Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm
On 11/1/2012 1:19 AM, meekerdb wrote: On 10/31/2012 6:58 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: Enumerate the programs computing functions fro N to N, (or the equivalent notion according to your chosen system). let us call those functions: phi_0, phi_1, phi_2, ... (the phi_i) Let B be a fixed bijection from N x N to N. So B(x,y) is a number. The number u is universal if phi_u(B(x,y)) = phi_x(y). And the equality means really that either both phi_u(B(x,y)) and phi_x(y) are defined (number) and that they are equal, OR they are both undefined. In phi_u(B(x,y)) = phi_x(y), x is called the program, and y the data. u is the computer. u i said to emulate the program (machine, ...) x on the input y. So u could be any number, depending on how you enumerated the functions and what bijection is used? Brent -- Oh, BTW, Bruno wrote the above ... not me. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Self-ascription and Perfect Model Model
On 30.10.2012 17:08 meekerdb said the following: On 10/30/2012 4:45 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: ... In this chapter, Van Fraassen has considered a map as a model for a typical model. A map is in the objective world, as well as a scientific model, but to use the map one has to find out where on the map he/she is located. I hope that you agree with that. I don't agree with it because it's obviously false. I just looked a map to see how close Sandy came to my brother's home in Virginia. I didn't need to locate myself on that map. In this case you need to locate your brother's home on that map. I do not see too much difference. I would agree with you that my statement does not cover all possible cases that one could imagine to employ a map, but the act of location should be there anyway. There is a correspondence between a real world and a map but the map by itself does not coordinate the reality to itself. This is done by a human being. Let me recall Van Fraassen's definition of a representation p. 21 “Z uses X to depict Y as F” The map seems to fit this pattern pretty well. Could you imagine some case, when you use a map as a map and you do not need the act of location? Evgenii -- http://blog.rudnyi.ru/tag/bas-c-van-fraassen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Self-ascription and Perfect Model Model
On 30.10.2012 16:25 Bruno Marchal said the following: On 30 Oct 2012, at 12:53, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: ... You talk for example about integers as a framework for everything. Fine. Yet, I would like to understand how mankind through it development has invented integers. How comp would help to answer this? Comp might not been able to answer that, in any better way than, say, evolution theory. Numbers are important in nature, as everything is born from them, and to survive with bigger chance, the universal numbers, us in particular, have to be able to recognize them, and manipulate them accordingly. Comp is not a theory aimed at explaining everything directly. It is just, at the start, an hypothesis in philosophy of mind, and then it appears that it reduces the mind-body problem to an explanation of quanta and qualia from arithmetic/computer science. Its main value in the human science, is, imo, that he forces us to be more modest, and more aware that we know about nothing, if only because we have wrongly separate the human science (including theology, afterlife, metaphysics) and the exact sciences. Comp provides a way to reunite them. Comp can be seen as an abstract corpus callosum making a bridge between the formal and the informal, before bridging mind and matter. Below there is a couple of quotes about German idealism. Please replace Absolute Spirit by Natural Numbers there. Then it may give one possible answer to my question. “Absolute Spirit is the fundamental reality. But in order to create the world, the Absolute manifests itself, or goes out of itself in a sense, the Absolute forgets itself and empties itself into creation (although never really ceasing to be itself). Thus the world is created as a “falling away” from Spirit, as a “self-alienation” of Spirit, although the Fall is never anything but a play of Spirit itself.” “Having “fallen” into the manifest and material world, Spirit begins the process of returning to itself, and this process of the return of Spirit to Spirit is simply development or evolution itself. The original “descent” (or involution) is a forgetting, a fall, a self-alienation of Spirit; and the reverse movement of “ascent” (or evolution) is thus the self-remembering and self-actualization of Spirit. And yet, the Idealists emphasized, all of Spirit is fully present at each and every stage of evolution as the process of evolution itself. ” Evgenii -- http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2012/10/evolution-and-german-idealism.html -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm
On Thu, Nov 1, 2012 at 1:42 AM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.netwrote:
On 10/31/2012 6:14 PM, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote:
On Wed, Oct 31, 2012 at 7:59 PM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.netwrote:
Dear Cowboy,
One question. Was the general outline that I was trying to explain
make any sense to you? Without being obvious about it, I am trying to
finely parse the difference between the logic of temporal systems and the
logic of atemporal systems - such as the Platonic Realm - such that I might
show that reasonings that are correct in one are not necessarily correct in
the other.
This was not obvious to me, and going over the posts, I see how you're
leaning that way... but why not just say that, then? Don't get me wrong, I
love Joycean labyrinths as much as the next guy, but if the topic is on
some level tending towards sincerity, then I don't see the benefit in not
being obvious. Then again, I'm a Captain Obvious type. Should get the
shirt.
Hi Cowboy,
I am dyslexic, this colors/flavors everything I write
One problem that I have discovered (I thank Brent for bringing this up!)
is that in our reasoning we set up constructions - such as the person on
the desert island - that blur the very distinction that I am trying to
frame. We should never assume temporal situations to argue for relations
that are atemporal unless we are prepared to show the morphisms between the
two situations.
Isn't this already physical framework when you seem to be arguing for time
as primitive (n incompatible with comp to begin with, after which you seek
to carve out a distinction, when you've already mixed at the base?
My argument is that it is impossible to 'derive Becoming from Being,
but we can derive Being from Becoming. So why not work with the latter
idea? I am trying to get Bruno to admit, among other things, that he has to
assume a non-well founded logic for his result to work.;-)
I see less and less how you'd be able to do that, as I said, by making
process/linear time primitive in comp, and by assuming physical universe
with so many statements. Quantum Logic is part of the picture (see SANE
2004).
Bruno would have us, in step 8 of UDA, to not assume a concrete
robust physical universe. He goes on to argue that Occam's razor would
demand that we reject the very idea of the existence of physical worlds
given that he can 'show' how they can be reconstructed or derived from
irreducible - and thus ontologically primitive - Arithmetic 'objects' {0,
1, +, *} that are operating somehow in an atemporal way.
UDA does not contradict itself here. Restraints on processing power, on
memory and print capacities, implying time as some illusion emanating from
eternal primitives, don't exist when framed non-constructively, more like
sets of assignments, rather than operations in your sense, by which you
seem to mean physically primitive operations on par with ontologically
primitive arrow of time. Isn't this like cracking open the axioms, and then
complaining that the building has cracks in it?
There are simply a pile of concepts that are just assumed without
explanation in any discussion of philosophy/logic/math. My point is that a
theory must be have the capacity of being communicable ab initio for it to
even be considered. When I am confronted with a theory or a result or an
argument that seems to disallow for communicability I am going to baulk at
it!
And the possibility that you are baulking at your preconceptions rather
than engaging the theory has never happened to you? Happens to me all the
time.
We should be able to make the argument run without ever appealing to a
Platonic realm or any kind of 'realism'.
It's hard for me to see bets being made without some cash/investment/gap
of faith on the table.
Sure.
Then it would be easy for you to directly address the question: why assume
non-comp and then complain about comp's implications of time and physics
arising from dream interaction of universal numbers, therefore being not
primary or existing primitively?
In my thinking, if arithmetic is powerful enough to be a TOE and run the
TOE to generate our world, then that power should be obvious. My problem is
that it looks tooo much like the 'explanation' of creation that we find in
mythology, whether it is the
Ptahhttp://ancientegyptonline.co.uk/ptah.htmlof ancient Egypt or the egg
of Pangu http://www.livingmyths.com/Chinese.htm or whatever other myth
one might like. What makes an explanation framed in the sophisticated and
formal language of modal logic any different?
Nothing, at its base. Appearances and looks can deceive, as numbers can
too.
Would this not make that deception something in our understanding and
not the fault of numbers? After all, numbers are supposedly the least
ambiguous of entities!
On the surface, but not when you look under the hood. That's a
What is reality
A nice video http://www.newscientist.com/video/1872152752001-what-is-reality.html You have to ignore a short sponsor message at the beginning. Evgenii P.S. I have found it by http://magpie73.livejournal.com/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm
On 11/1/2012 6:54 AM, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote:
On Thu, Nov 1, 2012 at 1:42 AM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net
mailto:stephe...@charter.net wrote:
On 10/31/2012 6:14 PM, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote:
On Wed, Oct 31, 2012 at 7:59 PM, Stephen P. King
stephe...@charter.net mailto:stephe...@charter.net wrote:
[SPK]
One problem that I have discovered (I thank Brent for
bringing this up!) is that in our reasoning we set up
constructions - such as the person on the desert island
- that blur the very distinction that I am trying to
frame. We should never assume temporal situations to
argue for relations that are atemporal unless we are
prepared to show the morphisms between the two situations.
Isn't this already physical framework when you seem to be
arguing for time as primitive (n incompatible with comp to
begin with, after which you seek to carve out a distinction,
when you've already mixed at the base?
