On 11 Jan 2014, at 04:12, LizR wrote:
On 11 January 2014 15:57, Terren Suydam <[email protected]>
wrote:
If they're all truly identical then yes, it's much easier to see how
it could be experienced as a single consciousness.
But what precisely does it mean for an infinity of computations to
go through my state? How precisely is "my state" specified? Imagine
you have two computations that essentially simulate my brain and
they are identical in every way except that there is a difference in
orientation of a single water molecule. Would one of those
emulations be excluded from the infinity of computations going
through my state? If so, it
I don't think they emulate your brain, only your mental state.
They emulate the brains. emulation is 3p arithmetical (type Bp, G) The
mental is 1p (type Bp & p, S4Grz). the "p" is true (not emulated).
So I don't think a water molecule would normally matter, since it
isn't perceived.
It plays a role for the measure.
seems to be an overly stringent requirement for specifying my state,
but that could just be a question of what substitution level you bet
on. If the two nearly identical simulations do both contribute, then
we can ask the same question of bigger and bigger differences
between two hypothetical simulations until we can say unambiguously
that they cannot both be part of the snapshot of my current
conscious state. The question is then, where exactly did we cross
the line, and how do you define it?
Yes, that sounds reasonable. Although I beleive the subst level
isn't knowable, even in principle, according to Bruno.
Right. Terren asks for something impossible. Even if you know the
level, by chance, you cannot recognize all programs emulating you. We
cannot even recognize a program computing the factorial function, in
general. The link program ==> semantics is NOT computable (cf Rice
theorem, or just the seond recursion theorem: I can explain more).
You can also go through the same exercise, but modifying instead the
environment, where the environment could include other people and
their states of mind. This one seems easier, as you could group
together all computations whose differences don't impact the
environment that I am consciously aware of.
The point being that if we do allow that non-identical emulations
can contribute, that's where the "magic" happens... the fact that my
experience is a measure of the most stable continuations, in the
sense that white rabbits don't appear. Are there other worlds (akin
to Glak's) where I am typing this email only to be interrupted by a
ufo tractoring my house off the ground?
I think we have to assume so, along with ones where you
spontaneously combust, turn into a white rabbit, etc. But those have
very small measure (and I expect one day Bruno will explain why...
but I think this is an open problem!)
Yes, but the non triviality of the hypostases suggests we are not a so
long way from having a measure. the three material hypostases are
close to being under the apossible application of a theorem à-la
Gleason, justifying a unique measure, like a trace of some computation
density operator.
We might need some Ramanujan, of course. And "close" could mean "some
centuries", especially if people continue to ignore the question
(which we do since 1500 years).
Bruno
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