On 27 September 2013 12:51, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:

>  On 9/26/2013 5:40 PM, LizR wrote:
>  On 27 September 2013 12:18, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
>>  On 9/26/2013 4:51 PM, chris peck wrote:
>> *"Giving the built-in symmetry of this experiment, if asked before the
>> experiment about his personal future location, the experiencer must confess
>> he cannot predict with certainty the personal outcome of the experiment. He
>> is confronted to an unavoidable uncertainty."*
>> And the situations are very different because prior to teleportation
>> there is one me, waiting to be duplicated and sent to both locations. After
>> teleportation there are two 'me's, one at either location. That effects the
>> probabilities, surely?
>>  Mainly because it makes "I" ambiguous.  One answer would be the
>> probability of me being in Moscow is zero and the probability of me being
>> in Washington is zero, because I am going to be destroyed.
>> Another answer would be the probability of me being in Moscow is one and
>> the probability of me being in Washington is one, because there are going
>> to be two of me.
>>   Surely this is directly analogous to the situation in the MWI.
> The only difference I can see is that in MWI the whole world splits, and
> by this I mean that in each branch your body maintains all the quantum
> entanglements.  In the teleporter it is only the classical structure of you
> that can be duplicated (no cloning) and so all the entanglements are not
> duplicated (which why you can end up in two classically different places).
> Of course that all depends on assuming MWI is true.  Sometimes I think it
> is a little ironic that the advocates of MWI reduce everything to
> computation/information - but they reject the Bayesian/epistemic
> interpretation of QM in order to support it.

Good point, which I would say depends on exactly how the teleporter
actually works. (Are we, for the sake of argument, assuming "Heisenberg
compensators" ? :-)

I assume that in comp the substitution level is assumed to be above the
level of quantum entanglement - indeed, all that has to be duplicated is
the data structure that is (supposedly) stored in your brain. That is
presumably classical data, not qubits. So the same argument would apply if
a copy of you is made in a computer.

This is of course pushing the idea of the brain as digital computer (or
emulable by one) as far as it will go, to see if the wheels come off. The
question is, do they?

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