My argument is that it is impossible to 'derive Becoming from
Being, but we can derive Being from Becoming. So why not work with
the latter idea? I am trying to get Bruno to admit, among other
things, that he has to assume a non-well founded logic for his
result to work.;-)
I see less and less how you'd be able to do that, as I said, by making
process/linear time primitive in comp, and by assuming physical
universe with so many statements. Quantum Logic is part of the picture
(see SANE 2004).
Hi Cowboy,
I think of it this way: Change is fundamental (ala Heraclitus
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/heraclitus/#PhiPri and Bergson
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bergson/#5) and Being is its
automorphism http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Automorphism. Is that a bit
more clear? Linear time (why 'linear'? Is there such a thing as
non-linear time? Cyclic time is still linear, AFAIK...) is, IMHO, change
+ a measure. Without a measure of change, there is no time; there is
just change. If we take relativity seriously, we might even claim that
there is no difference between change minus measure and staticness... I
should mention that any change that has no measure associated with it is
zeroth order change.
Without the means to compare two different things to each other,
does it make any sense to be able to make coherent statements about some
change in one relative to the other. If there is just one thing, how do
we know anything about its possible change(s) unless we are looking at
it and gauging (measuring) its change against some thing else that has
some measure associated - but our observation of it violates the
stipulation of if there is just one thing.
The idea that somehow the observer is irrelevant in physics and
philosophy is, IMHO, one of the worse errors ever. Sure, we need to
minimize and even eliminate observer bias and preferred reference
framing, but eliminating the observer and replacing it with some
ambiguous 'view from nowhere' is undiluted hogwash. This is where
realist chafe me, they act as if the universe of objects is out there
and has definite properties in the complete absence of any clear
explanation for how those properties came to be defined in the first
place. OK, OK, I will stop ranting...
Bruno would have us, in step 8 of UDA, to not assume a
concrete robust physical universe. He goes on to argue that
Occam's razor would demand that we reject the very idea of
the existence of physical worlds given that he can 'show' how
they can be reconstructed or derived from irreducible - and
thus ontologically primitive - Arithmetic 'objects' {0, 1, +,
*} that are operating somehow in an atemporal way.
UDA does not contradict itself here. Restraints on processing
power, on memory and print capacities, implying time as some
illusion emanating from eternal primitives, don't exist when
framed non-constructively, more like sets of assignments, rather
than operations in your sense, by which you seem to mean
physically primitive operations on par with ontologically
primitive arrow of time. Isn't this like cracking open the
axioms, and then complaining that the building has cracks in it?
There are simply a pile of concepts that are just assumed
without explanation in any discussion of philosophy/logic/math. My
point is that a theory must be have the capacity of being
communicable ab initio for it to even be considered. When I am
confronted with a theory or a result or an argument that seems
to disallow for communicability I am going to baulk at it!
And the possibility that you are baulking at your preconceptions
rather than engaging the theory has never happened to you? Happens to
me all the time.
OK, got any ideas what these might be other
Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm
On 31 Oct 2012, at 19:59, Stephen P. King wrote: On 10/30/2012 7:36 PM, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote: On Tue, Oct 30, 2012 at 11:39 PM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net wrote: On 10/30/2012 5:39 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 10/30/2012 2:27 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 10/30/2012 5:15 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 10/30/2012 1:53 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: Dear Brent, What is it that distinguishes between tokens and propositions? Tokens are the physical elements (e.g. letters, words, sounds) that are used to represent a proposition in a particular language. What determines the map between the letters, words, sounds and the content of propositions? The proposition is the abstracted meaning which is independent of particular language. Does this independence do so far as to disallow for an arbitrary physical entity to know of it? Independence of abstractions from particular individuals is not independence from all. So Zwei est ein und ein. are tokens expressing the same proposition as Two equals one plus one. which is that 2=1+1. That Which 'that' do you refer to, the tokens or the proposition. is true only because multiple persons came to believe that it is true You previously agreed that one person alone could come to know that 2=1+1 or 17 is prime and express it symbolically, i.e. in tokens. So multiple persons are only necessary in order for the tokens to be used for communicating from one to another; which is the case whether the thing communicated is true or false. Reread this: In 10/30/2012 5:03 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 10/30/2012 3:05 PM, meekerdb wrote: [SPK] Unless multiple entities can agree that the sequence of symbols 17 is prime is an indicator of some particular mathematical object and one of its particular properties, then how does 17 is prime come to mean anything at all? I agree with that. But you're talking about the tokens 17 is prime not the concept that 17 is prime. Could not a person who grew up alone on an island realize that 17 has no divisors, and he could even invent a private language in which he could write down Peano's axioms. Why are you using such trivial and parochial framing for abstract questions? Why the reference to single individuals? Did you not understand that I am claiming that meaningfulness requires at least the possibility of interaction between many entities such that each can evaluate the truth value of a proposition and thus can truthfully claim to have knowledge of true statements? A person that grew and died on a desert island may have discovered for itself that 17 objects cannot be divided into equal subsets, but our statements about that are mere figemnts of our imagination as we could know nothing objective and non-imaginative at all about that person. We are imagining ourselves to have powers that we simply do not have. We are not omniscient voyeurs of Reality and there is not anything that is. How is an imaginary entity come to aquire a real 1p or actual real properties? It might if that imaginary entity is deemed to have 1p content within some narrative. But outside of that narrative, it does not even exist! Languaging more about this is getting us nowhere. Brent and acted to cause it to be true. Remove one person from the multiplicity and the meaning still is there. Remove all of them and the meaning vanishes. This needs a cowboy's few cents: Every bet on ontological primitive is, despite the infinite models and conjectures we can weave from them, just that: a bet. If this is stated clearly and honestly then it's cool, no matter if it turns out an error, as we've eliminated something at least. But this is unfortunately rarer than to pound people with real, reality, authentic vs imaginary, artificial in discourse where axioms are not shared: if somebody can demarcate this boundary clearly for all discourse, then I fail to see/understand how anybody could do this outside of being high with a smile on their face and comic implication. My intelligence is limited insofar as I cannot understand, how this is not some form of needless force, in face of our vast ignorance. Meaning is not some magical quality bestowed upon the discoverer of a set of relations. That's everybody's flavor of semantics working there. As for human; if this is close to philosophical humanism semantically, then it's safe to say that, paired with standard model of physics, it's nice epistemologies with a lot of bs for its close association to ideological atheism; particularly the assertion no supernatural miracle shit when asserting singularity as big bang is just that: another miracle; when the rules of the humanist bet said no miracles. m Dear Cowboy, One question. Was the general outline that I was trying to explain make any sense to you? Without being obvious about it,
Re: Could universes in a multiverse be solipsistic ? Would this be a problem ?
