On 29 Mar 2013, at 13:14, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Friday, March 29, 2013 6:21:59 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 28 Mar 2013, at 20:15, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Thursday, March 28, 2013 10:41:22 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 26 Mar 2013, at 17:53, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Tuesday, March 26, 2013 10:13:09 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 26 Mar 2013, at 13:35, Craig Weinberg wrote:

It is if you assume photons bouncing back and forth.

unlike a universal
number. The fixed point of the two mirrors needs infinities of
reflexions, but the machine self-reference needs only two
diagonalizations. As I said, you must study those things and convince

It sounds like a dodge to me. Fundamental truths seem like they are always conceptually simple. I can teach someone the principle of binary math in two minutes without them having to learn to build a computer from scratch. You don't have to learn to use Maxwell's equations to be convinced that electromagnetism involves wave properties.


I can explain diagonalization in two minutes. If this can help.

What would help more is to explain how diagonalization contributes to a computation being an experienced awareness rather than an unconscious outcome.

Diagonalization shows that a machine can refer to itself in many sense, which are equivalent in "god's eyes", but completely different in the machine's eyes, and some of those self-reference verify accepted axioms for knowledge, observable, etc.

How do you know that it intentionally refers to itself rather than unconsciously reflecting another view of itself?

I don't know. But you are saying you know that it does that, so how do you know?

If my car's wheel is out of alignment, the tire tracks might show that the car is pulling to the right and is being constantly corrected. That entire pattern is merely a symptom of the overall machine - the tracks themselves are not referring or inferring any intelligence back to the car, and the car does not use its tracks to realign itself. It is we who do the inferring and referring.

> or a cartoon of a lion talking about itself into some kind of
> subjective experience for the cartoon, or cartoon-ness, or lion-
> ness, or talking-ness. Self-reference has no significance unless we
> assume that the self already has awareness.

Hmm... I am open to that assumption, but usually I prefer to add the
universality assumption too.

> If I say 'these words refer to themselves', or rig up a camera to
> point at a screen displaying the output of Tupper's Self- Referential
> formula, I still have nothing but a camera, a screen and some
> meaningless graphics. This assumption pulls qualia out of thin air,
> ignores the pathetic fallacy completely, and conflates all
> territories with maps.

On the contrary, we get a rich and complex theory of qualia, even a
testable one, as we get the quanta too, and so can compare with
nature. Please, don't oversimplify something that you have not studied.

How can there be a such thing as a theory of qualia? Qualia is precisely that which theory cannot access in any way.

Yes, that is one the main axiom for qualia. Not only you have a theory, but you share it with me.

How do you know it is a main axiom for qualia?

It is not someything I can know. It was just something we are agreeing on, so that your point made my points, and refute the idea that you can use it as a tool for invalidating comp.

I agree that it is an important axiom, but only to discern qualia from quanta. It doesn't explain qualia itself or justify its existence (or insistence) in particular.

Sure. Nice we agree on that axiom. My point was just that this cannot be used against comp, as the comp theory of qualia explains that particular aspect.

It's like saying that the important thing about the Moon is that we can't swim there. The fact that I understand that the Moon is not in the ocean doesn't mean I can take credit for figuring out the Moon. To me it shows the confirmation bias of the approach. You are looking at reality from the start as if it were a kind of theory,

I bet I can find a theory, indeed. But this does not mean that anything about machine can be made into a theory.

Sure, I'm not denying that it is true that we can't swim to the Moon, or that this theory could not be part of a larger theory, but the theory still doesn't produce a theory justifying the Moon.

It justifies the existence of the appearance of the moon, and its stability. Then the actual existence is geographical, contingent. Comp justifies that we cannot justify such things.

so that this detail about qualia being non-theoretical has inflated significance.

It is important indeed, but of course it is not use here as an argument for comp, only as showing that you can't use the absence of a theory as an argument against comp, because computer science explains that absence of theory, and the presence of useful meta- theory.

The meta-theory may be useful, but does it call for qualia in particular, rather than just an X which serves the functions of non- communicability?

That kind of question can never been answered in communicable way.

If you were a shoemaker, the important thing about diamonds might be that they aren't shoes.


>>> I might find it convenient to invent an entirely new spectrum of
>>> colors to keep track of my file folders, but that doesn't mean
>>> that this new spectrum can just be 'developed' out of thin air.
>> You must not ask a machine something that you can't do yourself, to
>> compare it to yourself.
>> But if you are saying that a machine can come up with a new format
>> by virtue of its self reference, then that is what I assume Comp
>> says is the origination of color.
> Qualia obeys laws.
> Qualia makes laws. Laws are nothing except the interaction of qualia
> on multiple nested scales.

That's much too vague.

Vague is ok if it is accurate too.

Too vague leads to empty accuracy. It is accurate because we don't understand.

Or it could be that we understand that the reality can only be accurately described in vague terms - the reality itself is vague, hence it has flexibility to create the derived experiences of precision.

