Bruno, With MWI are some universes less probable than others. I have difficulty understanding how a universe can be statistical. I think I understand the frequency argument. But that does not make sense either. Richard
On Mon, May 27, 2013 at 2:36 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > > On 27 May 2013, at 19:10, meekerdb wrote: > > On 5/27/2013 1:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 26 May 2013, at 20:23, meekerdb wrote: > > On 5/26/2013 1:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 26 May 2013, at 04:00, meekerdb wrote: > > >>> >> Whether or not it is recorded or extractable in this universe is >> immaterial. If the universe is infinitely large or infinitely varied, we >> each reappear an infinite number of times. There are a countably infinite >> number of programs, and for any given level of complexity, there is a >> finite number of possible programs shorter than some length. Any >> consciousness we simulate is the consciousness of something that exists >> somewhere else in the infinitely varied/infinitely large universe, and if >> the universe is really this big, then someone else far away could simulate >> you perfectly without having to extract a record of you. Just running >> Bruno's UDA for a long enough time "ressurects" everyone, we are all >> contained in that short program. >> > > > To which, one is tempted to respond: So what? If there is all this > simulation going on, what reason is there to suppose it is being done by > being anything like us or that the worlds in which the simulations take > place (the "real" ones, if there are any) are anything like this one. > > > Because the FPI makes "this one" a statistical sum on all possible one. > > > What do you mean by "a statiscal sum"? FPI must still pick out some kind > of unity; not just an average. > > > Why? How so? > > > If not, then I don't know what FPI means. I thought it referred to one's > experience of being a person, but the is a unity to that experience. I > experience being Brent Meeker. I don't experience being Bruno Marchal. > > > FPI = First Person Indeterminacy. > > When you look at your body, or neighborhood, below your level of > substitution what comp predicts you will see, is the trace of the > infinitley many computations which go through your state. That's how the > FPI makes "this one" resulting from a statistical sum. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > You are simply led back to trying to discover what are possible worlds, > where "possible" can be anything from "familiar enough I can understand it" > to "nomologically possible" to "not containing contradictions". > > > Possible means "livable from a first person point of view in such a way > that you would not see the difference above the substitution level". > > > So all simulations must look just like this?? > > > Yes. When done at the right level (if it exists). By definition, I would > say. > > > How does that then comport with everything happens, because it's NOT the > case that everything happens here. > > > Every possible subjective experience happens, , related to the many > computations (in arithmetic) but with different relative probabilities. > > Comp makes the physical reality more solid, as it show it to rely on > eternal statistics on atemporal number relations. > > "Everything physical happens" is really the "p -> BDp" explained by the > LUMs' theology, and it is more like "shit happens", to be short. (I explain > the math on the FOAR list if you are interested). > > Bruno > > > > > Brent > > > > > > Below the substitution level, everyone (humans, alien, numbers ..) see > the same average on all computations, which, due to the constraints of > self-reference and theoretical computer science is a well structured, > highly complex, mathematical object. > > So what? So physics is reduced to arithmetic, or to machine theology... > and this in a way which saves humans from reductionism. > > > I didn't know reductionism endangered us. :-) > > > It eliminates the person, in theory first, in camp, slavery, our gulag, > after. It is a constant in human history, and it is what gives to religions > (including materialist and atheist one) their bad reputation. Read La > Mettrie and Sade to learn more on this. > > Bruno > > > > > Brent > > It makes also comp into science and out of philosophy. All this leads to > a different, platonist and non aristotelian, view on "reality". It makes > "Matter" into a failed hypothesis (Matter =primitive matter). > > Bruno > > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > No virus found in this message. > Checked by AVG - www.avg.com > Version: 2013.0.3343 / Virus Database: 3184/6358 - Release Date: 05/25/13 > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > No virus found in this message. > Checked by AVG - www.avg.com > Version: 2013.0.3343 / Virus Database: 3184/6360 - Release Date: 05/26/13 > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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