On 01 Nov 2012, at 00:35, Stephen P. King wrote: On 10/31/2012 9:39 AM, Roger Clough wrote: 1) Yes, numbers float in a sea of universal mind (the One). 2) Here's a thought. If the universe acts like a gigantic homunculus, with the supreme monad or One as its mind, then could there be a solipsism to our universe such that other multiverse versions of oiur universe could not access (the mind of) ours ? Would this be a problem for multiverse theories ? Roger Clough,rclo...@verizon.net 10/31/2012 Dear Roger, I think that this idea is exactly wrong. The idea that numbers float in a sea of universal mind (the One) makes the explanation an infinite regress. Replace the One by arithmetical truth, and the infinite regress disappear. They reappear *in* arithmetical truth, but have fixed points (some provably, some non provably). No problem. That is OK if and only if you allow for the concept of the One to be Kaufman and Zuckerman's Quine Atom aka Russell operator, but if not it does not work. Why? Because numbers have to be distinguishable from to have individual values. The totality of numbers is an infinity and thus have the property that their proper parts cannot be distinguished from their totality. How does the One accomplish this? It seems to me that we have to assume that the One is conscious of the numbers and that makes the numbers something different from the One for 1) to work and this is no different from what a finite mind does. My point here is that a mind cannot be infinite because it would be incapable of distinguishing it's self from any of its proper parts - making it the ultimate solipsist. Do there exist maps between the totality of an infinite set to an improper part? If yes, what are their necessary properties? The One is solipsist, as the one is unique and alone. But I don't see why it should be conscious. It might be, but I see no evidence for this. Bruno The idea of 2) seems to be demolished by Dennett's argument against the homunculus or else the One is strictly a solipsist as I argued above. I suspect that the mapping between wholes and improper parts is the same as Bruno's measure problem. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm
On 01 Nov 2012, at 00:58, Stephen P. King wrote: On 10/31/2012 12:22 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 30 Oct 2012, at 18:29, Stephen P. King wrote: On 10/30/2012 12:38 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: No? If they do not have something equivalent to concepts, how can they dream? Yes, the universal numbers can have concept. Dear Bruno, Let's start over. Please plain in detail what is a universal number and how it (and not ordinary numbers) have concepts or 1p. I will give more detail on FOAR, soon or later. But let me explains quickly. Fix your favorite Turing universal system. It can be a programming language, a universal Turing machine, or a sigma_1 complete theory, or even a computer. Dear Bruno, That 'fixing occurs at our level only. We are free (relatively) to fix our axiomatic objects from the wide variety that have been proven to exist within the Mathematical universe of concepts or, if we are clever, we can invent new concepts and work with them; but we cannot do things in our logic that are self-contradictory unless we make sure that the contradictions are not allowed to be pathological. OK. No problem. Enumerate the programs computing functions fro N to N, (or the equivalent notion according to your chosen system). let us call those functions: phi_0, phi_1, phi_2, ... (the phi_i) Let B be a fixed bijection from N x N to N. So B(x,y) is a number. The number u is universal if phi_u(B(x,y)) = phi_x(y). And the equality means really that either both phi_u(B(x,y)) and phi_x(y) are defined (number) and that they are equal, OR they are both undefined. In phi_u(B(x,y)) = phi_x(y), x is called the program, and y the data. u is the computer. u i said to emulate the program (machine, ...) x on the input y. OK, but this does not answer my question. What is the ontological level mechanism that distinguishes the u and the x and the y from each other? The one you have chosen above. But let continue to use elementary arithmetic, as everyone learn it in school. So the answer is: elementary arithmetic. What I am trying to explain to you that ontological level objects cannot have any logical mechanism that requires temporarily unless you are assuming some form of Becoming as an ontological primitive. Platonism, as far as I know, disallows this. Indeed. becoming, like the whole physicalness, emerges from inside. It is 1p (plural). Bruno Comp is the thesis that I can survive with a physical digital computer in place of the physical brain, as far as it emulates me close enough. Comp gives a special role to computer (physical incarnation of a universal number). The comp idea is that computer can supports thinking and consciousness, and makes them capable of manifestation relatively to other universal structure (physical universes if that exists, people, etc.). This should answer your question. The lobian machines are only universal numbers, having the knowledge that they are universal. I can prove to any patient human that he/she is Löbian (I cannot prove that he/she is sound or correct, note). The UDA results is that whatever you mean by physical for making comp meaningful, that physicalness has to emerge entirely and only, from a 'competition' between all universal numbers. There is no need to go out of arithmetic, and worst, there is no possible use of going out of arithmetic, once betting on comp. By arithmetic I mean arithmetical truth, or the standard model of arithmetic, I don't mean a theory. I mean the whole set of true arithmetical propositions, or of their Gödel numbers. Bruno -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm
On 01 Nov 2012, at 01:18, Stephen P. King wrote: On 10/31/2012 12:45 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 30 Oct 2012, at 18:39, Stephen P. King wrote: On 10/30/2012 12:51 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 30 Oct 2012, at 17:04, meekerdb wrote: On 10/30/2012 4:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: My argument is that concepts of truth and provability of theorems apply only to the concepts of numbers and their constructions, not to numbers themselves. Truth applies to proposition, or sentences representing them for some machine/numbers. If not, comp does not even makes sense. So your are agreeing? Two has no truth value, but Two equals one plus one. does. Yes I agree. It seems I insisted on this a lot. But in this context, it seems that Stephen was using this to assert that the truth of, say Two equals one plus one. depend on some numbers or subject having to discover it, or prove it. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ Dear Bruno, My point is that a number is not a capable of being an ontological primitive Then I can stop reading as you need to assume the numbers (or anything Turing equivalent) to get them. Dear Bruno, So it is OK to assume that which I seek to explain? You can't explain the numbers without assuming the numbers. This has been foreseen by Dedekind, and vert well justified by many theorem in mathematical logic. Below the number, you are lead to version of ultrafinitism, which is senseless in the comp theory. *and* having some particular set of values and meanings. I just assume x + 0 = x x + s(y) = s(x + y) x *0 = 0 x*s(y) = x*y + x And hope you understand. I can understand these symbols because there is at least a way to physically implement them. Those notion have nothing to do with physical implementation. Implementation and physical will be explained from them. A natural thing as they are much more complex than the laws above. In the absence of some common media, even if it is generated by sheaves of computations, there simply isno way to understand anything. Why ? You must accept non-well foundedness for your result to work, but you seem fixated against that. 1004. A statement, such as 2 = 1+1 or two equals one plus one, are said truthfully to have the same meaning because there are multiple and separable entities that can have the agreement on the truth value. In the absence of the ability to judge a statement independently of any particular entity capable of understanding the statement, there is no meaning to the concept that the statement is true or false. To insist that a statement has a meaning and is true (or false) in an ontological condition where no entities capable of judging the meaning, begs the question of meaningfulness! You are taking for granted some things that your arguments disallow. Do you agree that during the five seconds just after the Big Bang (assuming that theory) there might not have been any possible observers. But then the Big Bang has no more sense. No, I don't. Why? Because that concept of the five seconds just after the Big Bang is an assumption of a special case or pleading. I might as well postulate the existence of Raindow Dash to act as the entity to whom the Truth of mathematical statements have absolute meaning. To be frank, I thing that the Big Bang theory, as usually explained is a steaming pile of rubbish, as it asks us to believe that the totality of all that exists sprang into being from Nothing. I actually agree, by accident, on this. But this is not relevant for my point. Imagine that we can show that some solution to GR equantion have universe so poor that life cannot exist in there, would you say that such universe cannot exist? I believe that the totality of what exists is eternal, having no beginning and no end. I am OK with that. It is close to Platonism. But with comp we can restrict this to the arithmetical truth (a highly non computable structure, but still conceivable by universal numbers, relatively). What we infer from our observations of Hubble expansion is just an effect that follows, ultimately, from our finiteness. Including time and space. So we do agree again. I think Brent is right, and Quentin. You confuse 1+1=2 with human expression for pointing on that proposition. You obviously needs human to understand those 1+1=2 , but the content of 1+1=2 has simply no relation at all with the human, or with a physical universe. No, none of you have yet to be able to understand my counter- argument. It is not complicated. We cannot assume to have something when the means for its existence is not allowed. My claim is that meaningfulness supervenes on the possibility of interaction of *many* entities and is independent of any *one* (or some lesser finite subset) of that Many. But arithmetical truth is full of entities, even
Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm
On 01 Nov 2012, at 05:27, meekerdb wrote: On 10/31/2012 11:52 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: I don't see why denying mathematical realism would entail saying no to the doctor. It implies not saying yes qua computatio. It implies NOT understanding what Church thesis is about, as to show it consistent you need the diagonalization, which use the excluded middle principle. You can still say yes, but only by using some magic. The doctor isn't proposing to replace part of you brain with a piece of Platonia, he has a real physical device to implant. This is not related. That will follow step 8. Here, you have to be arithmetical realist to get an idea of what a computer is, and how it functions, as the physical one will approximate it, well enough, it is hoped. Of course you can say yes to the doctor, just because you trust him. But comp is not saying yes to the doctor. Comp is the doctrine that saying yes will indeed work, once the artificial brain is a *computer*. The definition of computer makes no sense with arithmetical realism. ?? If I'm a materialist I could say yes because I think the artificial brain produces the same input/output signals. But you need to be arithmetical realist to define what you mean by same input-output. Arithmetical realism is not a big deal. It means that you believe that 2+2=5 OR 2+2≠5. I don't see why I would have believe in Platonia. Comp use only arithmetical platonia, and that is just a poetical expression to say that you believe that 17 is prime independently of the existence of the Higgs boson. I may believe that only some computations are instantiated and there are no infinities. OK, but again, that is different. That's the move toward physical ultrafinitism. You can keep comp, up to step seven, and we are back on the fact that step 8 (the movie-graph argument) makes such move senseless. But note that to just define the term computation, you need to be arithmetical realist. But if there were no step 8, indeed, you might have succeed in saving a form of materialism. I still miss what you don't understand in the step 8. you did not comment my recent answer on this. Maybe you could try to elaborate on your intuition. Why and how does a primitive matter change something in a computation or in the consciousness associated to it, and this in a Turing emulable manner? Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm
On 01 Nov 2012, at 06:19, meekerdb wrote: On 10/31/2012 6:58 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: (actually it was Bruno) Enumerate the programs computing functions fro N to N, (or the equivalent notion according to your chosen system). let us call those functions: phi_0, phi_1, phi_2, ... (the phi_i) Let B be a fixed bijection from N x N to N. So B(x,y) is a number. The number u is universal if phi_u(B(x,y)) = phi_x(y). And the equality means really that either both phi_u(B(x,y)) and phi_x(y) are defined (number) and that they are equal, OR they are both undefined. In phi_u(B(x,y)) = phi_x(y), x is called the program, and y the data. u is the computer. u i said to emulate the program (machine, ...) x on the input y. So u could be any number, depending on how you enumerated the functions and what bijection is used? Any number. I am not sure, the enumeration has to be given by an algorithm. But yes, the notion of computation, universality, etc. are intensional notion, and makes sense only relatively to the other number. That is why a often add relative before number. This should be obvious. The doctor who scan your brain will also have some flexibility in the encoding of your current local and relative state. I doubt it can encode it with the number 4, though. You might say, that 4 is for the fourth compact disk on the shell doctor, but then 4 is no more an encoding, but only a pointer to an encoding. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Self-ascription and Perfect Model Model
