Hi Bruno Marchal  

I was thinking of a computer as a monad, 
but whether it can think or not would
have to be an assumption (that it contains
an intellect). I forgot that inanimate matter
does not have an intellect. So I have to retract
that statement. Sorry.  

This may be another mistake or be trivial, as I am 
not a mathematician,but studying his causation 
theory again suggests that Leibniz's preestablished
harmony might be a
special case of the Turing machine. It would be
more applicable to man and life in that
Leibniz allows for Aristotle's end-causation as well
as the traditional 'efficient causation".


Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
9/27/2012  
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 


----- Receiving the following content -----  
From: Bruno Marchal  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-09-26, 06:48:13 
Subject: Re: WHOA! A reassessment of my position that computers cannot bealive, 
conscious, or intelligent 


Hi Roger Clough, 

> Hi Bruno Marchal 
> 
> I'm still trying to digest it, but Leibniz' principles that 
> 
> a) every explanation is a cause, 
> 
> and 
> 
> b) every substance can be causative 
> 
> and 
> 
> c) every substance is alive (and presumably intelligent) 
> 
> 
> Allow the possibility of computers being conscious. 
> And alive. And intelligent. At least in the Leibnizian sense 
> that all substances are alive, etc. I had been thinking in 
> conventional ways that according to Leibniz are wrong. 

I have not much time to comment. If Leibniz helped you to open your  
mind to the idea that computer can think, that is good news (for you  
and Leibniz, and our fellows the machines). 

Note that "computer can think" is an abbreviation for "computer (the  
material object) can support a thinking entity relatively to some  
other universal environment. The material object does not really think  
per se, be it brain or computer, nor does it really exists at the base  
level. It is more a projected information pattern. 

I try to avoid the term "substance", as in occident it means often  
"primitive matter", but if you use it in the greek sense (hypostase)  
as I think you do, I can make some sense of what you say. To be sure I  
am not sure "alive", or "causative" have clear referents. Those are  
epistemological concepts. Yet I makes sense of the idea that  
explanation have a causal feature, but I can't explain what I mean by  
this now. 
Basically you can see a program as a cause for a universal machine to  
act in some way, like the sign put on the Golem forehead :) 

You might elaborate on how Leibniz made your mind change on this  
capital point. 

