetical truth, or even a tiny part of it).
Note that comp is neutral monist. The transcendental truth is very
simple, and entirely delimited by the laws of addition and
multiplication (or anything Turing equivalent). The rest are digital
machines (or relative number) psychological projections: they are
lawful too.


so that the material brain is reflected in the ideal mind,
but one critical difference.

Thought requires that somewhere there's a someone or something
in the driver's seat. I can't imagine a material self, it has
to be mental-- transcendent, in Platonia or the mind.
It is what causes motion and makes decisions.


No problems here, except that there is no physical brain in Platonia,
nor really (primitive) physical brain on earth, unless you redefine
"physical" explicitly through the coherence conditions on the possible
computations/dreams by numbers. Those coherence conditions cannot be
imposed on the theory. They have to be extracted from the logics of
(machine) self-reference.

Platonia always rules !

OK, but like Plotinus and the neoplatonists, even Platonia is just a
"servant of God" or an "emanation of God", who or which is the reason
why Platonia "exists".
The advantage of comp is that it explains the origin of the "three
gods" from arithmetic, in the sense that almost all numbers will
believe correctly in three "objects/subjects" verifying most
discourses made about them by mystics and open minded rationalists
Indian, Chinese and Greeks. You can take a look at my "Plotinus" paper
for more on this.
Like the neoplatonists, comp leads to a form of platonist
pythagoreanism.

My main point is not a defense of that idea, but that such theory
(mainly comp + classical theory of knowledge) is empirically testable.
It is hard to imagine a more testable theory, as the whole of physics
is derivable from arithmetic in a precise way. Only local geographies
and local histories are not derivable, not even by a god.

Bruno





Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
9/25/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen


----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-09-24, 10:45:01
Subject: Re: questions on machines, belief, awareness, and knowledge


On 24 Sep 2012, at 16:39, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 9/24/2012 9:34 AM, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi meekerdb

The computer can mechanically prove something,
but it cannot know that it did so. It cannot
sit back with a beer and muse over how smart it is.


Hi Roger,

What you are considering that a computer does not have is the
ability to model itself within its environment and compute
optimizations of such a model to guide its future choices. This can
be well represented within a computational framework and it is
something that Bruno has worked out in his comp model. (My only beef
with Bruno is that his model is so abstract that it is completely
disconnected from the physical world and thus has a "body" problem.)

But that is the "scientific success" of the comp theory (not
"model") : it reduces the mind body problem to a body problem, in a
precise realm, with a technic to extract the "laws of bodies", making
comp an utterly scientific, in Popper sense, theory. You still miss
the point. The body problem is not a defect, it is the main success
of
comp.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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