subject:"Max and FPI"



On 02 Apr 2014, at 23:15, LizR wrote:

As instructed I will have a look at Brent's proofs and see if I  
follow them, and agree...



On 2 April 2014 15:45, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 4/1/2014 7:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
BTW, are you OK in the math thread? Are you OK, like Liz apparently,  
that the Kripke frame (W,R) respects A - []A iff R is symmetrical?


Should I give the proof of the fact that the Kripke frame (W,R)  
respects []A - [][]A iff R is a transitive?


Bruno

Here's the ones I've done so far.  One more to go.  Hold off on that  
proof (or put a warning in the subject line so I can avoid reading  
it).


Brent

 ***
 Show that

 (W, R) respects []A - A if and only if R is reflexive,

R is reflexive implies (alpha R alpha) for all alpha.  []A in alpha  
implies A is true in all beta where (alpha R beta), which includes  
the case beta=alpha. So R is reflexive implies (W,R) respects []A-A.


I like more words, but I think I follow that and it comes out right.

Assume R is not reflexive.  Then there exists at least one world  
beta such that (alpha R beta) and ~(beta R alpha).  Consider a  
valuation such that p=f in alpha and p=t in all beta.  Then []p is  
true in alpha but p is false so []A-A is false in alpha for some  
A.  R not reflexive implies []A-A is not respected for all alpha  
and all valuations.


Yes that seems right, too. Brent obviously has a far more logical  
mind than I do, but I guess I already knew that.


 (W, R) respects []A - [][]A if and only R is transitive,

R is transitive means that for all beta such that (alpha R beta) and  
all gamma such that (beta R gamma), (alpha R gamma).  So every []A  
implies A=t in all beta and also A=t in all gamma.  But A=t in all  
gamma means []A is true in beta, which in turn means [][]A is true  
in alpha.  So R is transitive implies (W,R) respects []A-[][]A.


Suppose R is not transitive, so for all beta (alpha R beta) and  
there are some gamma such that [(beta R gamma) and ~(alpha R  
gamma)].  Let A=t in beta, A=f in gamma.  Then []A is true in alpha  
but []A isn't true in beta, so [][]A isn't true in alpha.  So (W, R)  
respects []A - [][]A implies R is transitive.


Yes, again, I eventually managed to follow that. You make it seem so  
easy.


 (W, R) respects  A - []A if and only R is symmetrical,

R symmetrical means that if (alpha R beta) then (beta R alpha).  
Suppose A is true in alpha; then A is true in beta (by symmetry of  
R) and this holds for all alpha and beta so []A in alpha.


Suppose R is not symmetrical, so there is a pair of worlds (alpha R  
beta) and ~(beta R alpha).  So consider V such that A=t in alpha and  
A=f in all worlds gamma such that (beta R gamma) then ~A in beta.   
So it would be false that []A in alpha.


Again I an overawed.

 (W,R) respects []A - A if and only if R is ideal,

R is ideal, means that for every alpha there is a beta such that  
(alpha R beta).  Suppose []A is true in alpha, then A must be true  
in every world beta (alpha R beta) and there is a least on such  
beta, so A is true in alpha.


Suppose R is not ideal, then there is a cul-de-sac alpha.  For alpha  
[]A is vacously true for all A, but A is false so []A-A is false.


Yes.

 (W, R) respects A - ~[]A if and only if R is realist.

R is realist means that for every world alpha there is a world beta  
such that (alpha R beta) and beta is cul-de-sac.  Suppose A is true  
in beta, then A is true in alpha but A=f in beta so []A cannot  
be true in alpha.  Hence A-~[]A in alpha where alpha is any non  
cul-de-sac world.  Then consider a cul-de-sac world like beta; A  
is always false in beta so A-X is true in beta for any X,  
including ~[]A.


I think my brain is starting to melt down, I can't work out if that  
proves if and only if ?


By the way why realist ?



By lack of imagination of my part. The idea that is that we can die  
at each instant (in each world) looks realist.  A - ~[]A i  
the main axiom of the smallest theory of life/intelligence.


OK, Liz, but sometimes you say it seems correct. You should perhaps  
try to convince your son, or Charles, to develop the confidence.


Bruno








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Re: Max and FPI



On 02 Apr 2014, at 23:20, LizR wrote:


On 3 April 2014 04:37, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

Suppose R is not transitive, so for all beta (alpha R beta) and  
there are some gamma such that [(beta R gamma) and ~(alpha R gamma)].


I cannot parse that sentence, I guess some word are missing. R is  
not transitive means that there exist alpha, beta and gamma, such that
alpha R beta, and beta R gamma, and ~(alpha R gamma). I will guess  
that this is what you meant.


That's what I took it to mean. (I didn't realise that wasn't what it  
said!)


As a math teacher I am aware that when a student cannot solve a  
problem, it is very often due to their inability to read a text  
literally.
To progress in math you have to try to be dumber, not cleverer.  
Especially in logic.







OK Liz? Others? Feel free to ask definitions or explanations.

Yes, at least at the point where I think very hard about each one,  
they all seem to make sense.


Good, but you might need to train yourself so that seems becomes  
pretty sure.






The next one is important, as it plays a role in the 'derivation of  
physics'.


 (W, R) respects  A - []A if and only R is symmetrical,

R symmetrical means that if (alpha R beta) then (beta R alpha).


Yes, for all alpha and beta in W.
Suppose A is true in alpha; then A is true in beta (by symmetry  
of R) and this holds for all alpha and beta so []A in alpha.


And so A - []A is true in alpha.  (Here we are using the  
deduction rule in the CPL context, which is valid. Later we will see  
it is not valid in the modal context).


Suppose R is not symmetrical, so there is a pair of worlds (alpha R  
beta) and ~(beta R alpha).  So consider V such that A=t in alpha  
and A=f in all worlds gamma such that (beta R gamma) then ~A in  
beta.  So it would be false that []A in alpha.


Liz told me this already! OK.

Phew.

 (W,R) respects []A - A if and only if R is ideal,

R is ideal, means that for every alpha there is a beta such that  
(alpha R beta).  Suppose []A is true in alpha, then A must be true  
in every world beta (alpha R beta) and there is a least on such  
beta, so A is true in alpha.


OK.


Suppose R is not ideal, then there is a cul-de-sac alpha.  For  
alpha []A is vacously true for all A, but A is false so []A-A  
is false.


Yes, all cul-de-sac world are counterexample of []A - A. In the  
Kripke semantics, they are counterexamples of #, with # put for  
any proposition.

 (W, R) respects A - ~[]A if and only if R is realist.

R is realist means that for every world alpha there is a world beta  
such that (alpha R beta) and beta is cul-de-sac.


For every *transitory* world alpha. OK. The cul-de-sac world are  
still world!




Suppose A is true in beta, then A is true in alpha but A=f in  
beta so []A cannot be true in alpha.  Hence A-~[]A in alpha  
where alpha is any non cul-de-sac world.  Then consider a cul-de- 
sac world like beta; A is always false in beta so A-X is true  
in beta for any X, including ~[]A.


OK. Nice.

So you proved that R is realist implies that (W, R) respects A -  
~[]A.


But you have still not prove that if R is *not* realist, (W,R) does  
not respect A - ~[]A  (unlike all other cases). OK?


You proved: (W, R) realist implies respects A - ~[]A, but  
not yet the converse, that respects A - ~[]A implies  (W, R)  
realist.


I let you search, and might justify this (with pre-warning to avoid  
spoiling!).


And what about the euclidian multiverse?  May be you did them?

R is euclidian, or euclidean, if  (aRb and aRc) implies bRc, for all  
a, b and c in W.  (I use a for the greek alpha!)


Proposition: (W,R) respects A - []A   iff   R is euclidian.

Hmm. I'll think about that later.


OK. The time you are using to learn is not important, unless you ...  
forget the work already done. For the long term memorizing, it is  
better to revise 2 minutes everyday, instead of learning day and night  
just before the exams :)


Bruno





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Re: Max and FPI



On 03 Apr 2014, at 01:16, ghib...@gmail.com wrote:



On Tuesday, April 1, 2014 3:40:18 PM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 31 Mar 2014, at 20:14, meekerdb wrote:

 On 3/31/2014 10:41 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

 On 31 Mar 2014, at 19:04, meekerdb wrote:

 On 3/31/2014 12:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

 OK...you see an elegant explanation sBould the empirically
 observed fact actually not be.

 But would even that alone have been remotely near the ballpark
 of things taken seriously, had there not been extreme quantum
 strangeness  irreconcilable at that time, with the most core,
 most fundamental accomplishments of science to date?

 MWI evacuates all weirdness from QM. It restores fully
 - determinacy
 - locality
 - physical realism

 The price is not that big, as nature is used to multiplied
 things, like the water molecules in the ocean, the stars in the
 sky, the galaxies, etc.
 Each time, the humans are shocked by this, and Gordiano Bruno get
 burned for saying that stars are other suns, and that they might
 have planets, with other living being.
 It is humbling, but not coneptually new, especially for a
 computationalist, which explains the MW from simple arithmetic,
 where you need only to believe in the consequence of addition and
 multiplication of integers.



 The price is not having a unified 'self' - which many people would
 consider a big price since all observation and record keeping
 which is used to empirically test theories assumes this unity.

 Really?





 If you observe X and you want to use that as empircal test of a
 theory it isn't helpful if your theory of the instruments says
 they also recorded not-X.

 It is helpful when it is part of the only theories which are
 working, like QM, or arithmetic.

 No it's not.  It's reason the Born rule is needed and the source of
 the difficulty of interpreting probability in MWI and the 'white
 rabbit problem' in comp.

In my opinion, Gleason theorem solves this problem for the case of QM.
And if the Zs logic verifies some quite plausible conjecture, the case
of comp is reduced to the case of QM.
This is a technical point, 'course.

But even if such solutions did not exist, the MWI remains
understandable, which is not the case for QM+collapse.

Is this how Science works Bruno?


?
I just said that a theory can make sense, and another theory does not.  
QM+collapse is contradictory, or it introduces new axioms, and they  
can all be summed into some arbitrary dualist cut between macro and  
micro, or subject and object, etc.




That a theory is good even when it fails tests deriving from other  
scientific and/or mathematical domains, or sub-components thereof,  
regarded at the high end of reliability, based on the accumulation  
of different, mutually independent, tests devised and passed?


?
But QM, by which I always mean QM-without-collapse, is the theory  
which has been tested the most, and I think that it is the only theory  
who lived without being refuted for more than 10 years, except perhaps  
for thermodynamic.






If that isn't a falsifiable event, then what is?


But QM has not (yet) been falsified.



Are you saying, the only event that really matters, is what is the  
best explanation currently available? That is totally contradicted,  
by the entirety of scientific history in terms of what actually  
happens you realize?


actually happens?
You can't bet that a theoiry is false because it is the best  
explanation. Nobody pretend that QM is true, but it works very well,  
and with comp there is some hope to justify it from a deeper principle  
(computationalism).





So in that caseare you saying  - like Popper, like Deutsch - the  
fact of that is all wrong or irrelevant and nothing to do with Real  
Science, which is all about throwing explanations regardless of  
quality everywhere a gap is spotted, if there's more than one,  
performing some amazingly rational and dispassionate fireplace  
discussion wearing crushed velvet jackets and smoking pipes, the way  
the best friends do the Friday evening the Time Traveller vanishes  
into time, and the Friday after he shoes up covered in lipsticky  
lovebites clutching a dodgy flower.


I am not an expert in philosophy of science. My point was only that QM  
and MWI are the same theory.






Is that how you're defining science? Because you do seem to be  
neglecting falsification - any practical possibility of it.


I don't understand this remark at all. I am just saying that QM is  
equivalent with MWI (the quantum many, and perhaps even the comp  
many), and QM seems working pretty well, and then it confirms the  
comp MW prediction (and others one). The collapse is a metaphysical  
assumption unsupported by zero evidences, and contradicting QM. It  
seems to me.
If you can give me one reference on an experimental confirmation of  
the collapse, give me a link.


I did believe Bohr in his defense of the collapse, due to a  
perturbation, but after reading EPR, I

Re: Max and FPI



On 03 Apr 2014, at 05:12, ghib...@gmail.com wrote:



On Tuesday, March 25, 2014 3:01:04 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 25 Mar 2014, at 05:48, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:



On Monday, March 24, 2014 4:48:13 AM UTC, chris peck wrote:
The only person in any doubt was you wasn't it Liz?

I found Tegmark's presentation very disappointing. He was  
alarmingly apologetic about MWI pleading that its flaws were  
mitigated by the fact other interpretations had similar flaws; as  
if the fact someone else is ill would make you less ill yourself. I  
think in the world of QM interpretations, with bugger all evidence  
to decide between them, the game is to even out the playing field  
in terms of flaws and then chase parsimony. Ofcourse, whether an  
infinite set of worlds is more or less parsimonious than just one  
+  a few hidden variables, or one + a spooky wave function  
collapse, depends very much on what definition of parsimonious you  
find most fitting.


MWI is refuted by the massive totally unexamined - some unrealized  
to this day - assumptions built in at the start.


?

MWI seems to me to be the literal understanding of QM (without  
collapse).
It is also a simple consequence of computationalism, except we get a  
multi-dreams and the question remains open if this defines a  
universe, a multiverse, or a multi-multiverses, etc. (results points  
toward a multiverse though).





It's like, local realism - a reasonable assumed universal.


Local realism is not part of QM assumption. It is a direct  
consequence of the linearity of the Schroedinger Equation, and the  
linearity of the tensor products.




But only the bare bones. Assuming locarealism means locality as we  
perceive,


As we infer from what we perceive. We cannot *perceive locality by  
itself.




and classically seems to be. In; these dimensions. But what happens  
when science transforms through a major generalization? The  
hallmark is that not only theories get merged, broken up, such that  
everything looks different. But  that the revolution stretchs right  
out to the conceptual framework itself...the basic concepts that  
are upfront necessary to be shared, for basic communication to take  
place. It's all concepts broken apart, while others merged  
together. We can put some faith in local realism, but in what  
dimensionality it's pure, we don't about that yet..we don't  
know.MWI assumes that it's a safe scientific known. It isn't. In  
fact everything is against that.


