Re: Comp
John, On 06 Mar 2011, at 22:10, John Mikes wrote: Andrew and Bruno: (Re: Andrew's discussion below): according to what I pretend to understand of Bruno's position, the math' universe (numbers and what they 'build' as the 'world') is more fundamental than the application we call physics. I wrote more because the real fundamental is based on the rel everything, still hidden from our knowledge and only parts transpire continually (since many millennia ago). We arrived at a stage, different from the one 1000 or 3000 years ago and devised a logic (or more) which is different from those applied earlier. Yet it is not the ultimate - or should I say not all of them. There may be different logical ways in our future development (you may call it evolution, I don't) just as different arithmetics as well of which we state today impossible. So was the spherical Earth or molecular genetics. A problem (in my mind) about compute: does 'computing' include an evaluation of the result automatically, by the device itself, or does it need a thinking mind to valuate the computation? Does 'comp' act upon the result of its own computation? ( H O W ? ) The abstract entity or person, which is associated to computation, within our comp model (as you would say, but a logician would say here within our comp theory) is the one doing the interpretation. So the (relevant) evaluation is included in the computing itself. I would not add by the device itself, because the term device denotes more the body or hird person description, (which does not really exist, and is itself a creation of the person). The person's consciousness and body is somehow attached to infinite class of equivalence extracted from *all* the computations. The term all is itself justified by the miracle (Gödel's term) of the thesis of church, which makes such self-reference arithmetically definable. Also the word automatically raises the question whether it requires some homunculus(?) - (call it a factor or any presently unknown dynamics?) instigating it for us rather than - or even BUILT IN as - a not-yet discovered intrinsic part of the functionality to be discovered? It is has been discovered, I would say. It is a fixed point of self- observation. It is the one who will be described by all the arithmetical hypostases. It is built-in in all rich (Löbian) universal entities. You might call it an homunculus, but it is just a universal number that knows that it is universal. With my agnosticism (ignorance about the not-yet disclosed parts of the wholeness) it is hard to agree with any proof, truth, or evidence. The most I can do is a potentially possible. The question, in science, is never about agreeing or disagreeing. But of understanding the theory and its deductive rules, and to see if a derivation of a conclusion is valid or not. The question of the truth of our assumption is a matter of personal opinion, and can be discussed in philosophy. Unfortunately, this is not very well know, and some scientist believes that in science we know some truth. But this is a confusion between science and philosophy. I appreciate philosophy and philosophical discussions, but to progress, it is useful to distinguish science from the philosophies which can be developed around it. Eventually that distinction is, in the comp theory (within the comp model) somewhat captured by the splitting between G and G*. G playing the role of science, and G* playing the role of philosophy. Many philosophical statement can become scientific by just adding an interrogative mark like ?. In our setting, a difficulty comes from the fact that we study scientifically (this really means without the pretension of truth) both the science by the machine and the philosophy by the machine. Best, Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: causes (was:ON THE THEORY OF EVERYTHING was Another TOE short paper)
Hi John, On 06 Mar 2011, at 22:27, John Mikes wrote: On Sun, Mar 6, 2011 at 3:53 PM, Stephen Paul King stephe...@charter.net wrote: Is the causes word even necessary? Would it not be accurate to say that a change in information = a change in our description, unless you are assuming some sort of pluralistic 1st person view, i.e. from the point of view of many (a fixed set of observers): 'collapse' is nothing but a change in the information common to all that causes' (or necessitates!) a change in the description of each individual to remain a viable member of the 'many'? Onward! Stephen Thanks, Stephen, for standing up against the verb 'causes'. In our limited views of the totality (the unlimited complexity of the wholeness) we can only search for factors contributing to changes we experience WITHIN the model of our knowledge. If we find such, we are tempted to call it THE cause - while many more (from the unknown) may also play in. You are right. The term cause is very tricky. They are as many notion of cause than there exists modal logics (infinities). We can say that a causes b, if B(a - b), in some context/theory defining locally modality B. It *is* a vague notion. Information is also a tricky term, maybe: knowledge of relations we (lately?) acquired in our topical model of yesterday's knowledge, but definitely also WITHIN our knowable model. (Please forgive me for using yesterday's: nobody can think in terms of all the ongoing news of today). Information has to be distinguished from true information, consistent information, true consistent information, etc. In comp, the modalities of the self-reference forces us to introduce those distinction. Eventually this shows that machines have an incredibly rich canonical theology (scientifically testable, because it contains the machine's physic). Here, the theology of a machine is defined by the truth *about* the machine. Nobody can know it, but a machine can study its logic (independently of its content) for a simpler (in term of the strongness of its provability predicate (the B in the hypostases)). Have a good day, Bruno -Original Message- From: Brent Meeker Sent: Sunday, March 06, 2011 3:09 PM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: ON THE THEORY OF EVERYTHING was Another TOE short paper On 3/6/2011 7:18 AM, 1Z wrote: On Mar 4, 7:10 pm, Brent Meekermeeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: Collapse appears to instruments as well as people - that's why we can shared records of experiments and agree on them. I'm not sure what you mean by account for collapse. At least one interpretation of QM, advocated by Peres, Fuchs, and Omnes for example, is that the collapse is purely epistemological. All that changes is our knowledge or model of the state and QM merely predicts probabilities for this change. Such epistemological theories need to be carefully distinguished from consciousness causes collapse theories. Right. Epistemological collapse is nothing but a change in information that causes us to change our description. ** Is the causes word even necessary? Would it not be accurate to say that a change in information = a change in our description, unless you are assuming some sort of pluralistic 1st person view, i.e. from the point of view of many (a fixed set of observers): 'collapse' is nothing but a change in the information common to all that causes' (or necessitates!) a change in the description of each individual to remain a viable member of the 'many'? Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Reversal without primary matter elimination (step 7)
On 06 Mar 2011, at 20:21, Brent Meeker wrote: On 3/6/2011 5:07 AM, 1Z wrote: The way I see it the MG consciousness would not be conscious of any world except the virtual world of the MG, which is to say not conscious at all in our terms. It could, provided enough environment and Bruno emphasizes the UD will provide an arbitrarily large environment, be conscious *in this other universe*. But I think that's Stathis's example of the conscious rock. It's conscious modulo some interpretation, but that's a reductio against saying it's conscious at all. Brent I am not a fan of the MG specifically, but I don't see why you need a world to have consciousness as if of a world. The BIV argument indicates that you only need to simulate incoming data on peripheral nerves But how much of the world do you need to simulate to produce consistent incoming data? and to allow the MG to act? I think a lot. And in any case it is within and relative to this simulated world that consciousness exists (if it does). The MGA tends to obscure this because it helps itself to our intuition about this world and that we are simulating it and so we know what the simulation means, i.e. we have an interpretation. That's why I referred to the rock that computes everything paradox; it's the same situation except we *don't* have a ready made intuitive interpretation. Stathis, as I recall, defended the idea that the rock could, by instantiating consciousness, provide it's own interpretation. I agreed with the inference, but I regard it as a reductio against the rock that computes everything. The brain-in-a-vat is somewhat different in that it is usually supposed it is connected to our world for perception and action. So it can have real (our kind of) consciousness. What about a disconnected dreaming 'brain-in-a-vat'? Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: ON THE THEORY OF EVERYTHING was Another TOE short paper
