On 08 Mar 2011, at 15:54, 1Z wrote:
On Mar 8, 1:43 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 07 Mar 2011, at 21:48, David Nyman wrote:
On 7 March 2011 15:56, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Reduction is not elimination
Ontological reduction does not necessarily entail epistemological
*elimination*, b
On 08 Mar 2011, at 20:11, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 3/8/2011 10:41 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
We could start with lambda terms, or combinators instead. A
computation (of phi_4(5) is just a sequence
phi_4^0 (5) phi_4^1 (5) phi_4^2 (5) phi_4^3 (5) phi_4^4 (5)
phi_4^5 (5) phi_4^6 (5) ...
On Mar 9, 1:03 am, David Nyman wrote:
> On 8 March 2011 23:42, 1Z wrote:
>
> > How can they fail to be composite when they include interactions,
> > structures and bindings? What ***are*** you on about?
>
> Say there is a pile of bricks that, under some externally-applied
> description, could b
On 8 March 2011 23:42, 1Z wrote:
> How can they fail to be composite when they include interactions,
> structures and bindings? What ***are*** you on about?
Say there is a pile of bricks that, under some externally-applied
description, could be construed as a house; then that pile is what
there
On Mar 8, 9:15 pm, David Nyman wrote:
> On 8 March 2011 12:16, 1Z wrote:
>
> > There are uncontroversial examples of successful reduction, eg
> > the reduction of heat to molecular motion. In these cases
> > the reduced phenomenon still exists. There is still such
> > a thing as heat. People wh
On 8 March 2011 12:16, 1Z wrote:
> There are uncontroversial examples of successful reduction, eg
> the reduction of heat to molecular motion. In these cases
> the reduced phenomenon still exists. There is still such
> a thing as heat. People who sincerely think mind is reducible
> to brain state
On 3/8/2011 10:55 AM, 1Z wrote:
On Mar 8, 6:48 pm, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 3/8/2011 9:36 AM, 1Z wrote:
On Mar 8, 4:45 pm, Brent Meekerwrote:
On 3/8/2011 6:21 AM, 1Z wrote:
Up to a point. But if the faking deviated very far from perceptions of
On 3/8/2011 10:41 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
We could start with lambda terms, or combinators instead. A
computation (of phi_4(5) is just a sequence
phi_4^0 (5) phi_4^1 (5) phi_4^2 (5) phi_4^3 (5) phi_4^4 (5)
phi_4^5 (5) phi_4^6 (5) ...
_4 is the program. 5 is the input. ^i is the ith
On Mar 8, 6:48 pm, Brent Meeker wrote:
> On 3/8/2011 9:36 AM, 1Z wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > On Mar 8, 4:45 pm, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
> >> On 3/8/2011 6:21 AM, 1Z wrote:
>
> Up to a point. But if the faking deviated very far from perceptions of
>
> > this world the BIV would no longer be a
On 3/8/2011 9:36 AM, 1Z wrote:
On Mar 8, 4:45 pm, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 3/8/2011 6:21 AM, 1Z wrote:
Up to a point. But if the faking deviated very far from perceptions of
this world the BIV would no longer be able to process them. We casually
talk of "white rabb
On 3/8/2011 9:36 AM, 1Z wrote:
On Mar 8, 4:45 pm, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 3/8/2011 6:21 AM, 1Z wrote:
Up to a point. But if the faking deviated very far from perceptions of
this world the BIV would no longer be able to process them. We casually
talk of "white rabb
On Mar 8, 4:45 pm, Brent Meeker wrote:
> On 3/8/2011 6:21 AM, 1Z wrote:
>
>
>
> >> Up to a point. But if the faking deviated very far from perceptions of
> >> > this world the BIV would no longer be able to process them. We casually
> >> > talk of "white rabbits" on this list, which are perf
On 3/8/2011 6:21 AM, 1Z wrote:
Up to a point. But if the faking deviated very far from perceptions of
> this world the BIV would no longer be able to process them. We casually
> talk of "white rabbits" on this list, which are perfectly understandable
> things and are really of this world (e.
On 3/8/2011 3:14 AM, Andrew Soltau wrote:
What I am driving at here is the same question as in the email Comp.
Granted that all possible states exist, what changes the point of the
present moment from one to another. My referring to 'the thinker' was
probably not a helpful metaphor. Given the u
On Mar 8, 1:43 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 07 Mar 2011, at 21:48, David Nyman wrote:
>
>
>
> > On 7 March 2011 15:56, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> Reduction is not elimination
>
> >
>
> >> Ontological reduction does not necessarily entail epistemological
> >> *elimination*, but it does enta
On Mar 8, 11:47 am, Andrew Soltau wrote:
> On 06/03/11 15:22, 1Z wrote:
>
> > On Mar 4, 8:12 pm, Andrew Soltau wrote:
> >> On 04/03/11 19:10, Brent Meeker wrote:> Collapse "appears" to instruments
> >> as well as people
>
> >> We don't have any evidence for that,
> > Of course we do
>
> That
On Mar 8, 12:46 am, Brent Meeker wrote:
> On 3/7/2011 4:15 PM, 1Z wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > On Mar 7, 8:28 pm, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
> >> On 3/7/2011 12:01 PM, 1Z wrote:
>
> >>> On Mar 7, 6:29 pm, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
> On 3/7/2011 1:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> > On 06 Mar 2011, at
On Mar 8, 11:10 am, Andrew Soltau wrote:
> On 06/03/11 19:24, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
>
> > On 06 Mar 2011, at 14:16, Andrew Soltau wrote:
>
> >> On 07/02/11 15:22, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> >>> Comp makes precise that saying to be a machine is equivalent with
> >>> saying that there is a level
On 07 Mar 2011, at 19:29, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 3/7/2011 1:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 06 Mar 2011, at 20:21, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 3/6/2011 5:07 AM, 1Z wrote:
The way I see it the MG consciousness would not be conscious of
any
> world except the virtual world of the MG, which is
On 07 Mar 2011, at 21:48, David Nyman wrote:
On 7 March 2011 15:56, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Reduction is not elimination
Ontological reduction does not necessarily entail epistemological
*elimination*, but it does entail ontological *elimination*.