Personally, even without comp and without QM, everything is  
conceptually more simpler than any one-thing approach, which always  
needs much more particular assumptions.





There literally dozens of others. Like assuming major properties  
are duplicated as is between higher and lower macrostate layers.  
MWI'ers need to assume local realism at quantum levels as is.  
Unprecedented if true. Daft in other words.


Is it not more simple to assume the same realism at all scale, that  
to bet on different one?






When I throw this at them, the response if there is one is usually6  
denial that MWI needs those massive assumptions and would not have  
happened without them. Arguments come the lines of MWI is derived  
clean from the wave function or by some other theoretical  
strtucture, involving simple assumptions only none of them things  
like local realism.


I agree, except that local realism is, as I said above, a  
consequence of the SWE.






They just don't get it, science, anymore. theories as internal  
theory structure get improved all the time as part of an ongoing  
progression. Building out an assumption is not a matter of  
improving theory structure alone.


MWI is tied to assuming local realism for all time, because it was  
only the extreme and disturbing - incomprehensible even to the  
greats - character of quantum strangenessl. MWI is tied to it,  
because that is what it took  hat an outrageous, unscientific  
notion like MWI  could be taken seriously at all.


Frankly, I believe the exact contrary. MWI is what you get from  
assuming the axioms of quantum mechanics, and that is the unitary  
evolution.




MWI even now, has not defense for itself, without reference to  
quantum strangeness,, and restorations to classical determinism.


Which I think would be enough to make it most plausible than any  
other (sur)-interpretation. But MWI, which is just the SWE seen  
from inside, restore not classical determinism, but also, well,  
local locality and well local realism.






It's a quantum theory, and it's wrong, because it's assumptions are  
that the nature of reality is hard tied forever to principles,


That's QM. That tomorrow we might discover that QM is false is just  
science. But if comp and/or QM is correct, the many-thing will  
remain with us, indeed.




hard tied to the complexities of this dimension, this universe  
right here. What a  joke. The harm done by this theory is  
immeasurable. A theory sterile for all

Re: Max and FPI



On 03 Apr 2014, at 08:49, meekerdb wrote:


On 4/2/2014 6:43 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
The original proof of Gleason is not easy, but a more elementary  
proof (which remains not that simple) has been found by Cooke,  
Keane and Moran, and can be found in the (very good) book by  
Richard Hugues (you can find a PDF on the net).


Only if you look for Richard Hughes


Oops sorry.

(In french, Hugues is a common first name, without the second h).  
Normally Google proposes alternate spelling, when there is no more  
than few mistakes, so I doubt your statement, but thanks for helping  
me to realize there is a h more in that name.


let me try: yes Google corrects it, apparently hugues does not seem  
exist.


Showing results for richard hughes
Search instead for Richard Hugues

Well, if you search *only* on  Richard Hughes you find a poet, then  
a musician, then a footballer, then a jockey player, then an  
architect, an evangelist, an optician, a minister, ... gosh the  
quantum physicists does not seem to appear quickly ... But all their  
names have the two h.


Ah! There is french (of course) Richard Hugues, who is a ...  
computational biologist !


Bruno





Brent

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Re: Max and FPI

2014-04-02 Thread Bruno Marchal


Hi Richard,

On 01 Apr 2014, at 18:11, Richard Ruquist wrote:

Bruno, I have a problem with the Gleason Theorem because it appears  
to me to be saying that every possible quantum state is realized  
with equal probability at first, but the frequency at which each  
universe reoccurs is given by the FPI probabilities that are  
measured in controlled quantum experiments.
If what I just said is true, I'm sure you can see my the source of  
my skepticism. So please correct my understanding of the Gleason  
Theorem.

Richard



Gleason theorem, on the contrary, shows that for Hilbert space with  
dimension 3, the measure, assumed to be totally additive, made on  
quantum propositions (i.e. closed subspaces of the Hilbert space) is  
given by the trace of some density operator, and this leads to the  
Born rules or its generalizations on mixed states. It does not use  
either the FPI nor the MWI, and somehow rules out the uniform  
probabilities for quantum states.


The original proof of Gleason is not easy, but a more elementary proof  
(which remains not that simple) has been found by Cooke, Keane and  
Moran, and can be found in the (very good) book by Richard Hugues (you  
can find a PDF on the net).


A constructive (and readable, and free!) proof has also been given by  
Richman and Bridges:


http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.42.9076rep=rep1type=pdf

Bruno






On Tue, Apr 1, 2014 at 11:18 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:


On 01 Apr 2014, at 03:33, meekerdb wrote:


On 3/31/2014 6:00 PM, LizR wrote:

On 1 April 2014 06:04, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
The price is not having a unified 'self' - which many people would  
consider a big price since all observation and record keeping  
which is used to empirically test theories assumes this unity.  If  
you observe X and you want to use that as empircal test of a  
theory it isn't helpful if your theory of the instruments says  
they also recorded not-X.


(I suspect some people would consider it a big price not to have a  
unified self for other reasons, too!)


I can't see how it's worse for your theory to say that your  
instruments will record X and not X as opposed to saying they  
will record X or not X, but we don't know which.


That's before the fact.  I didn't write will.   MWI is a theory  
that says when you read your instrument and it says X, it's only  
one of an infinite set some of which say X and some say not-X.


The former explanation says there will be apparent but explicable  
randomness, the latter says there will be intrinsic and  
inexplicable randomness.


But is it explicable.  Bruno is careful to refer to uncertainty  
or indeterminancy.  Those are not necessarily probabilities  
unless they can be quantified to satisfy Kolomogorov's axioms - and  
it's not clear to me that they can.  The axioms require that the  
set of everything have measure 1.  But in this case everything  
is ill defined and uncountably infinite.


It might be definable though, like the consciousness of the  
universal machine. It is the least Turing emulable entity having  
some futures in the arithmetical reality. It is the first person  
mental state in front of the maximal FPI.




In common applications of QM one assumes isolation and considers  
only a small (at least finite) set of possible results - which  
works FAPP.


But in Everett and comp we know why, without having to invoke a  
mysterious pseudo-God-like selection, apparently. ISTM.



Bruno


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Re: Max and FPI

2014-04-02 Thread Bruno Marchal

On 02 Apr 2014, at 03:43, meekerdb wrote:

On 4/1/2014 2:25 PM, LizR wrote:
I just read the definition of Gleason's theorem on Wikipedia and
now my brain is full. A for-dummies version would be appreciated...

I think what Gleason proved is that the only consistent probability
measure on a Hilbert space is given by the normalized inner
product. But it's not clear that there is a probability measure on
the MW.

http://physics.stackexchange.com/questions/20802/why-is-gleasons-theorem-not-enough-to-obtain-born-rule-in-many-worlds-interpret

Interesting. It looks like, at first sight, that Gleason + the FPI (+
some abandon of the naïve view on worlds) might solve the Born Rule.
I might dig on this when I have more time. I have to revise Quantum
logic and algebra to do this, but musing on Gleason theorem augments
my feeling that the Z1* logics might be closer to QM than I hope!

Note that your link contains a link to the original proof of Gleason.

Bruno

Brent

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Re: Max and FPI

2014-04-02 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 02 Apr 2014, at 04:45, meekerdb wrote:


On 4/1/2014 7:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
BTW, are you OK in the math thread? Are you OK, like Liz  
apparently, that the Kripke frame (W,R) respects A - []A iff R  
is symmetrical?


Should I give the proof of the fact that the Kripke frame (W,R)  
respects []A - [][]A iff R is a transitive?


Bruno


Here's the ones I've done so far.  One more to go.  Hold off on that  
proof (or put a warning in the subject line so I can avoid reading  
it).


?
It looks like you did it below.

Liz, try to see if you are convinced by Brent, before reading this post.




Brent

 ***
 Show that

 (W, R) respects []A - A if and only if R is reflexive,

R is reflexive implies (alpha R alpha) for all alpha.  []A in alpha  
implies A is true in all beta where (alpha R beta), which includes  
the case beta=alpha. So R is reflexive implies (W,R) respects []A-A.


OK.




Assume R is not reflexive.  Then there exists at least one world  
beta such that (alpha R beta) and ~(beta R alpha).  Consider a  
valuation such that p=f in alpha and p=t in all beta.


in all beta different from alpha (of course). OK.



Then []p is true in alpha but p is false so []A-A is false in alpha  
for some A.  R not reflexive implies []A-A is not respected for all  
alpha and all valuations.


OK.





 (W, R) respects []A - [][]A if and only R is transitive,

R is transitive means that for all beta such that (alpha R beta) and  
all gamma such that (beta R gamma), (alpha R gamma).  So every []A  
implies A=t in all beta and also A=t in all gamma.  But A=t in all  
gamma means []A is true in beta, which in turn means [][]A is true  
in alpha.  So R is transitive implies (W,R) respects []A-[][]A.


Nice direct proof.

People can search an alternate proof using the reduction ad absurdum.







Suppose R is not transitive, so for all beta (alpha R beta) and  
there are some gamma such that [(beta R gamma) and ~(alpha R gamma)].


I cannot parse that sentence, I guess some word are missing. R is not  
transitive means that there exist alpha, beta and gamma, such that
alpha R beta, and beta R gamma, and ~(alpha R gamma). I will guess  
that this is what you meant.






 Let A=t in beta,


OK. Or A=t in all the beta such that alpha R beta, but you can also  
assume alpha accesses only beta, to build the counterexample.




A=f in gamma.


Good choice, to build the counterexample.




Then []A is true in alpha but []A isn't true in beta, so [][]A isn't  
true in alpha.  So (W, R) respects []A - [][]A implies R is  
transitive.


Very good, so the transitive case is closed!

You should no more worry reading my posts :)

OK Liz? Others? Feel free to ask definitions or explanations.

The next one is important, as it plays a role in the 'derivation of  
physics'.





 (W, R) respects  A - []A if and only R is symmetrical,

R symmetrical means that if (alpha R beta) then (beta R alpha).


Yes, for all alpha and beta in W.




Suppose A is true in alpha; then A is true in beta (by symmetry of  
R) and this holds for all alpha and beta so []A in alpha.


And so A - []A is true in alpha.  (Here we are using the deduction  
rule in the CPL context, which is valid. Later we will see it is not  
valid in the modal context).




Suppose R is not symmetrical, so there is a pair of worlds (alpha R  
beta) and ~(beta R alpha).  So consider V such that A=t in alpha and  
A=f in all worlds gamma such that (beta R gamma) then ~A in beta.   
So it would be false that []A in alpha.


Liz told me this already! OK.






 (W,R) respects []A - A if and only if R is ideal,

R is ideal, means that for every alpha there is a beta such that  
(alpha R beta).  Suppose []A is true in alpha, then A must be true  
in every world beta (alpha R beta) and there is a least on such  
beta, so A is true in alpha.


OK.




Suppose R is not ideal, then there is a cul-de-sac alpha.  For alpha  
[]A is vacously true for all A, but A is false so []A-A is false.


Yes, all cul-de-sac world are counterexample of []A - A. In the  
Kripke semantics, they are counterexamples of #, with # put for any  
proposition.








 (W, R) respects A - ~[]A if and only if R is realist.

R is realist means that for every world alpha there is a world beta  
such that (alpha R beta) and beta is cul-de-sac.


For every *transitory* world alpha. OK. The cul-de-sac world are still  
world!




Suppose A is true in beta, then A is true in alpha but A=f in  
beta so []A cannot be true in alpha.  Hence A-~[]A in alpha  
where alpha is any non cul-de-sac world.  Then consider a cul-de-sac  
world like beta; A is always false in beta so A-X is true in  
beta for any X, including ~[]A.


OK. Nice.

So you proved that R is realist implies that (W, R) respects A -  
~[]A.


But you have still not prove that if R is *not* realist, (W,R) does  
not respect A - ~[]A  (unlike all other cases). OK?


You proved: (W, R) realist implies respects A - ~[]A, but not

Re: Max and FPI

As instructed I will have a look at Brent's proofs and see if I follow
them, and agree...


On 2 April 2014 15:45, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

 On 4/1/2014 7:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

 BTW, are you OK in the math thread? Are you OK, like Liz apparently, that
 the Kripke frame (W,R) respects A - []A iff R is symmetrical?

 Should I give the proof of the fact that the Kripke frame (W,R) respects
 []A - [][]A iff R is a transitive?

 Bruno


 Here's the ones I've done so far.  One more to go.  Hold off on that proof
 (or put a warning in the subject line so I can avoid reading it).

 Brent

  ***
  Show that
 
  (W, R) respects []A - A if and only if R is reflexive,

 R is reflexive implies (alpha R alpha) for all alpha.  []A in alpha
 implies A is true in all beta where (alpha R beta), which includes the case
 beta=alpha. So R is reflexive implies (W,R) respects []A-A.


I like more words, but I think I follow that and it comes out right.


 Assume R is not reflexive.  Then there exists at least one world beta such
 that (alpha R beta) and ~(beta R alpha).  Consider a valuation such that
 p=f in alpha and p=t in all beta.  Then []p is true in alpha but p is false
 so []A-A is false in alpha for some A.  R not reflexive implies []A-A is
 not respected for all alpha and all valuations.


Yes that seems right, too. Brent obviously has a far more logical mind than
I do, but I guess I already knew that.


  (W, R) respects []A - [][]A if and only R is transitive,

 R is transitive means that for all beta such that (alpha R beta) and all
 gamma such that (beta R gamma), (alpha R gamma).  So every []A implies A=t
 in all beta and also A=t in all gamma.  But A=t in all gamma means []A is
 true in beta, which in turn means [][]A is true in alpha.  So R is
 transitive implies (W,R) respects []A-[][]A.

