> On 3 Jan 2019, at 02:26, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote: > > > > On Wednesday, January 2, 2019 at 12:18:50 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 30 Dec 2018, at 18:56, agrays...@gmail.com <javascript:> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Sunday, December 30, 2018 at 12:10:12 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> > On 24 Dec 2018, at 16:29, Mason Green <mason...@hotmail.com <>> wrote: >> > >> > David Deutsch suggested something like this I (that individual universes >> > are discrete, but the multiverse as a whole is continuous). >> > >> > “within each universe all observable quantities are discrete, but the >> > multiverse as a whole is a continuum. When the equations of quantum theory >> > describe a continuous but not-directly-observable transition between two >> > values of a discrete quantity, what they are telling us is that the >> > transition does not take place entirely within one universe. So perhaps >> > the price of continuous motion is not an infinity of consecutive actions, >> > but an infinity of concurrent actions taking place across the multiverse.” >> > January, 2001 The Discrete and the Continuous >> >> This is consistent with Digital Mechanism, and plausibly mandatory too. The >> computations evolves discretly, vertically in the universal computational >> deployment (the tiny sigma_1 arithmetic), but the first person indeterminacy >> is horizontal and takes into account infinitely many computations. But the >> precise topology and cardinality remains open problems. >> >> Bruno >> >> Applying this to a horse race, one not only gets dIscrete multiple >> universes, one for each horse as the winner, > > Why? I don’t see this. Horses could be classical machine, in which case the > same horse is the winner in all, or quasi-all universes. > > You believe that everything that's possible to happen, must happen; ergo Many > Worlds.

I prove that all computations are run in arithmetic, with relative proportion, handled by the math of self)-reference. I don’t believe in any world, nor even that the notion of (physical) world make sense, at least when using my working hypothesis. I do not assume a physical world, nor a physical theory. That is what we have to explain. > Horses are classical objects, so you can reject this example of the fallacy > in your thinking by modeling a situation with similar outcomes in a quantum > setting. AG In this case, I was (temporally, for the sake of the discussion) assuming the SWE, but nothing more. >> but assuming space is continuous, an additional uncountable set of >> universes for each winner, where the losers have different positions when >> the winner crosses the finish end line. This is not only beautiful. but >> utterly sublime. Wouldn't you agree? AG > > Yes, the multiplication would occur (assuming space continuous). But the same > horse would still be the winner, except perhaps if two horses are so close > that in some universe another one wins the race, due to that location > superposition. Yet, if the horse behaves classically, with respect to their > muscular force and strategy, the winner will be the same in some majority > (say) of worlds. That is a good thing, as it makes it possible for large > creature to have a partial control on their destiny, and take a lift instead > of jumping through a window. Of course such a classical appearance have to be > explained from the quantum formalism, and with mechanism, such quantum > formalism has to be justified from the statistics on many computations (of > all types). > > If you recast the horse race in a quantum context, which shouldn't be too > difficult, you will see that your *bias* that all things which are possible > to happen, MUST happen, leads to an absurdity. Try this; imagine several > electrons fired simultaneously, and the winner is the one which lands at the > positive extremity. No broken legs here, but I think one could massage this > model to include that as well. AG Yes, but that would be like, prior to the horse race, of putting them explicitly in a superposition state, like giving them some drugs according to some quantum choice. But without that, QM will predict the same horse will win in all “quasi-classical” reality. As a scientist, I just count the evidences, and evaluate the plausibility of the big picture proposed.I predicted the many-world appearances much before I realised the physicists were already open to this for empirical reason. Once you understand that there are infinitely many computations going through you actual state, you can understand that we have to see the trace of those computations when looking at ourself at a finer grained level than our substitution level. Then the rest is math, and more quantitative predictions. Bruno > > Bruno > > > > > >> >> >> >> > >> > -- >> > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> > "Everything List" group. >> > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> > email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com <>. >> > To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com <>. >> > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list >> > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. >> > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout >> > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com <javascript:>. >> To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com >> <javascript:>. >> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list >> <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout >> <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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