On Thu, May 9, 2019 at 5:22 AM Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
> > On 3 May 2019, at 15:27, Terren Suydam <[email protected]> wrote: > > One way to get around this is to hold that consciousness is associated > with the way information is processed. > > > > That is mechanism, but then you inherit infinitely many > body-representation in arithmetic, and the mind-body problem becomes in > part a justification of the appearances from a statistic to all > computations going through our brain. Then incompleteness explains what > this take the shape of a quantum reality. > Hi Bruno, Could you please explain or point me to some sources on how incompleteness leads to the quantum? What would the alternative be if not incompleteness? Jason > > > > > This is substrate independent - the fact that a brain is physical is > beside the point. You could implement a brain in software, and insofar as > the same kinds of information processing occur, it would be conscious in > the same kind of way. > > I find this idea compelling because it makes the link between brains and > consciousness without requiring matter, and provides a framework for > understanding consciousnesses of other kinds of machines. All that's > required is to assume there is something it is like for computation to > occur. > > > Yes. Then it is sad that so few people are aware that the notion of > computation is a purely arithmetical definition, so that we don’t need to > assume more than Robison arithmetic. Worst, we cannot assume more, without > exploding the number of aberration histories. This makes mechanism > testable, by comparing the physics emerging from the self-referential > statistics on all computations with the inferred physics. And it match > well, were physics itself miss the relation with the first person > perspective, necessarily (assuming mechanism). A materialist has a way out: > to invoke infinite to make the link brain-mind one-one, which it cannot be > once we do the digital truncation. > > Bruno > > > > > > Terren > > On Fri, May 3, 2019 at 2:26 AM <[email protected]> wrote: > >> >> >> On Thursday, May 2, 2019 at 8:03:52 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On 5/2/2019 4:55 PM, [email protected] wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Thursday, May 2, 2019 at 5:37:26 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On 5/2/2019 11:39 AM, [email protected] wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> Apparently *matter* is not "reducible" to just the physics a couple of >>>> particles. >>>> >>>> >>>> Then you're not a materialist. You think there is matter plus >>>> something else, that everyone calls "mind", but you're going to call it >>>> "matter" and add it to everyone else's list of matter so you can still call >>>> yourself a materialist. >>>> >>>> Brent >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> But everything reducing to the physics of particles is thought of as >>> *physicalism* (not materialism): >>> *Physicalism and materialism* >>> >>> Reductive physicalism >>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reductive_physicalism>...is normally >>> assumed to be incompatible with panpsychism. Materialism >>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Materialism>, if held to be distinct >>> from physicalism, is compatible with panpsychism insofar as mental >>> properties >>> >>> >>> What mental properties? intention? reflection? remembering? That's >>> what I mean by saying attributing "experience" to matter is an unprincipled >>> half-measure. >>> >>> Brent >>> >> >> >> Brains are matter, just as livers, legs, trees, tables, rocks, comets, >> planets, stars, cockroaches, galaxies, bacteria .. are matter. >> >> Brains produce intentions, reflections, remembrances, ... . >> >> So (at least some) matter of the cosmos has psychical (mental) properties. >> >> The body+mind idea, the idea that mind is something separate from body, >> is perhaps the worst idea ever invented. >> >> @philipthrift >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/2F9B3576-E003-4773-A5E7-2F0FF11ABE2F%40ulb.ac.be > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/2F9B3576-E003-4773-A5E7-2F0FF11ABE2F%40ulb.ac.be?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> > . > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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