On 06 Mar 2011, at 16:16, 1Z wrote: On Mar 4, 5:49 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 04 Mar 2011, at 17:31, 1Z wrote: On Mar 4, 2:20 pm, Andrew Soltau andrewsol...@gmail.com wrote: I suspect we all may. Wong states that, important as a grand unified theory might be, ... it is lacking in one important fundamental aspect, viz., the role of consciousness [which] could in fact be considered the most fundamental aspect of physics. How does he know consciousness is fundamental? Consciousness has been put under the rug by physicists since about 1500 years. Really? Have daffodils and shopping centres likewise? Physicists cannot be accused of neglecting something unless it can be shown to be something they should prima facie be dealing with. They do use it all the time. They have just use the primary matter (as simplifying assumption), and the identity thesis (as simplig-fying assumption), so that they can correlated observation with predictive theories. This leads to problem with respect to the new physics (quantum physics), and with respect to the computationalist hypothesis. But the Platonist were aware of this (mainly by the dream argument), and kept us vigilant of not reifying matter. Physics is the science of the fundamental. Then I am a physicist. If consciousness is another high level phenomenon, like shopping centres, it is no business of the physicist. IF consciousness emerges ... That might be a big IF. If you think cosnc. is fundamental, you are making an extraordinary claim and the burden of proof is on you. I am not making any claim about the fact that consciousness is fundamental or not. I just try to understand that phenomenon, among other phenomenon. And I show that if we suppose that consciousness can be related to some computation, then matter is not fundamental. Matter emerges as a modality of self-reference (the material hypostases). And the point is that it makes comp + the classical theory of knowledge testable. It has come back through the doubtful idea of the collapse of the wave packet. It is a way to avoid the literal many-worlds aspect of the linear quantum evolution. This has been debunked by many since. See the work of Abner Shimony, for example. I remind you that we are in the everything list which is based on the idea that everything is simpler than something. Of course Everett has given a comp phenomenological account of the collapse with the linear equation, so that if consciousness collapse physically the wave, you need a non-comp theory of consciousness. Then comp by itself is a theory of consciousness, and does provide a transparent (I mean testable) link with consciousness, not by identifying the mystery of consciousness with a non linear and non mechanical phenomenon (the collapse) but by providing an explanation of the quantum and the linear from the computationalist hypothesis. Given that conciousness seems all too clearly to be centrally involved in quantum mechanics, That isn't clear at all It is. In the collapse theory, it has to be the collapser (the other theories are too vague, or refuted). Not at all. Objective collapse theories such as GRW have not been refuted, and spiritual interpretations, like von Neumann's are the vagues of the lot I refer you to Shimony for a refutation that consciousness can collapse the Q wave. And GRW proposes a new theory, which they admit themselves to be ad hoc, and makes no sense in QM+relativity. I am not sure at all it works even for non relativistic QM. It would reduce Quantum computation to classical probabilistic computation, in particular. That might still be possible (forgetting relativity). I can imagine that it could lead to the collapse of many comp complexity classes, including P and NP. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
RE: first person indeterminacy vs predictability
But if most histories are equally likely, and most of them are random and unpredictable and weird in the sense that suddenly crocodiles fly by, then why can we predict rather reliably that none of those weird histories will happen? From: marc...@ulb.ac.be To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: first person indeterminacy Date: Sun, 6 Mar 2011 19:47:20 +0100 You can also consider the iteration of self-duplication. If you iterate 64 times, there will be 2^64 versions of you. First person indeterminacy is the fact that most of the 2^64 versions of you will agree that they were unable to predict in advance what was the next outcome at each iteration. Most will consider that their histories (like: WMMMWWMWWWWMMWMMWM ... (length 64) are random, even Chaitin-incompressible. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: first person indeterminacy vs predictability
On 07 Mar 2011, at 10:47, Digital Physics wrote: But if most histories are equally likely, and most of them are random and unpredictable and weird in the sense that suddenly crocodiles fly by, then why can we predict rather reliably that none of those weird histories will happen? From: marc...@ulb.ac.be To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: first person indeterminacy Date: Sun, 6 Mar 2011 19:47:20 +0100 You can also consider the iteration of self-duplication. If you iterate 64 times, there will be 2^64 versions of you. First person indeterminacy is the fact that most of the 2^64 versions of you will agree that they were unable to predict in advance what was the next outcome at each iteration. Most will consider that their histories (like: WMMMWWMWWWWMMWMMWM ... (length 64) are random, even Chaitin-incompressible. Nobody said that the histories are generated by the iterated self- duplication. The iterated self-duplication is used here only to understand what is the first person indeterminacy in a very simple context (the context of pure iterated self-duplication). Assuming comp, the 3-histories(*) are generated by the UD, which is a non trivial mathematical object, and 1-histories(*) appears in the relative 1-person way by a highly complex mixing of computable histories and oracles (which can be handled mathematically with the logics of self-reference). There is no reason for making all relative histories equally likely. It is not easy to prevent white rabbits and flying crocodile, but computer science and mathematical logic shows that it is not easy either to prove that comp and first person indeterminacy implies them. And if we prove comp implies them, then observation and induction makes comp false or very non plausible. Note also that, as Russell Standish recalled recently, white rabbits (flying crocodiles) are not random structures. They are aberrant consistent extensions, a bit like in our nocturnal dreams. Bruno (*) the suffix 1 and 3, in 1-x and 3-x, means x as seen by the first person or the third person respectively, as defined for example in the sane04 paper: http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Reversal without primary matter elimination (step 7)
On Mar 6, 7:21 pm, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: On 3/6/2011 5:07 AM, 1Z wrote: The way I see it the MG consciousness would not be conscious of any world except the virtual world of the MG, which is to say not conscious at all in our terms. It could, provided enough environment and Bruno emphasizes the UD will provide an arbitrarily large environment, be conscious*in this other universe*. But I think that's Stathis's example of the conscious rock. It's conscious modulo some interpretation, but that's a reductio against saying it's conscious at all. Brent I am not a fan of the MG specifically, but I don't see why you need a world to have consciousness as if of a world. The BIV argument indicates that you only need to simulate incoming data on peripheral nerves But how much of the world do you need to simulate to produce consistent incoming data? Presumably not that much, since we are not aware of that much and to allow the MG to act? I think a lot. And in any case it is within and relative to this simulated world that consciousness exists (if it does). The MGA tends to obscure this because it helps itself to our intuition about this world and that we are simulating it and so we know what the simulation means, i.e. we have an interpretation. That's why I referred to the rock that computes everything paradox; it's the same situation except we *don't* have a ready made intuitive interpretation. Stathis, as I recall, defended the idea that the rock could, by instantiating consciousness, provide it's own interpretation. I agreed with the inference, but I regard it as a reductio against the rock that computes everything. The brain-in-a-vat is somewhat different in that it is usually supposed it is connected to our world for perception and action. No, it usually isn't. It is usually supposed to have falsified inputs So it can have real (our kind of) consciousness. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: ON THE THEORY OF EVERYTHING was Another TOE short paper
