On 11 Jan 2014, at 03:57, Terren Suydam wrote:

If they're all truly identical then yes, it's much easier to see howit could be experienced as a single consciousness.But what precisely does it mean for an infinity of computations togo through my state?

`It means that from your first person perspective, you would not see`

`the difference between those computations. Now this is not`

`constructive. If you look at the UD* from outside, you cannot in`

`general recognize those computations. But by definition, they go`

`through the right subst level, so you can lived them, and they add to`

`the measure.`

How precisely is "my state" specified? Imagine you have twocomputations that essentially simulate my brain and they areidentical in every way except that there is a difference inorientation of a single water molecule.

`Normally, this will count as two different computations. But actually,`

`it is simple to distinguish the computations by the i in the`

`computations of the phi_i(x) in the UD*.`

Would one of those emulations be excluded from the infinity ofcomputations going through my state?

No.

If so, it seems to be an overly stringent requirement for specifyingmy state, but that could just be a question of what substitutionlevel you bet on.

`of course, if the position of the water molecule implemented a special`

`private memory, then the computations can differentiate, and you need`

`to refine the subst level. If not, you will have two equiavlent`

`computations, but running in different part of the UD*, and this can`

`play a role in the measure.`

If the two nearly identical simulations do both contribute, then wecan ask the same question of bigger and bigger differences betweentwo hypothetical simulations until we can say unambiguously thatthey cannot both be part of the snapshot of my current consciousstate. The question is then, where exactly did we cross the line,and how do you define it?

`We cannot know our level, and worst: we cannot algorithmically`

`recognize what a program do. So there is just no 3p criterion. That is`

`why you need to *bet* on a level. But this makes only the problem more`

`complex, and physics get the non computable feature on which I insist`

`so often.`

You can also go through the same exercise, but modifying instead theenvironment, where the environment could include other people andtheir states of mind. This one seems easier, as you could grouptogether all computations whose differences don't impact theenvironment that I am consciously aware of.The point being that if we do allow that non-identical emulationscan contribute,

We do allow them, an infinity of them. They all contribute.

that's where the "magic" happens... the fact that my experience is ameasure of the most stable continuations, in the sense that whiterabbits don't appear. Are there other worlds (akin to Glak's) whereI am typing this email only to be interrupted by a ufo tractoring myhouse off the ground?

`Yes, but if comp is true, that events has a very low probability to`

`happen, but it is not null. The same already happens with QM.`

Bruno

Terren On Jan 10, 2014 9:02 PM, "LizR" <lizj...@gmail.com> wrote:On 11 January 2014 14:34, Terren Suydam <terren.suy...@gmail.com>wrote:Yeah, if there's one thing about the UDA that seems like magic tome, that's it - how an infinity of emulations "condense" into asingle conscious experience.If they're identical, I guess you wouldn't be able to tell theexperiences apart. They would be "fungible", like the infiniteidentical copies that exist in the MWI prior to branching /differentiation. So they would just be one experience, even if itwas generated an infinite number of times. I guess this is the"capsule theory" of identity, like Fred Hoyle and "his pigeon holesand flashlight" view of consciousness in "October the first is toolate". From the viewpoint of the experiencer, it wouldn't matter ifmillions of pigeon holes were identical, with identical notes inthem, and others only appeared once.I think. (I'm assuming it's the "infinity" part that's the problem...) --You received this message because you are subscribed to the GoogleGroups "Everything List" group.To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. --You received this message because you are subscribed to the GoogleGroups "Everything List" group.To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

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