Bruno, this is what I was trying to say
On Mar 8, 11:32 am, Andrew Soltau wrote:
> On 06/03/11 15:06, 1Z wrote:
>
> > On Mar 4, 5:46 pm, Andrew Soltau wrote:
> >> The measurement problem is the question of why, or even if, collapse
> >> occurs. Certainly no coherent concept of how and why collapse occurs has
> >> been formulated in a
On 08 Mar 2011, at 09:23, Digital Physics wrote:
As you suggested, I tried to check the archive to make sense of your
replies, but I utterly failed. The archive seems to be full of
unexplained terminology as well. In your opinion, which previous
messages provide justifications of your clai
On Mar 8, 1:02 am, David Nyman wrote:
> On 8 March 2011 00:11, 1Z wrote:
>
>
>
> > It's rather well known that reductivism and eliminativism are
> > not equivalent positions, for instance.
>
> > And reductive identity theorists say mind "is" a bunch
> > of micro physical goings-on, whereas the
Hi John
On 06/03/11 21:10, John Mikes wrote:
A problem (in my mind) about "compute": does 'computing' include an
evaluation of the result automatically, *_by the device itself_*, or
does it need a /*_"thinking" mind_*/ to valuate the computation? Does
'comp' */_act_/* upon the result of its ow
On 06/03/11 15:27, 1Z wrote:
> Clearly it is a universal property of the system in which we find
> ourselves, physical or arithmetical.
One philosopher saying something doesn't make it "clear"
Indeed. Clearly, in this case, it is a universal property of the system
in which we findourselves,
On 06/03/11 15:22, 1Z wrote:
On Mar 4, 8:12 pm, Andrew Soltau wrote:
On 04/03/11 19:10, Brent Meeker wrote:> Collapse "appears" to instruments as
well as people
We don't have any evidence for that,
Of course we do
That was a rather blanket statement. But if we can doubt the existence
of
On 06/03/11 15:19, 1Z wrote:
On Mar 4, 7:10 pm, Andrew Soltau wrote:
I remind you that we are in the everything list which is based on the
idea that "everything" is simpler than "something".
If we take Chalmers and Bitbol seriously, consciousness is a perfectly
symmetrical emergent property o
On 06/03/11 15:06, 1Z wrote:
On Mar 4, 5:46 pm, Andrew Soltau wrote:
The measurement problem is the question of why, or even if, collapse
occurs. Certainly no coherent concept of how and why collapse occurs has
been formulated in a manner which meets with general acceptance. It
appears, as Dav
On 06/03/11 20:06, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 06 Mar 2011, at 14:24, Andrew Soltau wrote:
On 05/03/11 14:46, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I appreciate your point on the logical types. Now, to base them on a
physics, taken a priori, will prevent the solution of the
computationalist mind body problem. El
On 06/03/11 19:45, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 06 Mar 2011, at 14:18, Andrew Soltau wrote:
On 07/02/11 15:22, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I have debunked more than once on this list the idea that a movie
can think. (It is an error akin to the confusion between a number
and a gödel number of a number, a
On 06/03/11 19:24, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 06 Mar 2011, at 14:16, Andrew Soltau wrote:
On 07/02/11 15:22, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Comp makes precise that saying to be a machine is equivalent with
saying that there is a level of functional substitution where my
(first person) consciousness is
On 06/03/11 19:17, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 06 Mar 2011, at 14:16, Andrew Soltau wrote:
Hi Bruno
On 05/03/11 14:46, Bruno Marchal wrote:
BTW, you did not answer my last point on the comp reversal, at the
UDA step seven.
From that previous email
Step seven itself shows the reversal betwe
On 06/03/11 18:47, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 06 Mar 2011, at 14:16, Andrew Soltau wrote:
On 05/03/11 14:46, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Chalmers told me that first person indeterminacy does not exist, and
not much more, and Bitbol never reply to me when I sent him my PhD.
I am still not sure if I co
On 06/03/11 18:07, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Hi Andrew,
On 06 Mar 2011, at 14:14, Andrew Soltau wrote:
Hi Bruno
On 05/03/11 14:46, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 04 Mar 2011, at 20:10, Andrew Soltau wrote:
I remind you that we are in the everything list which is based on
the idea that "everything" i
On 06/03/11 17:32, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 06 Mar 2011, at 14:17, Andrew Soltau wrote:
On 07/02/11 15:22, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Chalmers defines a 'Computational Hypothesis'
You might attribute this to Putnam or Fodor, or many others,
including Galouye. That's CTM. I argue that the computa
As you suggested, I tried to check the archive to make sense of your replies,
but I utterly failed. The archive seems to be full of unexplained terminology
as well. In your opinion, which previous messages provide justifications of
your claims on finite random strings and white rabbit hallucina
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