On 9/25/2013 8:22 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Thu, Sep 26, 2013 at 02:34:10AM +0000, chris peck wrote:
I'll have a pop at this because I have a problem too.
I get stuck on Bruno's 'proof' at the point where the comp practitioner, about
to be duplicated and sent to Washington and Moscow, is asked to estimate his
chances of arriving at Moscow. Allegedly I should feel it to be 50/50 and this
establishes 1st person indeterminacy.
Trouble is, as far as I have been able, I can only arrive at the 50/50 result
if I deny 'comp'. That is, if I feel that there is something over and above the
description of me at the required substitution level, that is nevertheless a
vital part of me, that follows one or the other path. But that breaks the rules
of the game. It contradicts comp.
If I follow the rules of the game , if I genuinely believe comp, then I must
also believe (and feel) that a later diary/memory containing the entry 'I am in
Moscow not Washington' and a diary containing the entry 'I am in Washington not
Moscow' both have equal claim on being my diary now. If I believe comp then I
have to say that whilst there will be no diary with both entries, each one is
genuinely mine. Given that, the chances of this diary now containing either
entry later is 1, not 50/50. No indeterminacy.
The diary is the one that you have with you. You will not have two
diaries, since you cannot experience being in Moscow and Wsahington at
the same time with contradicting the "survivability" axiom of
COMP. Therefore the probability of the diary containing 'I am in
Washington not Moscow' is decidedly less than 1. That it is precisely
0.5 is a little more debatable, however, particularly in the later steps.
I've read some responses to similar quibbles alleging that the
quibblers have confused 1-p and 3-p perspectives. Alternatively, you
can argue that you can only buy into Bruno's conclusion if you
covertly smuggle in to the game an illicit concept of 'I' over and
I disagree that the 'I' concept is illicit in this argument. It is
upfront with the "folk" concept of surviving an artificial brain
transplant. The 'I' is what survives.
But the folk concept assumes there can only be one "I".
So when our mortal frame shall be disjoin’d
The lifeless lump uncoupled from the mind,
From sense of grief and pain we shall be free;
We shall not feel, because we will not be.
Nay, though our atoms should revolve by chance,
And matter leap into the former dance;
Though time our life and motion could restore
And make our bodies what they were before.
What gain to us would all this bustle bring?
The new-made man would be another thing;
When once an interrupting pause is made,
That individual Being is decayed.
We who are dead and gone, shall bear no part
In all the pleasures, nor shall feel the smart,
Which to that other Mortal shall accrue,
Whom of our matter time shall mold anew.
--- Lucretius, translated by John Dryden
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