On Mar 7, 9:30 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 06 Mar 2011, at 16:16, 1Z wrote: On Mar 4, 5:49 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 04 Mar 2011, at 17:31, 1Z wrote: On Mar 4, 2:20 pm, Andrew Soltau andrewsol...@gmail.com wrote: I suspect we all may. Wong states that, important as a grand unified theory might be, ... it is lacking in one important fundamental aspect, viz., the role of consciousness [which] could in fact be considered the most fundamental aspect of physics. How does he know consciousness is fundamental? Consciousness has been put under the rug by physicists since about 1500 years. Really? Have daffodils and shopping centres likewise? Physicists cannot be accused of neglecting something unless it can be shown to be something they should prima facie be dealing with. They do use it all the time. They have just use the primary matter (as simplifying assumption), and the identity thesis (as simplig-fying assumption), so that they can correlated observation with predictive theories. You haven;t explained why they should be dealing with consc. in the first place. Surely it is prima facie psychology. This leads to problem with respect to the new physics (quantum physics), So you say. Many think QM problems have nothing to do with consc. and with respect to the computationalist hypothesis. But the Platonist were aware of this (mainly by the dream argument), and kept us vigilant of not reifying matter. Physics is the science of the fundamental. Then I am a physicist. Physics is the empirical sciencce of the fundamental. If consciousness is another high level phenomenon, like shopping centres, it is no business of the physicist. IF consciousness emerges ... That might be a big IF. You need to show that it *is* a big if before accusing physicists of neglecting comp. If you think cosnc. is fundamental, you are making an extraordinary claim and the burden of proof is on you. I am not making any claim about the fact that consciousness is fundamental or not Implicitly you are. To say that physics has failed to deal with it is to imply that it should be dealing with it, which is to imply that it is fundamental . I just try to understand that phenomenon, among other phenomenon. And I show that if we suppose that consciousness can be related to some computation, then matter is not fundamental. Matter emerges as a modality of self-reference (the material hypostases). And the point is that it makes comp + the classical theory of knowledge testable. It has come back through the doubtful idea of the collapse of the wave packet. It is a way to avoid the literal many-worlds aspect of the linear quantum evolution. This has been debunked by many since. See the work of Abner Shimony, for example. I remind you that we are in the everything list which is based on the idea that everything is simpler than something. Of course Everett has given a comp phenomenological account of the collapse with the linear equation, so that if consciousness collapse physically the wave, you need a non-comp theory of consciousness. Then comp by itself is a theory of consciousness, and does provide a transparent (I mean testable) link with consciousness, not by identifying the mystery of consciousness with a non linear and non mechanical phenomenon (the collapse) but by providing an explanation of the quantum and the linear from the computationalist hypothesis. Given that conciousness seems all too clearly to be centrally involved in quantum mechanics, That isn't clear at all It is. In the collapse theory, it has to be the collapser (the other theories are too vague, or refuted). Not at all. Objective collapse theories such as GRW have not been refuted, and spiritual interpretations, like von Neumann's are the vagues of the lot I refer you to Shimony for a refutation that consciousness can collapse the Q wave. And GRW proposes a new theory, which they admit themselves to be ad hoc, and makes no sense in QM+relativity. I am not sure at all it works even for non relativistic QM. So? conscisouness does it by magic is not better. It would reduce Quantum computation to classical probabilistic computation, in particular. That might still be possible (forgetting relativity). I can imagine that it could lead to the collapse of many comp complexity classes, including P and NP. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
RE: first person indeterminacy vs predictability
You write white rabbits (flying crocodiles) are not random structures. They are aberrant consistent extensions, a bit like in our nocturnal dreams. I agree that white rabbits have programs much shorter than those of random structures. But you also claim that most will consider their histories ... Chaitin-incompressible. This means long programs and no predictability at all, contradicting daily experience. Then you say but computer science and mathematical logic shows that it is not easy either to prove that comp and first person indeterminacy implies [flying rabbits]. I don't understand - it has been shown it's not easy to prove that? How has it been shown it's not easy to prove that? And you say: There is no reason for making all relative histories equally likely. But then what's the alternative? From: marc...@ulb.ac.be To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: first person indeterminacy vs predictability Date: Mon, 7 Mar 2011 14:58:15 +0100 On 07 Mar 2011, at 10:47, Digital Physics wrote:But if most histories are equally likely, and most of them are random and unpredictable and weird in the sense that suddenly crocodiles fly by, then why can we predict rather reliably that none of those weird histories will happen? From: marc...@ulb.ac.be To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: first person indeterminacy Date: Sun, 6 Mar 2011 19:47:20 +0100 You can also consider the iteration of self-duplication. If you iterate 64 times, there will be 2^64 versions of you. First person indeterminacy is the fact that most of the 2^64 versions of you will agree that they were unable to predict in advance what was the next outcome at each iteration. Most will consider that their histories (like: WMMMWWMWWWWMMWMMWM ... (length 64) are random, even Chaitin-incompressible. Nobody said that the histories are generated by the iterated self-duplication. The iterated self-duplication is used here only to understand what is the first person indeterminacy in a very simple context (the context of pure iterated self-duplication). Assuming comp, the 3-histories(*) are generated by the UD, which is a non trivial mathematical object, and 1-histories(*) appears in the relative 1-person way by a highly complex mixing of computable histories and oracles (which can be handled mathematically with the logics of self-reference). There is no reason for making all relative histories equally likely. It is not easy to prevent white rabbits and flying crocodile, but computer science and mathematical logic shows that it is not easy either to prove that comp and first person indeterminacy implies them. And if we prove comp implies them, then observation and induction makes comp false or very non plausible. Note also that, as Russell Standish recalled recently, white rabbits (flying crocodiles) are not random structures. They are aberrant consistent extensions, a bit like in our nocturnal dreams. Bruno (*) the suffix 1 and 3, in 1-x and 3-x, means x as seen by the first person or the third person respectively, as defined for example in the sane04 paper:http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: ON THE THEORY OF EVERYTHING was Another TOE short paper
