> On 3 May 2019, at 15:27, Terren Suydam <[email protected]> wrote: > > One way to get around this is to hold that consciousness is associated with > the way information is processed.
That is mechanism, but then you inherit infinitely many body-representation in arithmetic, and the mind-body problem becomes in part a justification of the appearances from a statistic to all computations going through our brain. Then incompleteness explains what this take the shape of a quantum reality. > This is substrate independent - the fact that a brain is physical is beside > the point. You could implement a brain in software, and insofar as the same > kinds of information processing occur, it would be conscious in the same kind > of way. > > I find this idea compelling because it makes the link between brains and > consciousness without requiring matter, and provides a framework for > understanding consciousnesses of other kinds of machines. All that's > required is to assume there is something it is like for computation to occur. Yes. Then it is sad that so few people are aware that the notion of computation is a purely arithmetical definition, so that we don’t need to assume more than Robison arithmetic. Worst, we cannot assume more, without exploding the number of aberration histories. This makes mechanism testable, by comparing the physics emerging from the self-referential statistics on all computations with the inferred physics. And it match well, were physics itself miss the relation with the first person perspective, necessarily (assuming mechanism). A materialist has a way out: to invoke infinite to make the link brain-mind one-one, which it cannot be once we do the digital truncation. Bruno > > Terren > > On Fri, May 3, 2019 at 2:26 AM <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > > > On Thursday, May 2, 2019 at 8:03:52 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: > > > On 5/2/2019 4:55 PM, [email protected] <> wrote: >> >> >> On Thursday, May 2, 2019 at 5:37:26 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: >> >> >> On 5/2/2019 11:39 AM, [email protected] <> wrote: >>> >>> Apparently matter is not "reducible" to just the physics a couple of >>> particles. >> >> Then you're not a materialist. You think there is matter plus something >> else, that everyone calls "mind", but you're going to call it "matter" and >> add it to everyone else's list of matter so you can still call yourself a >> materialist. >> >> Brent >> >> >> >> >> But everything reducing to the physics of particles is thought of as >> physicalism (not materialism): >> Physicalism and materialism >> >> Reductive physicalism >> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reductive_physicalism>...is normally assumed >> to be incompatible with panpsychism. Materialism >> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Materialism>, if held to be distinct from >> physicalism, is compatible with panpsychism insofar as mental properties >> > > What mental properties? intention? reflection? remembering? That's what I > mean by saying attributing "experience" to matter is an unprincipled > half-measure. > > Brent > > > Brains are matter, just as livers, legs, trees, tables, rocks, comets, > planets, stars, cockroaches, galaxies, bacteria .. are matter. > > Brains produce intentions, reflections, remembrances, ... . > > So (at least some) matter of the cosmos has psychical (mental) properties. > > The body+mind idea, the idea that mind is something separate from body, is > perhaps the worst idea ever invented. > > @philipthrift > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/2F9B3576-E003-4773-A5E7-2F0FF11ABE2F%40ulb.ac.be. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
