On 11 Jan 2014, at 03:57, Terren Suydam wrote:
If they're all truly identical then yes, it's much easier to see how
it could be experienced as a single consciousness.
But what precisely does it mean for an infinity of computations to
go through my state?
It means that from your first person perspective, you would not see
the difference between those computations. Now this is not
constructive. If you look at the UD* from outside, you cannot in
general recognize those computations. But by definition, they go
through the right subst level, so you can lived them, and they add to
the measure.
How precisely is "my state" specified? Imagine you have two
computations that essentially simulate my brain and they are
identical in every way except that there is a difference in
orientation of a single water molecule.
Normally, this will count as two different computations. But actually,
it is simple to distinguish the computations by the i in the
computations of the phi_i(x) in the UD*.
Would one of those emulations be excluded from the infinity of
computations going through my state?
No.
If so, it seems to be an overly stringent requirement for specifying
my state, but that could just be a question of what substitution
level you bet on.
of course, if the position of the water molecule implemented a special
private memory, then the computations can differentiate, and you need
to refine the subst level. If not, you will have two equiavlent
computations, but running in different part of the UD*, and this can
play a role in the measure.
If the two nearly identical simulations do both contribute, then we
can ask the same question of bigger and bigger differences between
two hypothetical simulations until we can say unambiguously that
they cannot both be part of the snapshot of my current conscious
state. The question is then, where exactly did we cross the line,
and how do you define it?
We cannot know our level, and worst: we cannot algorithmically
recognize what a program do. So there is just no 3p criterion. That is
why you need to *bet* on a level. But this makes only the problem more
complex, and physics get the non computable feature on which I insist
so often.
You can also go through the same exercise, but modifying instead the
environment, where the environment could include other people and
their states of mind. This one seems easier, as you could group
together all computations whose differences don't impact the
environment that I am consciously aware of.
The point being that if we do allow that non-identical emulations
can contribute,
We do allow them, an infinity of them. They all contribute.
that's where the "magic" happens... the fact that my experience is a
measure of the most stable continuations, in the sense that white
rabbits don't appear. Are there other worlds (akin to Glak's) where
I am typing this email only to be interrupted by a ufo tractoring my
house off the ground?
Yes, but if comp is true, that events has a very low probability to
happen, but it is not null. The same already happens with QM.
Bruno
Terren
On Jan 10, 2014 9:02 PM, "LizR" <[email protected]> wrote:
On 11 January 2014 14:34, Terren Suydam <[email protected]>
wrote:
Yeah, if there's one thing about the UDA that seems like magic to
me, that's it - how an infinity of emulations "condense" into a
single conscious experience.
If they're identical, I guess you wouldn't be able to tell the
experiences apart. They would be "fungible", like the infinite
identical copies that exist in the MWI prior to branching /
differentiation. So they would just be one experience, even if it
was generated an infinite number of times. I guess this is the
"capsule theory" of identity, like Fred Hoyle and "his pigeon holes
and flashlight" view of consciousness in "October the first is too
late". From the viewpoint of the experiencer, it wouldn't matter if
millions of pigeon holes were identical, with identical notes in
them, and others only appeared once.
I think.
(I'm assuming it's the "infinity" part that's the problem...)
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