On Saturday, March 30, 2013 7:01:47 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 29 Mar 2013, at 13:14, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, March 29, 2013 6:21:59 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 28 Mar 2013, at 20:15, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, March 28, 2013 10:41:22 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 26 Mar 2013, at 17:53, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tuesday, March 26, 2013 10:13:09 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On 26 Mar 2013, at 13:35, Craig Weinberg wrote: 
>>>>
>>>> It is if you assume photons bouncing back and forth.
>>>  
>>>
>>>> unlike a universal   
>>>> number. The fixed point of the two mirrors needs infinities of   
>>>> reflexions, but the machine self-reference needs only two   
>>>> diagonalizations. As I said, you must study those things and convince   
>>>> yourself. 
>>>>
>>>> It sounds like a dodge to me. Fundamental truths seem like they are 
>>> always conceptually simple. I can teach someone the principle of binary 
>>> math in two minutes without them having to learn to build a computer from 
>>> scratch. You don't have to learn to use Maxwell's equations to be convinced 
>>> that electromagnetism involves wave properties.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> ?
>>>
>>> I can explain diagonalization in two minutes. If this can help.
>>>
>>
>> What would help more is to explain how diagonalization contributes to a 
>> computation being an experienced awareness rather than an unconscious 
>> outcome.
>>
>>
>> Diagonalization shows that a machine can refer to itself in many sense, 
>> which are equivalent in "god's eyes", but completely different in the 
>> machine's eyes, and some of those self-reference verify accepted axioms for 
>> knowledge, observable, etc. 
>>
>
> How do you know that it  intentionally refers to itself rather than 
> unconsciously reflecting another view of itself? 
>
>
> I don't know. But you are saying you know that it does that, so how do you 
> know? 
>

Because every experience that I have ever had with symbols is that they do 
not literally refer to anything. A parrot need not speak English to repeat 
words interactively. A red octagon need not inherently refer to stopping 
just because we use it to tell ourselves to stop. I understand exactly what 
that is - how semiotics can help us tease apart the semantic from the 
pragmatic and syntactic, and my views help show how all three are 
symmetrical aspects of the whole, which is sense participation. Comp turns 
sense upside down, and conflates it with semantic and pragmatic modes under 
the completely inhospitable umbrella of syntax. Arithmetic is a 
disembodied, impersonal, and automated syntax which for some reason winds 
up becoming embodied as semantic persons....but there is no reason to 
imagine that could happen going by the arithmetic alone. The pathetic 
fallacy plugs the gap between who we know we are and what we want to 
believe got us here.
 

>
>
>
>
> If my car's wheel is out of alignment, the tire tracks might show that the 
> car is pulling to the right and is being constantly corrected. That entire 
> pattern is merely a symptom of the overall machine - the tracks themselves 
> are not referring or inferring any intelligence back to the car, and the 
> car does not use its tracks to realign itself. It is we who do the 
> inferring and referring.
>
>
>>
>>
>>
>>  
>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> > or a cartoon of a lion talking about itself into some kind of   
>>>> > subjective experience for the cartoon, or cartoon-ness, or lion- 
>>>> > ness, or talking-ness. Self-reference has no significance unless we   
>>>> > assume that the self already has awareness. 
>>>>
>>>> Hmm... I am open to that assumption, but usually I prefer to add the   
>>>> universality assumption too. 
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> > If I say 'these words refer to themselves', or rig up a camera to   
>>>> > point at a screen displaying the output of Tupper's Self-Referential 
>>>>   
>>>> > formula, I still have nothing but a camera, a screen and some   
>>>> > meaningless graphics. This assumption pulls qualia out of thin air,   
>>>> > ignores the pathetic fallacy completely, and conflates all   
>>>> > territories with maps. 
>>>>
>>>> On the contrary, we get a rich and complex theory of qualia, even a   
>>>> testable one, as we get the quanta too, and so can compare with   
>>>> nature. Please, don't oversimplify something that you have not studied. 
>>>>
>>>
>>> How can there be a such thing as a theory of qualia? Qualia is precisely 
>>> that which theory cannot access in any way.
>>>
>>>
>>> Yes, that is one the main axiom for qualia. Not only you have a theory, 
>>> but you share it with me.
>>>
>>
>> How do you know it is a main axiom for qualia? 
>>
>>
>> It is not someything I can know. It was just something we are agreeing 
>> on, so that your point made my points, and refute the idea that you can use 
>> it as a tool for invalidating comp.
>>
>>
> I agree that it is an important axiom, but only to discern qualia from 
> quanta. It doesn't explain qualia itself or justify its existence (or 
> insistence) in particular.
>
>
>
> Sure. Nice we agree on that axiom. My point was just that this cannot be 
> used against comp, as the comp theory of qualia explains that particular 
> aspect.
>

That's like saying that shades of grey explains the color spectrum since 
when the sun goes down, colors become grey.
 