On 07 Mar 2011, at 15:10, 1Z wrote: On Mar 7, 9:30 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 06 Mar 2011, at 16:16, 1Z wrote: On Mar 4, 5:49 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 04 Mar 2011, at 17:31, 1Z wrote: On Mar 4, 2:20 pm, Andrew Soltau andrewsol...@gmail.com wrote: I suspect we all may. Wong states that, important as a grand unified theory might be, ... it is lacking in one important fundamental aspect, viz., the role of consciousness [which] could in fact be considered the most fundamental aspect of physics. How does he know consciousness is fundamental? Consciousness has been put under the rug by physicists since about 1500 years. Really? Have daffodils and shopping centres likewise? Physicists cannot be accused of neglecting something unless it can be shown to be something they should prima facie be dealing with. They do use it all the time. They have just use the primary matter (as simplifying assumption), and the identity thesis (as simplig-fying assumption), so that they can correlated observation with predictive theories. You haven;t explained why they should be dealing with consc. in the first place. Surely it is prima facie psychology. There is no human observation without consciousness. We can use physical equation to predict where a planet can be, not where a planet can be seen, but we usually link the two. The greeks were aware that link necessitate a theory which unify knowledge and escape the dream problem. Aristotle was aware of that too, but its followers took his primary matter for granted, and this had made easier the separation of theology from the science, with the result of making physics a theology which ignores itself. This leads to problem with respect to the new physics (quantum physics), So you say. Many think QM problems have nothing to do with consc. QM has just dingle out the more general problem of the existence of consciousness in a physical world. I am not saying that consciousness is related per se with the quantum. On the contrary, as you know, I defend Everett, and Everett use the less magical theory of consciousness: comp (or weakening). Consciousness plays a role in physics because we have to link being and seeing. All physical theories uses an implicit theory of consciousness (the identity thesis, or what is is what I see). and with respect to the computationalist hypothesis. But the Platonist were aware of this (mainly by the dream argument), and kept us vigilant of not reifying matter. Physics is the science of the fundamental. Then I am a physicist. Physics is the empirical sciencce of the fundamental. Then I am even more a physicist. Indeed I show that the comp theory of consciousness (computationalism) is empirically falsifiable (accepting the greek classical theory of knowledge). If consciousness is another high level phenomenon, like shopping centres, it is no business of the physicist. IF consciousness emerges ... That might be a big IF. You need to show that it *is* a big if before accusing physicists of neglecting comp. They do not neglect comp. They use it implicitly ever since Aristotle, and explicitly since Everett. They neglect the consciousness, or the mind-body problem. If you think cosnc. is fundamental, you are making an extraordinary claim and the burden of proof is on you. I am not making any claim about the fact that consciousness is fundamental or not Implicitly you are. To say that physics has failed to deal with it is to imply that it should be dealing with it, which is to imply that it is fundamental It was fundamental for the greek. Science is born from an understanding that the physical reality might hide something, notably mathematical truth (Xeuxippes), or just 'truth', the original god of the Platonists. But you can do physics without working on the mind- body problem. But fundamental physics is more demanding. To solve the mind-body problem in a monist theory, you have to sacrify, at the ontological level, either mind or matter (provably so assuming comp). . I just try to understand that phenomenon, among other phenomenon. And I show that if we suppose that consciousness can be related to some computation, then matter is not fundamental. Matter emerges as a modality of self-reference (the material hypostases). And the point is that it makes comp + the classical theory of knowledge testable. It has come back through the doubtful idea of the collapse of the wave packet. It is a way to avoid the literal many-worlds aspect of the linear quantum evolution. This has been debunked by many since. See the work of Abner Shimony, for example. I remind you that we are in the everything list which is based on the idea that everything is simpler than something. Of course Everett has given a comp phenomenological account of the collapse with the linear equation, so that if
Re: ON THE THEORY OF EVERYTHING was Another TOE short paper
On Mar 7, 2:52 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: You haven;t explained why they should be dealing with consc. in the first place. Surely it is prima facie psychology. There is no human observation without consciousness. There can be no observations without sense organs, but it is not the job of physics to study sense organs Implicitly you are. To say that physics has failed to deal with it is to imply that it should be dealing with it, which is to imply that it is fundamental It was fundamental for the greek. Science is born from an understanding that the physical reality might hide something, notably mathematical truth (Xeuxippes), or just 'truth', the original god of the Platonists. But you can do physics without working on the mind- body problem. But fundamental physics is more demanding. To solve the mind-body problem in a monist theory, you have to sacrify, at the ontological level, either mind or matter (provably so assuming comp). Reduction is not elimination -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: first person indeterminacy vs predictability
On 07 Mar 2011, at 15:26, Digital Physics wrote:
You write white rabbits (flying crocodiles) are not random
structures. They are aberrant
consistent extensions, a bit like in our nocturnal dreams. I agree
that white rabbits have programs much shorter than those of random
structures.
It depends. Very short programs can generate all random structures.
White rabbits have intrinsically very deep (in Bennett's sense)
programs. They are relatively costly. But technically this is not
enough for eliminating them from the first person appearance, unless
we use the self-referential logics.
But you also claim that most will consider their histories ...
Chaitin-incompressible.
In the case of you being duplicated in W and M iteratively. Not in
case of you in the UD's work.
This means long programs and no predictability at all, contradicting
daily experience.
Not at all. If you agree with Everett, and send a beam of particles
prepared in the state (up + down) on a {up, down}-mirror, you see
the splitting of the beam. If you label the left and right electrons
by W and M, you can bet the strings will be incompressible, and this
is a quantum analog of iterated self-duplication. This gives an hint
for the vanishing of the WR: computable histories about the
substitution level, and randomness below. That justifies in part the
quantum appearance from the digitalness of the mind (not of matter).
Then you say but computer science and mathematical logic shows that
it is not easy either to prove that comp and first person
indeterminacy implies [flying rabbits]. I don't understand - it has
been shown it's not easy to prove that? How has it been shown it's
not easy to prove that?
That is actually rather obvious, if you know just a bit of computer
science. To get all the computational histories, you need Church
thesis and the enumeration of all partial computable function. By the
padding theorem, this is a highly redundant and fractal (and complex)
structure, and by the theorem of Rice, the set of codes corresponding
to any non trivial functions is not recursive (making our substitution
level) unknowable. So it is rather highly complex to derive the
possibility of white rabbits from that. In this list we discuss
alternate manner to approach that measure problem.
And you say: There is no reason for making all relative histories
equally likely. But then what's the alternative?
To study the math of the universal dovetailing, and of what machine
can say about themselves and about they consistent extension
relatively to it.
Accepting the comp theory, together with the classical theory of
knowledge, although we don't have the measure, we can extract the
logic obeyed by the particular case of the measure one. I have
succeeded in showing that it obeys already a quantum-like logic. This
needs a bit of advanced computer science/mathematical logic. See my
paper for details and references.