 Suppose R is not transitive, so for all beta (alpha R beta) and there are
 some gamma such that [(beta R gamma) and ~(alpha R gamma)].  Let A=t in
 beta, A=f in gamma.  Then []A is true in alpha but []A isn't true in beta,
 so [][]A isn't true in alpha.  So (W, R) respects []A - [][]A implies R is
 transitive.

 Yes, again, I eventually managed to follow that. You make it seem so easy.


  (W, R) respects  A - []A if and only R is symmetrical,

 R symmetrical means that if (alpha R beta) then (beta R alpha). Suppose A
 is true in alpha; then A is true in beta (by symmetry of R) and this
 holds for all alpha and beta so []A in alpha.

 Suppose R is not symmetrical, so there is a pair of worlds (alpha R beta)
 and ~(beta R alpha).  So consider V such that A=t in alpha and A=f in all
 worlds gamma such that (beta R gamma) then ~A in beta.  So it would be
 false that []A in alpha.

 Again I an overawed.


  (W,R) respects []A - A if and only if R is ideal,

 R is ideal, means that for every alpha there is a beta such that (alpha R
 beta).  Suppose []A is true in alpha, then A must be true in every world
 beta (alpha R beta) and there is a least on such beta, so A is true in
 alpha.

 Suppose R is not ideal, then there is a cul-de-sac alpha.  For alpha []A
 is vacously true for all A, but A is false so []A-A is false.

 Yes.


  (W, R) respects A - ~[]A if and only if R is realist.

 R is realist means that for every world alpha there is a world beta such
 that (alpha R beta) and beta is cul-de-sac.  Suppose A is true in beta,
 then A is true in alpha but A=f in beta so []A cannot be true in
 alpha.  Hence A-~[]A in alpha where alpha is any non cul-de-sac world.
  Then consider a cul-de-sac world like beta; A is always false in beta so
 A-X is true in beta for any X, including ~[]A.


I think my brain is starting to melt down, I can't work out if that proves
if and only if ?

By the way why realist ?

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Re: Max and FPI

On 3 April 2014 04:37, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


 Suppose R is not transitive, so for all beta (alpha R beta) and there are
 some gamma such that [(beta R gamma) and ~(alpha R gamma)].


 I cannot parse that sentence, I guess some word are missing. R is not
 transitive means that there exist alpha, beta and gamma, such that
 alpha R beta, and beta R gamma, and ~(alpha R gamma). I will guess that
 this is what you meant.


That's what I took it to mean. (I didn't realise that wasn't what it said!)

OK Liz? Others? Feel free to ask definitions or explanations.


Yes, at least at the point where I think very hard about each one, they all
seem to make sense.


 The next one is important, as it plays a role in the 'derivation of
 physics'.


  (W, R) respects  A - []A if and only R is symmetrical,

 R symmetrical means that if (alpha R beta) then (beta R alpha).


 Yes, for all alpha and beta in W.

 Suppose A is true in alpha; then A is true in beta (by symmetry of R)
 and this holds for all alpha and beta so []A in alpha.

 And so A - []A is true in alpha.  (Here we are using the deduction rule
 in the CPL context, which is valid. Later we will see it is not valid in
 the modal context).


 Suppose R is not symmetrical, so there is a pair of worlds (alpha R beta)
 and ~(beta R alpha).  So consider V such that A=t in alpha and A=f in all
 worlds gamma such that (beta R gamma) then ~A in beta.  So it would be
 false that []A in alpha.

 Liz told me this already! OK.


Phew.

  (W,R) respects []A - A if and only if R is ideal,

 R is ideal, means that for every alpha there is a beta such that (alpha R
 beta).  Suppose []A is true in alpha, then A must be true in every world
 beta (alpha R beta) and there is a least on such beta, so A is true in
 alpha.


 OK.


 Suppose R is not ideal, then there is a cul-de-sac alpha.  For alpha []A
 is vacously true for all A, but A is false so []A-A is false.


 Yes, all cul-de-sac world are counterexample of []A - A. In the Kripke
 semantics, they are counterexamples of #, with # put for any proposition.

  (W, R) respects A - ~[]A if and only if R is realist.

 R is realist means that for every world alpha there is a world beta such
 that (alpha R beta) and beta is cul-de-sac.


 For every *transitory* world alpha. OK. The cul-de-sac world are still
 world!



 Suppose A is true in beta, then A is true in alpha but A=f in beta so
 []A cannot be true in alpha.  Hence A-~[]A in alpha where alpha is
 any non cul-de-sac world.  Then consider a cul-de-sac world like beta; A
 is always false in beta so A-X is true in beta for any X, including
 ~[]A.


 OK. Nice.

 So you proved that R is realist implies that (W, R) respects A - ~[]A.

 But you have still not prove that if R is *not* realist, (W,R) does not
 respect A - ~[]A  (unlike all other cases). OK?

 You proved: (W, R) realist implies respects A - ~[]A, but not yet
 the converse, that respects A - ~[]A implies  (W, R) realist.

 I let you search, and might justify this (with pre-warning to avoid
 spoiling!).

 And what about the euclidian multiverse?  May be you did them?

 R is euclidian, or euclidean, if  (aRb and aRc) implies bRc, for all a, b
 and c in W.  (I use a for the greek *alpha*!)

 Proposition: (W,R) respects A - []A   iff   R is euclidian.

 Hmm. I'll think about that later.

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Re: Max and FPI


On Monday, March 31, 2014 6:41:55 AM UTC+1, Liz R wrote:

 I'm not sure collapse is an observed fact. Collapse is an assumption which 
 explains how we come to measure discrete values.

 
Would mind helping me place your meaning in terms of mine Liz?
,  
Say, if we imagine a process of stripping back the meaning of 
'wave-function' based on the single goal only, of finding the common ground 
starting point, least open to  different - likely mis-conception, very 
likely my side. 
 
On that basis, my stripped back wave-function is the pattern made on the  
in the two slit experiment, by all those particles coming through, where 
each one hits. Purely on that temporary definition alone, would we be on 
common ground (a) so far as it goes - given the goal -  it's a legitimate 
definition (b) the wave function is an observed fact, and so is its 
collapse? . 
 
Else, if the only facts I'm managing to reveal is the embarrassing kind 
like the sorry ass paucity of my basic grasp of things, heydon't be 
embarrassed :O) Give it to me straight

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Re: Max and FPI

On 3 April 2014 10:55, ghib...@gmail.com wrote:


 On Monday, March 31, 2014 6:41:55 AM UTC+1, Liz R wrote:

 I'm not sure collapse is an observed fact. Collapse is an assumption
 which explains how we come to measure discrete values.


 Would mind helping me place your meaning in terms of mine Liz?
 ,
 Say, if we imagine a process of stripping back the meaning of
 'wave-function' based on the single goal only, of finding the common ground
 starting point, least open to  different - likely mis-conception, very
 likely my side.

 On that basis, my stripped back wave-function is the pattern made on the
 in the two slit experiment, by all those particles coming through, where
 each one hits. Purely on that temporary definition alone, would we be on
 common ground (a) so far as it goes - given the goal -  it's a legitimate
 definition (b) the wave function is an observed fact, and so is its
 collapse? .


My take on this is that the wave function is what is assumed to explain the
interference pattern formed by the particles, and collapse is what is
assumed, in the Copenhagen view, to explain why the pattern is made up of
individual pointlike events. The Bohm and MWI (and probably the
time-symmetry) views make different assumptions to explain this seemingly
counter-intuitive result.

Hence the observed fact is that an interference pattern builds up from many
discrete events, and several hypotheses have been put forward to explain
this, wavefunction collapse being one of them.

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Re: Max and FPI


On Wednesday, April 2, 2014 11:10:18 PM UTC+1, Liz R wrote:

 On 3 April 2014 10:55, ghi...@gmail.com javascript: wrote:


 On Monday, March 31, 2014 6:41:55 AM UTC+1, Liz R wrote:

 I'm not sure collapse is an observed fact. Collapse is an assumption 
 which explains how we come to measure discrete values.

  
 Would mind helping me place your meaning in terms of mine Liz?
 ,  
 Say, if we imagine a process of stripping back the meaning of 
 'wave-function' based on the single goal only, of finding the common ground 
 starting point, least open to  different - likely mis-conception, very 
 likely my side. 
  
 On that basis, my stripped back wave-function is the pattern made on the  
 in the two slit experiment, by all those particles coming through, where 
 each one hits. Purely on that temporary definition alone, would we be on 
 common ground (a) so far as it goes - given the goal -  it's a legitimate 
 definition (b) the wave function is an observed fact, and so is its 
 collapse? . 


 My take on this is that the wave function is what is assumed to explain 
 the interference pattern formed by the particles, and collapse is what is 
 assumed, in the Copenhagen view, to explain why the pattern is made up of 
 individual pointlike events. The Bohm and MWI (and probably the 
 time-symmetry) views make different assumptions to explain this seemingly 
 counter-intuitive result.

 Hence the observed fact is that an interference pattern builds up from 
 many discrete events, and several hypotheses have been put forward to 
 explain this, wavefunction collapse being one of them

 
 I've no criticism of that, save subjective that I still can't nail the 
common ground. Given that on the terms of 'temporarily stripping back' the 
way I said, doesn't have to satisfy the way you just said, beyond the 
minimal standard of being, alright as a gross simplification? I mean, it's 
reasonable a gross simplification would merge a distinction between the 
pattern on the backscreen and the nature intrinsic to the pattern itself, 
and the ultimate cause of that, to the pattern on the backscreen 
representing the impact points of particles or isn't it? 
If it isn't, then we can simplify back further, and just call the 'pattern 
on the backscreen'.
 
We can simplify the 'collapse' back further and call that the pattern 
disappears. 
 
I'm not taking the piss Liz...it will help me to see a concrete common 
ground component of what is an experimentally observed fact. It's fine if 
you don't think that's the issue...it might not be in the end, but if we 
can agree on something that is an observed fact, we can probably use that 
to work out, how gross a simplification you think it is, vs I think it is. 
As things stand, the apparent indication all considered is that you think 
it's a simplification far greater and grosser than I think it is :O) 

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Re: Max and FPI

On 3 April 2014 11:46, ghib...@gmail.com wrote:


 On Wednesday, April 2, 2014 11:10:18 PM UTC+1, Liz R wrote:

 On 3 April 2014 10:55, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:


 On Monday, March 31, 2014 6:41:55 AM UTC+1, Liz R wrote:

 I'm not sure collapse is an observed fact. Collapse is an assumption
 which explains how we come to measure discrete values.


 Would mind helping me place your meaning in terms of mine Liz?
 ,
 Say, if we imagine a process of stripping back the meaning of
 'wave-function' based on the single goal only, of finding the common ground
 starting point, least open to  different - likely mis-conception, very
 likely my side.

 On that basis, my stripped back wave-function is the pattern made on
 the  in the two slit experiment, by all those particles coming through,
 where each one hits. Purely on that temporary definition alone, would we be
 on common ground (a) so far as it goes - given the goal -  it's a
 legitimate definition (b) the wave function is an observed fact, and so is
 its collapse? .


 My take on this is that the wave function is what is assumed to explain
 the interference pattern formed by the particles, and collapse is what is
 assumed, in the Copenhagen view, to explain why the pattern is made up of
 individual pointlike events. The Bohm and MWI (and probably the
 time-symmetry) views make different assumptions to explain this seemingly
 counter-intuitive result.

 Hence the observed fact is that an interference pattern builds up from
 many discrete events, and several hypotheses have been put forward to
 explain this, wavefunction collapse being one of them


  I've no criticism of that, save subjective that I still can't nail the
 common ground. Given that on the terms of 'temporarily stripping back' the
 way I said, doesn't have to satisfy the way you just said, beyond the
 minimal standard of being, alright as a gross simplification? I mean, it's
 reasonable a gross simplification would merge a distinction between the
 pattern on the backscreen and the nature intrinsic to the pattern itself,
 and the ultimate cause of that, to the pattern on the backscreen
 representing the impact points of particles or isn't it?


Sorry I can't really parse that.


 If it isn't, then we can simplify back further, and just call the 'pattern
 on the backscreen'.

 We can simplify the 'collapse' back further and call that the pattern
 disappears.

 I'm not taking the piss Liz...it will help me to see a concrete common
 ground component of what is an experimentally observed fact. It's fine if
 you don't think that's the issue...it might not be in the end, but if we
 can agree on something that is an observed fact, we can probably use that
 to work out, how gross a simplification you think it is, vs I think it is.
 As things stand, the apparent indication all considered is that you think
 it's a simplification far greater and grosser than I think it is :O)


What was wrong with my statement of the observed fact - an interference
pattern builds up from many pointlike events ? The only thing to (perhaps)
take issue with is the meaning of pointlike, I would say, which could be
taken to mean small compared to the scale of the interference pattern.
Here is an illustration:

[image: Inline images 1]

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Re: Max and FPI


On Tuesday, April 1, 2014 3:40:18 PM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 31 Mar 2014, at 20:14, meekerdb wrote: 

  On 3/31/2014 10:41 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
  
  On 31 Mar 2014, at 19:04, meekerdb wrote: 
  
  On 3/31/2014 12:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
  
  OK...you see an elegant explanation sBould the empirically   
  observed fact actually not be. 
  
  But would even that alone have been remotely near the ballpark   
  of things taken seriously, had there not been extreme quantum   
  strangeness  irreconcilable at that time, with the most core,   
  most fundamental accomplishments of science to date? 
  
  MWI evacuates all weirdness from QM. It restores fully 
  - determinacy 
  - locality 
  - physical realism 
  
  The price is not that big, as nature is used to multiplied   
  things, like the water molecules in the ocean, the stars in the   
  sky, the galaxies, etc. 
  Each time, the humans are shocked by this, and Gordiano Bruno get   
  burned for saying that stars are other suns, and that they might   
  have planets, with other living being. 
  It is humbling, but not coneptually new, especially for a   
  computationalist, which explains the MW from simple arithmetic,   
  where you need only to believe in the consequence of addition and   
  multiplication of integers. 
  