Bruno 



> 
> 
> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
> 9/26/2012 
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 
> 
> 
> ----- Receiving the following content ----- 
> From: Bruno Marchal 
> Receiver: everything-list 
> Time: 2012-09-25, 11:20:17 
> Subject: Re: questions on machines, belief, awareness, and knowledge 
> 
> 
> Hi Roger Clough 
> 
>> Hi Bruno Marchal 
>> 
>> Do you believe that a computer has a physical mind 
>> that can be conscious ? 
> 
> My personal beliefs are private. 
> 
> With comp a computer (universal machine/number) has no physical mind, 
> nor a primitive physical body. But it has an infinity of non physical 
> bodies. It is bizarre, and I am not sure this can be understood 
> without taking the comp first person indeterminacy into account. 
> Knowing the work of Everett in QM can help to illustrate, but QM is 
> not assumed in comp. 
> 
>> The immanent is that which is in spacetime, is extended and physical. 
>> The transcendent is that which is outside of spacetime, is not 
>> extended and is nonphysical. 
> 
> I can be OK with that vocabulary. 
> 
> 
>> 
>> Platonia is transcendent, numbers are transcendent, arithmetic is 
>> transcendent. 
> 
> OK. Although I am myself using transcendent in a more restricted form, 
> but I can be OK with this for awhile. 
> 
> 
>> Yet you seem to believe that mind is immanent, not transcendent. 
> 
> The mind of the universal machine is transcendent, and it obeys 
> transcendental laws, but my particular mind yesterday when listening 
> to music and drinking coffee was immanent. The mind has the two 
> aspects, as it is transcendent, but from its perspective it has, most 
> of the time, immanent aspect. In fact, that is what consciousness does 
> all the time: connecting transcendence and immanence, through self- 
> dfferentiation. The physical has those two aspects too (with comp): it 
> connects the universal physical laws with the geographical particular 
> local and relative reality. 
> 
> 
>> Isn't there a conflict in such an understanding ? 
> 
> 
> You tell me. 
> 
>> In idealism the ideal world is the reflection of the actual world, 
> 
> That might not exist, even in Platonia. With comp, we can take a very 
> little Platonia (arithmetical truth, or even a tiny part of it). 
> Note that comp is neutral monist. The transcendental truth is very 
> simple, and entirely delimited by the laws of addition and 
> multiplication (or anything Turing equivalent). The rest are digital 
> machines (or relative number) psychological projections: they are 
> lawful too. 
> 
> 
>> so that the material brain is reflected in the ideal mind, 
>> but one critical difference. 
> 
>> Thought requires that somewhere there's a someone or something 
>> in the driver's seat. I can't imagine a material self, it has 
>> to be mental-- transcendent, in Platonia or the mind. 
>> It is what causes motion and makes decisions. 
> 
> 
> No problems here, except that there is no physical brain in Platonia, 
> nor really (primitive) physical brain on earth, unless you redefine 
> "physical" explicitly through the coherence conditions on the possible 
> computations/dreams by numbers. Those coherence conditions cannot be 
> imposed on the theory. They have to be extracted from the logics of 
> (machine) self-reference. 
> 
>> Platonia always rules ! 
> 
> OK, but like Plotinus and the neoplatonists, even Platonia is just a 
> "servant of God" or an "emanation of God", who or which is the reason 
> why Platonia "exists". 
> The advantage of comp is that it explains the origin of the "three 
> gods" from arithmetic, in the sense that almost all numbers will 
> believe correctly in three "objects/subjects" verifying most 
> discourses made about them by mystics and open minded rationalists 
> Indian, Chinese and Greeks. You can take a look at my "Plotinus" paper 
> for more on this. 
> Like the neoplatonists, comp leads to a form of platonist 
> pythagoreanism. 
> 
> My main point is not a defense of that idea, but that such theory 
> (mainly comp + classical theory of knowledge) is empirically testable. 
> It is hard to imagine a more testable theory, as the whole of physics 
> is derivable from arithmetic in a precise way. Only local geographies 
> and local histories are not derivable, not even by a god. 
> 
> Bruno 
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> 
>> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
>> 9/25/2012 
>> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 
>> 
>> 
>> ----- Receiving the following content ----- 
>> From: Bruno Marchal 
>> Receiver: everything-list 
>> Time: 2012-09-24, 10:45:01 
>> Subject: Re: questions on machines, belief, awareness, and knowledge 
>> 
>> 
>> On 24 Sep 2012, at 16:39, Stephen P. King wrote: 
>> 
>>> On 9/24/2012 9:34 AM, Roger Clough wrote: 
>>>> Hi meekerdb 
>>>> 
>>>> The computer can mechanically prove something, 
>>>> but it cannot know that it did so. It cannot 
>>>> sit back with a beer and muse over how smart it is. 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> Hi Roger, 
>>> 
>>> What you are considering that a computer does not have is the 
>>> ability to model itself within its environment and compute 
>>> optimizations of such a model to guide its future choices. This can 
>>> be well represented within a computational framework and it is 
>>> something that Bruno has worked out in his comp model. (My only beef 
>>> with Bruno is that his model is so abstract that it is completely 
>>> disconnected from the physical world and thus has a "body" problem.) 
>> 
>> But that is the "scientific success" of the comp theory (not 
>> "model") : it reduces the mind body problem to a body problem, in a 
>> precise realm, with a technic to extract the "laws of bodies", making 
>> comp an utterly scientific, in Popper sense, theory. You still miss 
>> the point. The body problem is not a defect, it is the main success  
>> of 
>> comp. 
>> 
>> Bruno 
>> 
>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ 
>> 
>> 
>> 
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> 
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ 
> 
> 
> 
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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ 



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