On 19 Jan 2014, at 03:39, LizR wrote:
It would seem that "sufficiently advanced technology" will
eventually be able to detect all the neural correlates of
consciousness.
Betting on some theory. Betting on some substitution level. Beware the
charlatan.
Maybe a p-zombie should be defined as something that has the neural
correlates of consciousness but is still somehow not conscious.
Yes. Good idea.
Or that there ain't no such animal.
We can logically conceive them. Imagine a dead corpse. You can easily
conceive that he is not conscious. Now, animate the dead corpse so
that it behaves like he was alive, but keep conceiving that it is
unconscious, a bit like an actor in a movie, except it interacts
"relevantly" with you.
There is no flagrant contradiction. And that is all you need to
conceive them logically, without choosing any theory in particular.
Now, in some theory, that can become contradictory, or having an
infinitesimal plausiblity.
You can conceive zombie, like you can conceive Santa Klaus.
No need to believe in them, nor even in their plausibility to be
conceivable.
Bruno
On 19 January 2014 15:38, Russell Standish <li...@hpcoders.com.au>
wrote:
My information comes from New Scientist, so its not specialist
knowledge.
That said, Global Workspace Theory appears to be empirically confirmed
by the latest neuroscience, and that would be the space where the
system integrates the outputs of its various subsystems, ie is
self-conscious.
The other idea that is interesting in quite the same way is Tononi's
integrated information measure of brain activity.
Whilst all of this is cutting edge, and hence subject to revision as
new research is done, it does seem to me that it will be quite
possible to have a measure of a system that indicates self-awareness
(given sufficient time series data of its components).
On Sat, Jan 18, 2014 at 09:10:42PM -0500, Stephen Paul King wrote:
> Dear Russel,
>
> Can we detect self-modeling in our brains now? I have been doing
some
> research into Secure computation, trust me, my team is pretty sure
that we
> can make computations look like noise on the network.
>
>
> On Sat, Jan 18, 2014 at 8:50 PM, Russell Standish <li...@hpcoders.com.au
>wrote:
>
> > On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 02:48:53PM -0500, Stephen Paul King wrote:
> > > Dare Jason,
> > >
> > >
> > > On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 1:48 PM, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com
>
> > wrote:
> > > >
> > > > So why can't zombies have intentions? Remember the only
thing zombies
> > > > supposedly lack is qualia. If a zombie is hungry and goes
out to buy a
> > > > burger, I would say it had an intention to fill its stomach.
> > > >
> > >
> > > Intentions require self-models. Zombies by definition cannot
have
> > > self-models otherwise they would have first person experience.
My point
> > is
> > > that I am claiming that self-models are, content-wise, the
same as first
> > > person experience. 1-p is, after all what we are considering
that a
> > zombie
> > > does not have, so how can it have intentionality? It has no
object to
> > whom
> > > the intention obtains, thus no intentionality.
> >
> > I don't see the obviousness in "Zombies by definition cannot have
> > self-models otherwise they would have first person experience".
The
> > presence of a self model is something that is objectively
verifiable,
> > by albeit rather intrusive neurophysiological means. Your
statement
> > would entail a physical difference between a zombie and a non-
zombie,
> > whereas, conventionally a p-zombie is physically indistinguishable
> > from the conscious person.
> >
> >
> > --
> >
> >
> >
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> > Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
> > Principal, High Performance Coders
> > Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
> > University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au
> >
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