  
  
  The price is not having a unified 'self' - which many people would   
  consider a big price since all observation and record keeping   
  which is used to empirically test theories assumes this unity. 
  
  Really? 
  
  
  
  
  
  If you observe X and you want to use that as empircal test of a   
  theory it isn't helpful if your theory of the instruments says   
  they also recorded not-X. 
  
  It is helpful when it is part of the only theories which are   
  working, like QM, or arithmetic. 
  
  No it's not.  It's reason the Born rule is needed and the source of   
  the difficulty of interpreting probability in MWI and the 'white   
  rabbit problem' in comp. 

 In my opinion, Gleason theorem solves this problem for the case of QM.   
 And if the Zs logic verifies some quite plausible conjecture, the case   
 of comp is reduced to the case of QM. 
 This is a technical point, 'course. 

 But even if such solutions did not exist, the MWI remains   
 understandable, which is not the case for QM+collapse. 

 
Is this how Science works Bruno? That a theory is good even when it fails 
tests deriving from other scientific and/or mathematical domains, or 
sub-components thereof, regarded at the high end of reliability, based on 
the accumulation of different, mutually independent, tests devised and 
passed? 
 
If that isn't a falsifiable event, then what is? Are you saying, the only 
event that really matters, is what is the best explanation currently 
available? That is totally contradicted, by the entirety of scientific 
history in terms of what actually happens you realize? 
 
So in that caseare you saying  - like Popper, like Deutsch - the fact 
of that is all wrong or irrelevant and nothing to do with Real Science, 
which is all about throwing explanations regardless of quality everywhere a 
gap is spotted, if there's more than one, performing some amazingly 
rational and dispassionate fireplace discussion wearing crushed velvet 
jackets and smoking pipes, the way the best friends do the Friday evening 
the Time Traveller vanishes into time, and the Friday after he shoes up 
covered in lipsticky lovebites clutching a dodgy flower. 
 
Is that how you're defining science? Because you do seem to be neglecting 
falsification - any practical possibility of it. 

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Re: Max and FPI


On Thursday, April 3, 2014 12:03:51 AM UTC+1, Liz R wrote:

 On 3 April 2014 11:46, ghi...@gmail.com javascript: wrote:


 On Wednesday, April 2, 2014 11:10:18 PM UTC+1, Liz R wrote:

 On 3 April 2014 10:55, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:


 On Monday, March 31, 2014 6:41:55 AM UTC+1, Liz R wrote:

 I'm not sure collapse is an observed fact. Collapse is an assumption 
 which explains how we come to measure discrete values.

  
 Would mind helping me place your meaning in terms of mine Liz?
 ,  
 Say, if we imagine a process of stripping back the meaning of 
 'wave-function' based on the single goal only, of finding the common 
 ground 
 starting point, least open to  different - likely mis-conception, very 
 likely my side. 
  
 On that basis, my stripped back wave-function is the pattern made on 
 the  in the two slit experiment, by all those particles coming through, 
 where each one hits. Purely on that temporary definition alone, would we 
 be 
 on common ground (a) so far as it goes - given the goal -  it's a 
 legitimate definition (b) the wave function is an observed fact, and so is 
 its collapse? . 


 My take on this is that the wave function is what is assumed to explain 
 the interference pattern formed by the particles, and collapse is what is 
 assumed, in the Copenhagen view, to explain why the pattern is made up of 
 individual pointlike events. The Bohm and MWI (and probably the 
 time-symmetry) views make different assumptions to explain this seemingly 
 counter-intuitive result.

 Hence the observed fact is that an interference pattern builds up from 
 many discrete events, and several hypotheses have been put forward to 
 explain this, wavefunction collapse being one of them

  
  I've no criticism of that, save subjective that I still can't nail the 
 common ground. Given that on the terms of 'temporarily stripping back' the 
 way I said, doesn't have to satisfy the way you just said, beyond the 
 minimal standard of being, alright as a gross simplification? I mean, it's 
 reasonable a gross simplification would merge a distinction between the 
 pattern on the backscreen and the nature intrinsic to the pattern itself, 
 and the ultimate cause of that, to the pattern on the backscreen 
 representing the impact points of particles or isn't it? 


 Sorry I can't really parse that.
  

 If it isn't, then we can simplify back further, and just call the 
 'pattern on the backscreen'.
  
 We can simplify the 'collapse' back further and call that the pattern 
 disappears. 
  
 I'm not taking the piss Liz...it will help me to see a concrete common 
 ground component of what is an experimentally observed fact. It's fine if 
 you don't think that's the issue...it might not be in the end, but if we 
 can agree on something that is an observed fact, we can probably use that 
 to work out, how gross a simplification you think it is, vs I think it is. 
 As things stand, the apparent indication all considered is that you think 
 it's a simplification far greater and grosser than I think it is :O) 


 What was wrong with my statement of the observed fact - an interference 
 pattern builds up from many pointlike events ? The only thing to (perhaps) 
 take issue with is the meaning of pointlike, I would say, which could be 
 taken to mean small compared to the scale of the interference pattern. 
 Here is an illustration:

 [image: Inline images 1]

 
 
Nothing wrong with it Liz, if you are willing to state what is an observed 
fact, and what sense you would also accept that observed fact could 
be entirely defined as - probably a simplification - within the bounds of 
what you actually think the wavefunction is really about, or 
the debate pertaining to that. 
 
Because...look I know all the stuff you just defined, about the backscreen 
pattern being representation of where the individual bits hit, the images, 
and so on. So that's a form of common ground which is great. But it 
doesn't confirm the common ground that I suggest we need to have this 
particular conversation. Which you obviously are under no obligation to 
have, of course. But I'm being dogmatic here...I don't see how to 
understand the reasonable distinction you are making, such that the patern 
on the backscreen, however you want to define, is an observable fact, and 
so is its disappearance. And yet, the disappearance of the wavefunction is 
not observable. 
 
I'm sure there's plenty of theory sitting behind that. But surely you 
can also nail it directly to what is observable, and is fact, in terms of 
that being NOT implicate of observability of the disappearnance of the wave 
function..  

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Re: Max and FPI


On Thursday, April 3, 2014 12:35:39 AM UTC+1, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:


 On Thursday, April 3, 2014 12:03:51 AM UTC+1, Liz R wrote:

 On 3 April 2014 11:46, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:


 On Wednesday, April 2, 2014 11:10:18 PM UTC+1, Liz R wrote:

 On 3 April 2014 10:55, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:


 On Monday, March 31, 2014 6:41:55 AM UTC+1, Liz R wrote:

 I'm not sure collapse is an observed fact. Collapse is an assumption 
 which explains how we come to measure discrete values.

  
 Would mind helping me place your meaning in terms of mine Liz?
 ,  
 Say, if we imagine a process of stripping back the meaning of 
 'wave-function' based on the single goal only, of finding the common 
 ground 
 starting point, least open to  different - likely mis-conception, very 
 likely my side. 
  
 On that basis, my stripped back wave-function is the pattern made on 
 the  in the two slit experiment, by all those particles coming through, 
 where each one hits. Purely on that temporary definition alone, would we 
 be 
 on common ground (a) so far as it goes - given the goal -  it's a 
 legitimate definition (b) the wave function is an observed fact, and so 
 is 
 its collapse? . 


 My take on this is that the wave function is what is assumed to explain 
 the interference pattern formed by the particles, and collapse is what is 
 assumed, in the Copenhagen view, to explain why the pattern is made up of 
 individual pointlike events. The Bohm and MWI (and probably the 
 time-symmetry) views make different assumptions to explain this seemingly 
 counter-intuitive result.

 Hence the observed fact is that an interference pattern builds up from 
 many discrete events, and several hypotheses have been put forward to 
 explain this, wavefunction collapse being one of them

  
  I've no criticism of that, save subjective that I still can't nail the 
 common ground. Given that on the terms of 'temporarily stripping back' the 
 way I said, doesn't have to satisfy the way you just said, beyond the 
 minimal standard of being, alright as a gross simplification? I mean, it's 
 reasonable a gross simplification would merge a distinction between the 
 pattern on the backscreen and the nature intrinsic to the pattern itself, 
 and the ultimate cause of that, to the pattern on the backscreen 
 representing the impact points of particles or isn't it? 


 Sorry I can't really parse that.
  

 If it isn't, then we can simplify back further, and just call the 
 'pattern on the backscreen'.
  
 We can simplify the 'collapse' back further and call that the pattern 
 disappears. 
  
 I'm not taking the piss Liz...it will help me to see a concrete common 
 ground component of what is an experimentally observed fact. It's fine if 
 you don't think that's the issue...it might not be in the end, but if we 
 can agree on something that is an observed fact, we can probably use that 
 to work out, how gross a simplification you think it is, vs I think it is. 
 As things stand, the apparent indication all considered is that you think 
 it's a simplification far greater and grosser than I think it is :O) 


 What was wrong with my statement of the observed fact - an interference 
 pattern builds up from many pointlike events ? The only thing to (perhaps) 
 take issue with is the meaning of pointlike, I would say, which could be 
 taken to mean small compared to the scale of the interference pattern. 
 Here is an illustration:

 [image: Inline images 1]

  
  
 Nothing wrong with it Liz, if you are willing to state what is an observed 
 fact, and what sense you would also accept that observed fact could 
 be entirely defined as - probably a simplification - within the bounds of 
 what you actually think the wavefunction is really about, or 
 the debate pertaining to that. 
  
 Because...look I know all the stuff you just defined, about the backscreen 
 pattern being representation of where the individual bits hit, the images, 
 and so on. So that's a form of common ground which is great. But it 
 doesn't confirm the common ground that I suggest we need to have this 
 particular conversation. Which you obviously are under no obligation to 
 have, of course. But I'm being dogmatic here...I don't see how to 
 understand the reasonable distinction you are making, such that the patern 
 on the backscreen, however you want to define, is an observable fact, and 
 so is its disappearance. And yet, the disappearance of the wavefunction is 
 not observable. 
  
 I'm sure there's plenty of theory sitting behind that. But surely you 
 can also nail it directly to what is observable, and is fact, in terms of 
 that being NOT implicate of observability of the disappearnance of the wave 
 function..  

 
I meant I'm not being dogmatic here. Not a Freudian slip at least so far 
as I dig within myself. Clearly, my brain does not like, or believe, the 
distinction that gets banded around here, that 'collapse' isn't 'observed'. 
It looks like magical made up nonsense to

Re: Max and FPI


On Thursday, April 3, 2014 12:40:21 AM UTC+1, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:


 On Thursday, April 3, 2014 12:35:39 AM UTC+1, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:


 On Thursday, April 3, 2014 12:03:51 AM UTC+1, Liz R wrote:

 On 3 April 2014 11:46, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:


 On Wednesday, April 2, 2014 11:10:18 PM UTC+1, Liz R wrote:

 On 3 April 2014 10:55, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:


 On Monday, March 31, 2014 6:41:55 AM UTC+1, Liz R wrote:

 I'm not sure collapse is an observed fact. Collapse is an assumption 
 which explains how we come to measure discrete values.

  
 Would mind helping me place your meaning in terms of mine Liz?
 ,  
 Say, if we imagine a process of stripping back the meaning of 
 'wave-function' based on the single goal only, of finding the common 
 ground 
 starting point, least open to  different - likely mis-conception, very 
 likely my side. 
  
 On that basis, my stripped back wave-function is the pattern made on 
 the  in the two slit experiment, by all those particles coming through, 
 where each one hits. Purely on that temporary definition alone, would we 
 be 
 on common ground (a) so far as it goes - given the goal -  it's a 
 legitimate definition (b) the wave function is an observed fact, and so 
 is 
 its collapse? . 


 My take on this is that the wave function is what is assumed to 
 explain the interference pattern formed by the particles, and collapse is 
 what is assumed, in the Copenhagen view, to explain why the pattern is 
 made 
 up of individual pointlike events. The Bohm and MWI (and probably the 
 time-symmetry) views make different assumptions to explain this seemingly 
 counter-intuitive result.

 Hence the observed fact is that an interference pattern builds up from 
 many discrete events, and several hypotheses have been put forward to 
 explain this, wavefunction collapse being one of them

  
  I've no criticism of that, save subjective that I still can't nail the 
 common ground. Given that on the terms of 'temporarily stripping back' the 
 way I said, doesn't have to satisfy the way you just said, beyond the 
 minimal standard of being, alright as a gross simplification? I mean, it's 
 reasonable a gross simplification would merge a distinction between the 
 pattern on the backscreen and the nature intrinsic to the pattern itself, 
 and the ultimate cause of that, to the pattern on the backscreen 
 representing the impact points of particles or isn't it? 


 Sorry I can't really parse that.
  

 If it isn't, then we can simplify back further, and just call the 
 'pattern on the backscreen'.
  
 We can simplify the 'collapse' back further and call that the pattern 
 disappears. 
  
 I'm not taking the piss Liz...it will help me to see a concrete common 
 ground component of what is an experimentally observed fact. It's fine if 
 you don't think that's the issue...it might not be in the end, but if we 
 can agree on something that is an observed fact, we can probably use that 
 to work out, how gross a simplification you think it is, vs I think it is. 
 As things stand, the apparent indication all considered is that you think 
 it's a simplification far greater and grosser than I think it is :O) 


 What was wrong with my statement of the observed fact - an interference 
 pattern builds up from many pointlike events ? The only thing to (perhaps) 
 take issue with is the meaning of pointlike, I would say, which could be 
 taken to mean small compared to the scale of the interference pattern. 
 Here is an illustration:

 [image: Inline images 1]

  
  
 Nothing wrong with it Liz, if you are willing to state what is an 
 observed fact, and what sense you would also accept that observed 
 fact could be entirely defined as - probably a simplification - within the 
 bounds of what you actually think the wavefunction is really about, or 
 the debate pertaining to that. 
  
