Re: measure problem
On 04 Mar 2013, at 03:19, Stephen P. King wrote: On 3/3/2013 8:17 PM, Richard Ruquist wrote: Well if what emerges from comp is not physics, then physics refutes comp. So that means that you can use physics to say what comp must emerge. what is proposed is that both comp and physics are co-emergent and co-defining. Neither is ontologically primitive. Then UDA is flawed. Where? Bruno On Sun, Mar 3, 2013 at 3:43 PM, Terren Suydam terren.suy...@gmail.com wrote: Ok, maybe I'm missing something but I'm not sure how a paper that assumes physics can say anything about how physics might emerge from arithmetic. On Mar 3, 2013 2:49 PM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net wrote: On 3/3/2013 10:11 AM, Terren Suydam wrote: Hi Stephen, That's a nice read but written under the materialist assumption so doesn't really apply to my question. Terren Hi Terren, Hummm, I can translate it in my mind over to the dual... On Sun, Mar 3, 2013 at 7:15 AM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net wrote: On 3/3/2013 12:37 AM, Terren Suydam wrote: Hi, When Bruno claims that physics can be derived from the UD, would a proof of that represent, on some level, a (partial) solution to the measure problem? Terren -- Hi Terren, It would seem so, or more accurately the other-way around. I just found this paper which has as an abstract: I review how discrete structures, embodied in the integers, appear in the laws of physics, from quantum mechanics to statistical mechanics to the Standard Model. I argue that the integers are emergent. If we are looking to build the future laws of physics, discrete mathematics is no better a starting point than the rules of scrabble. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: measure problem
On 3/3/2013 12:37 AM, Terren Suydam wrote: Hi, When Bruno claims that physics can be derived from the UD, would a proof of that represent, on some level, a (partial) solution to the measure problem? Terren -- Hi Terren, It would seem so, or more accurately the other-way around. I just found this paper http://fqxi.org/data/essay-contest-files/Tong_integers.pdf which has as an abstract: I review how discrete structures, embodied in the integers, appear in the laws of physics, from quantum mechanics to statistical mechanics to the Standard Model. I argue that the integers are emergent. If we are looking to build the future laws of physics, discrete mathematics is no better a starting point than the rules of scrabble. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: measure problem
Hi Stephen, That's a nice read but written under the materialist assumption so doesn't really apply to my question. Terren On Sun, Mar 3, 2013 at 7:15 AM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.netwrote: On 3/3/2013 12:37 AM, Terren Suydam wrote: Hi, When Bruno claims that physics can be derived from the UD, would a proof of that represent, on some level, a (partial) solution to the measure problem? Terren -- Hi Terren, It would seem so, or more accurately the other-way around. I just found this paperhttp://fqxi.org/data/essay-contest-files/Tong_integers.pdfwhich has as an abstract: I review how discrete structures, embodied in the integers, appear in the laws of physics, from quantum mechanics to statistical mechanics to the Standard Model. I argue that the integers are emergent. If we are looking to build the future laws of physics, discrete mathematics is no better a starting point than the rules of scrabble. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: measure problem
On 03 Mar 2013, at 06:37, Terren Suydam wrote: Hi, When Bruno claims that physics can be derived from the UD, would a proof of that represent, on some level, a (partial) solution to the measure problem? Yes. UDA gives the large shape (cf Plato versus Aristotle), and the translation in arithmetic gives already a quantum logic, and the open problems we need to solve and to progress. It would astonishing that the Theaetetus gives directly physics, without change in the theory of knowledge, but up to now, the TOY theory works, thanks to QM. But the task is big and we are at the beginning, and that why I present this often as a translation of the mind body problem into arithmetic/computer science. Bruno Terren -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: measure problem
On 3/3/2013 10:11 AM, Terren Suydam wrote: Hi Stephen, That's a nice read but written under the materialist assumption so doesn't really apply to my question. Terren Hi Terren, Hummm, I can translate it in my mind over to the dual... On Sun, Mar 3, 2013 at 7:15 AM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net mailto:stephe...@charter.net wrote: On 3/3/2013 12:37 AM, Terren Suydam wrote: Hi, When Bruno claims that physics can be derived from the UD, would a proof of that represent, on some level, a (partial) solution to the measure problem? Terren -- Hi Terren, It would seem so, or more accurately the other-way around. I just found this paper http://fqxi.org/data/essay-contest-files/Tong_integers.pdf which has as an abstract: I review how discrete structures, embodied in the integers, appear in the laws of physics, from quantum mechanics to statistical mechanics to the Standard Model. I argue that the integers are emergent. If we are looking to build the future laws of physics, discrete mathematics is no better a starting point than the rules of scrabble. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: measure problem