It is exactly the justification of letting people lacking rigor in philosophy, theology, etc. By making the non-understanding intrinsic, you can jutisfy all the possible wishful thinking, and introduce all the arbitrariness you want.

That's true, but it still makes more sense that precision could arise from vagueness than the other way around. If we look at a blurry digital image, it is only our visual awareness which provides the blurry quality. Zoom in on the picture and there is no blur at all, only discretely defined pixels. On that level, there is no difference between a blurry data set and a focused one. In comp, all that there can be is focused data...so where does the blur come from, and why?

From the intensional variant of self-reference.

Now, if reality is vague, I could likewise use that to doubt even more your apparent certainty that machine cannot support consciousness ...

I would only say that reality is vague in the absolute/ultimate sense. What we would call local reality is not normally vague. We can't go against the momentum of what has been established in the universe completely. We can walk north and expect to eventually come around from the south, but not from the east. Machine consciousness would have to come from the east by only traveling north and south.


I would if I could, but when I try that, it doesn't work. I'm only interested in making sense of reality, not making sense of theories.

But then develop your ideas without pretending that they make false other theories. Why not trying to be cautious with the work of others, if you don't want theorize. Why asserting that machine cannot support consciousness, if you are not interested in making sense of theories.

Because my hypothesis shows why comp would not be true, so even though I don't study every theory which assumes comp is true, I can understand that they must all be false, at least in their ultimate implications.

You don't show that at all. Each time you did, you illustrate that you agree what the machines are already saying.

What the machines are saying is true, but not because they know what they are saying.

Of course. They know it because they believe in it and it happens to be true. Indeed.

It's like the tire tracks. I can say 'the car is out of alignment because the steering is pulling to the right' and you can say 'Yes. that is exactly what the tracks say also.' That doesn't mean that what the tracks say makes sense to the car though.

Of course.

That is not to say there is not a lot of important things to study by assuming that comp is true, I only say that consciousness itself is not one of them.

Comp is defined by consciousness invariance, so what you say does not make sense.

I'm saying that assuming comp is true can teach us how to get really convincing illusions of consciousness, but what is taken to be a creative spring of consciousness at the heart of arithmetic is actually the non-consciousness of the universal un-person. It is a default mode or test pattern. It has no proprietary authenticity. It's like a blister package...it surrounds every product in the same way, and it is more or less shaped like the product, but it is not the product.

OK, but why?

Qualia are useful
to accelerate information processing, and the integration of that
processing in a person.

I challenge that. Whatever accelerations you are attributing to qualia I think are just other types of quanta.

No quanta are physical objects. I guess you mean number. But it is not because qualia can have some consequences capable of being evaluate with some numbers, that qualia are numbers themselves.

I didn't think we were talking about physical objects. I was trying to say that any kind of functional benefit for arithmetic agendas would be better served by an unconscious quantitative feature than a qualitative experience.

Because you assume that a program might not been able to support an experience,

No, not at all. I'm going with the assumption that a program could support an experience here.

But then you agree with comp.

The question is, why would it want to, where does it get the idea that there is such a thing as experience, and how does it actually generate such a thing? I see no advantage, no possibility for discovery, and no mechanism to initiate and preserve it.

But that's probably because you don't study computer science. The mechanism you ask for is given by self-reference, and the other reference made possible with respect of their most probable computations, and sub-level computations.

but this force you to introduce non turing emulability of something present in the brain or in the molecules, but you fail to do so. So you are speculating on something just to prevent a type of explanation.

I'm surprised you are in the materialist camp on this.


I am not saying that there is any new force present in the brain or in the molecules, I am saying that all force is a symptom of motive extension on some level of description, and that the brain and molecules themselves are only symptoms of sense extension on some level of description.

That what all ideally correct machines already discover when looking inward, or reasoning.

It is like a creationist saying that Darwin evolution is a brilliant idea, explaining a lot, but failing on what is important: how God made the world in six days.

But Genesis is an old idea which was around long before Darwin. What I'm talking about is a new idea which says 'evolution explains how species are selected, but it doesn't explain why they belong here in the first place'.

And they are unavoidable for machines in rich
and statistically stable universal relations with each others.

I don't think that you can know that what you are looking at which fulfills the requirements of the UMs is qualia. It's non- communicable, and therefore trivially 'private', but that doesn't mean it is experiential.

No, but assuming comp, they are at the least the best candidate for the qualia, especially when using the classical theory of knowledge and observation, which provide a notion of experience, as explained in the paper and in some post I sent.

Sure I agree, but to me assuming comp is like assuming the sky is yellow. If the sky is yellow then puffy clouds on a sunny day would likely be black. I don't disagree with the logic, but the beginning assumption is wrong.

It is wrong because you assume it wrong. You fail to show it is wrong, without begging the question, I'm afraid.

I don't assume it is wrong, I just see that it can only seem to make sense if you ignore the reality of aesthetics.






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