On Wed, Sep 26, 2012 at 3:33 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> > On 26 Sep 2012, at 06:38, Jason Resch wrote: > > >> >> On Sep 25, 2012, at 10:20 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: >> >> >>> Hi Roger Clough >>> >>> Hi Bruno Marchal >>>> >>>> Do you believe that a computer has a physical mind >>>> that can be conscious ? >>>> >>> >>> My personal beliefs are private. >>> >>> With comp a computer (universal machine/number) has no physical mind, >>> nor a primitive physical body. But it has an infinity of non physical >>> bodies. It is bizarre, and I am not sure this can be understood without >>> taking the comp first person indeterminacy into account. Knowing the work >>> of Everett in QM can help to illustrate, but QM is not assumed in comp. >>> >>> The immanent is that which is in spacetime, is extended and physical. >>>> The transcendent is that which is outside of spacetime, is not extended >>>> and is nonphysical. >>>> >>> >>> I can be OK with that vocabulary. >>> >>> >>> >>>> Platonia is transcendent, numbers are transcendent, arithmetic is >>>> transcendent. >>>> >>> >>> OK. Although I am myself using transcendent in a more restricted form, >>> but I can be OK with this for awhile. >>> >>> >>> Yet you seem to believe that mind is immanent, not transcendent. >>>> >>> >>> The mind of the universal machine is transcendent, and it obeys >>> transcendental laws, but my particular mind yesterday when listening to >>> music and drinking coffee was immanent. The mind has the two aspects, as it >>> is transcendent, but from its perspective it has, most of the time, >>> immanent aspect. In fact, that is what consciousness does all the time: >>> connecting transcendence and immanence, through self-dfferentiation. The >>> physical has those two aspects too (with comp): it connects the universal >>> physical laws with the geographical particular local and relative reality. >>> >>> >>> Isn't there a conflict in such an understanding ? >>>> >>> >>> >>> You tell me. >>> >>> In idealism the ideal world is the reflection of the actual world, >>>> >>> >>> That might not exist, even in Platonia. With comp, we can take a very >>> little Platonia (arithmetical truth, or even a tiny part of it). >>> Note that comp is neutral monist. The transcendental truth is very >>> simple, and entirely delimited by the laws of addition and multiplication >>> (or anything Turing equivalent). The rest are digital machines (or relative >>> number) psychological projections: they are lawful too. >>> >>> >>> so that the material brain is reflected in the ideal mind, >>>> but one critical difference. >>>> >>> >>> Thought requires that somewhere there's a someone or something >>>> in the driver's seat. I can't imagine a material self, it has >>>> to be mental-- transcendent, in Platonia or the mind. >>>> It is what causes motion and makes decisions. >>>> >>> >>> >>> No problems here, except that there is no physical brain in Platonia, >>> nor really (primitive) physical brain on earth, unless you redefine >>> "physical" explicitly through the coherence conditions on the possible >>> computations/dreams by numbers. Those coherence conditions cannot be >>> imposed on the theory. They have to be extracted from the logics of >>> (machine) self-reference. >>> >>> Platonia always rules ! >>>> >>> >>> OK, but like Plotinus and the neoplatonists, even Platonia is just a >>> "servant of God" or an "emanation of God", who or which is the reason why >>> Platonia "exists". >>> The advantage of comp is that it explains the origin of the "three gods" >>> from arithmetic, in the sense that almost all numbers will believe >>> correctly in three "objects/subjects" >>> >> >> Bruno, >> >> I am curious, what are the three gods? >> >> Are these explained in your Plotinus paper? >> > > Yes. > The three (neoplatonist) gods are: > > 1) the outer god, or truth, for Plato. It is simple, but has no name, nor > description. With comp, we can take arithmetical truth. > 2) the Noùs, or Platonia, the realm of the ideas, or the intelligible. In > arithmetic it is played by Bp, and it splits into what the machine can say > about it, G, and what is true about it, G*. > 3) the inner god. It is the conjunct of the two preceding gods: > provability and truth: Bp & p. It has no name, but acts like the machine. > It Plato's universal soul, the theaetetus knower. In arithmetic, it is > played by the modal box of the S4Grz modal logic. > > Then you have the intelligible matter (Bp & Dt), and the sensible matter > (Bp & Dt & p). The Dt conditions makes it into a probability one on the > computations (obtained by restricting the arithmetical interpretation of > the sentence letter, p, q, ..., on the sigma_1 sentences (this tranlates > comp in arithmetic). > > More on this when I have more time. Someday I will give you the > enunciation of Solovay theorem, which is the key here. Thank you. I look forward to this. > > > > > > >> >> verifying most discourses made about them by mystics and open minded >>> rationalists Indian, Chinese and Greeks. You can take a look at my >>> "Plotinus" paper for more on this. >>> Like the neoplatonists, comp leads to a form of platonist pythagoreanism. >>> >>> My main point is not a defense of that idea, but that such theory >>> (mainly comp + classical theory of knowledge) is empirically testable. >>> It is hard to imagine a more testable theory, as the whole of physics is >>> derivable from arithmetic in a precise way. Only local geographies and >>> local histories are not derivable, not even by a god. >>> >> >> Do you consider different geographies to include different places with >> different particles or different dimensions of space time, or do you think >> comp implies a single physics for all observers. One like that of our >> standard model? >> > > Comp implies the same physics for all universal machines. Physics is > really a collection of theorems in elementary arithmetic, or of true but > unprovable (by fixed machine) arithmetical sentences (but this will > concerned more sensible matter than intelligible matter). This helps to > separate the quanta and the qualia. If the mass of the electron is not > derivable from arithmetic, it will mean that it is geographical, and that > we can access to physical realities where electron will have other mass. So does comp provide any hints as to which aspects of our local universe should be universal and which are geographical? > Thanks to S4Grz1, Z1* and X1*, we know already that physics does not > collapse into classical logic. In such a case, physics would have been > shown trivial, and all "phsyical laws" would be local, or geographical. It was not 100% clear to me what you meant. Did you mean that we already know all physical laws are local/geographical, or that we already know that all physical laws are not local/geographical? 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