 Because...look I know all the stuff you just defined, about 
 the backscreen pattern being representation of where the individual bits 
 hit, the images, and so on. So that's a form of common ground which is 
 great. But it doesn't confirm the common ground that I suggest we need to 
 have this particular conversation. Which you obviously are under no 
 obligation to have, of course. But I'm being dogmatic here...I don't 
 see how to understand the reasonable distinction you are making, such 
 that the patern on the backscreen, however you want to define, is an 
 observable fact, and so is its disappearance. And yet, the disappearance of 
 the wavefunction is not observable. 
  
 I'm sure there's plenty of theory sitting behind that. But surely you 
 can also nail it directly to what is observable, and is fact, in terms of 
 that being NOT implicate of observability of the disappearnance of the wave 
 function..  

  
 I meant I'm not being dogmatic here. Not a Freudian slip at least so far 
 as I dig within myself. Clearly, my brain does not like, or believe, the 
 distinction that gets banded around here,

Re: Max and FPI

gbhibbsa, I'm getting a bit confused here. All I said is that wavefunction
collapse isn't an observed fact, which seems to me a fairly reasonable
statement, because we can't observe entities like wavefunctions directly,
and we certainly can't observe their collapse directly. Some people would
say we can't observe *anything* directly, but under the normally understood
meaning of observe it seems reasonable to say that we observe the images
on our retinas, and hence that we can observe the dots on a screen, and we
can also be reasonably said to be able to observe the pattern they make.
I'm not saying anything about the MWI or Copenhagen or whatever here,
merely that (in normal usage of observe) we can observe dots on a screen,
and we can't observe abstract theoretical entities like wavefunctions, or
their collapse.

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Re: Max and FPI


On Thursday, April 3, 2014 1:24:28 AM UTC+1, Liz R wrote:

 gbhibbsa, I'm getting a bit confused here. All I said is that wavefunction 
 collapse isn't an observed fact, which seems to me a fairly reasonable 
 statement, because we can't observe entities like wavefunctions directly, 
 and we certainly can't observe their collapse directly. Some people would 
 say we can't observe *anything* directly, but under the normally 
 understood meaning of observe it seems reasonable to say that we observe 
 the images on our retinas, and hence that we can observe the dots on a 
 screen, and we can also be reasonably said to be able to observe the 
 pattern they make. I'm not saying anything about the MWI or Copenhagen or 
 whatever here, merely that (in normal usage of observe) we can observe 
 dots on a screen, and we can't observe abstract theoretical entities like 
 wavefunctions, or their collapse.

 
I apologize for the extensive subset of my much more extensive range of 
shortcomings causing up to all of that confusion. 
 
May I try again...this time boiling it all down to a single request? Based 
on what was at the time the widely accepted proxy for the more 
problematic meaning of 'observation', what was observed that gave rise in 
the first place to the widely perceived, arguably urgent, need for 
an Interpretation of what  it meant? 
 
 
Hopefully you're good-to-go answering the question on those terms. Or 
to say what  you need additional clarification about that then you would 
be, that is linked to somethiing tangible for me...like a particular word 
or phrase. 
 
 

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Re: Max and FPI

On 3 April 2014 14:39, ghib...@gmail.com wrote:


 On Thursday, April 3, 2014 1:24:28 AM UTC+1, Liz R wrote:

 gbhibbsa, I'm getting a bit confused here. All I said is that
 wavefunction collapse isn't an observed fact, which seems to me a fairly
 reasonable statement, because we can't observe entities like wavefunctions
 directly, and we certainly can't observe their collapse directly. Some
 people would say we can't observe *anything* directly, but under the
 normally understood meaning of observe it seems reasonable to say that we
 observe the images on our retinas, and hence that we can observe the dots
 on a screen, and we can also be reasonably said to be able to observe the
 pattern they make. I'm not saying anything about the MWI or Copenhagen or
 whatever here, merely that (in normal usage of observe) we can observe
 dots on a screen, and we can't observe abstract theoretical entities like
 wavefunctions, or their collapse.


 I apologize for the extensive subset of my much more extensive range of
 shortcomings causing up to all of that confusion.

 May I try again...this time boiling it all down to a single request? Based
 on what was at the time the widely accepted proxy for the more
 problematic meaning of 'observation', what was observed that gave rise in
 the first place to the widely perceived, arguably urgent, need for
 an Interpretation of what  it meant?


The observation described above, and shown in the pictures. The need for
interpretation comes from the fact that the objects (electrons or photons,
for example) involved are assumed to be far too small to be influenced by
both slits in the experiment (the fact that they form localised dots on the
screen also indicates that they are very small). Yet all these small
objects manage to build up a global interference pattern involving the
presence of both slits (a pattern that vanishes if one slit is covered).

This doesn't at first seem paradoxical, because a similar phenomenon occurs
when a wave in water passes through two gaps of the right size, for
example. In this case there is a medium present at each point through which
the waves are travelling, so the influence has something to transmit it,
and the resulting effect is easily explanied.

So one's first guess is likely to be that the photons or electron in the
2-slit experiment are just be interfering with each other in a similar
manner ... which wouldn't be paradoxical , of course ... except for the
additional fact that the intensity of the source can be turned down until
only one particle is passing through the apparatus at any given time - yet
even in this case, the interference pattern still appears (eventually).

This situation appears in need of urgent explanation because the apparent
smallness of the particles in relation to the size of the equipment
suggests that a single electron or photon can't possibly know about (be
influenced by) a slit which it doesn't pass through, and which is,
relatively speaking, a large distance away. Assuming a photon passes
through the left hand slit, say, there is no known physical mechanism
available to tell it about the existence of the right hand slit. Yet it
will hit the screen in a position that is (statistically) determined by
what looks like interference between waves passing through both slits.
Hence the paradox.


 Hopefully you're good-to-go answering the question on those terms. Or
 to say what  you need additional clarification about that then you would
 be, that is linked to somethiing tangible for me...like a particular word
 or phrase.



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Re: Max and FPI


On Tuesday, March 25, 2014 3:01:04 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 25 Mar 2014, at 05:48, ghi...@gmail.com javascript: wrote:


 On Monday, March 24, 2014 4:48:13 AM UTC, chris peck wrote:

 The only person in any doubt was you wasn't it Liz?

 I found Tegmark's presentation very disappointing. He was alarmingly 
 apologetic about MWI pleading that its flaws were mitigated by the fact 
 other interpretations had similar flaws; as if the fact someone else is ill 
 would make you less ill yourself. I think in the world of QM 
 interpretations, with bugger all evidence to decide between them, the game 
 is to even out the playing field in terms of flaws and then chase 
 parsimony. Ofcourse, whether an infinite set of worlds is more or less 
 parsimonious than just one +  a few hidden variables, or one + a spooky 
 wave function collapse, depends very much on what definition of 
 parsimonious you find most fitting.

  
 MWI is refuted by the massive totally unexamined - some unrealized to this 
 day - assumptions built in at the start. 


 ?

 MWI seems to me to be the literal understanding of QM (without collapse).
 It is also a simple consequence of computationalism, except we get a 
 multi-dreams and the question remains open if this defines a universe, a 
 multiverse, or a multi-multiverses, etc. (results points toward a 
 multiverse though).



 It's like, local realism - a reasonable assumed universal. 


 Local realism is not part of QM assumption. It is a direct consequence of 
 the linearity of the Schroedinger Equation, and the linearity of the tensor 
 products.



 But only the bare bones. Assuming locarealism means locality as we 
 perceive, 


 As we infer from what we perceive. We cannot *perceive locality by itself.



 and classically seems to be. In; these dimensions. But what happens when 
 science transforms through a major generalization? The hallmark is that not 
 only theories get merged, broken up, such that everything looks 
 different. But  that the revolution stretchs right out to the conceptual 
 framework itself...the basic concepts that are upfront necessary to be 
 shared, for basic communication to take place. It's all concepts broken 
 apart, while others merged together. We can put some faith in local 
 realism, but in what dimensionality it's pure, we don't about that yet..we 
 don't know.MWI assumes that it's a safe scientific known. It isn't. In fact 
 everything is against that.


 Personally, even without comp and without QM, everything is conceptually 
 more simpler than any one-thing approach, which always needs much more 
 particular assumptions. 


  
 There literally dozens of others. Like assuming major properties are 
 duplicated as is between higher and lower macrostate layers. MWI'ers need 
 to assume local realism at quantum levels as is. Unprecedented if true. 
 Daft in other words. 


 Is it not more simple to assume the same realism at all scale, that to bet 
 on different one?



  
 When I throw this at them, the response if there is one is usually6 denial 
 that MWI needs those massive assumptions and would not have happened 
 without them. Arguments come the lines of MWI is derived clean from the 
 wave function or by some other theoretical strtucture, involving simple 
 assumptions only none of them things like local realism.


 I agree, except that local realism is, as I said above, a consequence of 
 the SWE.



  
 They just don't get it, science, anymore. theories as internal theory 
 structure get improved all the time as part of an ongoing 
 progression. Building out an assumption is not a matter of improving theory 
 structure alone. 
  
 MWI is tied to assuming local realism for all time, because it was only 
 the extreme and disturbing - incomprehensible even to the greats - 
 character of quantum strangenessl. MWI is tied to it, because that is what 
 it took  hat an outrageous, unscientific notion like MWI  could be taken 
 seriously at all. 


 Frankly, I believe the exact contrary. MWI is what you get from assuming 
 the axioms of quantum mechanics, and that is the unitary evolution. 



 MWI even now, has not defense for itself, without reference to quantum 
 strangeness,, and restorations to classical determinism. 


 Which I think would be enough to make it most plausible than any other 
 (sur)-interpretation. But MWI, which is just the SWE seen from inside, 
 restore not classical determinism, but also, well, local locality and well 
 local realism. 



  
 It's a quantum theory, and it's wrong, because it's assumptions are that 
 the nature of reality is hard tied forever to principles, 


 That's QM. That tomorrow we might discover that QM is false is just 
 science. But if comp and/or QM is correct, the many-thing will remain with 
 us, indeed.



 hard tied to the complexities of this dimension, this universe right here. 
 What a  joke. The harm done by this theory is immeasurable. A theory 
 sterile for all time, placed all

Re: Max and FPI


On Thursday, April 3, 2014 3:07:26 AM UTC+1, Liz R wrote:

 On 3 April 2014 14:39, ghi...@gmail.com javascript: wrote:


 On Thursday, April 3, 2014 1:24:28 AM UTC+1, Liz R wrote:

 gbhibbsa, I'm getting a bit confused here. All I said is that 
 wavefunction collapse isn't an observed fact, which seems to me a fairly 
 reasonable statement, because we can't observe entities like wavefunctions 
 directly, and we certainly can't observe their collapse directly. Some 
 people would say we can't observe *anything* directly, but under the 
 normally understood meaning of observe it seems reasonable to say that we 
 observe the images on our retinas, and hence that we can observe the dots 
 on a screen, and we can also be reasonably said to be able to observe the 
 pattern they make. I'm not saying anything about the MWI or Copenhagen or 
 whatever here, merely that (in normal usage of observe) we can observe 
 dots on a screen, and we can't observe abstract theoretical entities like 
 wavefunctions, or their collapse.

  
 I apologize for the extensive subset of my much more extensive range of 
 shortcomings causing up to all of that confusion. 
  
 May I try again...this time boiling it all down to a single 
 request? Based on what was at the time the widely accepted proxy for 
 the more problematic meaning of 'observation', what was observed that gave 
 rise in the first place to the widely perceived, arguably urgent, need for 
 an Interpretation of what  it meant? 


 The observation described above, and shown in the pictures. The need for 
 interpretation comes from the fact that the objects (electrons or photons, 
 for example) involved are assumed to be far too small to be influenced by 
 both slits in the experiment (the fact that they form localised dots on the 
 screen also indicates that they are very small). Yet all these small 
 objects manage to build up a global interference pattern involving the 
 presence of both slits (a pattern that vanishes if one slit is covered).

 This doesn't at first seem paradoxical, because a similar phenomenon 
 occurs when a wave in water passes through two gaps of the right size, for 
 example. In this case there is a medium present at each point through which 
 the waves are travelling, so the influence has something to transmit it, 
 and the resulting effect is easily explanied.

 So one's first guess is likely to be that the photons or electron in the 
 2-slit experiment are just be interfering with each other in a similar 
 manner ... which wouldn't be paradoxical , of course ... except for the 
 additional fact that the intensity of the source can be turned down until 
 only one particle is passing through the apparatus at any given time - yet 
 even in this case, the interference pattern still appears (eventually).

 This situation appears in need of urgent explanation because the 
 apparent smallness of the particles in relation to the size of the 
 equipment suggests that a single electron or photon can't possibly know 
 about (be influenced by) a slit which it doesn't pass through, and which 
 is, relatively speaking, a large distance away. Assuming a photon passes 
 through the left hand slit, say, there is no known physical mechanism 
 available to tell it about the existence of the right hand slit. Yet it 
 will hit the screen in a position that is (statistically) determined by 
 what looks like interference between waves passing through both slits. 
 Hence the paradox.

 
 I'd agree that's a component but why is that on its own a more urgent 
problem than the action at a distance problems with Newton's force when 
gravity? Or all those contradictions that accumulated in the late 19th 
century, that people felt were pretty incomprehensible and shocking, yet no 
one at any time started talking about the need for an 'interpretation' that 
made it all feel explained at any price? How come everyone was willing to 
leave all those problems wide open for up to hundreds of years, until not 
just an interpretation and explanation but scientific next generation 
theory, complete with all the traits science the way they knew and loved 
were explicit and visible. They had worse problems than this electron? On 
there own terms, as the knowledge they had, that was important to them, 
that was being upended by the contradictions that they faced. Was it worse 
for them, or where they just willing to live with it, because they knew 
they just had not accumulated enough knowledge yet to begin to answer the 
questions? 
 
The Interpretation Movement, was pretty unprecedented in that sense. That 
an explanation,a way to make sense ofwas raised over everything 
else, including whether and what extent that explanation inherited any of 
the traits most fundamental, most unique, to science and science only. MWI 
hasn't got one. Not one. Or name one, and explain why it's fundamental to 
science, and unique to science and only science. 
 