Ok, maybe I'm missing something but I'm not sure how a paper that assumes physics can say anything about how physics might emerge from arithmetic. On Mar 3, 2013 2:49 PM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net wrote: On 3/3/2013 10:11 AM, Terren Suydam wrote: Hi Stephen, That's a nice read but written under the materialist assumption so doesn't really apply to my question. Terren Hi Terren, Hummm, I can translate it in my mind over to the dual... On Sun, Mar 3, 2013 at 7:15 AM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.netwrote: On 3/3/2013 12:37 AM, Terren Suydam wrote: Hi, When Bruno claims that physics can be derived from the UD, would a proof of that represent, on some level, a (partial) solution to the measure problem? Terren -- Hi Terren, It would seem so, or more accurately the other-way around. I just found this paperhttp://fqxi.org/data/essay-contest-files/Tong_integers.pdfwhich has as an abstract: I review how discrete structures, embodied in the integers, appear in the laws of physics, from quantum mechanics to statistical mechanics to the Standard Model. I argue that the integers are emergent. If we are looking to build the future laws of physics, discrete mathematics is no better a starting point than the rules of scrabble. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: measure problem
On 3/3/2013 3:43 PM, Terren Suydam wrote: Ok, maybe I'm missing something but I'm not sure how a paper that assumes physics can say anything about how physics might emerge from arithmetic. Check out this paper: http://boole.stanford.edu/pub/ratmech.pdf On Mar 3, 2013 2:49 PM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net mailto:stephe...@charter.net wrote: On 3/3/2013 10:11 AM, Terren Suydam wrote: Hi Stephen, That's a nice read but written under the materialist assumption so doesn't really apply to my question. Terren Hi Terren, Hummm, I can translate it in my mind over to the dual... On Sun, Mar 3, 2013 at 7:15 AM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net mailto:stephe...@charter.net wrote: On 3/3/2013 12:37 AM, Terren Suydam wrote: Hi, When Bruno claims that physics can be derived from the UD, would a proof of that represent, on some level, a (partial) solution to the measure problem? Terren -- Hi Terren, It would seem so, or more accurately the other-way around. I just found this paper http://fqxi.org/data/essay-contest-files/Tong_integers.pdf which has as an abstract: I review how discrete structures, embodied in the integers, appear in the laws of physics, from quantum mechanics to statistical mechanics to the Standard Model. I argue that the integers are emergent. If we are looking to build the future laws of physics, discrete mathematics is no better a starting point than the rules of scrabble. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: measure problem
Well if what emerges from comp is not physics, then physics refutes comp. So that means that you can use physics to say what comp must emerge. On Sun, Mar 3, 2013 at 3:43 PM, Terren Suydam terren.suy...@gmail.com wrote: Ok, maybe I'm missing something but I'm not sure how a paper that assumes physics can say anything about how physics might emerge from arithmetic. On Mar 3, 2013 2:49 PM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net wrote: On 3/3/2013 10:11 AM, Terren Suydam wrote: Hi Stephen, That's a nice read but written under the materialist assumption so doesn't really apply to my question. Terren Hi Terren, Hummm, I can translate it in my mind over to the dual... On Sun, Mar 3, 2013 at 7:15 AM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net wrote: On 3/3/2013 12:37 AM, Terren Suydam wrote: Hi, When Bruno claims that physics can be derived from the UD, would a proof of that represent, on some level, a (partial) solution to the measure problem? Terren -- Hi Terren, It would seem so, or more accurately the other-way around. I just found this paper which has as an abstract: I review how discrete structures, embodied in the integers, appear in the laws of physics, from quantum mechanics to statistical mechanics to the Standard Model. I argue that the integers are emergent. If we are looking to build the future laws of physics, discrete mathematics is no better a starting point than the rules of scrabble. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: measure problem
On 3/3/2013 8:17 PM, Richard Ruquist wrote: Well if what emerges from comp is not physics, then physics refutes comp. So that means that you can use physics to say what comp must emerge. what is proposed is that both comp and physics are co-emergent and co-defining. Neither is ontologically primitive. On Sun, Mar 3, 2013 at 3:43 PM, Terren Suydam terren.suy...@gmail.com wrote: Ok, maybe I'm missing something but I'm not sure how a paper that assumes physics can say anything about how physics might emerge from arithmetic. On Mar 3, 2013 2:49 PM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net wrote: On 3/3/2013 10:11 AM, Terren Suydam wrote: Hi Stephen, That's a nice read but written under the materialist assumption so doesn't really apply to my question. Terren Hi Terren, Hummm, I can translate it in my mind over to the dual... On Sun, Mar 3, 2013 at 7:15 AM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net wrote: On 3/3/2013 12:37 AM, Terren Suydam wrote: Hi, When Bruno claims that physics can be derived from the UD, would a proof of that represent, on some level, a (partial) solution to the measure problem? Terren -- Hi Terren, It would seem so, or more accurately the other-way around. I just found this paper which has as an abstract: I review how discrete structures, embodied in the integers, appear in the laws of physics, from quantum mechanics to statistical mechanics to the Standard Model. I argue that the integers are emergent. If we are looking to build the future laws of physics, discrete mathematics is no better a starting point than the rules of scrabble. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
measure problem
Hi, When Bruno claims that physics can be derived from the UD, would a proof of that represent, on some level, a (partial) solution to the measure problem? Terren -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: One solution to the Measure Problem: UTM outputs a qualia, not a universe