>
>
>
>  
>
>>
>>
>>
>> It's like saying that the important thing about the Moon is that we can't 
>> swim there. The fact that I understand that the Moon is not in the ocean 
>> doesn't mean I can take credit for figuring out the Moon. To me it shows 
>> the confirmation bias of the approach. You are looking at reality from the 
>> start as if it were a kind of theory, 
>>
>>
>> I bet I can find a theory, indeed. But this does not mean that anything 
>> about machine can be made into a theory.
>>
>
> Sure, I'm not denying that it is true that we can't swim to the Moon, or 
> that this theory could not be part of a larger theory, but the theory still 
> doesn't produce a theory justifying the Moon.
>
>
> It justifies the existence of the appearance of the moon, and its 
> stability. Then the actual existence is geographical, contingent. Comp 
> justifies that we cannot justify such things.
>

I don't think that it does. It justifies the stability of locations which 
we cannot swim to, but I don't think it puts an appearance or presence 
there at all. It smuggles in our experience of the Moon and says "aha, we 
have a hole in our theory which can be filled by this Moon experience", but 
it could be filled by any function which has the right characteristics, it 
need not be the Moon at all.
 

>
>
>
>  
>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> so that this detail about qualia being non-theoretical has inflated 
>> significance. 
>>
>>
>> It is important indeed, but of course it is not use here as an argument 
>> for comp, only as showing that you can't use the absence of a theory as an 
>> argument against comp, because computer science explains that absence of 
>> theory, and the presence of useful meta-theory.
>>
>
> The meta-theory may be useful, but does it call for qualia in particular, 
> rather than just an X which serves the functions of non-communicability?
>
>
> That kind of question can never been answered in communicable way. 
>

Really? It seems like a very straightforward question, and it seems like 
the answer is no - it does not call for qualia in particular, since no 
function could turn green or begins to itch when it is solved. As in the 
Deleuze quote, representation has no ability to mobilize anything. It has 
no way to access private qualia at all, rather it is a common principle of 
organization across all public phenomena.
 

>
>
>
>  
>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> If you were a shoemaker, the important thing about diamonds might be that 
>> they aren't shoes.
>>
>>
>> Lol.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>  
>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>  
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> > 
>>>> > 
>>>> > 
>>>> > 
>>>> > 
>>>> >> 
>>>> >> 
>>>> >> 
>>>> >> 
>>>> >>> I might find it convenient to invent an entirely new spectrum of   
>>>> >>> colors to keep track of my file folders, but that doesn't mean   
>>>> >>> that this new spectrum can just be 'developed' out of thin air. 
>>>> >> 
>>>> >> You must not ask a machine something that you can't do yourself, to 
>>>>   
>>>> >> compare it to yourself. 
>>>> >> 
>>>> >> But if you are saying that a machine can come up with a new format   
>>>> >> by virtue of its self reference, then that is what I assume Comp   
>>>> >> says is the origination of color. 
>>>> > 
>>>> > Qualia obeys laws. 
>>>> > 
>>>> > Qualia makes laws. Laws are nothing except the interaction of qualia 
>>>>   
>>>> > on multiple nested scales. 
>>>>
>>>> That's much too vague.
>>>
>>>
>>> Vague is ok if it is accurate too.
>>>
>>>
>>> Too vague leads to empty accuracy. It is accurate because we don't 
>>> understand. 
>>>
>>>
>> Or it could be that we understand that the reality can only be accurately 
>> described in vague terms - the reality itself is vague, hence it has 
>> flexibility to create the derived experiences of precision.
>>
>>
>> It is exactly the justification of letting people lacking rigor in 
>> philosophy, theology, etc. 
>> By making the non-understanding intrinsic, you can jutisfy all the 
>> possible wishful thinking, and introduce all the arbitrariness you want.
>>
>
> That's true, but it still makes more sense that precision could arise from 
> vagueness than the other way around. If we look at a blurry digital image, 
> it is only our visual awareness which provides the blurry quality. Zoom in 
> on the picture and there is no blur at all, only discretely defined pixels. 
> On that level, there is no difference between a blurry data set and a 
> focused one. In comp, all that there can be is focused data...so where does 
> the blur come from, and why?
>
>
> From the intensional variant of self-reference.
>

Why is that blurry?
 

