# Re: "No black-hole singularities" in an undated loop-quantum-gravity theory

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On 1/5/2019 1:50 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
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```On 4 Jan 2019, at 19:35, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:

On 1/4/2019 3:51 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
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```On 4 Jan 2019, at 05:16, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:

On 1/3/2019 6:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
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```As a scientist, I just count the evidences, and evaluate the plausibility of
the big picture proposed.I predicted the many-world appearances much before I
realised the physicists were already open to this for empirical reason. Once
you understand that there are infinitely many computations going through you
actual state,
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```What does it mean "your actual state"?   How is it defined within the UD?
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```It is defined indexically, like in a block universe, but in a more precise way through the Gödel
number of a Löbian machine in the []p & X modes (with X in {p, <>t, <>t & p}, p
being limited to the sigma_1 (semi-computable) arithmetical sentences.
```
```I don't think I understand that.  You're saying that within all the UD
computations there are ones that implement specific Lobian machines and their
interactions with some world they are embedded in?
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```This comes from the first person indeterminacy on the computations.
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Every computation is a person?  What does it mean "a computation"? ...one of the threads of the UD?  or some state of the UD?
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```To have a probability notion, we need to define the measure one by []p & <>t. (Because with
the logic G we don’t have []p -> <>t, and we need the “<>t” to avoid the cul-de-sac (cf
the typical default hypothesis in probability theory).

The FPI is on all computations (sigma_1 sentences), but they are restricted by
being those implementing consistent extensions on the Löbian machine “you are”.
```
Consistent in what sense?  Just not proving a contradiction...how does  thread of the UD prove a contradiction?  or does it mean consistent in the sense of representing a quasi-classical world in which the electron's spin measures either UP of DOWN but not both?
```

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```There is no “world” per, only computations “rich enough” to continue
consistently your history (the “world” will be apparent only).
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So will it be apparently consistent?  What would it mean for it to be inconsistent?  Logic is timeless so if it proves X and then it proves not-X that is a contradiction.  But FP experience is not timeless,  so X can be true now and not-X true later and there is no contradiction.
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```Of coure, "actual state" does not refer to anything in the mind-block picture
(which is just the structure (N, 0, +, *)). The actual state is purely phenomenological.
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```?? This is supposed to explain phenomenology in terms of computations.  I understand
computations, like Turing machines, have states.  But I don't understand these
"actual states”.
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```I am not sure to understand your problem here. All mind state are actual from
the first person point of view.
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"Mind state" = "a conscious thought"?  OK, but then how does that relate to the computations of a UD?
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```The definition of “[]p” is already an indexical,
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"Indexical" literally means you can point to it.  I don't understand how you are using the word.
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```and you can add axioms like “I am in Helsinki” or “I am in Washington”, which
change the actual state/machine (but G and G* still applies to them). The
phenomenologies are given by the hypostases. The physical phenomenologies is
given by the sigma_1 sentences structured by the mode of each “material”
hypostases (the one given by the X above).

```
```We cannot define it in any 3p terms. It is pure 1p, but with mechanism,
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```But the idea is to explain 1p experience in 3p terms, i.e. in terms of
computations.
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```At the meta level only. We can define, like Theaetetus, knowledge (which is 1p) by “[]p
& p”, but only because we limit ourself, non constructively, to sound machine. The
machine itself cannot do that: “[]p & p” cannot be define in the language of the
machine, for reason similar as the fact that they cannot define truth.

This explains why the 1p “I” has to look non definable by each concerned entity
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Fine, I understand that.  But you propose that it is definable in terms of the computations of the UD and that's the definition I seek.
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```and this is what lead to retrieved consciousness associated indexically, and non
constructively, to the machine, if you are OK to define consciousness by (immediate,
with <>t) knowable, indubitable, but also non rationally justifiable (provable)
and non definable.
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Those are all 1p attributes of propositions.  The question is how they are instantiated in the UD computations.
```

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```Consciousness is just the name we give to that personal feeling.

You see that consciousness has no 3p definition from the machine’s point of
view. But “we”, who knows that the machine is sound (because we limit ourself
to such machine) can know and prove this. The machine can do the same about any
machine supposed to be correct.

```
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```its (meta) logic is captured by the (3p describable if the machine assumes
Mechanism) material mode.
We know that intuitively: the actual state of the guy in Moscow is “I am in
Moscow”, and the actual state of the guy in Washington is “I am in Washington”.
Both are correct, but as everyone know (except John apparently), both the W and
M guys  feel their actual state as being very different of the mental state of
their counterpart.
```
```The trouble with that explanation is that you have jumped from description in
terms of a UD, to a description in terms of a world with Washington and Moscow
and a duplicating machine.  Leaving a chasm of explanation between the two.
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```Which chasm? Keep in mind that (at the meta-level) we assume computationalism.
Whatever experience you live in the duplication experience in some “world”
(assuming that exist), there will be computations in arithmetic mimicking those
histories, and the 1p indeterminacy is on those computations. Again, I was
assuming some “world” with Washington and Moscow, but that is neutral on the
primary character that such world would have with the Materialist position,
which is NOT assume.
```
You say it is not assumed.  But you use it as though it is assumed and you didn't derive it.
```

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```That is already done at the step 1 of the UDA. There is a chasm only if you
assume the ontological of world, but that is not in need to be assumed. Replace
such world by any computation mimicking the world enough so that the 1p view
cannot distinguish such world and the computation.
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Yes, I made that same point a long time ago, that if the UD is going to produce conscious thoughts it must produce a "world" in which those are thoughts about something.
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```Take, in case you feel the substitution level is very low (fine grained) the
Heisenberg Matrix of our cluster of galaxies at the level of quarks with
10^(100^1000) decimals. It is executed somewhere in the sigma_1 arithmetical
reality (by the comp assumption).
```
```
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It is not good enough to just say it must be in there somewhere "assuming comp", because we are testing comp by seeing whether it describes experience.  So it is evasive to say that in the infinitude of arithmetic and UD computations, a descriptions of your experience, and any possible experience, in in there.
```
Brent

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