On 11/1/2012 5:03 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: On 30.10.2012 17:08 meekerdb said the following: On 10/30/2012 4:45 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: ... In this chapter, Van Fraassen has considered a map as a model for a typical model. A map is in the objective world, as well as a scientific model, but to use the map one has to find out where on the map he/she is located. I hope that you agree with that. I don't agree with it because it's obviously false. I just looked a map to see how close Sandy came to my brother's home in Virginia. I didn't need to locate myself on that map. In this case you need to locate your brother's home on that map. I do not see too much difference. I would agree with you that my statement does not cover all possible cases that one could imagine to employ a map, but the act of location should be there anyway. There is a correspondence between a real world and a map but the map by itself does not coordinate the reality to itself. This is done by a human being. Let me recall Van Fraassen's definition of a representation p. 21 “Z uses X to depict Y as F” The map seems to fit this pattern pretty well. Could you imagine some case, when you use a map as a map and you do not need the act of location? Of course not. But in many cases I do not need to locate myself, which was crucial to van Frassen's point about self reference. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Self-ascription and Perfect Model Model
On 01.11.2012 18:00 meekerdb said the following: On 11/1/2012 5:03 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: On 30.10.2012 17:08 meekerdb said the following: On 10/30/2012 4:45 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: ... In this chapter, Van Fraassen has considered a map as a model for a typical model. A map is in the objective world, as well as a scientific model, but to use the map one has to find out where on the map he/she is located. I hope that you agree with that. I don't agree with it because it's obviously false. I just looked a map to see how close Sandy came to my brother's home in Virginia. I didn't need to locate myself on that map. In this case you need to locate your brother's home on that map. I do not see too much difference. I would agree with you that my statement does not cover all possible cases that one could imagine to employ a map, but the act of location should be there anyway. There is a correspondence between a real world and a map but the map by itself does not coordinate the reality to itself. This is done by a human being. Let me recall Van Fraassen's definition of a representation p. 21 “Z uses X to depict Y as F” The map seems to fit this pattern pretty well. Could you imagine some case, when you use a map as a map and you do not need the act of location? Of course not. But in many cases I do not need to locate myself, which was crucial to van Frassen's point about self reference. It was just a special case. It was my fault that I have not described it better. In the general case this is The Problem of Coordination (chapter 5 in the book). Evgenii -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Self-ascription and Perfect Model Model
On 01 Nov 2012, at 11:09, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: On 30.10.2012 16:25 Bruno Marchal said the following: On 30 Oct 2012, at 12:53, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: ... You talk for example about integers as a framework for everything. Fine. Yet, I would like to understand how mankind through it development has invented integers. How comp would help to answer this? Comp might not been able to answer that, in any better way than, say, evolution theory. Numbers are important in nature, as everything is born from them, and to survive with bigger chance, the universal numbers, us in particular, have to be able to recognize them, and manipulate them accordingly. Comp is not a theory aimed at explaining everything directly. It is just, at the start, an hypothesis in philosophy of mind, and then it appears that it reduces the mind-body problem to an explanation of quanta and qualia from arithmetic/computer science. Its main value in the human science, is, imo, that he forces us to be more modest, and more aware that we know about nothing, if only because we have wrongly separate the human science (including theology, afterlife, metaphysics) and the exact sciences. Comp provides a way to reunite them. Comp can be seen as an abstract corpus callosum making a bridge between the formal and the informal, before bridging mind and matter. Below there is a couple of quotes about German idealism. Please replace Absolute Spirit by Natural Numbers there. Here there is a little difficulty. With comp, the absolut Spirit (or the one, or God, or the big thing without a name, etc...) can be the Natural Numbers (I would add structured by + and *, as it is not just 0, 1, 2, ...). But then comp can prove that there is no way the creatures itself could ever know that, nor even completely able to explain what that could mean. There is no paradox. There is only a remind that we cannot prove that comp is true. If ever we could prove comp, then we could give a name to God, and then we fall ... again. Then it may give one possible answer to my question. “Absolute Spirit is the fundamental reality. But in order to create the world, the Absolute manifests itself, or goes out of itself in a sense, the Absolute forgets itself and empties itself into creation (although never really ceasing to be itself). Thus the world is created as a “falling away” from Spirit, as a “self-alienation” of Spirit, although the Fall is never anything but a play of Spirit itself.” Yes. This remind me of my quoting of Aurobindo, which suits so well something in both comp, and, swim has to say, the salvia divinorum experience: What, you ask, was the beginning of it all? And it is this ... Existence that multiplied itself For sheer delight of being And plunged into numberless trillions of forms So that it might Find Itself Innumerably (Aurobindo) “Having “fallen” into the manifest and material world, Spirit begins the process of returning to itself, and this process of the return of Spirit to Spirit is simply development or evolution itself. The original “descent” (or involution) is a forgetting, a fall, a self- alienation of Spirit; and the reverse movement of “ascent” (or evolution) is thus the self-remembering and self-actualization of Spirit. And yet, the Idealists emphasized, all of Spirit is fully present at each and every stage of evolution as the process of evolution itself. ” I can't agree more, Evgenii. It is also very close to Plotinus' emanation/conversion, which has influenced the Christians a lot, even if this has often taken the shape of fairy tales (which obviously should never been taken literally). In Plotinus, and in comp we can say more: it is the process of conversion of the Soul toward the Spirit, which literally create the material reality. It is the indeterminateness of the border of the universal mind, where God loss control, so to speak, which makes it possible for the soul to start the conversion, and come back to the source. That conception of matter is already in Aristotle, but Plotinus gives the Platonist correction which makes it consistent, and even necessary I would say, with the theology, including physics, of the universal machines. Each individual universal machines is a window for the arithmetical truth to discover (partially) itself, but also losing itself, in itself. This entails a double amnesia: God has to forget his identity to explore itself, and the creatures have to forget the window and the exploration (the body and the environment) to remember who they are. Likewise with salvia: you forget who you are here to remind who you are there, and vice versa, apparently from many reports, although you can also just disconnect, instead of forgetting (which is handy when the phone rings). Indeed, the same with comp once you accept the greek definition of knowledge and dream---roughly speaking: true belief
Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm
On 01 Nov 2012, at 14:25, Stephen P. King wrote: But I agree with comp up to the strong version of step 8! But then you have to find the flaw in step 8. as step 8 is done in comp, without adding any assumptions, of course. I accept comp with a weak version of step 8 or, I think equivalently, a weak version of computational universality: A computation is universal if it is not dependent on any one particular physical system. This is called functional, not universal. It has nothing to do with Turing universality. This implies, to me, that there is at least one physical system that such a universal computation can be said to actually run on! I don't see this. This goes against the Parmenidean/Platonistic idea of computation as static objects in eternity that are completely independent of physical stuff! Sorry but, by definition, computations are static objects in arithmetic (or in fortanic, Lispic, combinatoric, lambdaic, etc There are a lot of equivalent ontological choices here.). The physicist have not (yet) found a definition of computation which does not use that mathematical definition. This exists, though, has *many* physical systems are in principle Turing universal. But Turing universal is a mathematical, even arithmetical, (even in the strong logician sense). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Self-ascription and Perfect Model Model
On 01.11.2012 18:30 Bruno Marchal said the following: On 01 Nov 2012, at 11:09, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: ... “Absolute Spirit is the fundamental reality. But in order to create the world, the Absolute manifests itself, or goes out of itself in a sense, the Absolute forgets itself and empties itself into creation (although never really ceasing to be itself). Thus the world is created as a “falling away” from Spirit, as a “self-alienation” of Spirit, although the Fall is never anything but a play of Spirit itself.” Yes. This remind me of my quoting of Aurobindo, which suits so well something in both comp, and, swim has to say, the salvia divinorum experience: What, you ask, was the beginning of it all? And it is this ... Existence that multiplied itself For sheer delight of being And plunged into numberless trillions of forms So that it might Find Itself Innumerably (Aurobindo) “Having “fallen” into the manifest and material world, Spirit begins the process of returning to itself, and this process of the return of Spirit to Spirit is simply development or evolution itself. The original “descent” (or involution) is a forgetting, a fall, a self-alienation of Spirit; and the reverse movement of “ascent” (or evolution) is thus the self-remembering and self-actualization of Spirit. And yet, the Idealists emphasized, all of Spirit is fully present at each and every stage of evolution as the process of evolution itself. ” I can't agree more, Evgenii. It is also very close to Plotinus' emanation/conversion, which has influenced the Christians a lot, even if this has often taken the shape of fairy tales (which obviously should never been taken literally). In Plotinus, and in comp we can say more: it is the process of conversion of the Soul toward the Spirit, which literally create the material reality. It is the indeterminateness of the border of the universal mind, where God loss control, so to speak, which makes it possible for the soul to start the conversion, and come back to the source. That conception of matter is already in Aristotle, but Plotinus gives the Platonist correction which makes it consistent, and even necessary I would say, with the theology, including physics, of the universal machines. Each individual universal machines is a window for the arithmetical truth to discover (partially) itself, but also losing itself, in itself. This entails a double amnesia: God has to forget his identity to explore itself, and the creatures have to forget the window and the exploration (the body and the environment) to remember who they are. Likewise with salvia: you forget who you are here to remind who you are there, and vice versa, apparently from many reports, although you can also just disconnect, instead of forgetting (which is handy when the phone rings). Indeed, the same with comp once you accept the greek definition of knowledge and dream---roughly speaking: true belief (knowledge) and consistent belief (dream). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ Then you may like Ken Wilber, The Marriage of Sense and Soul: Integrating Science and Religion as the quotes have been from this book. There is nothing about comp there but the book is not that bad. I should say that the author understands the religion pretty general: as spirit and contemplation. It is an interesting overview of how science has started to dominate over art and moral and what could be done against it. The different would-be solutions from history are also considered. Wilber’s solution, if I have understood correctly, goes like a combination of German idealism (that you like) + Joga. Evgenii -- http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2012/10/the-marriage-of-sense-and-soul.html -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm
On 11/1/2012 11:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
[SPK] Bruno would have us, in step 8 of UDA, to not assume a
concrete robust physical universe.