>
>
>
>
>  
>
>>
>> Now, if reality is vague, I could likewise use that to doubt even more 
>> your apparent certainty that machine cannot support consciousness ...
>>
>
> I would only say that reality is vague in the absolute/ultimate sense. 
> What we would call local reality is not normally vague. We can't go against 
> the momentum of what has been established in the universe completely. We 
> can walk north and expect to eventually come around from  the south, but 
> not from the east. Machine consciousness would have to come from the east 
> by only traveling north and south.
>
>
>
> ?
>

The constraints of machines are not vague, but some aspects of the cosmos, 
particularly the non-mechanical interiors, are vague. We can focus our 
vagueness, but a machine can't blur it's robotic, binary codes.
 

>
>
>
>
>
>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>  
>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I would if I could, but when I try that, it doesn't work. I'm only 
>>> interested in making sense of reality, not making sense of theories.
>>>
>>>
>>> But then develop your ideas without pretending that they make false 
>>> other theories. Why not trying to be cautious with the work of others, if 
>>> you don't want theorize.
>>> Why asserting that machine cannot support consciousness, if you are not 
>>> interested in making sense of theories. 
>>>
>>
>> Because my hypothesis shows why comp would not be true, so even though I 
>> don't study every theory which assumes comp is true, I can understand that 
>> they must all be false, at least in their ultimate implications. 
>>
>>
>> You don't show that at all. Each time you did, you illustrate that you 
>> agree what the machines are already saying.
>>
>>
> What the machines are saying is true, but not because they know what they 
> are saying. 
>
>
> Of course. They know it because they believe in it and it happens to be 
> true. Indeed.
>

You don't know that at all though. You know that it happens to be true, but 
not that there is any intentional belief there. What if you wanted to make 
a machine that didn't believe anything? What if you wanted to make a 
digital parrot which can listen and repeat but not understand your 
conversations? To me, that is easy, but in your Comp, you seem to be saying 
that this is impossible. 
 

>
>
>
> It's like the tire tracks. I can say 'the car is out of alignment because 
> the steering is pulling to the right' and you can say 'Yes. that is exactly 
> what the tracks say also.'  That doesn't mean that what the tracks say 
> makes sense to the car though.
>
>
> Of course.
>

To me that is the same principle behind all computation. We are tapping 
into the mappings between forms and functions as generic relations but when 
we do, we lose all aesthetic difference, propriety and genuine 
intentionality.
 

>
>
>
>
>
>>
>>
>> That is not to say there is not a lot of important things to study by 
>> assuming that comp is true, I only say that consciousness itself is not one 
>> of them.
>>
>>
>> Comp is defined by consciousness invariance, so what you say does not 
>> make sense. 
>>
>>
> I'm saying that assuming comp is true can teach us how to get really 
> convincing illusions of consciousness, but what is taken to be a creative 
> spring of consciousness at the heart of arithmetic is actually the 
> non-consciousness of the universal un-person. It is a default mode or test 
> pattern. It has no proprietary authenticity. It's like a blister 
> package...it surrounds every product in the same way, and it is more or 
> less shaped like the product, but it is not the product. 
>
>
> OK, but why?
>

Because it is orthogonal to eternity and eternity is the fundamental axis.
 

>
>
>
>
>
>
>>
>>
>>  
>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>  
>>>
>>>> Qualia are useful   
>>>> to accelerate information processing, and the integration of that   
>>>> processing in a person. 
>>>
>>>
>>> I challenge that. Whatever accelerations you are attributing to qualia I 
>>> think are just other types of quanta.
>>>
>>>
>>> No quanta are physical objects. I guess you mean number. But it is not 
>>> because qualia can have some consequences capable of being evaluate with 
>>> some numbers, that qualia are numbers themselves. 
>>>
>>>
>> I didn't think we were talking about physical objects. I was trying to 
>> say that any kind of functional benefit for arithmetic agendas would be 
>> better served by an unconscious quantitative feature than a qualitative 
>> experience.
>>
>>
>> Because you assume that a program might not been able to support an 
>> experience, 
>>
>
> No, not at all. I'm going with the assumption that a program could support 
> an experience here. 
>
>
>
> But then you agree with comp.
>

No, but I can suspend disbelief in comp long enough to consider the 
implications of it.
 

