> On 4 Jan 2019, at 19:35, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
>
>
>
> On 1/4/2019 3:51 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> On 4 Jan 2019, at 05:16, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 1/3/2019 6:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>> As a scientist, I just count the evidences, and evaluate the plausibility
>>>> of the big picture proposed.I predicted the many-world appearances much
>>>> before I realised the physicists were already open to this for empirical
>>>> reason. Once you understand that there are infinitely many computations
>>>> going through you actual state,
>>> What does it mean "your actual state"? How is it defined within the UD?
>>
>> It is defined indexically, like in a block universe, but in a more precise
>> way through the Gödel number of a Löbian machine in the []p & X modes (with
>> X in {p, <>t, <>t & p}, p being limited to the sigma_1 (semi-computable)
>> arithmetical sentences.
>
> I don't think I understand that. You're saying that within all the UD
> computations there are ones that implement specific Lobian machines and their
> interactions with some world they are embedded in?
This comes from the first person indeterminacy on the computations. To have a
probability notion, we need to define the measure one by []p & <>t. (Because
with the logic G we don’t have []p -> <>t, and we need the “<>t” to avoid the
cul-de-sac (cf the typical default hypothesis in probability theory).
The FPI is on all computations (sigma_1 sentences), but they are restricted by
being those implementing consistent extensions on the Löbian machine “you are”.
There is no “world” per, only computations “rich enough” to continue
consistently your history (the “world” will be apparent only).
>
>>
>> Of coure, "actual state" does not refer to anything in the mind-block
>> picture (which is just the structure (N, 0, +, *)). The actual state is
>> purely phenomenological.
>
> ?? This is supposed to explain phenomenology in terms of computations. I
> understand computations, like Turing machines, have states. But I don't
> understand these "actual states”.
I am not sure to understand your problem here. All mind state are actual from
the first person point of view. The definition of “[]p” is already an
indexical, and you can add axioms like “I am in Helsinki” or “I am in
Washington”, which change the actual state/machine (but G and G* still applies
to them). The phenomenologies are given by the hypostases. The physical
phenomenologies is given by the sigma_1 sentences structured by the mode of
each “material” hypostases (the one given by the X above).
>
>> We cannot define it in any 3p terms. It is pure 1p, but with mechanism,
>
> But the idea is to explain 1p experience in 3p terms, i.e. in terms of
> computations.
At the meta level only. We can define, like Theaetetus, knowledge (which is 1p)
by “[]p & p”, but only because we limit ourself, non constructively, to sound
machine. The machine itself cannot do that: “[]p & p” cannot be define in the
language of the machine, for reason similar as the fact that they cannot define
truth.
This explains why the 1p “I” has to look non definable by each concerned entity
about itself, and this is what lead to retrieved consciousness associated
indexically, and non constructively, to the machine, if you are OK to define
consciousness by (immediate, with <>t) knowable, indubitable, but also non
rationally justifiable (provable) and non definable. Consciousness is just the
name we give to that personal feeling.
You see that consciousness has no 3p definition from the machine’s point of
view. But “we”, who knows that the machine is sound (because we limit ourself
to such machine) can know and prove this. The machine can do the same about any
machine supposed to be correct.
>
>
>> its (meta) logic is captured by the (3p describable if the machine assumes
>> Mechanism) material mode.
>> We know that intuitively: the actual state of the guy in Moscow is “I am in
>> Moscow”, and the actual state of the guy in Washington is “I am in
>> Washington”. Both are correct, but as everyone know (except John
>> apparently), both the W and M guys feel their actual state as being very
>> different of the mental state of their counterpart.
>
> The trouble with that explanation is that you have jumped from description in
> terms of a UD, to a description in terms of a world with Washington and
> Moscow and a duplicating machine. Leaving a chasm of explanation between the
> two.
Which chasm? Keep in mind that (at the meta-level) we assume computationalism.
Whatever experience you live in the duplication experience in some “world”
(assuming that exist), there will be computations in arithmetic mimicking those
histories, and the 1p indeterminacy is on those computations. Again, I was
assuming some “world” with Washington and Moscow, but that is neutral on the
primary character that such world would have with the Materialist position,
which is NOT assume. That is already done at the step 1 of the UDA. There is a
chasm only if you assume the ontological of world, but that is not in need to
be assumed. Replace such world by any computation mimicking the world enough so
that the 1p view cannot distinguish such world and the computation. Take, in
case you feel the substitution level is very low (fine grained) the Heisenberg
Matrix of our cluster of galaxies at the level of quarks with 10^(100^1000)
decimals. It is executed somewhere in the sigma_1 arithmetical reality (by the
comp assumption).
Bruno
>
> Brent
>
>
>>
>> All indexicals are treated directly or indirectly with Kleene’s second
>> recursion theorem. Like G and G* are shown arithmetically complete by using
>> that theorem, or its equivalent formal version (Gödel diagonal lemma).
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>> Brent
>>>
>>>> you can understand that we have to see the trace of those computations
>>>> when looking at ourself at a finer grained level than our substitution
>>>> level. Then the rest is math, and more quantitative predictions.
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