On 13 Oct 2012, at 17:55, John Clark wrote:



On Sat, Oct 13, 2012  Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

>>> Keep in mind that I use the compatibilist definition of free will, which is the (machine) ability to exploits its self- indetermination (with indetermination in the Turing sense, (not in the comp first person sense, nor the quantum one). It is basically the ability to do conscious choice.

>> I can't keep it in mind because the above sounds very much like gibberish.

> What exactly sounds like gibberish?

Well, to list the gibberish we should probably begin with "the comp first person sense", but that's just the start. We mustn't forget the very word "compatibilists" because they like to make noises like "free will and determinism are compatible ideas" without having the slightest "idea" what free will means. Or compatibilist, who insist that "free will" can exist for reasons that have nothing to do with metaphysics but fail to realize that if it exists for any reason, metaphysical or otherwise, then it's deterministic.


I have commented this, but I forget to comment the last line.



And lets not forget those who insist that in order to qualify as "free will" the "conscious choice" must not be done for a reason AND it must not not be done for a reason.


Why? They are inconsistent, so I suggest that, on the contrary, we do forget them. Why do you want to keep in mind an inconsistent theory? It is the "atheist" error again and again. Better to focus on the definition which makes sense, and this for any concepts, be it God, universe, free will, consciousness, etc.

Bruno





  John K Clark

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