On Sun, Jan 19, 2014 at 11:38 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

>
> On 19 Jan 2014, at 03:39, LizR wrote:
>
> It would seem that "sufficiently advanced technology" will eventually be
> able to detect all the neural correlates of consciousness.
>
>
> Betting on some theory. Betting on some substitution level. Beware the
> charlatan.
>
>
>
> Maybe a p-zombie should be defined as something that has the neural
> correlates of consciousness but is still somehow not conscious.
>
>
> Yes. Good idea.
>
>
>
> Or that there ain't no such animal.
>
>
> We can logically conceive them. Imagine a dead corpse. You can easily
> conceive that he is not conscious. Now, animate the dead corpse so that it
> behaves like he was alive, but keep conceiving that it is unconscious, a
> bit like an actor in a movie, except it interacts "relevantly" with you.
>
> There is no flagrant contradiction. And that is all you need to conceive
> them logically, without choosing any theory in particular.
>
> Now, in some theory, that can become contradictory, or having an
> infinitesimal plausiblity.
>
> You can conceive zombie, like you can conceive Santa Klaus.
> No need to believe in them, nor even in their plausibility to be
> conceivable.
>
>
My problem with this though is if a zombie is physically indistinguishable,
then all the same information content exists in the zombie brain as the
non-zombie brain. So is it not correct to say the zombie knows something
when it possesses all the right information in its brain? If it knows it
sees colors, knows it has beliefs, knows it is conscious, but somehow is
not conscious, this, to me, seems like a contradiction.

Jason

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