There are some parts you

Re: Max and FPI

2014-04-01 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 31 Mar 2014, at 20:14, meekerdb wrote:


On 3/31/2014 10:41 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 31 Mar 2014, at 19:04, meekerdb wrote:


On 3/31/2014 12:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


OK...you see an elegant explanation sBould the empirically  
observed fact actually not be.


But would even that alone have been remotely near the ballpark  
of things taken seriously, had there not been extreme quantum  
strangeness  irreconcilable at that time, with the most core,  
most fundamental accomplishments of science to date?


MWI evacuates all weirdness from QM. It restores fully
- determinacy
- locality
- physical realism

The price is not that big, as nature is used to multiplied  
things, like the water molecules in the ocean, the stars in the  
sky, the galaxies, etc.
Each time, the humans are shocked by this, and Gordiano Bruno get  
burned for saying that stars are other suns, and that they might  
have planets, with other living being.
It is humbling, but not coneptually new, especially for a  
computationalist, which explains the MW from simple arithmetic,  
where you need only to believe in the consequence of addition and  
multiplication of integers.





The price is not having a unified 'self' - which many people would  
consider a big price since all observation and record keeping  
which is used to empirically test theories assumes this unity.


Really?





If you observe X and you want to use that as empircal test of a  
theory it isn't helpful if your theory of the instruments says  
they also recorded not-X.


It is helpful when it is part of the only theories which are  
working, like QM, or arithmetic.


No it's not.  It's reason the Born rule is needed and the source of  
the difficulty of interpreting probability in MWI and the 'white  
rabbit problem' in comp.


In my opinion, Gleason theorem solves this problem for the case of QM.  
And if the Zs logic verifies some quite plausible conjecture, the case  
of comp is reduced to the case of QM.

This is a technical point, 'course.

But even if such solutions did not exist, the MWI remains  
understandable, which is not the case for QM+collapse. It provides a  
clear 3p pictures, and reduces the measure problem to a (solved or  
not) phenomenological problem. Any collapse or physical selection  
theory seems to add something to the wave, which seems always to be  
justified in an ad hoc restriction of what the wave described.











We need only the unity of the first person self, from the first  
person self point of view, and that is guarantied by the comp  
hypothesis.


Guarantee by definition doesn't mean much.


Almost. It is guarantied once you are willing to believe that the  
brain is an organic Turing emulable machine, or that consciousness is  
sub-susbt-level computations invariant.









Ah! Brent, this list is called everything because it is open to  
the idea that everything, or nothing,  is simpler than any mono- 
thing.


I know why it's called that, but I assumed that I didn't have to be  
true believer to participate.


On the contrary, that is welcome, I think, as some of us have a taste  
for discussing and are skeptic at all level.


I am certainly not true believer in anything, (with one common  
exception like consciousness), but I like to take a theory seriously  
and push its logic up to the possible contradiction.


The point here was a remind that some people believe that a simple  
theory, which provides an explanation for the phenomenology, is better  
than a more complex theory, even if that later satisfies some human  
coquetry like being 3p unique.


We don't know the truth, but we can evaluate the plausibilities and  
the consistencies, etc.











I can understand that it is counter-intuitive, but the brain has  
not been programmed for the big picture, so we can expect the  
possible truth to be shocking, it seems to me.


Alas, there is a temptation regard how shocking a theory is as  
evidence for it.


We can only hope God is not malicious.

Now, I don't use shocking as evidences, given that I defend MW as more  
plausible than ~MW, indeed by arguing that it is more conservative, as  
it preserves (or keep the hope of them being preserved) locality,  
determinacy, and some form of physical realism.


BTW, are you OK in the math thread? Are you OK, like Liz apparently,  
that the Kripke frame (W,R) respects A - []A iff R is symmetrical?


Should I give the proof of the fact that the Kripke frame (W,R)  
respects []A - [][]A iff R is a transitive?


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Max and FPI

2014-04-01 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 01 Apr 2014, at 03:33, meekerdb wrote:


On 3/31/2014 6:00 PM, LizR wrote:

On 1 April 2014 06:04, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
The price is not having a unified 'self' - which many people would  
consider a big price since all observation and record keeping which  
is used to empirically test theories assumes this unity.  If you  
observe X and you want to use that as empircal test of a theory it  
isn't helpful if your theory of the instruments says they also  
recorded not-X.


(I suspect some people would consider it a big price not to have a  
unified self for other reasons, too!)


I can't see how it's worse for your theory to say that your  
instruments will record X and not X as opposed to saying they  
will record X or not X, but we don't know which.


That's before the fact.  I didn't write will.   MWI is a theory  
that says when you read your instrument and it says X, it's only one  
of an infinite set some of which say X and some say not-X.


The former explanation says there will be apparent but explicable  
randomness, the latter says there will be intrinsic and  
inexplicable randomness.


But is it explicable.  Bruno is careful to refer to uncertainty or  
indeterminancy.  Those are not necessarily probabilities unless  
they can be quantified to satisfy Kolomogorov's axioms - and it's  
not clear to me that they can.  The axioms require that the set of  
everything have measure 1.  But in this case everything is ill  
defined and uncountably infinite.


It might be definable though, like the consciousness of the universal  
machine. It is the least Turing emulable entity having some futures  
in the arithmetical reality. It is the first person mental state in  
front of the maximal FPI.




In common applications of QM one assumes isolation and considers  
only a small (at least finite) set of possible results - which works  
FAPP.


But in Everett and comp we know why, without having to invoke a  
mysterious pseudo-God-like selection, apparently. ISTM.



Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Max and FPI

2014-04-01 Thread Richard Ruquist

Bruno, I have a problem with the Gleason Theorem because it appears to me
to be saying that every possible quantum state is realized with equal
probability at first, but the frequency at which each universe reoccurs is
given by the FPI probabilities that are measured in controlled quantum
experiments. If what I just said is true, I'm sure you can see my the
source of my skepticism. So please correct my understanding of the Gleason
Theorem.
Richard


On Tue, Apr 1, 2014 at 11:18 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


 On 01 Apr 2014, at 03:33, meekerdb wrote:

  On 3/31/2014 6:00 PM, LizR wrote:

  On 1 April 2014 06:04, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

 The price is not having a unified 'self' - which many people would
 consider a big price since all observation and record keeping which is used
 to empirically test theories assumes this unity.  If you observe X and you
 want to use that as empircal test of a theory it isn't helpful if your
 theory of the instruments says they also recorded not-X.


  (I suspect some people would consider it a big price not to have a
 unified self for other reasons, too!)

 I can't see how it's worse for your theory to say that your instruments
 will record X and not X as opposed to saying they will record X or not
 X, but we don't know which.


 That's before the fact.  I didn't write will.   MWI is a theory that
 says when you read your instrument and it says X, it's only one of an
 infinite set some of which say X and some say not-X.

  The former explanation says there will be apparent but explicable
 randomness, the latter says there will be intrinsic and inexplicable
 randomness.


 But is it explicable.  Bruno is careful to refer to uncertainty or
 indeterminancy.  Those are not necessarily probabilities unless they can
 be quantified to satisfy Kolomogorov's axioms - and it's not clear to me
 that they can.  The axioms require that the set of everything have
 measure 1.  But in this case everything is ill defined and uncountably
 infinite.


 It might be definable though, like the consciousness of the universal
 machine. It is the least Turing emulable entity having some futures in
 the arithmetical reality. It is the first person mental state in front of
 the maximal FPI.



 In common applications of QM one assumes isolation and considers only a
 small (at least finite) set of possible results - which works FAPP.


 But in Everett and comp we know why, without having to invoke a
 mysterious pseudo-God-like selection, apparently. ISTM.


 Bruno


 http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Max and FPI

2014-04-01 Thread LizR

I just read the definition of Gleason's theorem on Wikipedia and now my
brain is full. A for-dummies version would be appreciated...

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Re: Max and FPI

2014-04-01 Thread meekerdb


On 4/1/2014 2:25 PM, LizR wrote:
I just read the definition of Gleason's theorem on Wikipedia and now my brain is full. A 
for-dummies version would be appreciated...


I think what Gleason proved is that the only consistent probability measure on a Hilbert 
space is given by the normalized inner product.  But it's not clear that there is a 
probability measure on the MW.


http://physics.stackexchange.com/questions/20802/why-is-gleasons-theorem-not-enough-to-obtain-born-rule-in-many-worlds-interpret

Brent

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Re: Max and FPI

2014-04-01 Thread LizR

Eek! Am I a mystical many-worlder (on days that don't have a T in them) ?

Thank you that was very interesting, although I still don't know what to
make of quantum theory (that's good, right?)

By the way I've seen Kirk on a rock before somewhere, maybe it was in a
parallel universe...



On 2 April 2014 14:43, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

 On 4/1/2014 2:25 PM, LizR wrote:

 I just read the definition of Gleason's theorem on Wikipedia and now my
 brain is full. A for-dummies version would be appreciated...


 I think what Gleason proved is that the only consistent probability
 measure on a Hilbert space is given by the normalized inner product.  But
 it's not clear that there is a probability measure on the MW.

 http://physics.stackexchange.com/questions/20802/why-is-
 gleasons-theorem-not-enough-to-obtain-born-rule-in-many-worlds-interpret

 Brent


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Re: Max and FPI

2014-04-01 Thread Richard Ruquist

Apparently my conception of Gleason's Theorem is incorrect. However, I was
struck by something the author of the answer, Mitchell Porter, said that is
exactly what I thought the Gleason Theorem was about:
In my opinion, the sensible interpretation of a nonuniform measure in a
multiverse theory (insofar as one can ever be sensible about such
matters) is that it means that the worlds are duplicated, in proportion to
the deviation from uniformity. The true measure will be the natural,
uniform one, and the Born frequencies have to come about from the
duplication of worlds.


On Tue, Apr 1, 2014 at 9:43 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

 On 4/1/2014 2:25 PM, LizR wrote:

 I just read the definition of Gleason's theorem on Wikipedia and now my
 brain is full. A for-dummies version would be appreciated...


 I think what Gleason proved is that the only consistent probability
 measure on a Hilbert space is given by the normalized inner product.  But
 it's not clear that there is a probability measure on the MW.

 http://physics.stackexchange.com/questions/20802/why-is-
 gleasons-theorem-not-enough-to-obtain-born-rule-in-many-worlds-interpret

 Brent

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Re: Max and FPI

2014-04-01 Thread meekerdb


On 4/1/2014 7:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
BTW, are you OK in the math thread? Are you OK, like Liz apparently, that the Kripke 
frame (W,R) respects A - []A iff R is symmetrical?


Should I give the proof of the fact that the Kripke frame (W,R) respects []A - [][]A 
iff R is a transitive?


Bruno 


Here's the ones I've done so far.  One more to go.  Hold off on that proof (or put a 
warning in the subject line so I can avoid reading it).


Brent

 ***
 Show that

 (W, R) respects []A - A if and only if R is reflexive,

R is reflexive implies (alpha R alpha) for all alpha.  []A in alpha implies A is true in 
all beta where (alpha R beta), which includes the case beta=alpha. So R is reflexive 
implies (W,R) respects []A-A.


Assume R is not reflexive.  Then there exists at least one world beta such that (alpha R 
beta) and ~(beta R alpha).  Consider a valuation such that p=f in alpha and p=t in all 
beta.  Then []p is true in alpha but p is false so []A-A is false in alpha for some A.  R 
not reflexive implies []A-A is not respected for all alpha and all valuations.


 (W, R) respects []A - [][]A if and only R is transitive,

R is transitive means that for all beta such that (alpha R beta) and all gamma such that 
(beta R gamma), (alpha R gamma).  So every []A implies A=t in all beta and also A=t in all 
gamma.  But A=t in all gamma means []A is true in beta, which in turn means [][]A is true 
in alpha.  So R is transitive implies (W,R) respects []A-[][]A.


Suppose R is not transitive, so for all beta (alpha R beta) and there are some gamma such 
that [(beta R gamma) and ~(alpha R gamma)].  Let A=t in beta, A=f in gamma.  Then []A is 
true in alpha but []A isn't true in beta, so [][]A isn't true in alpha.  So (W, R) 
respects []A - [][]A implies R is transitive.



 (W, R) respects  A - []A if and only R is symmetrical,

R symmetrical means that if (alpha R beta) then (beta R alpha). Suppose A is true in 
alpha; then A is true in beta (by symmetry of R) and this holds for all alpha and beta 
so []A in alpha.


Suppose R is not symmetrical, so there is a pair of worlds (alpha R beta) and ~(beta R 
alpha).  So consider V such that A=t in alpha and A=f in all worlds gamma such that (beta 
R gamma) then ~A in beta.  So it would be false that []A in alpha.



 (W,R) respects []A - A if and only if R is ideal,

R is ideal, means that for every alpha there is a beta such that (alpha R beta).  Suppose 
[]A is true in alpha, then A must be true in every world beta (alpha R beta) and there is 
a least on such beta, so A is true in alpha.


Suppose R is not ideal, then there is a cul-de-sac alpha.  For alpha []A is vacously true 
for all A, but A is false so []A-A is false.




 (W, R) respects A - ~[]A if and only if R is realist.

R is realist means that for every world alpha there is a world beta such that (alpha R 
beta) and beta is cul-de-sac.  Suppose A is true in beta, then A is true in alpha but 
A=f in beta so []A cannot be true in alpha.  Hence A-~[]A in alpha where alpha is 
any non cul-de-sac world.  Then consider a cul-de-sac world like beta; A is always false 
in beta so A-X is true in beta for any X, including ~[]A.

***


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Re: Max and FPI



On 31 Mar 2014, at 07:41, LizR wrote:

I'm not sure collapse is an observed fact. Collapse is an assumption  
which explains how we come to measure discrete values.



