On 12 Oct 2012, at 22:36, John Clark wrote:
On Fri, Oct 12, 2012 Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
> Keep in mind that I use the compatibilist definition of free will,
which is the (machine) ability to exploits its self-indetermination
(with indetermination in the Turing sense, (not in the comp first
person sense, nor the quantum one). It is basically the ability to
do conscious choice.
I can't keep it in mind because the above sounds very much like
gibberish.
What exactly sounds like gibberish?
> Intelligence implies free will, and free will implies consciousness.
And even if it wasn't gibberish it would be circular because your
"definition" of free will involves consciousness.
I did gave the semi-axiomatic: consciousness is something which we
know to be true yet cannot prove or justify, and define, and which is
invariant for a digital transformation à -la "yes doctor". I refer you
to explanation already given or to the papers.
You did not quote the whole paragraph which contained that definition.
You seem to believe in an mind/brain identity thesis which has been
shown incompatible with the thesis that the brain is Turing emulable.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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