On 20/09/2007, Hal Finney [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: The lifetime formulation also captures the intuition many people have that consciousness should not jump around as observer moments are created in the various simulations and scenarios we imagine in our thought experiments. That was the conclusion I reached in the posting referenced above, that teleportation might in some sense not work even though someone walks out of the machine thousands of miles away who remembers walking into it. The measure of such a lifetime would be substantially less than that of a similar person who never teleports. I have great conceptual difficulty with this idea. It seems to allow that I could have died five minutes ago even though I still feel that I am alive now. (This is OK with me because I think the best way to look at ordinary life is as a series of transiently existing OM's which create an illusion of a self persisting through time, but I don't think this is what you were referring to.) -- Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: One solution to the Measure Problem: UTM outputs a qualia, not a universe
[By the way, I notice that I do not receive my own postings back in email, which makes my archive incomplete. Does anyone know if there is a way to configure the mailing list reflector to give me back my own messages?] Russell Standish wrote: On Wed, Sep 19, 2007 at 12:10:33PM -0700, Hal Finney wrote: The lifetime formulation also captures the intuition many people have that consciousness should not jump around as observer moments are created in the various simulations and scenarios we imagine in our thought experiments. That was the conclusion I reached in the posting referenced above, that teleportation might in some sense not work even though someone walks out of the machine thousands of miles away who remembers walking into it. The measure of such a lifetime would be substantially less than that of a similar person who never teleports. Hal Finney I note that you have identified yourself with the the ASSA camp in the past (at least I say so in my book, so it must be true, right! :). What you are proposing above is an anti-functionalist position. The question is does functionalism necessarily imply RSSA, and antifunctionalism imply the ASSA? ie, does this whole RSSA/ASSA debate turn on the question of functionalism? The distinction I am drawing seems somewhat orthogonal to the RSSA/ASSA debate. Suppose someone is about to die in a terrible accident. From the 1st person perspective, RSSA would say that he expects to survive through miraculous good luck. ASSA would say that he expects to die and never experience anything again. Now suppose that in most universes an advanced, benevolent human/AI civilization later recreates his mental state and in effect resurrects him in a sort of heaven. Both ASSA and RSSA might now say that his expectation prior to the accident should be to wake up in this heaven, that that is his most likely next experience. My argument suggests otherwise, that the chance of this being his next experience would be rather low. However it basically leaves the RSSA/ASSA distinction intact. We would go back to the situation where RSSA predicts a miraculously lucky survival of the accident while ASSA predicts death. But actually my analysis is supportive of the ASSA in this form, in that the measure of a lifetime which ends in the accident is much higher than the measure of one which survives. As far as functionalism, I agree that this kind of analysis argues against it. Indeed the post from Wei Dai which introduced this concept, which I quote here, http://www.udassa.com/origins.html (apologies for the incompleteness of this web site), suggests that the size of a computer would affect measure, contradicting functionalism. Frankly I suspect that Bruno's analysis would or should lead to the same kind of conclusion. I wonder if he supports strict functionalism? Would he say yes doctor to any and all functional brain replacements? Or would some additional investigation be appropriate? I wonder where this leaves Mallah, who admits to computationalism, yet is died-in-the-wool ASSA? Indeed I have often wondered where in the world is Jacques Mallah, who was so influential on this list in the past but who seems to have vanished utterly from the net. Actually, I wrote that sentence based on previous Google searches, but just now I discovered that as of two weeks ago he has published his first communication in many years: http://arxiv.org/abs/0709.0544 . Here is his abstract, which seems similar in its goals to your own work: : The Many Computations Interpretation (MCI) of Quantum Mechanics : Authors: Jacques Mallah : (Submitted on 4 Sep 2007) : : Abstract: Computationalism provides a framework for understanding : how a mathematically describable physical world could give rise to : conscious observations without the need for dualism. A criterion : is proposed for the implementation of computations by physical : systems, which has been a problem for computationalism. Together : with an independence criterion for implementations this would allow, : in principle, prediction of probabilities for various observations : based on counting implementations. Applied to quantum mechanics, : this results in a Many Computations Interpretation (MCI), which is : an explicit form of the Everett style Many Worlds Interpretation : (MWI). Derivation of the Born Rule emerges as the central problem for : most realist interpretations of quantum mechanics. If the Born Rule : is derived based on computationalism and the wavefunction it would : provide strong support for the MWI; but if the Born Rule is shown not : to follow from these to an experimentally falsified extent, it would : indicate the necessity for either new physics or (more radically) : new philosophy of mind. I am looking forward to reading this! Hal --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are