I have to say that I am a bit astonished that some people seems to
have difficulties to grasp that once we assume comp, theoretical
computer science becomes *the* key tool to progress on the fundamental
question. The beam example above suggests empirically that we are
physically duplicated in the iterative way. But obviously we are not
just duplicated iteratively, we are also obeying computational laws,
and arithmetical laws, etc. If that was not the case, comp would imply
white noise and would fall immediately in Russell's Occam catastrophe.
But, thanks to God, universal numbers does not put only mess in
Platonia, they generate also a lot of order.
-- Bruno Marchal
From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: first person indeterminacy vs predictability
Date: Mon, 7 Mar 2011 14:58:15 +0100
On 07 Mar 2011, at 10:47, Digital Physics wrote:But if most
histories are equally likely, and most of them are random and
unpredictable and weird in the sense that suddenly crocodiles fly
by, then why can we predict rather reliably that none of those weird
histories will happen?
From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: first person indeterminacy
Date: Sun, 6 Mar 2011 19:47:20 +0100
You can also consider the iteration of self-duplication. If you
iterate 64 times, there will be 2^64 versions of you. First person
indeterminacy is the fact that most of the 2^64 versions of you will
agree that they were unable to predict in advance what was the next
outcome at each iteration. Most will consider that their histories
(like:
WMMMWWMWWWWMMWMMWM ... (length 64)
are random, even Chaitin-incompressible.
Nobody said that the histories are generated by the iterated self-
duplication. The iterated self-duplication is used here only to
understand what is the first person indeterminacy in a very simple
context (the context of pure iterated self-duplication).
Re: ON THE THEORY OF EVERYTHING was Another TOE short paper
On 07 Mar 2011, at 16:12, 1Z wrote: On Mar 7, 2:52 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: You haven;t explained why they should be dealing with consc. in the first place. Surely it is prima facie psychology. There is no human observation without consciousness. There can be no observations without sense organs, but it is not the job of physics to study sense organs Sense organs are usually conceived, both in MEC and in MAT, as measuring apparatus. When physics embraces monistic views and embed the physicist *in* in the world they are studying, they do study sense organ, even if they can simplify them in a lot of ways. The carbon nature of those sense organs might be not fundamental. Anyway, since Everett, we are back to normal, the physicist and his consciousness (through the comp theory of consciousness) is back in the picture. Now comp asks for extending that picture to the whole sigma_1 truth. Implicitly you are. To say that physics has failed to deal with it is to imply that it should be dealing with it, which is to imply that it is fundamental It was fundamental for the greek. Science is born from an understanding that the physical reality might hide something, notably mathematical truth (Xeuxippes), or just 'truth', the original god of the Platonists. But you can do physics without working on the mind- body problem. But fundamental physics is more demanding. To solve the mind-body problem in a monist theory, you have to sacrify, at the ontological level, either mind or matter (provably so assuming comp). Reduction is not elimination Ontological reduction does not necessarily entail epistemological reduction, but it does entail ontological reduction. That explains why a lot of honest materialist are keen to try to eliminate consciousness, like the Churchland, even Dennett. Now, as I said often, even before comp, uda, auda, it is easier to explain the illusion of matter to a consciousness than an illusion of consciousness to matter; if only because the notion of illusionary consciousness is a non sense at the start. Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: ON THE THEORY OF EVERYTHING was Another TOE short paper
On 07 Mar 2011, at 16:41, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 07 Mar 2011, at 16:12, 1Z wrote: Reduction is not elimination Ontological reduction does not necessarily entail epistemological reduction, but it does entail ontological reduction. Please read: Ontological reduction does not necessarily entail epistemological *elimination*, but it does entail ontological *elimination*. --- I think I wrote about instead of above in my preceding mail to 'digital physics'. --- And I apologize for my random use of the s, and my fuzzy use of the past tense for some verbs. I am very sorry. Don't hesitate to ask precision when you find my english ambiguous. Bruno That explains why a lot of honest materialist are keen to try to eliminate consciousness, like the Churchland, even Dennett. Now, as I said often, even before comp, uda, auda, it is easier to explain the illusion of matter to a consciousness than an illusion of consciousness to matter; if only because the notion of illusionary consciousness is a non sense at the start. Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
RE: first person indeterminacy vs predictability
I agree that white rabbits have programs much shorter than those of random
structures.
It depends. Very short programs can generate all random structures.
You mean the short program that computes the entire set! But this is irrelevant
here: to predict a concrete individual history, we must consider the
probability of the program that computes this concrete individual history, and
nothing else. The description of the entire set is much shorter than the
description of most of its individual elements. But it is useless as it has no
predictive power. Schmidhuber has a lots of papers on this:
http://www.idsia.ch/~juergen/computeruniverse.html
White rabbits have intrinsically very deep (in Bennett's sense) programs.
No, because many programs making white rabbits for video games are both short
and fast, that is, those rabbits are not deep in Bennett's sense.
But you also claim that most will consider their histories ...
Chaitin-incompressible.
In the case of you being duplicated in W and M iteratively. Not in
case of you in the UD's work.
This seems very unclear. What's the difference?
This means long programs and no predictability at all, contradicting
daily experience.
Not at all. If you agree with Everett, and send a beam of particles
prepared in the state (up + down) on a {up, down}-mirror, you see
the splitting of the beam. If you label the left and right electrons
by W and M, you can bet the strings will be incompressible,
sure, this still makes sense
and this is a quantum analog of iterated self-duplication. This gives an hint
for the vanishing of the WR: computable histories about the
substitution level, and randomness below. That justifies in part the
quantum appearance from the digitalness of the mind (not of matter).
Well, to me this sounds a bit like jargon used to hide the lack of substance.
Or can you explain this clearly? Excuse me for skipping the remainder of this
message.
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Re: first person indeterminacy vs predictability
On 07 Mar 2011, at 17:26, Digital Physics wrote:
I agree that white rabbits have programs much shorter than those
of random structures.
It depends. Very short programs can generate all random structures.
You mean the short program that computes the entire set! But this is
irrelevant here: to predict a concrete individual history, we must
consider the probability of the program that computes this concrete
individual history, and nothing else. The description of the entire
set is much shorter than the description of most of its individual
elements. But it is useless as it has no predictive power.
Schmidhuber has a lots of papers on this:
http://www.idsia.ch/~juergen/computeruniverse.html
The entire set of random string is useful to illustrate the first
person indeterminacy, and that was its role in my reply to Andrew and
1Z. So your remark is unfounded.
We have discussed this a lot with Juergen on this list. To keep its
position he was obliged to assume that finite strings can never be
said random, even form a first person point of view. You might take a
look in the archive. To sum up, Schmidhuber missed the first person
indeterminacy.
