> On 3 May 2019, at 19:09, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List > <[email protected]> wrote: > > I think that is right. But when you consider some simplified cases, e.g. a > computation written out on paper (or Bruno's movie graph) it becomes apparent > that consciousness must ultimately refer to other things. Much is made of > "self-awareness" but this is usually just having an internal model of one's > body, or social standing or some other model of the self. It is not > consciousness of consciousness...that is only a temporal reflection: "I was > conscious just now." In general terms we could say consciousness is > awareness of the evironment, where that includes one's body. Damasio > identifies emotions as awareness of the bodies state. The point is that the > stuff of which we are aware and which we find agreement with other people's > awareness is what we infer to be the physical world. It might be possible to > be conscious in some sense without a physical world, but it would be > qualitatively different.
How could a brain make a person aware that his brain is implemented in a ontological physical reality, or in the arithmetical reality? Only the observation will differ, and only if mechanism is false. Why assume matter, when the illusion ion matter can be explained, without it, and *cannot be explained* with it, unless bringing infinities in the ontology? Bruno > > Brent > > On 5/3/2019 6:27 AM, Terren Suydam wrote: >> One way to get around this is to hold that consciousness is associated with >> the way information is processed. This is substrate independent - the fact >> that a brain is physical is beside the point. You could implement a brain in >> software, and insofar as the same kinds of information processing occur, it >> would be conscious in the same kind of way. >> >> I find this idea compelling because it makes the link between brains and >> consciousness without requiring matter, and provides a framework for >> understanding consciousnesses of other kinds of machines. All that's >> required is to assume there is something it is like for computation to occur. >> >> Terren >> >> On Fri, May 3, 2019 at 2:26 AM <[email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >> >> >> On Thursday, May 2, 2019 at 8:03:52 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: >> >> >> On 5/2/2019 4:55 PM, [email protected] <> wrote: >>> >>> >>> On Thursday, May 2, 2019 at 5:37:26 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 5/2/2019 11:39 AM, [email protected] <> wrote: >>>> >>>> Apparently matter is not "reducible" to just the physics a couple of >>>> particles. >>> >>> Then you're not a materialist. You think there is matter plus something >>> else, that everyone calls "mind", but you're going to call it "matter" and >>> add it to everyone else's list of matter so you can still call yourself a >>> materialist. >>> >>> Brent >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> But everything reducing to the physics of particles is thought of as >>> physicalism (not materialism): >>> Physicalism and materialism >>> >>> Reductive physicalism >>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reductive_physicalism>...is normally assumed >>> to be incompatible with panpsychism. Materialism >>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Materialism>, if held to be distinct from >>> physicalism, is compatible with panpsychism insofar as mental properties >>> >> >> What mental properties? intention? reflection? remembering? That's what I >> mean by saying attributing "experience" to matter is an unprincipled >> half-measure. >> >> Brent >> >> >> Brains are matter, just as livers, legs, trees, tables, rocks, comets, >> planets, stars, cockroaches, galaxies, bacteria .. are matter. >> >> Brains produce intentions, reflections, remembrances, ... . >> >> So (at least some) matter of the cosmos has psychical (mental) properties. >> >> The body+mind idea, the idea that mind is something separate from body, is >> perhaps the worst idea ever invented. >> >> @philipthrift >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>. >> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list >> <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout >> <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>. >> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list >> <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout >> <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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