On 11 Jan 2014, at 04:12, LizR wrote:

On 11 January 2014 15:57, Terren Suydam <terren.suy...@gmail.com> wrote: If they're all truly identical then yes, it's much easier to see how it could be experienced as a single consciousness.

But what precisely does it mean for an infinity of computations to go through my state? How precisely is "my state" specified? Imagine you have two computations that essentially simulate my brain and they are identical in every way except that there is a difference in orientation of a single water molecule. Would one of those emulations be excluded from the infinity of computations going through my state? If so, it

I don't think they emulate your brain, only your mental state.

They emulate the brains. emulation is 3p arithmetical (type Bp, G) The mental is 1p (type Bp & p, S4Grz). the "p" is true (not emulated).



So I don't think a water molecule would normally matter, since it isn't perceived.

It plays a role for the measure.



seems to be an overly stringent requirement for specifying my state, but that could just be a question of what substitution level you bet on. If the two nearly identical simulations do both contribute, then we can ask the same question of bigger and bigger differences between two hypothetical simulations until we can say unambiguously that they cannot both be part of the snapshot of my current conscious state. The question is then, where exactly did we cross the line, and how do you define it?

Yes, that sounds reasonable. Although I beleive the subst level isn't knowable, even in principle, according to Bruno.

Right. Terren asks for something impossible. Even if you know the level, by chance, you cannot recognize all programs emulating you. We cannot even recognize a program computing the factorial function, in general. The link program ==> semantics is NOT computable (cf Rice theorem, or just the seond recursion theorem: I can explain more).



You can also go through the same exercise, but modifying instead the environment, where the environment could include other people and their states of mind. This one seems easier, as you could group together all computations whose differences don't impact the environment that I am consciously aware of.

The point being that if we do allow that non-identical emulations can contribute, that's where the "magic" happens... the fact that my experience is a measure of the most stable continuations, in the sense that white rabbits don't appear. Are there other worlds (akin to Glak's) where I am typing this email only to be interrupted by a ufo tractoring my house off the ground?

I think we have to assume so, along with ones where you spontaneously combust, turn into a white rabbit, etc. But those have very small measure (and I expect one day Bruno will explain why... but I think this is an open problem!)

Yes, but the non triviality of the hypostases suggests we are not a so long way from having a measure. the three material hypostases are close to being under the apossible application of a theorem à-la Gleason, justifying a unique measure, like a trace of some computation density operator. We might need some Ramanujan, of course. And "close" could mean "some centuries", especially if people continue to ignore the question (which we do since 1500 years).

Bruno





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