?
Reread step 8. Step 7 and step 8 are the only steps where I explicitly
do assume a primitive physical reality.
In step 8, it is done for the reductio ad absurdum.
Dear Bruno,
I have cut and pasted your exact words from SANE04 and you still
didn't understand... From:
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL.pdf
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL.pdf
...what if we don't grant a concrete robust physical universe?
Actually the 8th present step will explain
that such a move is nevertheless without purpose. This will make the
notion of concrete and
existing universe completely devoid of any explicative power. It
will follow that a much
weaker and usual form of Ockham's razor can be used to conclude that not
only physics has
been epistemologically reduced to machine psychology, but that
''matter'' has been
ontologically reduced to ''mind'' where mind is defined as the object
study of fundamental
machine psychology.
My claim is that _/*neither physical worlds nor numbers (or any
other object that must supervene on mind) can be ontologically
primitive*/_. Both must emerge from a neutral ground that is neither and
has no particular properties.
[SPK] He goes on to argue that Occam's razor would demand that we
reject the very idea of the existence of physical worlds
Only of primitive physical worlds. And you did agree with this. I just
prove this from comp. That's the originality. A bit of metaphysics is
made into a theorem in a theory (comp).
Can we agree that physical worlds emerge somehow from sharable
aspects of multiple sheaves of computations?
[SPK] given that he can 'show' how they can be reconstructed or
derived from irreducible - and thus ontologically primitive -
Arithmetic 'objects' {0, 1, +, *} that are operating somehow in an
atemporal way. We should be able to make the argument run without
ever appealing to a Platonic realm or any kind of 'realism'. In my
thinking, if arithmetic is powerful enough to be a TOE and run the
TOE to generate our world, then that power should be obvious. My
problem is that it looks tooo much like the 'explanation' of creation
that we find in mythology, whether it is the Ptah
http://ancientegyptonline.co.uk/ptah.html of ancient Egypt or the
egg of Pangu http://www.livingmyths.com/Chinese.htm or whatever
other myth one might like. What makes an explanation framed in the
sophisticated and formal language of modal logic any different?
I use the self-reference logic, for obvious reason. Again, this
entails the sue of some modal logics, due to a *theorem* by Solovay.
All correct machine whose beliefs extend RA obeys to G and G*. There
is no choice in the matter.
That is not changed or involved by my argument.
[SPK] I agree 10% with your point about 'miracles'. I am
very suspicions of special explanations' or 'natural conspiracies'.
(This comes from my upbringing as a Bible-believing Fundamentalist
and eventual rejection of that literalist mental straight-jacket.) As
I see things, any condition or situation that can be used to
'explain' some other conceptually difficult condition or situation
should be either universal in that they apply anywhere and anytime
But even in your theory anywhere and anytime must be defined by
something more primitive, given that you agree that physics cannot be
the fundamental theory, given that the physical reality is not primitive.
The concepts of where and when (positions in a space-time)
would seem to be rendered meaningless if there is no space-time (or
observers/measurements to define it), no? OH, BTW, I don't think that we
disagree that physics cannot be the fundamental theory. Physics
requires measurements/observations to be meaningful. Where I agree with
you is in your considerations of 1p and observer indeterminacy. Where
you and I disagree is on the question of resources. Resources are
required for computations to run so there has to be the availability
of resources involved in *any* consideration of computations. Ignoring
these considerations by only considering computations as Platonic
objects is wrong, IMHO.
You seem to be OK with computations as purely timeless objects (in
Platonia) that are such that somehow we finite entities can create
physical objects that can implement (in their dynamical functions)
instances of such, while I claim that computations are equivalence
classes of functions that physical systems can implement *and* abstract
objects. I see these two views as two poles of a spectrum. There is a
lot more detail in my considerations that I do not have time to go into
at this time...
My Theory of comp: Sheaves of Computations/arithmetic - define -
particular physical states
Re: Against Mechanism
On Wed, Oct 31, 2012 at 2:21 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: the you before the duplication or the you after the duplication? All the you after, are the you before, by definition of comp. OK, but the you before is not the you after. The Helsinki man knows nothing about Moscow or Washington, not even if he still exists after the duplication, but both the Moscow man and the Washington man know all about Helsinki even if they don't know about each other. what you will live, as a first person. If your mind works deterministically then what you will live to think you see will depend on the external environment. If your mind does NOT work deterministically then what you will live to think you see will depend on absolutely nothing, in other words it is random. There is no new sort of indeterminacy involved just the boring old sort, and how you expect to draw profound philosophical conclusions from such a flimsy foundation is a mystery. You know by comp that [...] I don't know anything by comp. At one time I thought I knew what you meant by the term, but then you say consciousness was there before Evolution produced brains and that the owner [of a brain] itself must attach his consciousness to all states existing in arithmetic. So I was wrong, I don't know what comp means. Before the duplication the you is the Helsinki man, after the duplication the you is the Helsinki man and the Washington man and the Moscow man. What is the probability the Helsinki man will write in his diary that he sees Washington? 0%. The guy reconstituted in Washington will say: Gosh I was wrong. That's the problem, you're not clear who I is. The Washington man made no error because he made no predictions of any sort, only the Helsinki man did that. The Washington man and Helsinki man have identical memories up to the point of duplication but after that they diverge. What is the probability the Helsinki man will write in his diary he sees Helsinki? 100%. No. In the protocol that I have described to you many times, the probability here is 0%, as he is cut and pasted. Not copy and pasted. If the Helsinki man had never seen Helsinki then he's not the Helsinki man, if he has seen that city then he wrote so in his diary. And it is not he sees but what will he see. And the protocol assures that he will only see washington, or Moscow. Who is he? What is the probability the Washington man will write in his diary he sees Washington? 100%. The question was asked to the Helsinki man. But you said the Helsinki man was destroyed, if so then he's got a rather severe case of writers block and is writing very little in his diary. And if the duplicating process destroys the Helsinki man then the probability the Helsinki man will write anything at all in his diary is 0%. Then comp is false. OK if you say so, its your invention so whatever comp means its false; although I am a little surprised that you expect a man who no longer exists to write stuff in his diary. The question is about your first person experience. [...]The question is not about you, but about the most probable result of an experiment that you can do. You push on a button, and you localize your directly accessible body. Your? You? John Clark believes that when considering matters of identity if Bruno Marchal stopped using so many pronouns without considering what they refer to then Bruno Marchal's thinking would be less muddled. As Quentin said, it is implicit in the Everett understanding of QM. In Everett a world does not split until there is a difference between them and neither does consciousness. And the same is true in the thought experiment, If Bruno Marchal's body is duplicated and sent to Washington and Moscow but inside identical boxes then Bruno Marchal's consciousness has not been duplicated and will not be until the boxes are opened and different things are observed by the Brunos, at that point they will no longer be each other but both will still beBruno Marchal In most physics experiments, even very advanced ones at CERN, the experimenter himself is not duplicated so in the question What particle do you expect to see? it's clear who you is; Only if you assume that the universe does not contain Boltzman brains, or a universal dovetailer, It doesn't matter if Boltzman brains exist or not. In physics experiments not involving self duplications which you is involved is obvious, and it can be proven to be correct by observing that when you predicts what you will see using physical laws the prediction usually proves to be true, so all the yous must have been assigned correctly. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this
Re: Could universes in a multiverse be solipsistic ? Would this be a problem ?