On 31 March 2014 16:27, ghib...@gmail.com wrote:

On Tuesday, March 25, 2014 3:01:04 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 25 Mar 2014, at 05:48, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:



On Monday, March 24, 2014 4:48:13 AM UTC, chris peck wrote:
The only person in any doubt was you wasn't it Liz?

I found Tegmark's presentation very disappointing. He was  
alarmingly apologetic about MWI pleading that its flaws were  
mitigated by the fact other interpretations had similar flaws; as  
if the fact someone else is ill would make you less ill yourself. I  
think in the world of QM interpretations, with bugger all evidence  
to decide between them, the game is to even out the playing field  
in terms of flaws and then chase parsimony. Ofcourse, whether an  
infinite set of worlds is more or less parsimonious than just one  
+  a few hidden variables, or one + a spooky wave function  
collapse, depends very much on what definition of parsimonious you  
find most fitting.


MWI is refuted by the massive totally unexamined - some unrealized  
to this day - assumptions built in at the start.


?


MWI seems to me to be the literal understanding of QM (without  
collapse).
It is also a simple consequence of computationalism, except we get a  
multi-dreams and the question remains open if this defines a  
universe, a multiverse, or a multi-multiverses, etc. (results points  
toward a multiverse though).


How can 'without collapse' in any sense be literal? Collapse is an  
empirically observed fact.



That is what I thought. I thought for some time (many years ago) that  
computationalism was false, because it implies MW, in some testable  
way if we look below our substitution level, but when reading QM  
textbook, I was struck by the collapse, and I thought this was an  
empiric facts. But I didn't find serious paper showing this, and got  
the QM light when discovering Everett. From this I became rather  
persuaded that QM confirms the comp proliferation of realities, up to  
the existence of the arithmetical measure problem.
Some experience with partial superposition (sometimes called  
schroedinger kitten) have been proposed as evidence for a collapse,  
but they are as much evidence of the MWI. An *apparent* collapse, can  
be as well considered as an apparent universe differentiation.








OK...you see an elegant explanation sBould the empirically observed  
fact actually not be.


But would even that alone have been remotely near the ballpark of  
things taken seriously, had there not been extreme quantum  
strangeness  irreconcilable at that time, with the most core, most  
fundamental accomplishments of science to date?


MWI evacuates all weirdness from QM. It restores fully
- determinacy
- locality
- physical realism

The price is not that big, as nature is used to multiplied things,  
like the water molecules in the ocean, the stars in the sky, the  
galaxies, etc.
Each time, the humans are shocked by this, and Gordiano Bruno get  
burned for saying that stars are other suns, and that they might have  
planets, with other living being.
It is humbling, but not coneptually new, especially for a  
computationalist, which explains the MW from simple arithmetic, where  
you need only to believe in the consequence of addition and  
multiplication of integers.








MWI is an extreme explanation that makes the universe infinity more  
complex and undiscoverable than it was before.



On the contrary. The *whole universe* becomes conceptually much  
simpler. The mono-universe is more complex, as it needs the same  
explanation accompanied by a selection principle contradicting the  
simple laws.





An intolerably extreme theory unprecedented in all science, to be  
taken seriously, requires an even more intolerable crisis. And it  
just so happens at that very same point, such an extremity  
confronted science...quantum strangeness.


But hold on a mo...I said MWI blasted complexity to the infinite  
limit. But that isn't true is it? MWI is Occam consistent, so the  
complexity malarkey is refuted good and proper. I will gladly stand  
corrected on that then.


Ah! OK.




But you would agree, wouldn't you, that were it not for that Occam  
argument  MWI would be placed in an untenlaable position?



I am not sure. Not only there are no evidence for a collapse, but  
there is no clear definition of what it would be. The SWE is  
incompatible with the collapse. If the collapse is true, QM is false.  
That's why Bohr insists that QM is false for the macro-reality. But,  
since then, QM has been confirmed at all scales, and is used in the  
foundation of cosmology, etc.








Glad you can agree about that. You should all really be able to  
agree about the hard-linking of MWI and quantumht strangeness.  
There's no reason why believing MW should obscure

Re: Max and FPI


Ghibbsa,

I answered to this in my reply to Liz. Usually I try to avoid this,  
but I confused the post. Sorry to Liz too.


Best,

Bruno



On 31 Mar 2014, at 05:27, ghib...@gmail.com wrote:



On Tuesday, March 25, 2014 3:01:04 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 25 Mar 2014, at 05:48, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:



On Monday, March 24, 2014 4:48:13 AM UTC, chris peck wrote:
The only person in any doubt was you wasn't it Liz?

I found Tegmark's presentation very disappointing. He was  
alarmingly apologetic about MWI pleading that its flaws were  
mitigated by the fact other interpretations had similar flaws; as  
if the fact someone else is ill would make you less ill yourself. I  
think in the world of QM interpretations, with bugger all evidence  
to decide between them, the game is to even out the playing field  
in terms of flaws and then chase parsimony. Ofcourse, whether an  
infinite set of worlds is more or less parsimonious than just one  
+  a few hidden variables, or one + a spooky wave function  
collapse, depends very much on what definition of parsimonious you  
find most fitting.


MWI is refuted by the massive totally unexamined - some unrealized  
to this day - assumptions built in at the start.


?


MWI seems to me to be the literal understanding of QM (without  
collapse).
It is also a simple consequence of computationalism, except we get a  
multi-dreams and the question remains open if this defines a  
universe, a multiverse, or a multi-multiverses, etc. (results points  
toward a multiverse though).


How can 'without collapse' in any sense be literal? Collapse is an  
empirically observed fact. OK...you see an elegant explanation  
sBould the empirically observed fact actually not be.


But would even that alone have been remotely near the ballpark of  
things taken seriously, had there not been extreme quantum  
strangeness  irreconcilable at that time, with the most core, most  
fundamental accomplishments of science to date?


MWI is an extreme explanation that makes the universe infinity more  
complex and undiscoverable than it was before. An intolerably  
extreme theory unprecedented in all science, to be taken seriously,  
requires an even more intolerable crisis. And it just so happens at  
that very same point, such an extremity confronted science...quantum  
strangeness.


But hold on a mo...I said MWI blasted complexity to the infinite  
limit. But that isn't true is it? MWI is Occam consistent, so the  
complexity malarkey is refuted good and proper. I will gladly stand  
corrected on that then. But you would agree, wouldn't you, that were  
it not for that Occam argument  MWI would be placed in an  
untenlaable position?


Glad you can agree about that. You should all really be able to  
agree about the hard-linking of MWI and quantumht strangeness.  
There's no reason why believing MW should obscure this fact.


And.that Occam argument. What is that based on again,  without  
which it wouldn't be viable. Yes that's right, it's quantum  
strangeness. None of the other stuff factors in much at all.

-
Hundredspossibly uncountably so...of largely unrealized,  
unexamined, assumptions  are fundamental in MWI construction from Q


I have pointed this out in the past. People typically try to rebut  
this basically the same way you try here, involving denying MWI is  
intrinsically linked to quantum strangeness in multiple, massive  
ways. I've listed some above. Each one of the examples above,  
demonstrate a way MWI would never have happened, or would be  
rendered untenable, where it not for some defence founded  
exclusively on quantum strangeness.


At ther times I've shown how it is impossible to render MWI without  
implicitly making several assumptions about local realism, as to its  
objective truth AS WE PERCEIVE IT, it's priority in relation to  
other conceptions on scales of what is fundamental, and so on.


It's  just shocking -  it used to be disturbing also - how none of  
you are willing to acknowledge the defining linkage of MWI and  
quantum strangeness. Despite massive evidence through multi[le  
dimensions from me. Despite obviousness. Despite complete failure to  
date of any one of you to  refute any one of the of the hard  
linkages (I.e. MWI would not exist or would be thrown out without  
that link) that I've given.


Despite the fact nothing new is ever said...the  same arguments just  
get repeated. Despite all of them, I think, totally demolished and  
refuated by a quantum strangeness dependency.


Like Bruno's repeat below of this argument QM is a direct  
consequence of these things and nothing else.



Local realism is not part of QM assumption. It is a direct  
consequence of the linearity of the Schroedinger Equation, and the  
linearity of the tensor products.

h
Yeah? So you think that because some equations have a linearity  
character - which may be important, may be puzzling. But because of  
this, you say, thiis feature alone is

Re: Max and FPI

2014-03-31 Thread LizR

Probably my fault because I was in a hurry  didn't reply under what I was
answering, as I try to do normally.

On 31 March 2014 21:06, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

 Ghibbsa,

 I answered to this in my reply to Liz. Usually I try to avoid this, but I
 confused the post. Sorry to Liz too.

 Best,

 Bruno


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Re: Max and FPI

2014-03-31 Thread Richard Ruquist

Bruno, Is not collapse restored for controlled experiments which are all
first-person? I know of no 3p experiments.
Richard


On Mon, Mar 31, 2014 at 5:22 AM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:

 Probably my fault because I was in a hurry  didn't reply under what I was
 answering, as I try to do normally.

 On 31 March 2014 21:06, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

 Ghibbsa,

 I answered to this in my reply to Liz. Usually I try to avoid this, but I
 confused the post. Sorry to Liz too.

 Best,

 Bruno


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Re: Max and FPI

2014-03-31 Thread ghibbsa


On Monday, March 31, 2014 8:30:35 AM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 31 Mar 2014, at 07:41, LizR wrote:

 I'm not sure collapse is an observed fact. Collapse is an assumption which 
 explains how we come to measure discrete values.


 On 31 March 2014 16:27, ghi...@gmail.com javascript: wrote:


 On Tuesday, March 25, 2014 3:01:04 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 25 Mar 2014, at 05:48, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:


 On Monday, March 24, 2014 4:48:13 AM UTC, chris peck wrote:

 The only person in any doubt was you wasn't it Liz?

 I found Tegmark's presentation very disappointing. He was alarmingly 
 apologetic about MWI pleading that its flaws were mitigated by the fact 
 other interpretations had similar flaws; as if the fact someone else is 
 ill 
 would make you less ill yourself. I think in the world of QM 
 interpretations, with bugger all evidence to decide between them, the game 
 is to even out the playing field in terms of flaws and then chase 
 parsimony. Ofcourse, whether an infinite set of worlds is more or less 
 parsimonious than just one +  a few hidden variables, or one + a spooky 
 wave function collapse, depends very much on what definition of 
 parsimonious you find most fitting.

  
 MWI is refuted by the massive totally unexamined - some unrealized to 
 this day - assumptions built in at the start. 


 ?

  
 MWI seems to me to be the literal understanding of QM (without collapse).
 It is also a simple consequence of computationalism, except we get a 
 multi-dreams and the question remains open if this defines a universe, a 
 multiverse, or a multi-multiverses, etc. (results points toward a 
 multiverse though).

  
 How can 'without collapse' in any sense be literal? Collapse is 
 an empirically observed fact. 



 That is what I thought. I thought for some time (many years ago) that 
 computationalism was false, because i implies MW, in some testable way if 
 we look below our substitution level, but when reading QM textbook, I was 
 struck by the collapse, and I thought this was an empiric facts. But I 
 didn't find serious paper showing this, and got the QM light when 
 discovering Everett. From this I became rather persuaded that QM confirms 
 the comp proliferation of realities, up to the existence of the 
 arithmetical measure problem.
 Some experience with partial superposition (sometimes called schroedinger 
 kitten) have been proposed a. s evidence for a collapse, but they are as 
 much evidence of the MWI. An *apparent* collapse, can be as well considered 
 as an apparent universe differentiation

 
This isn't like the structure of my thought on the matter.  Intense 
immersion is thfeature of yours, in what all appear to be your hallmark box 
of horrors :o) Yet the position of many years ago you relate, appears 
nearer full inversion of what you believe now than back. And that's a 
little bit fascinating because there may be a suggestion what you actually 
believe and what you corresponding immerse yourself in, and at what 
intensity, is decoupled, as least currently anyway. 
 
Or you kind of just made some of that up, which if so, might serve the 
purpose in your eyes of helping me to discover myself - the things you 
suspect I am tacitly assuming but don't know thato I am,  
 
Well there's a thought. And with allowances  duly made for that, another 
explanation would be along the lines of...
 
it  really doesn't take a dogmatic  empiricism for an overwhelming 
operational bias favouring what we observe as what happens over what we 
observe I as what does not happen. 
 
Try reeling everything back to the first days of QM, and adjust the picture 
a little so as to remove the element of quantum strangeness from the 
historical record completely. It never happened there was quantum 
strangeness. 
 
You obviously need to cook the books a little so that everything is just 
the same, as if quantum strangeness was real. Except in this world it's 
not. Real.
 
OK, so in that imaginery world, run me by our impressions the first time we 
observe wave function collapse.. (ilremember, it only exists in this world, 
when it suits us so we can look at the ways MWI could still come about 
without strangeness
 
. 
 
 
 








 OK...you see an elegant explanation sBould the empirically observed 
 fact actually not be.
  
 But would even that alone have been remotely near the ballpark of things 
 taken seriously, had there not been extreme quantum strangeness  
 irreconcilable at that time, with the most core, most 
 fundamental accomplishments of science to date? 


 MWI evacuates all weirdness from QM. It restores fully 
 - determinacy
 - locality
 - physical realism

 
That's the claim. But you don't seem to regard this as an important 
characteristic of MWI. 
 
I can what you mean Bruno. You are in a context of the minimum postulates, 
and then consequences, to derive a theory. Like MWI. 
 
That's fair enough. But that's a level of definition - an important one. 
That may

Re: Max and FPI



On 31 Mar 2014, at 12:44, ghib...@gmail.com wrote:



On Monday, March 31, 2014 8:30:35 AM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 31 Mar 2014, at 07:41, LizR wrote:

I'm not sure collapse is an observed fact. Collapse is an  
assumption which explains how we come to measure discrete values.



On 31 March 2014 16:27, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:

On Tuesday, March 25, 2014 3:01:04 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 25 Mar 2014, at 05:48, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:



On Monday, March 24, 2014 4:48:13 AM UTC, chris peck wrote:
The only person in any doubt was you wasn't it Liz?

