On 20 Jan 2014, at 01:24, LizR wrote:
On 20 January 2014 06:38, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
We can logically conceive them. Imagine a dead corpse. You can
easily conceive that he is not conscious. Now, animate the dead
corpse so that it behaves like he was alive, but keep conceiving
that it is unconscious, a bit like an actor in a movie, except it
interacts "relevantly" with you.
How is it animated?
By the will of God. For example.
Is it providential cosmic rays? OK, I guess that shows such can
exist, or we can be deluded (briefly). Or is it someone operating
the corpse by remote control, by plugging in millions of radio
transceivers into its nervous system?
No, for the problem at stake, it makes no sense to ask what animate
the zombie. You better need a non-comp idea (like the will of God, or
Magic), to conceive it. You can conceive magic, I hope. Just imagine a
magician, and you don't see the trick. Well just imagine that there is
no trick.
There is no flagrant contradiction. And that is all you need to
conceive them logically, without choosing any theory in particular.
OK, I suppose it's (kind of) possible. I spoke too loosely to say
there ain't no such being. The real question is this one...
Now, in some theory, that can become contradictory, or having an
infinitesimal plausiblity.
I think certainly infinitesimal, yes, but you're right - they are
possible. Unless somehow contradictory.
We don't like the notion of p-zombie, because it illustrates the
difficulty of the notion of consciousness. That is a reason more to
stay rational and adopt, at least until a contradiction shows up,
hypothesis like comp, in which the notion of zombie does not make
sense. But before choosing any theory, the conception of zombie is
very simple, you don't need more than the ability to conceive Santa
Klaus existence, and all children can do that.
Logic and (serious) philosophy relies on just one difficult exercise:
the ability to put our knowledge aside, and to recover our initial
schoolboy or schoolgirl beginners state.
Probably more on this when I explain modal logic. There are
interesting relations.
Bruno
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