> On 9 May 2019, at 16:23, Jason Resch <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Thu, May 9, 2019 at 5:22 AM Bruno Marchal <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > >> On 3 May 2019, at 15:27, Terren Suydam <[email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >> >> One way to get around this is to hold that consciousness is associated with >> the way information is processed. > > > That is mechanism, but then you inherit infinitely many body-representation > in arithmetic, and the mind-body problem becomes in part a justification of > the appearances from a statistic to all computations going through our brain. > Then incompleteness explains what this take the shape of a quantum reality. > > > Hi Bruno, > > Could you please explain or point me to some sources on how incompleteness > leads to the quantum? What would the alternative be if not incompleteness?
It is my contribution. The UDA reasoning shows that if Digital Mechanism is true, due to the first person indeterminacy, and its invariance for the delays, and the invariance for virtual-reconstitutions and physical reconstitutations, to predict the result of any physical experience, we have to do a statistics on all computations, (in arithmetic) relative to my actual state, notably all those computations below my substitution level. So physics is already reduced “intuitively” to computer science, and thus arithmetic, and probability theory accepting some reasonable definitions (coming from the greeks and/or motivated by the thought experiences) But then to get more mathematically useful result, this can be translated in the language of the universal machine, where the “beweisbar” predicate, which applies to any consistent extension of PA, plays the role of the rational belief, then incompleteness enforces the nuance between p, []p (belief), []p & p (knowledgeability, first person), []p & <>t (observable, sharable, first person plural, "bettable"), and []p & <>t & p (sensible, immediately observable, physical here-and-now). The quantum logic is given by either the "& p” nuances (which makes things “first person”) and the weakened & <>t, but that one is quite strong in this Gödelian setting, it is the consistency requirement (to have a probability, that is necessary, it is the default situation assumed by both Bayesian and non-Bayesian), or both, and indeed: when p is restricted to sigma_1 arithmetical proposition (the “leaves” of the universal dovetailing, that is the way to translate the computationalist hypothesis) we get a quantum logic at all three levels. I show this by reversing a morphism that Goldblatt has discovered between the modal logic B and minimal quantum logic. Those papers should help: Marchal B. The computationalist reformulation of the mind-body problem. Prog Biophys Mol Biol; 2013 Sep;113(1):127-40 https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/23567157 Marchal B. The Universal Numbers. From Biology to Physics, Progress in Biophysics and Molecular Biology, 2015, Vol. 119, Issue 3, 368-381. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26140993 B. Marchal. The Origin of Physical Laws and Sensations. In 4th International System Administration and Network Engineering Conference, SANE 2004, Amsterdam, 2004. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html (sane04) B. Marchal. A Purely Arithmetical, yet Empirically Falsifiable, Interpretation of Plotinus’ Theory of Matter. In Barry Cooper S. Löwe B., Kent T. F. and Sorbi A., editors, Computation and Logic in the Real World, Third Conference on Computability in Europe June 18-23, pages 263–273. Universita degli studi di Sienna, Dipartimento di Roberto Magari, 2007. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/CiE2007/SIENA.pdf Bruno > > Jason > > > > > > >> This is substrate independent - the fact that a brain is physical is beside >> the point. You could implement a brain in software, and insofar as the same >> kinds of information processing occur, it would be conscious in the same >> kind of way. >> >> I find this idea compelling because it makes the link between brains and >> consciousness without requiring matter, and provides a framework for >> understanding consciousnesses of other kinds of machines. All that's >> required is to assume there is something it is like for computation to occur. > > Yes. Then it is sad that so few people are aware that the notion of > computation is a purely arithmetical definition, so that we don’t need to > assume more than Robison arithmetic. Worst, we cannot assume more, without > exploding the number of aberration histories. This makes mechanism testable, > by comparing the physics emerging from the self-referential statistics on all > computations with the inferred physics. And it match well, were physics > itself miss the relation with the first person perspective, necessarily > (assuming mechanism). A materialist has a way out: to invoke infinite to make > the link brain-mind one-one, which it cannot be once we do the digital > truncation. > > Bruno > > > > >> >> Terren >> >> On Fri, May 3, 2019 at 2:26 AM <[email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >> >> >> On Thursday, May 2, 2019 at 8:03:52 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: >> >> >> On 5/2/2019 4:55 PM, [email protected] <> wrote: >>> >>> >>> On Thursday, May 2, 2019 at 5:37:26 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 5/2/2019 11:39 AM, [email protected] <> wrote: >>>> >>>> Apparently matter is not "reducible" to just the physics a couple of >>>> particles. >>> >>> Then you're not a materialist. You think there is matter plus something >>> else, that everyone calls "mind", but you're going to call it "matter" and >>> add it to everyone else's list of matter so you can still call yourself a >>> materialist. >>> >>> Brent >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> But everything reducing to the physics of particles is thought of as >>> physicalism (not materialism): >>> Physicalism and materialism >>> >>> Reductive physicalism >>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reductive_physicalism>...is normally assumed >>> to be incompatible with panpsychism. Materialism >>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Materialism>, if held to be distinct from >>> physicalism, is compatible with panpsychism insofar as mental properties >>> >> >> What mental properties? intention? reflection? remembering? That's what I >> mean by saying attributing "experience" to matter is an unprincipled >> half-measure. >> >> Brent >> >> >> Brains are matter, just as livers, legs, trees, tables, rocks, comets, >> planets, stars, cockroaches, galaxies, bacteria .. are matter. >> >> Brains produce intentions, reflections, remembrances, ... . >> >> So (at least some) matter of the cosmos has psychical (mental) properties. >> >> The body+mind idea, the idea that mind is something separate from body, is >> perhaps the worst idea ever invented. >> >> @philipthrift >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>. >> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list >> <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout >> <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>. >> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list >> <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout >> <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/2F9B3576-E003-4773-A5E7-2F0FF11ABE2F%40ulb.ac.be > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/2F9B3576-E003-4773-A5E7-2F0FF11ABE2F%40ulb.ac.be?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA%2BBCJUgtbP3zGbKpYtHPi9X4RtXJ_VCMhvrXG2TF4U%2BBowTjPg%40mail.gmail.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA%2BBCJUgtbP3zGbKpYtHPi9X4RtXJ_VCMhvrXG2TF4U%2BBowTjPg%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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