> On 28 May 2019, at 23:24, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List > <everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote: > > > > On 5/28/2019 4:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 27 May 2019, at 02:33, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com >>> <mailto:johnkcl...@gmail.com>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Tue, May 21, 2019 at 4:30 AM Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be >>> <mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote: >>> >>> >> Nobody knows the answer to the "hard problem of consciousness" because >>> >> nobody knows exactly what the question is or what criteria is to be used >>> >> to determine if its been successfully answered. >>> >>> > So you don’t understand it. >>> >>> Correct, I don't know the question so I have no way of knowing >> >> >> There are operational version of the problem, like what would be a criteria >> to allow a Japanese sexual automaton to get her human clients to be sent in >> jail for having lack some respect toward IT/HER/HIM. > > What's the criteria to allow a Japanese prostitute to get her human clients > to be sent in jail for having lack some respect toward IT/HER/HIM?
The usual one. Being raped (absence of consent) or being under the attempt of murder, or not paying her/him, etc. > >> >> You have agreed that two identical digital brain, physically realised in >> different place, doing the same computations, would support one >> consciousness, but you keep believing that physics is enough to predict our >> first person experience. Such prediction assumes that we know which >> computation support us, and that it is unique. This might not been the case, >> even with physicalism, > > Which?... that we don't know which computation supports us or that it is not > unique? The former is almost certainly the case. We know that the computation cannot be unique, as each computations is done with an extreme reducnance in (sigma_1) arithmetic. In (sigma_1) arithmetic, or if you prefer in the Universal dovetailing, if there were a unique computation, you need to explain why the same computation done with a different clock, or with some dummy instructions in between each step (of the other computation), makes that other Brent Meeker into a zombie. That would already violate step 2 in the UDA. Bruno > > Brent > >> and is provably not the case with mechanism, as arithmetic execute all >> “Boltzman Brain”, in fact just all computations. >> >> >> >> >>> if it's been successfully answered or not and after communicating with you >>> for years I don't think even you what would satisfy you. If I could prove >>> with mathematical certitude that X caused consciousness would you say the >>> issue had been put to bed and its time to move on to other things? >> >> >> On the contrary, I prove, in the frame of my working hypothesis, that this >> is impossible. >> >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >>> I doubt it, I think you'd say (correctly) that X may cause consciousness >>> but X is not consciousness. And the tail chasing would continue because you >>> don't know what exactly you want to know. >>> >>> >It is not so astonishing. That explains your lack of interest in greek >>> >philosophy. >>> >>> The fact that you ARE interested in Greek philosophy is tacit admission on >>> your part that the field you're so interested in has not advanced one >>> nanometer in 2500 years; after all no modern astronomer would dream of >>> studying Greek astronomical theories with the hope of it helping him in has >>> work because astronomy has advanced light years in the last 2500 years; and >>> the same is also true for medicine and mathematics and physics, but not for >>> Greek philosophy.. >>> >>> > The worst theologian are those who claim to know the truth. >>> >>> I agree, and the second worst type of theologian are those that abandon the >>> idea of God but believe they have made a great philosophical discovery by >>> not abandoned the ASCII sequence G-O-D. >>> >>> John K Clark >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com >>> <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. >>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv0dM4Y3eMgYfrXjXze0_f_WPbnK2DC0wWZvBcxDibT2yg%40mail.gmail.com >>> >>> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv0dM4Y3eMgYfrXjXze0_f_WPbnK2DC0wWZvBcxDibT2yg%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com >> <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. >> To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/392717A5-046F-4658-A635-473114545A82%40ulb.ac.be >> >> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/392717A5-046F-4658-A635-473114545A82%40ulb.ac.be?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/e6ec323f-63b9-4d82-c7b2-70beb65542dd%40verizon.net > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/e6ec323f-63b9-4d82-c7b2-70beb65542dd%40verizon.net?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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