You have to understand that the point here consists not in solving the
mind-body problem, but in formulating it in the computationalist
theory of the mind.
White rabbits have intrinsically very deep (in Bennett's sense)
programs.
No, because many programs making white rabbits for video games are
both short and fast, that is, those rabbits are not deep in
Bennett's sense.
But a sustaining white rabbit human hallucination is another matter.
And this is what we have to take into account in the measure problem
when we are confronted with the universal dovetailing.
But you also claim that most will consider their histories ...
Chaitin-incompressible.
In the case of you being duplicated in W and M iteratively. Not in
case of you in the UD's work.
This seems very unclear. What's the difference?
It is the difference between a counting algorithm, and a universal
algorithm. You might identify numbers and programs, and in that case
the difference is the difference between a list of programs, and a
list of the executions of the programs. If you have read enough in the
archive or in my paper to understand the first person indeterminacy
notion, you might understand that, from the first person points of
view, such a distinction does matter.
This means long programs and no predictability at all, contradicting
daily experience.
Not at all. If you agree with Everett, and send a beam of particles
prepared in the state (up + down) on a {up, down}-mirror, you see
the splitting of the beam. If you label the left and right electrons
by W and M, you can bet the strings will be incompressible,
sure, this still makes sense
and this is a quantum analog of iterated self-duplication. This
gives an hint
for the vanishing of the WR: computable histories about the
substitution level, and randomness below. That justifies in part the
quantum appearance from the digitalness of the mind (not of matter).
Well, to me this sounds a bit like jargon used to hide the lack of
substance.
I meant computable histories *above* the substitution level, and
randomness below. More precisely the randomness pertains on the set
of all computations going through my current relative states. This is
a consequence of the UD Argument. I refer you to my sane04 paper:
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html
Or can you explain this clearly? Excuse me for skipping the
remainder of this message.
I suggest you read the paper sane04(*). If you have a (real precise,
not philosophical) problem, just ask a precise question. We were
discussing the seventh step of the UD Argument. It would already be
easier if you can acknowledge the understanding of the first six
steps. Note that the skipped message was alluding to the more
technical part of the work, where the measure one is given by a
variant of Gödel-Löb self-reference logics, which I name arithmetical
hypostases, because I have used them to provide an arithmetical
interpretation of Plotinus theology, including his notion of matter.
The whole result is that comp, with the classical theory of knowledge,
is an empirically testable theory.
Bruno Marchal
(*)
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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Re: Reversal without primary matter elimination (step 7)
On 3/7/2011 1:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 06 Mar 2011, at 20:21, Brent Meeker wrote: On 3/6/2011 5:07 AM, 1Z wrote: The way I see it the MG consciousness would not be conscious of any world except the virtual world of the MG, which is to say not conscious at all in our terms. It could, provided enough environment and Bruno emphasizes the UD will provide an arbitrarily large environment, be conscious*in this other universe*. But I think that's Stathis's example of the conscious rock. It's conscious modulo some interpretation, but that's a reductio against saying it's conscious at all. Brent I am not a fan of the MG specifically, but I don't see why you need a world to have consciousness as if of a world. The BIV argument indicates that you only need to simulate incoming data on peripheral nerves But how much of the world do you need to simulate to produce consistent incoming data? and to allow the MG to act? I think a lot. And in any case it is within and relative to this simulated world that consciousness exists (if it does). The MGA tends to obscure this because it helps itself to our intuition about this world and that we are simulating it and so we know what the simulation means, i.e. we have an interpretation. That's why I referred to the rock that computes everything paradox; it's the same situation except we *don't* have a ready made intuitive interpretation. Stathis, as I recall, defended the idea that the rock could, by instantiating consciousness, provide it's own interpretation. I agreed with the inference, but I regard it as a reductio against the rock that computes everything. The brain-in-a-vat is somewhat different in that it is usually supposed it is connected to our world for perception and action. So it can have real (our kind of) consciousness. What about a disconnected dreaming 'brain-in-a-vat'? Bruno If you actually took a human brain and put it in-a-vat I think it would quickly go into a loop and no longer be conscious in any meaningful sense. But even that case what ever it was conscious of would be derivative from interaction with this world. If you grew a brain in a vat, one that never had perceptual experience, you would no more be able to discern consciousness in it than in a rock. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Reversal without primary matter elimination (step 7)
On Mar 7, 6:29 pm, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: On 3/7/2011 1:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 06 Mar 2011, at 20:21, Brent Meeker wrote: On 3/6/2011 5:07 AM, 1Z wrote: The way I see it the MG consciousness would not be conscious of any world except the virtual world of the MG, which is to say not conscious at all in our terms. It could, provided enough environment and Bruno emphasizes the UD will provide an arbitrarily large environment, be conscious*in this other universe*. But I think that's Stathis's example of the conscious rock. It's conscious modulo some interpretation, but that's a reductio against saying it's conscious at all. Brent I am not a fan of the MG specifically, but I don't see why you need a world to have consciousness as if of a world. The BIV argument indicates that you only need to simulate incoming data on peripheral nerves But how much of the world do you need to simulate to produce consistent incoming data? and to allow the MG to act? I think a lot. And in any case it is within and relative to this simulated world that consciousness exists (if it does). The MGA tends to obscure this because it helps itself to our intuition about this world and that we are simulating it and so we know what the simulation means, i.e. we have an interpretation. That's why I referred to the rock that computes everything paradox; it's the same situation except we *don't* have a ready made intuitive interpretation. Stathis, as I recall, defended the idea that the rock could, by instantiating consciousness, provide it's own interpretation. I agreed with the inference, but I regard it as a reductio against the rock that computes everything. The brain-in-a-vat is somewhat different in that it is usually supposed it is connected to our world for perception and action. So it can have real (our kind of) consciousness. What about a disconnected dreaming 'brain-in-a-vat'? Bruno If you actually took a human brain and put it in-a-vat I think it would quickly go into a loop and no longer be conscious in any meaningful sense. But even that case what ever it was conscious of would be derivative from interaction with this world. If you grew a brain in a vat, one that never had perceptual experience, you would no more be able to discern consciousness in it than in a rock. Brent Again , the point of BIV's is that they are fed fake sensory information -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Reversal without primary matter elimination (step 7)
