Hi 

Well Im sure that I am missing something important, but I can't see it so far...

>>The diary is the one that you have with you. You will not have two
diaries, since you cannot experience being in Moscow and Wsahington at
the same time with contradicting the "survivability" axiom of
COMP. Therefore the probability of the diary containing 'I am in
Washington not Moscow' is decidedly less than 1. That it is precisely
0.5 is a little more debatable, however, particularly in the later steps.

ISTM you are thinking about things after the teleportation has occurred. If one 
of the 'me's is asked after teleportation but before the doors are opened what 
are the chances of being in moscow, then I can see that there is indeterminacy.

But the way the step is formulated is that I am asked prior to teleportation:

"Giving the built-in symmetry of this experiment, if asked before the 
experiment about his personal future location, the experiencer must confess he 
cannot predict with certainty the personal outcome of the experiment. He is 
confronted to an unavoidable uncertainty."

And the situations are very different because prior to teleportation there is 
one me, waiting to be duplicated and sent to both locations. After 
teleportation there are two 'me's, one at either location. That effects the 
probabilities, surely?

If I am sufficiently described by the reading process to maintain 'I'ness then 
this 'I'ness goes to washington and moscow. Given I am supposed to be a 'comp 
practitioner' and therefore believe that nothing over and above the data read 
constitutes 'I' then, when I am asked what chance there is of me experiencing 
moscow in the future, the probability must be 1. No 1-p indeterminacy.

The indeterminacy of the situation after teleportation is dependent on an 
absence of knowledge concerning which 'me' is being asked the question: 'moscow 
me' or 'washington me'. But the situation prior to teleportation is certain 
because I know I will be both 'moscow me' and 'washington me'. If you like, 
both diaries will be identical up to the point of teleportation.

>> "I disagree that the 'I' concept is illicit in this argument. It is
upfront with the "folk" concept of surviving an artificial brain
transplant. The 'I' is what survives."

No, I assume comp and assume that comp is sufficient. Them are the rules of the 
game. I am not arguing that the comp 'I' is illicit. The illicit 'I' is 
something I feel has to be smuggled in (subconsciously?) to get the feeling of 
indeterminacy. An intuition, if you will, that despite trying to assume comp 
and that this description is being sent to both places, 'I' (an illicit I) only 
ends up at one.

>>That's one of the troubles with intuition pumps. To be quite honest,
that intuition pump fails me

Perhaps you don't, but it isn't important. I think it is generally accepted, 
perhaps not on this list, that one would be banging at the walls of the 
teleporter, screaming to be released, certain of impending death. That kind of 
intuition. The kind it has been fruitful not to ignore in our evolutionary 
past. ;)

All the best



Date: Fri, 27 Sep 2013 09:35:58 +1200
Subject: Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?
From: lizj...@gmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com

The MWI first made me realise that my notion of "I" might be inadequate in more 
ways than I'd previously imagined. For a while I went around thinking "there's 
a version of me - and it IS me - who's spontaneously combusting at this moment. 
And I can't say thank God I'm not her, because I *am* - or the me of a moment 
ago was (meanwhile another version of me has just mysteriously gained godlike 
powers...)


These thoughts used to freak me out a bit. When I later discovered comp it was 
just "oh....same old, same old..." :)






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