On 1/5/2019 1:50 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 4 Jan 2019, at 19:35, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:



On 1/4/2019 3:51 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 4 Jan 2019, at 05:16, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:



On 1/3/2019 6:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
As a scientist, I just count the evidences, and evaluate the plausibility of 
the big picture proposed.I predicted the many-world appearances much before I 
realised the physicists were already open to this for empirical reason. Once 
you understand that there are infinitely many computations going through you 
actual state,
What does it mean "your actual state"?   How is it defined within the UD?
It is defined indexically, like in a block universe, but in a more precise way through the Gödel 
number of a Löbian machine in the []p & X modes (with X in {p, <>t, <>t & p}, p 
being limited to the sigma_1 (semi-computable) arithmetical sentences.
I don't think I understand that.  You're saying that within all the UD 
computations there are ones that implement specific Lobian machines and their 
interactions with some world they are embedded in?
This comes from the first person indeterminacy on the computations.

Every computation is a person?  What does it mean "a computation"? ...one of the threads of the UD?  or some state of the UD?

To have a probability notion, we need to define the measure one by []p & <>t. (Because with 
the logic G we don’t have []p -> <>t, and we need the “<>t” to avoid the cul-de-sac (cf 
the typical default hypothesis in probability theory).

The FPI is on all computations (sigma_1 sentences), but they are restricted by 
being those implementing consistent extensions on the Löbian machine “you are”.
Consistent in what sense?  Just not proving a contradiction...how does  thread of the UD prove a contradiction?  or does it mean consistent in the sense of representing a quasi-classical world in which the electron's spin measures either UP of DOWN but not both?


There is no “world” per, only computations “rich enough” to continue 
consistently your history (the “world” will be apparent only).

So will it be apparently consistent?  What would it mean for it to be inconsistent?  Logic is timeless so if it proves X and then it proves not-X that is a contradiction.  But FP experience is not timeless,  so X can be true now and not-X true later and there is no contradiction.








Of coure, "actual state" does not refer to anything in the mind-block picture 
(which is just the structure (N, 0, +, *)). The actual state is purely phenomenological.
?? This is supposed to explain phenomenology in terms of computations.  I understand 
computations, like Turing machines, have states.  But I don't understand these 
"actual states”.
I am not sure to understand your problem here. All mind state are actual from 
the first person point of view.
"Mind state" = "a conscious thought"?  OK, but then how does that relate to the computations of a UD?


The definition of “[]p” is already an indexical,

"Indexical" literally means you can point to it.  I don't understand how you are using the word.

and you can add axioms like “I am in Helsinki” or “I am in Washington”, which 
change the actual state/machine (but G and G* still applies to them). The 
phenomenologies are given by the hypostases. The physical phenomenologies is 
given by the sigma_1 sentences structured by the mode of each “material” 
hypostases (the one given by the X above).




We cannot define it in any 3p terms. It is pure 1p, but with mechanism,
But the idea is to explain 1p experience in 3p terms, i.e. in terms of 
computations.
At the meta level only. We can define, like Theaetetus, knowledge (which is 1p) by “[]p 
& p”, but only because we limit ourself, non constructively, to sound machine. The 
machine itself cannot do that: “[]p & p” cannot be define in the language of the 
machine, for reason similar as the fact that they cannot define truth.

This explains why the 1p “I” has to look non definable by each concerned entity 
about itself,

Fine, I understand that.  But you propose that it is definable in terms of the computations of the UD and that's the definition I seek.

and this is what lead to retrieved consciousness associated indexically, and non 
constructively, to the machine, if you are OK to define consciousness by (immediate, 
with <>t) knowable, indubitable, but also non rationally justifiable (provable) 
and non definable.
Those are all 1p attributes of propositions.  The question is how they are instantiated in the UD computations.


Consciousness is just the name we give to that personal feeling.

You see that consciousness has no 3p definition from the machine’s point of 
view. But “we”, who knows that the machine is sound (because we limit ourself 
to such machine) can know and prove this. The machine can do the same about any 
machine supposed to be correct.






its (meta) logic is captured by the (3p describable if the machine assumes 
Mechanism) material mode.
We know that intuitively: the actual state of the guy in Moscow is “I am in 
Moscow”, and the actual state of the guy in Washington is “I am in Washington”. 
Both are correct, but as everyone know (except John apparently), both the W and 
M guys  feel their actual state as being very different of the mental state of 
their counterpart.
The trouble with that explanation is that you have jumped from description in 
terms of a UD, to a description in terms of a world with Washington and Moscow 
and a duplicating machine.  Leaving a chasm of explanation between the two.
Which chasm? Keep in mind that (at the meta-level) we assume computationalism. 
Whatever experience you live in the duplication experience in some “world” 
(assuming that exist), there will be computations in arithmetic mimicking those 
histories, and the 1p indeterminacy is on those computations. Again, I was 
assuming some “world” with Washington and Moscow, but that is neutral on the 
primary character that such world would have with the Materialist position, 
which is NOT assume.
You say it is not assumed.  But you use it as though it is assumed and you didn't derive it.


That is already done at the step 1 of the UDA. There is a chasm only if you 
assume the ontological of world, but that is not in need to be assumed. Replace 
such world by any computation mimicking the world enough so that the 1p view 
cannot distinguish such world and the computation.
Yes, I made that same point a long time ago, that if the UD is going to produce conscious thoughts it must produce a "world" in which those are thoughts about something.

Take, in case you feel the substitution level is very low (fine grained) the 
Heisenberg Matrix of our cluster of galaxies at the level of quarks with 
10^(100^1000) decimals. It is executed somewhere in the sigma_1 arithmetical 
reality (by the comp assumption).

It is not good enough to just say it must be in there somewhere "assuming comp", because we are testing comp by seeing whether it describes experience.  So it is evasive to say that in the infinitude of arithmetic and UD computations, a descriptions of your experience, and any possible experience, in in there.

Brent

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