Re: One solution to the Measure Problem: UTM outputs a qualia, not a universe
Stathis Papaioannou writes: On 20/09/2007, Hal Finney [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: The lifetime formulation also captures the intuition many people have that consciousness should not jump around as observer moments are created in the various simulations and scenarios we imagine in our thought experiments. That was the conclusion I reached in the posting referenced above, that teleportation might in some sense not work even though someone walks out of the machine thousands of miles away who remembers walking into it. The measure of such a lifetime would be substantially less than that of a similar person who never teleports. I have great conceptual difficulty with this idea. It seems to allow that I could have died five minutes ago even though I still feel that I am alive now. (This is OK with me because I think the best way to look at ordinary life is as a series of transiently existing OM's which create an illusion of a self persisting through time, but I don't think this is what you were referring to.) You will probably agree that there are some branches of the multiverse where you did indeed die five minutes ago, and perhaps people are standing around staring in shock at your dead body. And supposing that you had just had a narrow escape from a perilous situation, you might even consider that those branches where you died are of greater measure than those where you survived. That's basically all my analysis says, as far as normal life. The main novelty is what it has to say about exotic thought experiments like teleportation and resurrection. Hal Finney --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: One solution to the Measure Problem: UTM outputs a qualia, not a universe
On 21/09/2007, Hal Finney [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: As far as functionalism, I agree that this kind of analysis argues against it. Indeed the post from Wei Dai which introduced this concept, which I quote here, http://www.udassa.com/origins.html (apologies for the incompleteness of this web site), suggests that the size of a computer would affect measure, contradicting functionalism. How does this contradict functionalism? Functionalism needs to be true in order for the computer program to be conscious in the first place. -- Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: One solution to the Measure Problem: UTM outputs a qualia, not a universe
On 21/09/2007, Hal Finney [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: You will probably agree that there are some branches of the multiverse where you did indeed die five minutes ago, and perhaps people are standing around staring in shock at your dead body. And supposing that you had just had a narrow escape from a perilous situation, you might even consider that those branches where you died are of greater measure than those where you survived. That's basically all my analysis says, as far as normal life. The main novelty is what it has to say about exotic thought experiments like teleportation and resurrection. Those branches where I have died (as opposed to those where I am about to die) are of zero measure, while those where I have survived are of non-zero measure. If you give the branches where I have died a vote when calculating my measure, then why not give the branches where I never existed a vote as well? I am dead almost everywhere in the multiverse. -- Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: One solution to the Measure Problem: UTM outputs a qualia, not a universe
[I want to first note for the benefit of readers that I am Hal Finney and no relation to Hal Ruhl - it can be confusing having two Hal's on the list!] Rolf Nelson writes: UDASSA (if I'm interpreting it right, Hal?) says: 1. The measure of programs that produce OM (I am experiencing A, and I remember my previous experience as B) as its single output, compared to the measure of programs that produce OM (I am not experiencing A, and I remember my previous experience as B) as its single output, is what we perceive as the likelihood of A following B, rather than A not following B. I think you mean, the likelihood of A following B rather than not-A following B. That's probably reasonable, although I suggested a somewhat different approach in this (as usual) somewhat overly long posting: http://www.nabble.com/Teleportation-thought-experiment-and-UD%2BASSA-tf3057020.html#a8498222 Imagine that we could write down a description of a person's mental states for his whole lifetime, from birth to death. Every possible such sequence would be a possible lifetime and would exist in the universe of all information patterns. Some would have higher measure than others. As usual, it is plausible that the highest-measure such lifetimes would be those which exist as parts of universes that have reasonably simple descriptions. Then we can get at your question of what is the likelihood of A following B by asking, what is the measure of all lifetimes which experience event B followed by event A, compared to the measure of all lifetimes which experience event B not followed by event A. The difference from what you expressed would be, for example, if some future civilization creates simulated OMs which remember B followed by A, while in the real world B did not get followed by A. Your OM based formulation might have those future OMs add quite a bit of measure to B-then-A, while the lifetime based formulation would consider those as less important, because of the discontinuity between the original lifetime and the future simulation of B-then-A. The lifetime formulation also captures the intuition many people have that consciousness should not jump around as observer moments are created in the various simulations and scenarios we imagine in our thought experiments. That was the conclusion I reached in the posting referenced above, that teleportation might in some sense not work even though someone walks out of the machine thousands of miles away who remembers walking into it. The measure of such a lifetime would be substantially less than that of a similar person who never teleports. Hal Finney --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: One solution to the Measure Problem: UTM outputs a qualia, not a universe