On 3/7/2011 12:01 PM, 1Z wrote: On Mar 7, 6:29 pm, Brent Meekermeeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: On 3/7/2011 1:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 06 Mar 2011, at 20:21, Brent Meeker wrote: On 3/6/2011 5:07 AM, 1Z wrote: The way I see it the MG consciousness would not be conscious of any world except the virtual world of the MG, which is to say not conscious at all in our terms. It could, provided enough environment and Bruno emphasizes the UD will provide an arbitrarily large environment, be conscious*in this other universe*. But I think that's Stathis's example of the conscious rock. It's conscious modulo some interpretation, but that's a reductio against saying it's conscious at all. Brent I am not a fan of the MG specifically, but I don't see why you need a world to have consciousness as if of a world. The BIV argument indicates that you only need to simulate incoming data on peripheral nerves But how much of the world do you need to simulate to produce consistent incoming data? and to allow the MG to act? I think a lot. And in any case it is within and relative to this simulated world that consciousness exists (if it does). The MGA tends to obscure this because it helps itself to our intuition about this world and that we are simulating it and so we know what the simulation means, i.e. we have an interpretation. That's why I referred to the rock that computes everything paradox; it's the same situation except we *don't* have a ready made intuitive interpretation. Stathis, as I recall, defended the idea that the rock could, by instantiating consciousness, provide it's own interpretation. I agreed with the inference, but I regard it as a reductio against the rock that computes everything. The brain-in-a-vat is somewhat different in that it is usually supposed it is connected to our world for perception and action. So it can have real (our kind of) consciousness. What about a disconnected dreaming 'brain-in-a-vat'? Bruno If you actually took a human brain and put it in-a-vat I think it would quickly go into a loop and no longer be conscious in any meaningful sense. But even that case what ever it was conscious of would be derivative from interaction with this world. If you grew a brain in a vat, one that never had perceptual experience, you would no more be able to discern consciousness in it than in a rock. Brent Again , the point of BIV's is that they are fed fake sensory information But faking what? Faking our kind of world - not just noise. Then the BIV is conscious of our world. If it were just fed white noise it might be conscious of some other world the same way a rock may be conscious. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: ON THE THEORY OF EVERYTHING was Another TOE short paper
On 7 March 2011 15:56, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Reduction is not elimination snip Ontological reduction does not necessarily entail epistemological *elimination*, but it does entail ontological *elimination*. Bruno, this is what I was trying to say some time ago to Peter. Why ontological reduction does not necessarily entail epistemological *elimination* is of course precisely the question that mustn't be dodged or begged, which is what I'm convinced Peter is doing by insisting dogmatically that reduction is not elimination. The point is that a primitive-materialist micro-physical theory is implicitly (if not explicitly) committed to the claim that everything that exists is *just* some arrangement of ultimate material constituents. That's literally *all there is*, ex hypothesi. Despite the fact (and, a fortiori, *because* of the fact) that this is not what any of us, as observers, actually finds to be the case, we can nonetheless choose to deny or ignore this inconvenient truth. But if we do not so choose, we can perhaps see that here we have the materialist Hard Problem in perhaps its purest form: why should there be anything at all except an ensemble of quarks? (or whatever this month's ultimate constituent of everything is supposed to be). And why should any subset of an ensemble of quarks be localised as here or now? Adding computation to the materialist mix can't help, because computation is also just an arrangement of quarks, or whatever, and talking about emergence, or logical levels etc, can achieve nothing because after any amount of this logical gyrating *it's still all just quarks*. Of course, funnily enough, we manage nonetheless to talk about all these additional things, but then to claim that this talk can be materially identical to the quarks under some description is just to play circular and futile games with words. Plugging the conclusion into the premise can of course explain nothing, and simply begs the critical question in the most egregious way. The crucial difference in your theory, Bruno, to the extent that I've understood it, is that it is explicitly both analytic AND integrative. That is, it postulates specific arithmetical-computational ultimate components and their relations, AND it further specifies the local emergence of conscious first-person viewpoints, and their layers of composite contents, through an additional subtle filtering and synthesis of the relational ensemble. Hence, through a kind of duality of part and whole, it is able to avoid the monistic deathtrap, and consequently isn't forced to deny, or sweep under the rug, the categorical orthogonality of mind and body. In such a schema, the entire domain of the secondary qualities, including matter, time and space themselves, is localised and personalised at the intersection of these analytic and synthetic principles. David On 07 Mar 2011, at 16:41, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 07 Mar 2011, at 16:12, 1Z wrote: Reduction is not elimination Ontological reduction does not necessarily entail epistemological reduction, but it does entail ontological reduction. Please read: Ontological reduction does not necessarily entail epistemological *elimination*, but it does entail ontological *elimination*. --- I think I wrote about instead of above in my preceding mail to 'digital physics'. --- And I apologize for my random use of the s, and my fuzzy use of the past tense for some verbs. I am very sorry. Don't hesitate to ask precision when you find my english ambiguous. Bruno That explains why a lot of honest materialist are keen to try to eliminate consciousness, like the Churchland, even Dennett. Now, as I said often, even before comp, uda, auda, it is easier to explain the illusion of matter to a consciousness than an illusion of consciousness to matter; if only because the notion of illusionary consciousness is a non sense at the start. Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
Re: ON THE THEORY OF EVERYTHING was Another TOE short paper
On Mar 7, 8:48 pm, David Nyman da...@davidnyman.com wrote: On 7 March 2011 15:56, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Reduction is not elimination snip Ontological reduction does not necessarily entail epistemological *elimination*, but it does entail ontological *elimination*. Bruno, this is what I was trying to say some time ago to Peter. Why ontological reduction does not necessarily entail epistemological *elimination* is of course precisely the question that mustn't be dodged or begged, which is what I'm convinced Peter is doing by insisting dogmatically that reduction is not elimination. It's rather well known that reductivism and eliminativism are not equivalent positions, for instance. The point is that a primitive-materialist micro-physical theory is implicitly (if not explicitly) committed to the claim that everything that exists is *just* some arrangement of ultimate material constituents. Yep. And reductive identity theorists say mind is a bunch of micro physical goings-on, whereas their eliminativist opponents say mind Is nothing at all. That's literally *all there is*, ex hypothesi. Despite the fact (and, a fortiori, *because* of the fact) that this is not what any of us, as observers, actually finds to be the case, Either or neither or both of reductivism and eliminativism can be judged empirically inadequate: in no case does that make them the same -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Reversal without primary matter elimination (step 7)