On 11/1/2012 11:36 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 01 Nov 2012, at 00:35, Stephen P. King wrote: On 10/31/2012 9:39 AM, Roger Clough wrote: 1) Yes, numbers float in a sea of universal mind (the One). 2) Here's a thought. If the universe acts like a gigantic homunculus, with the supreme monad or One as its mind, then could there be a solipsism to our universe such that other multiverse versions of oiur universe could not access (the mind of) ours ? Would this be a problem for multiverse theories ? Roger Clough,rclo...@verizon.net 10/31/2012 Dear Roger, I think that this idea is exactly wrong. The idea that numbers float in a sea of universal mind (the One) makes the explanation an infinite regress. Replace the One by arithmetical truth, and the infinite regress disappear. Dear Bruno, Only if arithmetic truth is theory independent, but that ruins your result! It truth is theory independent then it is impossible for us to be able to know of it. All knowledge is 'theory laden' - as David Deutsch explains well. They reappear *in* arithmetical truth, but have fixed points (some provably, some non provably). No problem. Maybe you might write up an explanation of how arithmetic truth is independent of any ability to prove it. That might support your idea of arithmetic realism against my claim against it. That is OK if and only if you allow for the concept of the One to be Kaufman and Zuckerman's Quine Atom aka Russell operator, but if not it does not work. Why? Because numbers have to be distinguishable from to have individual values. The totality of numbers is an infinity and thus have the property that their proper parts cannot be distinguished from their totality. How does the One accomplish this? It seems to me that we have to assume that the One is conscious of the numbers and that makes the numbers something different from the One for 1) to work and this is no different from what a finite mind does. My point here is that a mind cannot be infinite because it would be incapable of distinguishing it's self from any of its proper parts - making it the ultimate solipsist. Do there exist maps between the totality of an infinite set to an improper part? If yes, what are their necessary properties? The One is solipsist, as the one is unique and alone. But I don't see why it should be conscious. It might be, but I see no evidence for this. I agree 100% with you on this. Bruno -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re:On the ontological status of elementary arithmetic
On 11/1/2012 11:39 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Enumerate the programs computing functions fro N to N, (or the equivalent notion according to your chosen system). let us call those functions: phi_0, phi_1, phi_2, ... (the phi_i) Let B be a fixed bijection from N x N to N. So B(x,y) is a number. The number u is universal if phi_u(B(x,y)) = phi_x(y). And the equality means really that either both phi_u(B(x,y)) and phi_x(y) are defined (number) and that they are equal, OR they are both undefined. In phi_u(B(x,y)) = phi_x(y), x is called the program, and y the data. u is the computer. u i said to emulate the program (machine, ...) x on the input y. OK, but this does not answer my question. What is the ontological level mechanism that distinguishes the u and the x and the y from each other? The one you have chosen above. But let continue to use elementary arithmetic, as everyone learn it in school. So the answer is: elementary arithmetic. Dear Bruno,' If there is no entity to chose the elementary arithmetic, how is it chosen or even defined such that there exist arithmetic statements that can possibly be true or false? We can assume some special Realm or entity does the work of choosing the consistent set of arithmetical statements or, as I suggest, we can consider the totality of all possible physical worlds as the implementers of arithmetic statements and thus their provers. Possible physical worlds, taken as a single aggregate, is just as timeless and non-located as the Platonic Realm and yet we don't need any special pleading for us to believe in them. ;-) My thinking here follows the reasoning of Jaakko Hintikka. Are you familiar with it? Game theoretic semantics for Proof theory http://www.hf.uio.no/ifikk/forskning/publikasjoner/tidsskrifter/njpl/vol4no2/gamesem.pdf -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Communicability
On 11/1/2012 11:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 01 Nov 2012, at 01:01, Stephen P. King wrote: Dear Bruno, Exactly what do these temporal concepts, such as explain, solve, interacting and emulating, mean in an atemporal setting? You are mixing temporal and atemporal ideas. ... Study a good book in theoretical computer science. You told me that you have the book by Matiyazevich. he does explicitly emulate Turing machine, which have a quite physical look, with a moving head, and obeying instruction is a temporal manner, and yet they can be shown to be emulated by a the existence or non existence of solution of Diophantine equations. Dear Bruno, That book, full of wonderful words and equations, is a physical object. That physical object is, in my thinking, an example of an implementation of the emulation of a Turing Machine... just as the image on my TV of Rainbow Dash and her friends is a physical implementation of magical Ponies. You seem to ignore the obvious... But this is already no more an enigma for many physicists which agree that temporality is just an illusion resulting from projection from higher dimension. Those physicists are wrong in their belief. This is argued well in this paper http://xxx.lanl.gov/abs/gr-qc/9708055 and in any other places. I recall a long chat that I had with Julian Barbor. In it I tried to ask him about the computational complexity of implementing his 'time capsule' and 'best matching' ideas, he seemed to not understand what the heck I was talking about and yet bemoaned the very problem at length in one of his papers on the idea! From pg 52 of http://www.platonia.com/barbour_hrp2003.pdf About ten years ago, I did some computer calculations to find such configurations with the Macintosh computer I then possessed. I was able to do exhaustive calculations up to N = 27, which took the computer about three days. Because the number of combinations that must be checked out grows exponentially with N, even with a modern supercomputer I doubt that calculations much beyond N = 50 would be feasible. BTW, it was reading this paper that opened my eyes to the NP-Hard problem of Leibniz' Pre-Established Harmony. I thought you agree that physics (and thus time) is not primitive. I agree, physics (and all that it such as particles, forces, matter, energy) impels cannot be ontologically primitive. But it must exist nonetheless. My challenge is showing how. I start with a notion of a property neutral totality of all that exists and consider how from that ground two aspects emerge simultaneously, the physical and the mental as mutually distinct dual aspects that when added together yield back the neutrality. This idea is very similar to Russell Standish's Theory of Nothing. This means that they can and need to be explain from non temporal notion. Arithmetic is the bloc mindspace. Is it a Singleton? Can it be exactly represented by a Boolean Algebra? I see 'mindspace as one half of the dual aspects. There is nothing more dynamical than the notion of computations, yet, they have been discovered in statical math structure. Mathematical objects are the epitome of static objects. I think that this view of math is blinkered. A description of a dynamic process may be static, but the evolutionaly Becoming aspect is still there, just hidden. Just as a photograph acts to freeze a moment in time... This is made possible as the statical sequence 0, 1, 2, 3, ... reintroduces a lot of quasi-time notion, and it is explained how some of them will play the role of the observable timing of events locally, by relative numbers. This is where you make the mistake. You are assuming that the ordering of numbers *is* the dynamic. I claim that the ordering of numbers *is a representation* of the dynamic. We should be very careful when we identify the map with the territory! I agree that there are situations when there is an exact isomorphism between map and territory, but that is only in the case of automorphisms and fixed points. We can use sequences of relative numbers, surely, but only when the conditions to define them occur. We cannot assume that the properties of relative numbers exist in the absence of the means to define the timing, locality and relations required. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Detecting Causality in Complex Ecosystems
The distinction between correlation and causality occasionally comes up in this discussion group, so I thought this paper might be of interest. Disclaimer - I haven't read it, but it is published in Science, and one of the authors (Robert May) I have the utmost respect for. Let me know if you can't find a non paywalled version. I will probably be able to get it from my institution's e-library. - Forwarded message from Complexity Digest Administration comdigad...@turing.iimas.unam.mx - Detecting Causality in Complex Ecosystems Identifying causal networks is important for effective policy and management recommendations on climate, epidemiology, financial regulation, and much else. We introduce a method, based on nonlinear state space reconstruction, that can distinguish causality from correlation. It extends to nonseparable weakly connected dynamic systems (cases not covered by the current Granger causality paradigm). The approach is illustrated both by simple models (where, in contrast to the real world, we know the underlying equations/relations and so can check the validity of our method) and by application to real ecological systems, including the controversial sardine-anchovy-temperature problem. Detecting Causality in Complex Ecosystems George Sugihara, Robert May, Hao Ye, Chih-hao Hsieh, Ethan Deyle, Michael Fogarty, Stephan Munch Science 26 October 2012: Vol. 338 no. 6106 pp. 496-500 http://unam.us4.list-manage2.com/track/click?u=0eb0ac9b4e8565f2967a8304bid=9e44b3450ae=d38efa683e See it on Scoop.it (http://www.scoop.it/t/papers/p/3161484398/detecting-causality-in-complex-ecosystems) , via Papers (http://www.scoop.it/t/papers) -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm
On 11/1/2012 12:23 PM, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote: Don't get me started on reductionism! I don't believe in it as I don't believe in ontologically primitive objects that have particular properties. Then I don't see how you can make an ontological bet. You're at the table, betting on 24 or whatever, but you won't place your chips. Hi Cowboy, Where is the Doctor's Office? I want to make an appointment! Until its tech is proven, I am taking Dr. McCoy's stance: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HxKJyeCRVek -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Solipsism = 1p
