On 12 Oct 2012, at 22:36, John Clark wrote:

On Fri, Oct 12, 2012 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> Keep in mind that I use the compatibilist definition of free will, which is the (machine) ability to exploits its self-indetermination (with indetermination in the Turing sense, (not in the comp first person sense, nor the quantum one). It is basically the ability to do conscious choice.

I can't keep it in mind because the above sounds very much like gibberish.


What exactly sounds like gibberish?




> Intelligence implies free will, and free will implies consciousness.

And even if it wasn't gibberish it would be circular because your "definition" of free will involves consciousness.

I did gave the semi-axiomatic: consciousness is something which we know to be true yet cannot prove or justify, and define, and which is invariant for a digital transformation à -la "yes doctor". I refer you to explanation already given or to the papers.

You did not quote the whole paragraph which contained that definition.

You seem to believe in an mind/brain identity thesis which has been shown incompatible with the thesis that the brain is Turing emulable.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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