I found Tegmark's presentation very disappointing. He was  
alarmingly apologetic about MWI pleading that its flaws were  
mitigated by the fact other interpretations had similar flaws; as  
if the fact someone else is ill would make you less ill yourself.  
I think in the world of QM interpretations, with bugger all  
evidence to decide between them, the game is to even out the  
playing field in terms of flaws and then chase parsimony.  
Ofcourse, whether an infinite set of worlds is more or less  
parsimonious than just one +  a few hidden variables, or one + a  
spooky wave function collapse, depends very much on what  
definition of parsimonious you find most fitting.


MWI is refuted by the massive totally unexamined - some unrealized  
to this day - assumptions built in at the start.


?


MWI seems to me to be the literal understanding of QM (without  
collapse).
It is also a simple consequence of computationalism, except we get  
a multi-dreams and the question remains open if this defines a  
universe, a multiverse, or a multi-multiverses, etc. (results  
points toward a multiverse though).


How can 'without collapse' in any sense be literal? Collapse is an  
empirically observed fact.



That is what I thought. I thought for some time (many years ago)  
that computationalism was false, because i implies MW, in some  
testable way if we look below our substitution level, but when  
reading QM textbook, I was struck by the collapse, and I thought  
this was an empiric facts. But I didn't find serious paper showing  
this, and got the QM light when discovering Everett. From this I  
became rather persuaded that QM confirms the comp proliferation of  
realities, up to the existence of the arithmetical measure problem.
Some experience with partial superposition (sometimes called  
schroedinger kitten) have been proposed a. s evidence for a  
collapse, but they are as much evidence of the MWI. An *apparent*  
collapse, can be as well considered as an apparent universe  
differentiation


This isn't like the structure of my thought on the matter.  Intense  
immersion is thfeature of yours, in what all appear to be your  
hallmark box of horrors :o)



That looks funny, but might also interesting to elaborate. As a  
scientist, I completely separate *a priori* the search of truth and  
the search of pleasantness. In the case of computationalism I am  
agnostic on both level, and somehow my mind oscillates. I don't think  
we have really choice in the matter.





Yet the position of many years ago you relate, appears nearer full  
inversion of what you believe now than back.


What do you want? My parents were Aristotelians, like everybody, also  
atheists at that time. Animals are naturally Aristotelians. We learn  
quickly the distinction between dream and reality, and we reify  
instinctively and by default the material reality. The reversion  
in the human history has been a flash, repeated recurrently in the  
east and in the west, then partially rationalized by the greeks, but  
still abandoned by the rationalists. In my case, the reversion was a  
slow process, but the quest started early. Fear of death leading to a  
fascination for the amoebas and protozoans, which seems immortal.







And that's a little bit fascinating because there may be a  
suggestion what you actually believe and what you corresponding  
immerse yourself in, and at what intensity, is decoupled, as least  
currently anyway.


In the meantime I understood that in science we always doubt, and so  
we don't have beliefs (in the mundane sense), but only assumption or  
theories.
Now, on some points, we might have very few doubts, like in elementary  
arithmetic, like x + 0 = x, but even there, an infinitesimal doubt  
remains and appears when you mix addition and multiplication (and bet  
on comp).









Or you kind of just made some of that up,


I would not do that, but I might try to explain myself to myself. I  
did got the many dreams in arithmetic before reading Everett. My  
interest in mechanism did grow from the reading of books in molecular  
biology, and I did study QM very superficially, and at that time. It  
was just an accompaniment for the needed biochemistry.
To illustrate mechanism, it was important that the molecules were well  
defined entities, and not mysterious uncertainty clouds. So, like  
most, I will not doubt one instant about the

Re: Max and FPI


Richard,

On 31 Mar 2014, at 11:33, Richard Ruquist wrote:

Bruno, Is not collapse restored for controlled experiments which are  
all first-person?


Yes, collapse is restored in the minds of each observer, but it is, as  
you say, a first person perspective, sharable as duplication is  
contagious, distributive, at the linear level, so to speak.







I know of no 3p experiments.


Me neither. That's a good reason to prefer to consider it as a first  
person perspective effect, which in this case, is predicted by the  
wave equation. Like comp predicts that the guy in W and in M feels to  
be in just one city. We don't feel the split.


But there is a measure problem to solve, and its solution should be  
equivalent with the core physical laws. Well, that's what I am arguing  
for.


Bruno






Richard


On Mon, Mar 31, 2014 at 5:22 AM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:
Probably my fault because I was in a hurry  didn't reply under what  
I was answering, as I try to do normally.


On 31 March 2014 21:06, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Ghibbsa,

I answered to this in my reply to Liz. Usually I try to avoid this,  
but I confused the post. Sorry to Liz too.


Best,

Bruno


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Re: Max and FPI


On 3/31/2014 12:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:



OK...you see an elegant explanation sBould the empirically observed fact 
actually
not be.
But would even that alone have been remotely near the ballpark of things 
taken
seriously, had there not been extreme quantum strangeness  irreconcilable at
that time, with the most core, most fundamental accomplishments of science 
to date?



MWI evacuates all weirdness from QM. It restores fully
- determinacy
- locality
- physical realism

The price is not that big, as nature is used to multiplied things, like the water 
molecules in the ocean, the stars in the sky, the galaxies, etc.
Each time, the humans are shocked by this, and Gordiano Bruno get burned for saying that 
stars are other suns, and that they might have planets, with other living being.
It is humbling, but not coneptually new, especially for a computationalist, which 
explains the MW from simple arithmetic, where you need only to believe in the 
consequence of addition and multiplication of integers.





The price is not having a unified 'self' - which many people would consider a big price 
since all observation and record keeping which is used to empirically test theories 
assumes this unity.  If you observe X and you want to use that as empircal test of a 
theory it isn't helpful if your theory of the instruments says they also recorded not-X.


Brent

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Re: Max and FPI



On 31 Mar 2014, at 19:04, meekerdb wrote:


On 3/31/2014 12:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


OK...you see an elegant explanation sBould the empirically  
observed fact actually not be.


But would even that alone have been remotely near the ballpark of  
things taken seriously, had there not been extreme quantum  
strangeness  irreconcilable at that time, with the most core, most  
fundamental accomplishments of science to date?


MWI evacuates all weirdness from QM. It restores fully
- determinacy
- locality
- physical realism

The price is not that big, as nature is used to multiplied things,  
like the water molecules in the ocean, the stars in the sky, the  
galaxies, etc.
Each time, the humans are shocked by this, and Gordiano Bruno get  
burned for saying that stars are other suns, and that they might  
have planets, with other living being.
It is humbling, but not coneptually new, especially for a  
computationalist, which explains the MW from simple arithmetic,  
where you need only to believe in the consequence of addition and  
multiplication of integers.





The price is not having a unified 'self' - which many people would  
consider a big price since all observation and record keeping which  
is used to empirically test theories assumes this unity.


Really?





If you observe X and you want to use that as empircal test of a  
theory it isn't helpful if your theory of the instruments says they  
also recorded not-X.


It is helpful when it is part of the only theories which are working,  
like QM, or arithmetic.


We need only the unity of the first person self, from the first person  
self point of view, and that is guarantied by the comp hypothesis.


Ah! Brent, this list is called everything because it is open to the  
idea that everything, or nothing,  is simpler than any mono-thing.


I can understand that it is counter-intuitive, but the brain has not  
been programmed for the big picture, so we can expect the possible  
truth to be shocking, it seems to me.


And then comp, even QM, can be wrong, also.

Bruno







Brent

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Re: Max and FPI


On 3/31/2014 10:41 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 31 Mar 2014, at 19:04, meekerdb wrote:


On 3/31/2014 12:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:



OK...you see an elegant explanation sBould the empirically observed fact 
actually
not be.
But would even that alone have been remotely near the ballpark of things 
taken
seriously, had there not been extreme quantum strangeness irreconcilable at
that time, with the most core, most fundamental accomplishments of science 
to date?



MWI evacuates all weirdness from QM. It restores fully
- determinacy
- locality
- physical realism

The price is not that big, as nature is used to multiplied things, like the water 
molecules in the ocean, the stars in the sky, the galaxies, etc.
Each time, the humans are shocked by this, and Gordiano Bruno get burned for saying 
that stars are other suns, and that they might have planets, with other living being.
It is humbling, but not coneptually new, especially for a computationalist, which 
explains the MW from simple arithmetic, where you need only to believe in the 
consequence of addition and multiplication of integers.





The price is not having a unified 'self' - which many people would consider a big price 
since all observation and record keeping which is used to empirically test theories 
assumes this unity.


Really?





If you observe X and you want to use that as empircal test of a theory it isn't helpful 
if your theory of the instruments says they also recorded not-X.


It is helpful when it is part of the only theories which are working, like QM, or 
arithmetic.


No it's not.  It's reason the Born rule is needed and the source of the difficulty of 
interpreting probability in MWI and the 'white rabbit problem' in comp.




We need only the unity of the first person self, from the first person self point of 
view, and that is guarantied by the comp hypothesis.


Guarantee by definition doesn't mean much.



Ah! Brent, this list is called everything because it is open to the idea that 
everything, or nothing,  is simpler than any mono-thing.


I know why it's called that, but I assumed that I didn't have to be true believer to 
participate.




I can understand that it is counter-intuitive, but the brain has not been programmed for 
the big picture, so we can expect the possible truth to be shocking, it seems to me.


Alas, there is a temptation regard how shocking a theory is as evidence for it.

Brent

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Re: Max and FPI

2014-03-31 Thread LizR

So for meaningful dsicussion it looks like we need either a good
explanation of the Born rule within the MWI (which I imagined had been
provided by decoherence, but apparently this ain't necessarily so?) or a
disproof of the MWI.

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Re: Max and FPI


On 3/31/2014 5:53 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:




On 1 April 2014 04:04, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net 
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

On 3/31/2014 12:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:



OK...you see an elegant explanation sBould the empirically observed
fact actually not be.
But would even that alone have been remotely near the ballpark of 
things taken
seriously, had there not been extreme quantum strangeness  
irreconcilable at
that time, with the most core, most fundamental accomplishments of 
science to
date?



MWI evacuates all weirdness from QM. It restores fully
- determinacy
- locality
- physical realism

The price is not that big, as nature is used to multiplied things, like the 
water
molecules in the ocean, the stars in the sky, the galaxies, etc.
Each time, the humans are shocked by this, and Gordiano Bruno get burned 
for saying
that stars are other suns, and that they might have planets, with other 
living being.
It is humbling, but not coneptually new, especially for a computationalist, 
which
explains the MW from simple arithmetic, where you need only to believe in 
the
consequence of addition and multiplication of integers.




The price is not having a unified 'self' - which many people would consider 
a big
price since all observation and record keeping which is used to empirically 
test
theories assumes this unity.  If you observe X and you want to use that as 
empircal
test of a theory it isn't helpful if your theory of the instruments says 
they also
recorded not-X.


Are you saying that the fact that we don't see many worlds is evidence against 
many worlds?


No, the fact that whatever our instrument reads our *theory* says there are infinitely 
many other readings.


Brent




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Re: Max and FPI


On 3/31/2014 6:00 PM, LizR wrote:

On 1 April 2014 06:04, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net 
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

The price is not having a unified 'self' - which many people would consider 
a big
price since all observation and record keeping which is used to empirically 
test
theories assumes this unity.  If you observe X and you want to use that as 
empircal
test of a theory it isn't helpful if your theory of the instruments says 
they also
recorded not-X.


(I suspect some people would consider it a big price not to have a unified self for 
other reasons, too!)


I can't see how it's worse for your theory to say that your instruments will record X 
and not X as opposed to saying they will record X or not X, but we don't know which.


That's before the fact.  I didn't write will.   MWI is a theory that says when you read 
your instrument and it says X, it's only one of an infinite set some of which say X and 
some say not-X.


The former explanation says there will be apparent but explicable randomness, the latter 
says there will be intrinsic and inexplicable randomness.


But is it explicable.  Bruno is careful to refer to uncertainty or indeterminancy.  
Those are not necessarily probabilities unless they can be quantified to satisfy 
Kolomogorov's axioms - and it's not clear to me that they can.  The axioms require that 
the set of everything have measure 1.  But in this case everything is ill defined and 
uncountably infinite.  In common applications of QM one assumes isolation and considers 
only a small (at least finite) set of possible results - which works FAPP.


Brent

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Re: Max and FPI

2014-03-31 Thread Stathis Papaioannou

On 1 April 2014 12:24, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 3/31/2014 5:53 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:




 On 1 April 2014 04:04, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 3/31/2014 12:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


OK...you see an elegant explanation sBould the empirically observed
 fact actually not be.

 But would even that alone have been remotely near the ballpark of things
 taken seriously, had there not been extreme quantum strangeness
 irreconcilable at that time, with the most core, most
 fundamental accomplishments of science to date?


  MWI evacuates all weirdness from QM. It restores fully
 - determinacy
 - locality
 - physical realism

  The price is not that big, as nature is used to multiplied things, like
 the water molecules in the ocean, the stars in the sky, the galaxies, etc.
 Each time, the humans are shocked by this, and Gordiano Bruno get burned
 for saying that stars are other suns, and that they might have planets,
 with other living being.
 It is humbling, but not coneptually new, especially for a
 computationalist, which explains the MW from simple arithmetic, where you
 need only to believe in the consequence of addition and multiplication of
 integers.



  The price is not having a unified 'self' - which many people would
 consider a big price since all observation and record keeping which is used
 to empirically test theories assumes this unity.  If you observe X and you
 want to use that as empircal test of a theory it isn't helpful if your
 theory of the instruments says they also recorded not-X.


  Are you saying that the fact that we don't see many worlds is evidence
 against many worlds?


 No, the fact that whatever our instrument reads our *theory* says there
 are infinitely many other readings.


Is that just a psychological problem or do you think it implies the theory
is wrong? If the theory were right, what should we expect to see?


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Max and FPI