On Wed, Sep 19, 2007 at 12:10:33PM -0700, Hal Finney wrote: The lifetime formulation also captures the intuition many people have that consciousness should not jump around as observer moments are created in the various simulations and scenarios we imagine in our thought experiments. That was the conclusion I reached in the posting referenced above, that teleportation might in some sense not work even though someone walks out of the machine thousands of miles away who remembers walking into it. The measure of such a lifetime would be substantially less than that of a similar person who never teleports. Hal Finney I note that you have identified yourself with the the ASSA camp in the past (at least I say so in my book, so it must be true, right! :). What you are proposing above is an anti-functionalist position. The question is does functionalism necessarily imply RSSA, and antifunctionalism imply the ASSA? ie, does this whole RSSA/ASSA debate turn on the question of functionalism? I wonder where this leaves Mallah, who admits to computationalism, yet is died-in-the-wool ASSA? Cheers -- A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: One solution to the Measure Problem: UTM outputs a qualia, not a universe
Hal wrote: Yes, as you note later this is very similar to the concept I called UD+ASSA or just UDASSA and described in a series of postings to this list back in 2005. It was not original with me but actually was based on an idea of Wei Dai, who founded this last way back in 1998. I was working at one point on the udassa.com site to bring the ideas together but never finished it. I'm surprised that guy found it, I don't recall mentioning that URL. Must have let it slip sometime! It appears that the post where I originally proposed this idea is missing from the Google Groups archive. Something must have gone wrong when I imported the group archive into Google Groups, or data rot got to it. The Mail-Archive.com archive is in even worse shape, missing everything from before Sept 2006. Fortunately a third archive at Nabble.com seems still complete, and the post can be found here: http://www.nabble.com/consciousness-based-on-information-or-computation--tf3053801.html#a8489008 As Hal notes on his website, I've since moved away from this position. I've explain my reasons on the mailing list as they occurred to me (for example http://www.nabble.com/relevance-of-the-real-measure-tf3055627.html#a8492185 and http://www.nabble.com/forum/ViewPost.jtp?post=8496294framed=y) but perhaps I should write down a summary for the new members. PS, if anyone wants to download the complete raw mailing list archive in zipped Unix mailbox format, please email me privately. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: One solution to the Measure Problem: UTM outputs a qualia, not a universe
On Sat, Sep 15, 2007 at 01:25:04PM -, Rolf Nelson wrote: If I understand the Measure Problem correctly, we wonder why we find ourselves in a Goldilocks Universe of stars and galaxies rather than a simpler universe consisting solely of blackbody radiation, or a more complex, unpredictable Harry Potter universe. I call this the Occam catastrophe in my book. The solution I give there is a requirement that observers have to be embedded in the universe they observe, ie are self-aware. 1. An attempt at the solution was that more complex universes are less probable; they are less likely to be produced by a random UTM. This explains why induction works, why we don't live in a Harry Potter universe. But this also means a simple blackbody radiation universe is more probable than a Goldilocks Universe. 2. So we say, There are more observers in a Goldilocks Universe, where observers evolve through natural selection, than in a blackbody radiation universe, where observers can only occasionally emerge through extremely infrequent statistical anomalies. But if both the Goldilocks Universe and the blackbody radiation universe are infinite in size, then both have an infinite number of observers. Unnormalisable measures are not an insurmountable problem. I give some examples where this can be done in appendix C of my book. Of course there are problems in the general case. ... Here is one possible solution: the UTM instead directly produces a qualia (or, if you prefer, substitute observer moment or whatever terminology you deem appropriate). We'll use a broad definition of qualia that can encompass complex observations like Rolf sits at his keyboard, reflecting on past observations and wondering why he seems to live in a Goldilocks Universe, since that's exactly the type of observation that we're trying to explain when we ponder the Measure Problem. Each qualia, in the proposed model, is a long, finite-length string that is output by a UTM running every possible random program. (This is the same type of UTM that some of you have been proposing, but it outputs an attempt at a single qualia, rather than outputting an entire universe.) Very few strings are qualia; most UTM programs fail to produce qualia. The proposed model additionally postulates that many qualia are compressible in a certain interesting way, such that the World-Index-Compression Postulate (below) is true. World-Index-Compression Postulate: The most probable way for the output of a random UTM program to be a single qualia, is through having a part of the program calculate a Universe, U, that is similar to the universe we currently are observing; and then having another part of the program search through the universe