Bruno,
With MWI are some universes less probable than others.
I have difficulty understanding how a universe can be statistical.
I think I understand the frequency argument. But that does not make sense
either.
Richard


On Mon, May 27, 2013 at 2:36 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

>
> On 27 May 2013, at 19:10, meekerdb wrote:
>
>  On 5/27/2013 1:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
>  On 26 May 2013, at 20:23, meekerdb wrote:
>
>  On 5/26/2013 1:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
>  On 26 May 2013, at 04:00, meekerdb wrote:
>
>
>>>
>>  Whether or not it is recorded or extractable in this universe is
>> immaterial.  If the universe is infinitely large or infinitely varied, we
>> each reappear an infinite number of times.  There are a countably infinite
>> number of programs, and for any given level of complexity, there is a
>> finite number of possible programs shorter than some length.  Any
>> consciousness we simulate is the consciousness of something that exists
>> somewhere else in the infinitely varied/infinitely large universe, and if
>> the universe is really this big, then someone else far away could simulate
>> you perfectly without having to extract a record of you.  Just running
>> Bruno's UDA for a long enough time "ressurects" everyone, we are all
>> contained in that short program.
>>
>
>
> To which, one is tempted to respond: So what?  If there is all this
> simulation going on, what reason is there to suppose it is being done by
> being anything like us or that the worlds in which the simulations take
> place (the "real" ones, if there are any) are anything like this one.
>
>
>  Because the FPI makes "this one" a statistical sum on all possible one.
>
>
> What do you mean by "a statiscal sum"?  FPI must still pick out some kind
> of unity; not just an average.
>
>
>  Why? How so?
>
>
> If not, then I don't know what FPI means.  I thought it referred to one's
> experience of being a person, but the is a unity to that experience.  I
> experience being Brent Meeker.  I don't experience being Bruno Marchal.
>
>
> FPI = First Person Indeterminacy.
>
> When you look at your body, or neighborhood, below your  level of
> substitution what comp predicts you will see, is the trace of the
> infinitley many computations which go through your state.  That's how the
> FPI makes "this one" resulting from a statistical sum.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>  You are simply led back to trying to discover what are possible worlds,
> where "possible" can be anything from "familiar enough I can understand it"
> to "nomologically possible" to "not containing contradictions".
>
>
>  Possible means "livable from a first person point of view in such a way
> that you would not see the difference above the substitution level".
>
>
> So all simulations must look just like this??
>
>
>  Yes. When done at the right level (if it exists). By definition, I would
> say.
>
>
> How does that then comport with everything happens, because it's NOT the
> case that everything happens here.
>
>
> Every possible subjective experience happens, , related to the many
> computations (in arithmetic) but with different relative probabilities.
>
> Comp makes the physical reality more solid, as it show it to rely on
> eternal statistics on atemporal number relations.
>
> "Everything physical happens" is really the "p -> BDp" explained by the
> LUMs' theology, and it is more like "shit happens", to be short. (I explain
> the math on the FOAR list if you are interested).
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
> Brent
>
>
>
>
>
>  Below the substitution level, everyone (humans, alien, numbers ..) see
> the same average on all computations, which, due to the constraints of
> self-reference and theoretical computer science is a well structured,
> highly complex, mathematical object.
>
>  So what? So physics is reduced to arithmetic, or to machine theology...
> and this in a way which saves humans from reductionism.
>
>
> I didn't know reductionism endangered us. :-)
>
>
>  It eliminates the person, in theory first, in camp, slavery, our gulag,
> after. It is a constant in human history, and it is what gives to religions
> (including materialist and atheist one) their bad reputation. Read La
> Mettrie and Sade to learn more on this.
>
>  Bruno
>
>
>
>
> Brent
>
>  It makes also comp into science and out of philosophy. All this leads to
> a different, platonist and non aristotelian, view on "reality". It makes
> "Matter" into a failed hypothesis (Matter =primitive matter).
>
>  Bruno
>
>
>
>    http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
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