On 11 Jan 2014, at 04:12, LizR wrote:

On 11 January 2014 15:57, Terren Suydam <terren.suy...@gmail.com>wrote:If they're all truly identical then yes, it's much easier to see howit could be experienced as a single consciousness.But what precisely does it mean for an infinity of computations togo through my state? How precisely is "my state" specified? Imagineyou have two computations that essentially simulate my brain andthey are identical in every way except that there is a difference inorientation of a single water molecule. Would one of thoseemulations be excluded from the infinity of computations goingthrough my state? If so, itI don't think they emulate your brain, only your mental state.

`They emulate the brains. emulation is 3p arithmetical (type Bp, G) The`

`mental is 1p (type Bp & p, S4Grz). the "p" is true (not emulated).`

So I don't think a water molecule would normally matter, since itisn't perceived.

It plays a role for the measure.

seems to be an overly stringent requirement for specifying my state,but that could just be a question of what substitution level you beton. If the two nearly identical simulations do both contribute, thenwe can ask the same question of bigger and bigger differencesbetween two hypothetical simulations until we can say unambiguouslythat they cannot both be part of the snapshot of my currentconscious state. The question is then, where exactly did we crossthe line, and how do you define it?Yes, that sounds reasonable. Although I beleive the subst levelisn't knowable, even in principle, according to Bruno.

`Right. Terren asks for something impossible. Even if you know the`

`level, by chance, you cannot recognize all programs emulating you. We`

`cannot even recognize a program computing the factorial function, in`

`general. The link program ==> semantics is NOT computable (cf Rice`

`theorem, or just the seond recursion theorem: I can explain more).`

You can also go through the same exercise, but modifying instead theenvironment, where the environment could include other people andtheir states of mind. This one seems easier, as you could grouptogether all computations whose differences don't impact theenvironment that I am consciously aware of.The point being that if we do allow that non-identical emulationscan contribute, that's where the "magic" happens... the fact that myexperience is a measure of the most stable continuations, in thesense that white rabbits don't appear. Are there other worlds (akinto Glak's) where I am typing this email only to be interrupted by aufo tractoring my house off the ground?I think we have to assume so, along with ones where youspontaneously combust, turn into a white rabbit, etc. But those havevery small measure (and I expect one day Bruno will explain why...but I think this is an open problem!)

`Yes, but the non triviality of the hypostases suggests we are not a so`

`long way from having a measure. the three material hypostases are`

`close to being under the apossible application of a theorem à-la`

`Gleason, justifying a unique measure, like a trace of some computation`

`density operator.`

`We might need some Ramanujan, of course. And "close" could mean "some`

`centuries", especially if people continue to ignore the question`

`(which we do since 1500 years).`

Bruno

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