On 9/26/2013 5:40 PM, LizR wrote:
On 27 September 2013 12:18, meekerdb <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On 9/26/2013 4:51 PM, chris peck wrote:
/"Giving the built-in symmetry of this experiment, if asked before the
experiment
about his personal future location, the experiencer must confess he cannot
predict
with certainty the personal outcome of the experiment. He is confronted to
an
unavoidable uncertainty."/
And the situations are very different because prior to teleportation there
is one
me, waiting to be duplicated and sent to both locations. After
teleportation there
are two 'me's, one at either location. That effects the probabilities,
surely?
Mainly because it makes "I" ambiguous. One answer would be the probability
of me
being in Moscow is zero and the probability of me being in Washington is
zero,
because I am going to be destroyed.
Another answer would be the probability of me being in Moscow is one and the
probability of me being in Washington is one, because there are going to be
two of me.
Surely this is directly analogous to the situation in the MWI.
The only difference I can see is that in MWI the whole world splits, and by this I mean
that in each branch your body maintains all the quantum entanglements. In the teleporter
it is only the classical structure of you that can be duplicated (no cloning) and so all
the entanglements are not duplicated (which why you can end up in two classically
different places). Of course that all depends on assuming MWI is true. Sometimes I think
it is a little ironic that the advocates of MWI reduce everything to
computation/information - but they reject the Bayesian/epistemic interpretation of QM in
order to support it.
Brent
If I measure a quantum event like a photon bouncing off / through a semi-silvered
mirror, the chances of each result is 50%. In "classic" qnautum theory I say there is a
50% chance of seeing the photon reflect, say. In the MWI I do the same, but I am now
aware that the probabilities work out as they do because I'm duplicated in the process
(or two pre-existing but fungible versions of me have now become distinct - or perhaps 2
lots of infinite numbers of copies...)
Ignoring the teleporter and just looking at the MWI gives the same results but is
perhaps a bit more intuitive. In the MWI "I" am also destroyed from moment to moment (or
even in classical single-universe physics, if you attach me to a "brain state" it all
gets very Heraclitean), and/or I am also duplicated from moment to moment (at least).
But the probabilities still work - I have a 50-50 chance of seeing the photon bouncing
or transmitting, and equivalently I have a 50-50 chance to end up in Moscow or
Washington. It just seems less obvious when I'm the particle in the experiment.
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