On Mon, Oct 29, 2012 at 3:44 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote: I'm talking about *every experiment* that has been done. There is nothing to misunderstand. When I change my mind, through my own thought or though some image or suggestion, that change is reflected as a passive consequence of the macro-level event. I am not at the mercy of the cellular agendas of my brain - I can think about all kinds of things. I can take drugs to further impose my high level agenda on low level neurology. You are at the mercy of the cellular agendas of your brain unless you believe there is a magical effect of consciousness on matter. How else can I try to explain this? It appears that you are bamboozled by complex systems, so that even if each simple interaction is understandable individually you imagine that something mysterious might be happening if you can't hold all of the interactions in your mind at once. To eliminate this difficulty, consider a very simple system that manifests consciousness. Suppose it has only two components, like two billiard balls. The components could have whatever special qualities are required for consciousness. For example, the balls could have evolved naturally as part of a larger organism. When these balls bounce off each other, consciousness is implemented. Now, the trajectory of these balls is determined completely by such factors as their position, mass, velocity, elasticity, air density, gravitational field, and so on. And as they go about their business bouncing around, consciousness of a basic kind is generated. As they are moving towards each other the ball system is thinking of the number 3, but when they hit and bounce apart it changes its mind and thinks of the number 2. Now, would you say the balls bounced apart because the system decided to think of the number 2, or would you say the system decided to think of the number 2 because the balls bounced apart? The question was about two identical computers, one made in a factory, the other assembled with fantastic luck from raw materials moving about randomly. Will there be any difference in the functioning or consciousness (or lack of it) of the two computers? Yes. We have no way of knowing whether the self-assembly is due to luck or not, so we have to give it the benefit of the doubt. The computer made in the factory is subject to the opposite bias, since we know precisely how it was fabricated and that it was made for the purpose of simulating consciousness. If asked to choose between a known pathological liar who claims to be telling the truth, and someone who has never claimed to be telling the truth, all things being equal, we have to give the benefit of the doubt to the latter, as we have no reason to expect deceit from them. You haven't answered the question. The spontaneously formed computer is *exactly the same* as the manufactured one. I give you what is apparently a brand new iPhone 5, complete with the inscription Designed by Apple in California, assembled in China. You turn it on and it searches for a WiFi network, asks you if you want to set it up as a new phone, asks for your Apple ID, and eventually the home screen appears with the familiar icons. I then inform you that this phone was formed spontaneously in a distant galaxy and arrived on Earth after being ejected by a supernova explosion billions of years ago. You disassemble it and determine that in every respect it seems the same as a phone from the factory. Do you still think that this phone would have different experiences purely because of its origin? -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Solipsism = 1p
On Thursday, November 1, 2012 8:43:07 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: On Mon, Oct 29, 2012 at 3:44 AM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: I'm talking about *every experiment* that has been done. There is nothing to misunderstand. When I change my mind, through my own thought or though some image or suggestion, that change is reflected as a passive consequence of the macro-level event. I am not at the mercy of the cellular agendas of my brain - I can think about all kinds of things. I can take drugs to further impose my high level agenda on low level neurology. You are at the mercy of the cellular agendas of your brain unless you believe there is a magical effect of consciousness on matter. I am at the mercy of the cellular agendas of my brain - absolutely, but the cells of my brain are, in some cases, at the mercy of my agenda. If I want to stay awake all night playing with some interesting toy, my circadian rhythms are going to have to wait, for a while anyways. How else can I try to explain this? You have already explained it over and over. You aren't listening to me. I understand every bit of your argument. It is my argument that you don't understand. I used to believe what you believe. I know better now. You have nothing to teach me. Your choices are to listen, not to listen, or bang your head against the wall telling me what I already know. It appears that you are bamboozled by complex systems, Nope. You are projecting stupidity onto me because your ego can't tolerate my disagreement with you. so that even if each simple interaction is understandable individually you imagine that something mysterious might be happening if you can't hold all of the interactions in your mind at once. To eliminate this difficulty, consider a very simple system that manifests consciousness. Suppose it has only two components, like two billiard balls. The components could have whatever special qualities are required for consciousness. For example, the balls could have evolved naturally as part of a larger organism. When these balls bounce off each other, consciousness is implemented. Now, the trajectory of these balls is determined completely by such factors as their position, mass, velocity, elasticity, air density, gravitational field, and so on. And as they go about their business bouncing around, consciousness of a basic kind is generated. As they are moving towards each other the ball system is thinking of the number 3, but when they hit and bounce apart it changes its mind and thinks of the number 2. Now, would you say the balls bounced apart because the system decided to think of the number 2, or would you say the system decided to think of the number 2 because the balls bounced apart? The difference between A) Balls bouncing because the system thought of a number and B) The system thought of a number because balls bounce is a matter of how the system interprets itself. Neither are primitively real. Consciousness is the capacity to discern different categories of realism. You dramatically underestimate the extent to which consciousness defines the universe. It is total. The question was about two identical computers, one made in a factory, the other assembled with fantastic luck from raw materials moving about randomly. Will there be any difference in the functioning or consciousness (or lack of it) of the two computers? Yes. We have no way of knowing whether the self-assembly is due to luck or not, so we have to give it the benefit of the doubt. The computer made in the factory is subject to the opposite bias, since we know precisely how it was fabricated and that it was made for the purpose of simulating consciousness. If asked to choose between a known pathological liar who claims to be telling the truth, and someone who has never claimed to be telling the truth, all things being equal, we have to give the benefit of the doubt to the latter, as we have no reason to expect deceit from them. You haven't answered the question. The spontaneously formed computer is *exactly the same* as the manufactured one. You are begging the question. I am saying that it is an ontological impossibility. Each event is a particular unrepeatable event in the history of the cosmos on some level. I give you what is apparently a brand new iPhone 5, complete with the inscription Designed by Apple in California, assembled in China. You turn it on and it searches for a WiFi network, asks you if you want to set it up as a new phone, asks for your Apple ID, and eventually the home screen appears with the familiar icons. I then inform you that this phone was formed spontaneously in a distant galaxy and arrived on Earth after being ejected by a supernova explosion billions of years ago. You disassemble it and determine that in every respect it seems the same as a phone from the
Re: Solipsism = 1p
On 11/1/2012 8:19 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: You have already explained it over and over. You aren't listening to me. I understand every bit of your argument. It is my argument that you don't understand. I used to believe what you believe. I know better now. The question is how do you know this. All I've seen are assertions about what computers will never be able to do - which is not evidence for much of anything. Brent You have nothing to teach me. Your choices are to listen, not to listen, or bang your head against the wall telling me what I already know. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Solipsism = 1p
On Fri, Nov 2, 2012 at 12:19 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote: On Thursday, November 1, 2012 8:43:07 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: On Mon, Oct 29, 2012 at 3:44 AM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comwrote: I'm talking about *every experiment* that has been done. There is nothing to misunderstand. When I change my mind, through my own thought or though some image or suggestion, that change is reflected as a passive consequence of the macro-level event. I am not at the mercy of the cellular agendas of my brain - I can think about all kinds of things. I can take drugs to further impose my high level agenda on low level neurology. You are at the mercy of the cellular agendas of your brain unless you believe there is a magical effect of consciousness on matter. I am at the mercy of the cellular agendas of my brain - absolutely, but the cells of my brain are, in some cases, at the mercy of my agenda. If I want to stay awake all night playing with some interesting toy, my circadian rhythms are going to have to wait, for a while anyways. But you can't stay awake unless your hardware allows it. You can't decide to do anything unless your brain goes into the particular configuration consistent with that decision, and the movement into that configuration is determined by physical factors. The experiential aspect of it is completely invisible to a scientist examining your brain. How else can I try to explain this? You have already explained it over and over. You aren't listening to me. I understand every bit of your argument. It is my argument that you don't understand. I used to believe what you believe. I know better now. You have nothing to teach me. Your choices are to listen, not to listen, or bang your head against the wall telling me what I already know. It appears that you are bamboozled by complex systems, Nope. You are projecting stupidity onto me because your ego can't tolerate my disagreement with you. It's not stupidity, it's impossible for a normal human to hold in his mind the entire complex workings of a brain. so that even if each simple interaction is understandable individually you imagine that something mysterious might be happening if you can't hold all of the interactions in your mind at once. To eliminate this difficulty, consider a very simple system that manifests consciousness. Suppose it has only two components, like two billiard balls. The components could have whatever special qualities are required for consciousness. For example, the balls could have evolved naturally as part of a larger organism. When these balls bounce off each other, consciousness is implemented. Now, the trajectory of these balls is determined completely by such factors as their position, mass, velocity, elasticity, air density, gravitational field, and so on. And as they go about their business bouncing around, consciousness of a basic kind is generated. As they are moving towards each other the