and pick out a substring by using an search algorithm SA(U) that tries to find a random sentient being in U and emit his qualia as the final output. This sounds kind of complex. Just how do you recognise sentience? As an example, take two qualia, that we will call Q(Goldilocks) and Q(Potter): Q(Goldilocks): All my life I have read that all swans are white. And indeed, today I just saw a white swan. Q(Potter): All my life I have read that all swans are white. But, today I just saw a black swan. Funny you should say this - all my life I read that swans were white*, but all the swans around here are actually black. It was only at the age of 28 that I saw my first white swan - when living in Europe. * in fairy stories of course - I knew full well that the first European exporers to our land were amazed at the black swans, and that they feature on the state flag where I grew up. -- A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: One solution to the Measure Problem: UTM outputs a qualia, not a universe
Le 15-sept.-07, à 15:25, Rolf Nelson a écrit : If I understand the Measure Problem correctly, we wonder why we find ourselves in a Goldilocks Universe of stars and galaxies rather than a simpler universe consisting solely of blackbody radiation, or a more complex, unpredictable Harry Potter universe. This is the ASSA (Absolute Self Sample Assumption) version of the measure problem. In this case, physicalism *does* provide a solution under the form of QM, which explains well the rarity of *THIRD person white rabbits*, through the idea of Everett + decoherence. Alas, Everett has to postulate a computationalist theory of mind, which makes unavoidable the first and third person distinction, and which, by that way, introduces the *FIRST person white rabbits*, and those 1-rabbits are not a priori eliminated through the quantum interferences; unless you derive the quantum interference from the winning general computations in the deployement of the UD work (UD = Universal dovetailer, not Hal Finney's UD which is typical ASSA use of an *Universal Distribution* (closer two the second paper of Schmidhuber based on computable probability distribution than to anything related to the 1-3 distinction). What QM do very well is to explain notion of 1-person plural from 1-person through the division of subject (à-la Washington/Moscow) into division of population of subjects (by contagion of superpositions), by entangling the quantum histories. QM can do that thanks to its double linearity (linearity of the tensor product, and linearity of evolution). A priori comp should completely failed on that, but then what I have done is showing that the nuance brought by the incompleteness phenomenon, gives much room to doubt that comp is already refuted. But then again, we have to extract the double linearity from comp without postulating QM, if we want keep comp, or even just QM (without collapse). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: One solution to the Measure Problem: UTM outputs a qualia, not a universe
World-Index-Compression Postulate: The most probable way for the output of a random UTM program to be a single qualia, is through having a part of the program calculate a Universe, U, that is similar to the universe we currently are observing; and then having another part of the program search through the universe and pick out a substring by using an search algorithm SA(U) that tries to find a random sentient being in U and emit his qualia as the final output. This sounds kind of complex. Just how do you recognise sentience? You can't recognize it directly, at least not with a 500-bit subroutine. (Otherwise you could write a 510-bit program that iterates through random substrings and picks the first sentient one, violating the given World-Index-Compression postulate.) But in an ordered world, you might track down a human (or other sentient being) within 500 bits with instructions like keep searching in a straight line, through an unbounded number of light-years, until you bump into something that stands upright, uses grammar, and would get angry if I punched it. (I'm making up these numbers, if I'm close to Realistic Numbers it's just luck and not insight here.) -Rolf --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: One solution to the Measure Problem: UTM outputs a qualia, not a universe
and would get angry if I punched it I meant to say, would punch me back if I punched it. It's begging the question for the search algorithm to know whether the internal mental state is angry. -Rolf --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: One solution to the Measure Problem: UTM outputs a qualia, not a universe
The considerations trying to solve the measure problem have not been that primitive, but much better. The concept of a cubic meter won't make sense in most of the universes, and to compare infinities in a rigorous manner is nothing new to mathematicians. Both, Standish and Schmidhuber (and surely others, too) have given well-advised attempts to solve the problem. Maybe you're right; I've tried to wade through the archives, searching on measure problem, but may have missed some key things. If we look at other (concrete, complete) proposals, I'm interested in what answers they give for: 1. How do you calculate the probability of your next observation, based on your current mental state? 2. What is the measure/probability of observers, or of OM's? This is necessary for moral calculations, you need to be able to say what other observers are experiencing in the state of the universe that will result from your actions! Related: how do we calculate the answer to self-indication puzzles, like SIA vs. SSA? 3. Why do we live in a Goldilocks universe rather than a Harry Potter universe or a blackbody universe? UDASSA (if I'm interpreting it right, Hal?) says: 1. The measure of programs that produce OM (I am experiencing A, and I remember my previous experience as B) as its single output, compared to the measure of programs that produce OM (I am not experiencing A, and I remember my previous experience as B) as its single output, is what we perceive as the likelihood of A following B, rather than A not following B. 2. The measure of an OM is the measure of the programs that produce OM. 3. (...) the biggest contribution to the measure of observers (and observer-moments) like our own will arise from programs which conceptually have two parts. The first part creates a universe similar to the one we see where the observers evolve, and the second part selects the observer for output. -Rolf --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: One solution to the Measure Problem: UTM outputs a qualia, not a universe