>
>
>
>
>
> The question is, why would it want to, where does it get the idea that 
> there is such a thing as experience, and how does it actually generate such 
> a thing? I see no advantage, no possibility for discovery, and no mechanism 
> to initiate and preserve it.
>
>
> But that's probably because you don't study computer science. The 
> mechanism you ask for is given by self-reference, and the other reference 
> made possible with respect of their most probable computations, and 
> sub-level computations.
>

That's exactly the bias that I would expect Comp to produce. It has nothing 
to do with experienced realism though. Self-reference is a concept which 
takes self and reference both for granted. In a machine, there is neither, 
but there is a pattern of relation which reminds us, like a ventriloquists 
dummy, of something familiar to our actual experience.
 

>
>
>
>
>
>  
>
>> but this force you to introduce non turing emulability of something 
>> present in the brain or in the molecules, but you fail to do so. So you are 
>> speculating on something just to prevent a type of explanation.
>>
>
> I'm surprised you are in the materialist camp on this. 
>
>
> ?
>

You are using the materialist shortsightedness "if you can't point to 
something in the brain that can be weighed, then it can't be real".
 

>
>
>
> I am not saying that there is any new force present in the brain or in the 
> molecules, I am saying that all force is a symptom of motive extension on 
> some level of description, and that the brain and molecules themselves are 
> only symptoms of sense extension on some level of description.
>
>
> That what all ideally correct machines already discover when looking 
> inward, or reasoning.
>

Does that make it untrue?
 

>
>
>
>
>
>> It is like a creationist saying that Darwin evolution is a brilliant 
>> idea, explaining a lot, but failing on what is important: how God made the 
>> world in six days.
>>
>
> But Genesis is an old idea which was around long before Darwin. What I'm 
> talking about is a new idea which says 'evolution explains how species are 
> selected, but it doesn't explain why they belong here in the first place'.
>  
>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>>
>>>
>>>  
>>>
>>>> And they are unavoidable for machines in rich   
>>>> and statistically stable universal relations with each others. 
>>>>
>>>
>>> I don't think that you can know that what you are looking at which 
>>> fulfills the requirements of the UMs is qualia. It's non-communicable, and 
>>> therefore trivially 'private', but that doesn't mean it is experiential. 
>>>
>>>
>>> No, but assuming comp, they are at the least the best candidate for the 
>>> qualia, especially when using the classical theory of knowledge and 
>>> observation, which provide a notion of experience, as explained in the 
>>> paper and in some post I sent.
>>>
>>
>> Sure I agree, but to me assuming comp is like assuming the sky is yellow. 
>> If the sky is yellow then puffy clouds on a sunny day would likely be 
>> black. I don't disagree with the logic, but the beginning assumption is 
>> wrong. 
>>
>>
>> It is wrong because you assume it wrong. You fail to show it is wrong, 
>> without begging the question, I'm afraid.
>>
>
> I don't assume it is wrong, I just see that it can only seem to make sense 
> if you ignore the reality of aesthetics.
>
>
> Why?
>

Because the more seriously we take the implications of comp being true, the 
more they diverge from our aesthetic experience. Comp predicts a universe 
in which aesthetics and authenticity are marginalized and hypothetical at 
best, but if you really look for them in comp, you won't find them.  Comp 
predicts a universe where Difference is trivial and universality is the 
rule, yet what we see in precisely the opposite. Aesthetic qualities are 
*everything* to us. We worship the significance of particular places and 
times for their power to capture our imagination. In a comp simulation, 
solving a problem on your tax return is no better than landing on Mars, its 
all generic execution - circuits and rules which differ from each other 
only in cardinality. All of life becomes a serial number. Why?

Craig


> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Craig
>  
>
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>>
>>
>>
>>
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
> email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com <javascript:>.
> To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com<javascript:>
> .
> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
>  
>  
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
>

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.


Reply via email to