On 11 Jan 2014, at 03:57, Terren Suydam wrote:

If they're all truly identical then yes, it's much easier to see how it could be experienced as a single consciousness.

But what precisely does it mean for an infinity of computations to go through my state?

It means that from your first person perspective, you would not see the difference between those computations. Now this is not constructive. If you look at the UD* from outside, you cannot in general recognize those computations. But by definition, they go through the right subst level, so you can lived them, and they add to the measure.





How precisely is "my state" specified? Imagine you have two computations that essentially simulate my brain and they are identical in every way except that there is a difference in orientation of a single water molecule.


Normally, this will count as two different computations. But actually, it is simple to distinguish the computations by the i in the computations of the phi_i(x) in the UD*.



Would one of those emulations be excluded from the infinity of computations going through my state?

No.


If so, it seems to be an overly stringent requirement for specifying my state, but that could just be a question of what substitution level you bet on.

of course, if the position of the water molecule implemented a special private memory, then the computations can differentiate, and you need to refine the subst level. If not, you will have two equiavlent computations, but running in different part of the UD*, and this can play a role in the measure.



If the two nearly identical simulations do both contribute, then we can ask the same question of bigger and bigger differences between two hypothetical simulations until we can say unambiguously that they cannot both be part of the snapshot of my current conscious state. The question is then, where exactly did we cross the line, and how do you define it?

We cannot know our level, and worst: we cannot algorithmically recognize what a program do. So there is just no 3p criterion. That is why you need to *bet* on a level. But this makes only the problem more complex, and physics get the non computable feature on which I insist so often.




You can also go through the same exercise, but modifying instead the environment, where the environment could include other people and their states of mind. This one seems easier, as you could group together all computations whose differences don't impact the environment that I am consciously aware of.

The point being that if we do allow that non-identical emulations can contribute,

We do allow them, an infinity of them. They all contribute.




that's where the "magic" happens... the fact that my experience is a measure of the most stable continuations, in the sense that white rabbits don't appear. Are there other worlds (akin to Glak's) where I am typing this email only to be interrupted by a ufo tractoring my house off the ground?

Yes, but if comp is true, that events has a very low probability to happen, but it is not null. The same already happens with QM.

Bruno




Terren

On Jan 10, 2014 9:02 PM, "LizR" <lizj...@gmail.com> wrote:
On 11 January 2014 14:34, Terren Suydam <terren.suy...@gmail.com> wrote: Yeah, if there's one thing about the UDA that seems like magic to me, that's it - how an infinity of emulations "condense" into a single conscious experience.

If they're identical, I guess you wouldn't be able to tell the experiences apart. They would be "fungible", like the infinite identical copies that exist in the MWI prior to branching / differentiation. So they would just be one experience, even if it was generated an infinite number of times. I guess this is the "capsule theory" of identity, like Fred Hoyle and "his pigeon holes and flashlight" view of consciousness in "October the first is too late". From the viewpoint of the experiencer, it wouldn't matter if millions of pigeon holes were identical, with identical notes in them, and others only appeared once.

I think.

(I'm assuming it's the "infinity" part that's the problem...)


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