Steven Smithee is not just a Black Belt Bayesian, but a Black Belt at Keeping Track of Who Has Said What About Cool Topics in Web Pages that are Linked To from Nowhere Else on the Internet. He pointed out http://udassa.com/summary1.html, where someone (Hal Finney, if we go by 'whois') said: A final point: I strongly suspect that the biggest contribution to the measure of observers (and observer-moments) like our own will arise from programs which conceptually have two parts. The first part creates a universe similar to the one we see where the observers evolve, and the second part selects the observer for output. I have argued elsewhere that each part can be relatively small compared to a program which was hard-wired to produce a specific observer and had all the information necessary to do so. Small programs have greater measure (occupy a greater fraction of possible input strings) hence this would be the main source of measure for observers like us. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: One solution to the Measure Problem: UTM outputs a qualia, not a universe
Rolf writes: World-Index-Compression Postulate: The most probable way for the output of a random UTM program to be a single qualia, is through having a part of the program calculate a Universe, U, that is similar to the universe we currently are observing; and then having another part of the program search through the universe and pick out a substring by using an search algorithm SA(U) that tries to find a random sentient being in U and emit his qualia as the final output. Yes, as you note later this is very similar to the concept I called UD+ASSA or just UDASSA and described in a series of postings to this list back in 2005. It was not original with me but actually was based on an idea of Wei Dai, who founded this last way back in 1998. I was working at one point on the udassa.com site to bring the ideas together but never finished it. I'm surprised that guy found it, I don't recall mentioning that URL. Must have let it slip sometime! You might enjoy this old post where I tried to work out in some plausible detail the size of a program to output a mental state, or as you say a quale, and came up with an answer in the 10s of kilobits, not far from your estimate. http://www.nabble.com/UDist-and-measure-of-observers-tf3056759.html Hal --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
One solution to the Measure Problem: UTM outputs a qualia, not a universe
If I understand the Measure Problem correctly, we wonder why we find ourselves in a Goldilocks Universe of stars and galaxies rather than a simpler universe consisting solely of blackbody radiation, or a more complex, unpredictable Harry Potter universe. 1. An attempt at the solution was that more complex universes are less probable; they are less likely to be produced by a random UTM. This explains why induction works, why we don't live in a Harry Potter universe. But this also means a simple blackbody radiation universe is more probable than a Goldilocks Universe. 2. So we say, There are more observers in a Goldilocks Universe, where observers evolve through natural selection, than in a blackbody radiation universe, where observers can only occasionally emerge through extremely infrequent statistical anomalies. But if both the Goldilocks Universe and the blackbody radiation universe are infinite in size, then both have an infinite number of observers. 3. Maybe we say, The Goldilocks Universe produces more observers per cubic meter. But then someone can propose the Tiny Blackbody Universe, which looks like an infinite region of blackbody radiation in our universe, but where everything is smaller by a factor of 10 to power of 1000. Why don't we live in the Tiny Universe? And at the very least, why does the universe waste all this empty space around us? Here is one possible solution: the UTM instead directly produces a qualia (or, if you prefer, substitute observer moment or whatever terminology you deem appropriate). We'll use a broad definition of qualia that can encompass complex observations like Rolf sits at his keyboard, reflecting on past observations and wondering why he seems to live in a Goldilocks Universe, since that's exactly the type of observation that we're trying to explain when we ponder the Measure Problem. Each qualia, in the proposed model, is a long, finite-length string that is output by a UTM running every possible random program. (This is the same type of UTM that some of you have been proposing, but it outputs an attempt at a single qualia, rather than outputting an entire universe.) Very few strings are qualia; most UTM programs fail to produce qualia. The proposed model additionally postulates that many qualia are compressible in a certain interesting way, such that the World-Index-Compression Postulate (below) is true. World-Index-Compression Postulate: The most probable way for the output of a random UTM program to be a single qualia, is through having a part of the program calculate a Universe, U, that is similar to the universe we currently are observing; and then having another part of the program search through the universe