On Mar 7, 8:28 pm, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: On 3/7/2011 12:01 PM, 1Z wrote: On Mar 7, 6:29 pm, Brent Meekermeeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: On 3/7/2011 1:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 06 Mar 2011, at 20:21, Brent Meeker wrote: On 3/6/2011 5:07 AM, 1Z wrote: The way I see it the MG consciousness would not be conscious of any world except the virtual world of the MG, which is to say not conscious at all in our terms. It could, provided enough environment and Bruno emphasizes the UD will provide an arbitrarily large environment, be conscious*in this other universe*. But I think that's Stathis's example of the conscious rock. It's conscious modulo some interpretation, but that's a reductio against saying it's conscious at all. Brent I am not a fan of the MG specifically, but I don't see why you need a world to have consciousness as if of a world. The BIV argument indicates that you only need to simulate incoming data on peripheral nerves But how much of the world do you need to simulate to produce consistent incoming data? and to allow the MG to act? I think a lot. And in any case it is within and relative to this simulated world that consciousness exists (if it does). The MGA tends to obscure this because it helps itself to our intuition about this world and that we are simulating it and so we know what the simulation means, i.e. we have an interpretation. That's why I referred to the rock that computes everything paradox; it's the same situation except we *don't* have a ready made intuitive interpretation. Stathis, as I recall, defended the idea that the rock could, by instantiating consciousness, provide it's own interpretation. I agreed with the inference, but I regard it as a reductio against the rock that computes everything. The brain-in-a-vat is somewhat different in that it is usually supposed it is connected to our world for perception and action. So it can have real (our kind of) consciousness. What about a disconnected dreaming 'brain-in-a-vat'? Bruno If you actually took a human brain and put it in-a-vat I think it would quickly go into a loop and no longer be conscious in any meaningful sense. But even that case what ever it was conscious of would be derivative from interaction with this world. If you grew a brain in a vat, one that never had perceptual experience, you would no more be able to discern consciousness in it than in a rock. Brent Again , the point of BIV's is that they are fed fake sensory information But faking what? Faking our kind of world - not just noise. Then the BIV is conscious of our world. That doesn't follow at all. You could fake something that is highly organised (not white noise) but also unrelated to reality. As such, the BIV is not conscious of it, where of implies some sort of real object, because there is no such real object. If it were just fed white noise it might be conscious of some other world the same way a rock may be conscious. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Reversal without primary matter elimination (step 7)
On 3/7/2011 4:15 PM, 1Z wrote: On Mar 7, 8:28 pm, Brent Meekermeeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: On 3/7/2011 12:01 PM, 1Z wrote: On Mar 7, 6:29 pm, Brent Meekermeeke...@dslextreme.comwrote: On 3/7/2011 1:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 06 Mar 2011, at 20:21, Brent Meeker wrote: On 3/6/2011 5:07 AM, 1Z wrote: The way I see it the MG consciousness would not be conscious of any world except the virtual world of the MG, which is to say not conscious at all in our terms. It could, provided enough environment and Bruno emphasizes the UD will provide an arbitrarily large environment, be conscious*in this other universe*. But I think that's Stathis's example of the conscious rock. It's conscious modulo some interpretation, but that's a reductio against saying it's conscious at all. Brent I am not a fan of the MG specifically, but I don't see why you need a world to have consciousness as if of a world. The BIV argument indicates that you only need to simulate incoming data on peripheral nerves But how much of the world do you need to simulate to produce consistent incoming data? and to allow the MG to act? I think a lot. And in any case it is within and relative to this simulated world that consciousness exists (if it does). The MGA tends to obscure this because it helps itself to our intuition about this world and that we are simulating it and so we know what the simulation means, i.e. we have an interpretation. That's why I referred to the rock that computes everything paradox; it's the same situation except we *don't* have a ready made intuitive interpretation. Stathis, as I recall, defended the idea that the rock could, by instantiating consciousness, provide it's own interpretation. I agreed with the inference, but I regard it as a reductio against the rock that computes everything. The brain-in-a-vat is somewhat different in that it is usually supposed it is connected to our world for perception and action. So it can have real (our kind of) consciousness. What about a disconnected dreaming 'brain-in-a-vat'? Bruno If you actually took a human brain and put it in-a-vat I think it would quickly go into a loop and no longer be conscious in any meaningful sense. But even that case what ever it was conscious of would be derivative from interaction with this world. If you grew a brain in a vat, one that never had perceptual experience, you would no more be able to discern consciousness in it than in a rock. Brent Again , the point of BIV's is that they are fed fake sensory information But faking what? Faking our kind of world - not just noise. Then the BIV is conscious of our world. That doesn't follow at all. You could fake something that is highly organised (not white noise) but also unrelated to reality. As such, the BIV is not conscious of it, where of implies some sort of real object, because there is no such real object. Up to a point. But if the faking deviated very far from perceptions of this world the BIV would no longer be able to process them. We casually talk of white rabbits on this list, which are perfectly understandable things and are really of this world (e.g. in Walt Disney pictures). But they are just tiny derivative, deviations from reality. Even things as real as optical illusions become difficult to process (which is why they produce illusions). If your BIV was a human brain and was provided the perceptions of, say, a bird it would probably be unable to process them - it would be as cut off as if you provided white noise. My point is that human brains evolve and learn in this world and it's the only kind of world they can be conscious of. You can fiddle a little with inputs to the BIV, but unless your inputs are just variants on this world, they'll mean nothing. Brent If it were just fed white noise it might be conscious of some other world the same way a rock may be conscious. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: ON THE THEORY OF EVERYTHING was Another TOE short paper
On 8 March 2011 00:11, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: It's rather well known that reductivism and eliminativism are not equivalent positions, for instance. snip And reductive identity theorists say mind is a bunch of micro physical goings-on, whereas their eliminativist opponents say mind Is nothing at all. Yes, indeed they do, as I am very well aware, but I've said why I think that neither of these well known positions can adequately address the mind-body issues, which is what we are discussing. My claim is that they are using circular reasoning, assuming the conclusion in the premise, or are simply ignoring the very tools they employ to construct their case. What specifically do you find to be the error in this analysis? Either or neither or both of reductivism and eliminativism can be judged empirically inadequate: in no case does that make them the same I have explained why I think any real distinction between the two in a materialist schema is fundamentally question-begging with respect to the mind-body problem, essentially in the terms Bruno articulated so succinctly. You haven't pointed out what is wrong with my argument, merely that others disagree with it. It would be more helpful if you would say simply what you find to be wrong or unclear in what I have said. David On Mar 7, 8:48 pm, David Nyman da...@davidnyman.com wrote: On 7 March 2011 15:56, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Reduction is not elimination snip Ontological reduction does not necessarily entail epistemological *elimination*, but it does entail ontological *elimination*. Bruno, this is what I was trying to say some time ago to Peter. Why ontological reduction does not necessarily entail epistemological *elimination* is of course precisely the question that mustn't be dodged or begged, which is what I'm convinced Peter is doing by insisting dogmatically that reduction is not elimination. It's rather well known that reductivism and eliminativism are not equivalent positions, for instance. The point is that a primitive-materialist micro-physical theory is implicitly (if not explicitly) committed to the claim that everything that exists is *just* some arrangement of ultimate material constituents. Yep. And reductive identity theorists say mind is a bunch of micro physical goings-on, whereas their eliminativist opponents say mind Is nothing at all. That's literally *all there is*, ex hypothesi. Despite the fact (and, a fortiori, *because* of the fact) that this is not what any of us, as observers, actually finds to be the case, Either or neither or both of reductivism and eliminativism can be judged empirically inadequate: in no case does that make them the same -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