ball system is thinking of the number 3, but when they hit and bounce apart it changes its mind and thinks of the number 2. Now, would you say the balls bounced apart because the system decided to think of the number 2, or would you say the system decided to think of the number 2 because the balls bounced apart? The difference between A) Balls bouncing because the system thought of a number and B) The system thought of a number because balls bounce is a matter of how the system interprets itself. Neither are primitively real. Consciousness is the capacity to discern different categories of realism. You dramatically underestimate the extent to which consciousness defines the universe. It is total. The ball system believes that the bouncing apart happened because of its decision. That is the nature of conscious systems: even if they are able to see their own internal workings they still have the feeling I did it because I wanted to. Which is true, I did do it because I wanted to, but the wanting, the decision and the action are all caused by the physical processes. The question was about two identical computers, one made in a factory, the other assembled with fantastic luck from raw materials moving about randomly. Will there be any difference in the functioning or consciousness (or lack of it) of the two computers? Yes. We have no way of knowing whether the self-assembly is due to luck or not, so we have to give it the benefit of the doubt. The computer made in the factory is subject to the opposite bias, since we know precisely how it was fabricated and that it was made for the purpose of simulating consciousness. If asked to choose between a known pathological liar who claims to be telling the truth, and someone who has never claimed to be telling the truth, all things being equal, we have to give the benefit of the doubt to the latter, as we have no reason to expect deceit from them. You haven't answered the question. The
Re: Solipsism = 1p
On Thursday, November 1, 2012 10:03:18 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote: On 11/1/2012 8:19 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: You have already explained it over and over. You aren't listening to me. I understand every bit of your argument. It is my argument that you don't understand. I used to believe what you believe. I know better now. The question is how do you know this. All I've seen are assertions about what computers will never be able to do - which is not evidence for much of anything. I don't know it, I understand it. My understanding could be incorrect, but I have seen no reason to suspect that so far. My purpose is not to make assertions about what computers will never be able to do, it is to present a framework for the organization of consciousness in the universe. The fact that computers thus far are no more sentient than other machines (something which should be and would be obvious to anyone not enthralled with science fiction religiosity about AI) makes sense in my framework, given that qualities of participation and perception accumulate through experience itself and cannot be imported from a completely foreign context. My model suggests that most physical qualities can only be experienced first hand from the inside out, so that a device built entirely on exterior qualities (positions in space) has no chance of accidentally reproducing an interiority which has developed longitudinally through time as sense experience. Craig Brent You have nothing to teach me. Your choices are to listen, not to listen, or bang your head against the wall telling me what I already know. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/2RhLxV1Y16oJ. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Life: origin, purpose, and qualia spectrum
On 10/31/2012 9:48 PM, Hal Ruhl wrote: Hi Everyone: I would like to restart my participation on the list by having a discussion regarding the aspects of what we call “life” in our universe starting in a simple manner as follows: [terms not defined herein have the usual “Laws of Physics” definition] 1) Definition (1): Energy (E) is the ability to subject a mass to a force. 2) There are several types of energy currently known: a) Mass itself via the conversion: [M = E/(c*c)] b) Gravitational c) Electromagnetic d) Nuclear [Strong and Weak forces] e) Dark Energy Hi Hal, Nice post! Any way that the energy/force/work relation can be considered as a broken symmetry restoration concept? 3) Definition (2) Work (W) Work is the flow of energy amongst the various types by means of a change in the spatial configuration, dynamics and/or amount of mass in a system brought about by an actual application of a force to a mass. 4) The exact original distribution of energy amongst the various types can’t be reestablished and the new configuration can’t do as much work as the prior configuration was capable of doing. [Second Law of Thermodynamics] Isn't the maximum entropy of a system a type of symmetry, where all equiprobable states look the same? 5) Time is not a factor: Once a flow of energy is possible it will take place immediately. 6) Conclusion (1): Since life is an energy flow conduit, wherever the possibility of life exists life will appear as rapidly as possible. The “origin” of life herein. Let me refer you to a very old paper of mine: http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/life.html 7) Some energy flows are prevented by what are known [in my memory] as “Energy Flow Hang-up Barriers” such as nuclear bonding coefficient issues, spatial configuration, spin, other spatial dynamics, ignition temperature requirements, electromagnetic repulsion, etc. [“Energy Flow Hang-up Barriers” is not my terminology – I think there was a twenty year or so old article in Scientific American I am looking for and a quick Internet search found a discussion of the repulsion hang-up in “Cosmology The Science of the Universe” by Edward Robert Harrison. 8) Once life is present it will immediately punch as many holes in as many Energy Hang-up Barriers as the details of the particular life entity involved allows – this is how it realizes its energy flow conduit character. The “purpose” of life herein. In other words life’s purpose is to hasten the heat death of its host universe. 9) Now add in evolution which is a random walk with a lower but no upper bound. Do you see mutation as a one-to-many map and selection as a many -to-one map? A discussion of the possible consequences [such as qualia levels of particular life entities - like degrees of consciousness] should await a critique and possibly a revision of the above. Comments are eagerly sought. Thank you Nice! -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Solipsism = 1p
On Thursday, November 1, 2012 10:03:21 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: On Fri, Nov 2, 2012 at 12:19 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: On Thursday, November 1, 2012 8:43:07 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: On Mon, Oct 29, 2012 at 3:44 AM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comwrote: I'm talking about *every experiment* that has been done. There is nothing to misunderstand. When I change my mind, through my own thought or though some image or suggestion, that change is reflected as a passive consequence of the macro-level event. I am not at the mercy of the cellular agendas of my brain - I can think about all kinds of things. I can take drugs to further impose my high level agenda on low level neurology. You are at the mercy of the cellular agendas of your brain unless you believe there is a magical effect of consciousness on matter. I am at the mercy of the cellular agendas of my brain - absolutely, but the cells of my brain are, in some cases, at the mercy of my agenda. If I want to stay awake all night playing with some interesting toy, my circadian rhythms are going to have to wait, for a while anyways. But you can't stay awake unless your hardware allows it. So what? I can't shoot a gun unless the trigger works. Does that mean I'm not shooting the gun by pulling the trigger? You can't decide to do anything unless your brain goes into the particular configuration consistent with that decision, and the movement into that configuration is determined by physical factors. The movement of the molecules of your brain *is* your decision. That's what I am telling you but you won't see it. You are only able to see it as a one way street which makes no sense. What you are saying is like 'water is ice but ice is not water'. If I feel something when something happens in my brain, then that means that whatever happens in my brain is also an event in the universe when something is felt. That means molecules feel and see. You could say that groups of molecules feel and see, and that's ok too, but you think it's the 'groupiness' that sees and not the physical reality of the molecules themselves. I am saying that there is no independent groupiness... it is a fantasy. Incorrect. What this means is that molecules as we see them are not the whole story, just as the brain and its actions are not the whole story. We are the other half of the story and we are not made of neurotransmitters or cells any more than a song we make up is our body. Two different ontological schemas. Two opposite schemas twisted orthogonally by the private time to public space juxtaposition. The experiential aspect of it is completely invisible to a scientist examining your brain. How else can I try to explain this? You have already explained it over and over. You aren't listening to me. I understand every bit of your argument. It is my argument that you don't understand. I used to believe what you believe. I know better now. You have nothing to teach me. Your choices are to listen, not to listen, or bang your head against the wall telling me what I already know. It appears that you are bamboozled by complex systems, Nope. You are projecting stupidity onto me because your ego can't tolerate my disagreement with you. It's not stupidity, it's impossible for a normal human to hold in his mind the entire complex workings of a brain. Maybe I misunderstood what you meant by It appears that you are bamboozled by complex systems. so that even if each simple interaction is understandable individually you imagine that something mysterious might be happening if you can't hold all of the interactions in your mind at once. To eliminate this difficulty, consider a very simple system that manifests consciousness. Suppose it has only two components, like two billiard balls. The components could have whatever special qualities are required for consciousness. For example, the balls could have evolved naturally as part of a larger organism. When these balls bounce off each other, consciousness is implemented. Now, the trajectory of these balls is determined completely by such factors as their position, mass, velocity, elasticity, air density, gravitational field, and so on. And as they go about their business bouncing around, consciousness of a basic kind is generated. As they are moving towards each other the ball system is thinking of the number 3, but when they hit and bounce apart it changes its mind and thinks of the number 2. Now, would you say the balls bounced apart because the system decided to think of the number 2, or would you say the system decided to think of the number 2 because the balls bounced apart? The difference between A) Balls bouncing because the system thought of a number and B) The system thought of a number because balls bounce is a matter of how the system interprets itself.