and pick out a substring by using an search algorithm SA(U) that tries to find a random sentient being in U and emit his qualia as the final output. As an example, take two qualia, that we will call Q(Goldilocks) and Q(Potter): Q(Goldilocks): All my life I have read that all swans are white. And indeed, today I just saw a white swan. Q(Potter): All my life I have read that all swans are white. But, today I just saw a black swan. The measure (or probability, if you prefer) of Q(Goldilocks) is greater than the measure of Q(Potter). Why? Perhaps Q(Goldilocks) and Q(Potter) are both 5000 bits long; it's almost impossible that any random UTM program would output either qualia directly by using a 5000 bit program. But postulate that there are shorter programs to emit these types of qualia: Smallest Goldilocks Program's code: (outputs Q(Goldilocks)) 1. Execute subroutine to internally generate the Goldilocks Universe. (This subroutine is 1000 bits long) 2. Search through the infinite universe you generated, until you find something that has a head and seems to react to swans. Look inside its head, and output the contents of whatever is inside its head. (This subroutine is 500 bits long) Total program size: 1500 bits. Smallest Potter Program's code: (outputs Q(Potter)) 1. Execute subroutine to internally generate the Potter Universe. (This subroutine is 1020 bits long, since Potter is more complex than Goldilocks) 2. Search through the infinite universe you generated, until you find something that has a head and seems to react to swans. Look inside its head, and output the contents of whatever is inside its head. (This subroutine is 500 bits long) Total program size: 1520 bits. The Potter qualia is 20 bits longer, and therefore is literally a million times less likely than the Goldilocks qualia in this scenario. What about the blackbody radiation universe? Because the universe is totally random, you can't efficiently use the same trick as in the more orderly universes. Your Search Algorithm will eventually find a thermal fluctuation that looks like something reacting to a swan and will output the contents of its head; however, the head is just going to contain an uncorrelated sea of thermal radiation, rather than a qualia. Q(Goldilocks
Re: measure problem
Le 02-mai-07, à 17:49, John Mikes a écrit : One wisdom above all others consists of formulating questions which by their wording eliminate the answers. Your question starts: What do you mean by ...our...? The classic reply: Who is asking? -- It is you and me and all who we can consider normal minds to converse with. * I try to be patient as long as I am around, but cannot take seriously a LM that 'knows' everything 'unknowable' and TELLS US all in an interview. It is all still in 'our' mind (imagination?) content. Why do you not 'extract' everything at once? Why piecemeal small portions of epistemic enrichment? All questions discussed on this and any other forum could be answered. Why are we so shy? (Maybe life would be intolerably boring knowing all the answers at once?) (I got it: it is the 'mathematically discernible' gap ...so is it a limitation? Yes. But the L machine can see its own limitations. The UD Argument explains why we have to expect physics rising from some geometry bearing on that limitation. and only its 'fears', 'hopes', (=suggestions, fantasies?) we(?) in our feeble mind work/content can produce similar unreal ideas.) Is the 'mathematical' included to justify the imperfections of a LM? Yes. - No, I did not really ask that. * Why did a LM not disclose 'itself' 3000 years ago? I guess that happens. There are some relations between so-called mystics or inward-looking truth researchers and lobian machine. with ALL the answers? Certainly not. Why still teasing us even now? A Sadist Loebian Machine! Does it have 'rules' on 'how much' to disclose in an interview? Who's rules? the Allmighty? but that is the LM itself! You see, I am confused. (ha ha) good for me. I will come back on the interview. I have to answer Mark Geddes' question on Tegmark little three-diagram first, and this could help to relate the interview and the search for a TOE. Indeed I have to explain the many nuances between the notion of computability, provability, knowability, observability, etc. All that in the arithmetical frame, ... and without being too much technical! The problem is that those nuances *are* technical! I am using technics here because our intuitions are misleading. Just note this. No Lobian Machine, even sound and ultra-powerful can ever be Allmighty. The contrary is true: the machine is somehow extremely modest. If you ask a sound (lobian) machine if she will ever say a bullshit, she answers that [either she will say a bullshit or she *might* say a bullshit]. This is a form of Godel's theorem. Lob's theorem shows in a deeper way that the L machine is really modesty-driven all along. The machine can also prove to herself that the more she learns, the less she knows. Her science makes her more ignorant, and lead her to bigger doubts, and thus also to bigger possibilities (relatively to her most probable computational history). Also, I use the term Lobian machine, in honor of Löb, but also as a shorter expression for a self-referentially correct machine having enough beliefs in elementary arithmetic. I remind you that in some older post you were willing to accept the idea that either you are yourself lobian, or that you can identify a lobian machine living in you (as far as you accept enough elementary arithmetical truth). Recall also I am not defending the comp hyp., I am just trying to show that the comp hyp. has (startling) observable and thus testable consequences (cf also both the UDA and the neoplatonists like Plotinus). Wishing you the best The best for you too. Hope this will help you to keep patient, thanks, Bruno John On 5/2/07, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Dear John, