Bruno, In my model which you have already said is not comp, all the computational histories happen in a mindspace and only one of them become physical. Richard
On Tue, May 28, 2013 at 10:56 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > > On 27 May 2013, at 20:44, Richard Ruquist wrote: > > Bruno, > With MWI are some universes less probable than others. > > > Only relatively to some state, some computational histories are less > probable. It is open if there is a more stringer notion of "probable > universe". Actually it is an open question is the notion of physical > multiverse make sense. There are only coherence conditions on (sharable) > dreams. Keep in mind that I am only translating a problem in math. Then it > is almost obvious it is more a platonist theology than an Aristotelian > theology. No one knows which one is correct. > > > > > > I have difficulty understanding how a universe can be statistical. > > > I have difficulty understanding how a universe can be. > > > > I think I understand the frequency argument. But that does not make sense > either. > > > ? Feel free to explain why. I think it is simpler to forget the notion of > physical universe, and to concentrate on the "computational histories" as > seen by a machine/number. > > Obviously, "neoneo-platonism" is very young, and an infinity of problems > are awaiting us there. > > Bruno > > > > > > Richard > > > On Mon, May 27, 2013 at 2:36 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > >> >> On 27 May 2013, at 19:10, meekerdb wrote: >> >> On 5/27/2013 1:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 26 May 2013, at 20:23, meekerdb wrote: >> >> On 5/26/2013 1:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 26 May 2013, at 04:00, meekerdb wrote: >> >> >>>> >>> Whether or not it is recorded or extractable in this universe is >>> immaterial. If the universe is infinitely large or infinitely varied, we >>> each reappear an infinite number of times. There are a countably infinite >>> number of programs, and for any given level of complexity, there is a >>> finite number of possible programs shorter than some length. Any >>> consciousness we simulate is the consciousness of something that exists >>> somewhere else in the infinitely varied/infinitely large universe, and if >>> the universe is really this big, then someone else far away could simulate >>> you perfectly without having to extract a record of you. Just running >>> Bruno's UDA for a long enough time "ressurects" everyone, we are all >>> contained in that short program. >>> >> >> >> To which, one is tempted to respond: So what? If there is all this >> simulation going on, what reason is there to suppose it is being done by >> being anything like us or that the worlds in which the simulations take >> place (the "real" ones, if there are any) are anything like this one. >> >> >> Because the FPI makes "this one" a statistical sum on all possible one. >> >> >> What do you mean by "a statiscal sum"? FPI must still pick out some kind >> of unity; not just an average. >> >> >> Why? How so? >> >> >> If not, then I don't know what FPI means. I thought it referred to one's >> experience of being a person, but the is a unity to that experience. I >> experience being Brent Meeker. I don't experience being Bruno Marchal. >> >> >> FPI = First Person Indeterminacy. >> >> When you look at your body, or neighborhood, below your level of >> substitution what comp predicts you will see, is the trace of the >> infinitley many computations which go through your state. That's how the >> FPI makes "this one" resulting from a statistical sum. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> You are simply led back to trying to discover what are possible worlds, >> where "possible" can be anything from "familiar enough I can understand it" >> to "nomologically possible" to "not containing contradictions". >> >> >> Possible means "livable from a first person point of view in such a way >> that you would not see the difference above the substitution level". >> >> >> So all simulations must look just like this?? >> >> >> Yes. When done at the right level (if it exists). By definition, I >> would say. >> >> >> How does that then comport with everything happens, because it's NOT the >> case that everything happens here. >> >> >> Every possible subjective experience happens, , related to the many >> computations (in arithmetic) but with different relative probabilities. >> >> Comp makes the physical reality more solid, as it show it to rely on >> eternal statistics on atemporal number relations. >> >> "Everything physical happens" is really the "p -> BDp" explained by the >> LUMs' theology, and it is more like "shit happens", to be short. (I explain >> the math on the FOAR list if you are interested). >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> Brent >> >> >> >> >> >> Below the substitution level, everyone (humans, alien, numbers ..) see >> the same average on all computations, which, due to the constraints of >> self-reference and theoretical computer science is a well structured, >> highly complex, mathematical object. >> >> So what? So physics is reduced to arithmetic, or to machine theology... >> and this in a way which saves humans from reductionism. >> >> >> I didn't know reductionism endangered us. :-) >> >> >> It eliminates the person, in theory first, in camp, slavery, our gulag, >> after. It is a constant in human history, and it is what gives to religions >> (including materialist and atheist one) their bad reputation. Read La >> Mettrie and Sade to learn more on this. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> Brent >> >> It makes also comp into science and out of philosophy. All this leads >> to a different, platonist and non aristotelian, view on "reality". It makes >> "Matter" into a failed hypothesis (Matter =primitive matter). >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> No virus found in this message. >> Checked by AVG - www.avg.com >> Version: 2013.0.3343 / Virus Database: 3184/6358 - Release Date: 05/25/13 >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> >> >> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> >> >> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> No virus found in this message. >> Checked by AVG - www.avg.com >> Version: 2013.0.3343 / Virus Database: 3184/6360 - Release Date: 05/26/13 >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> >> >> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> >> >> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> >> >> > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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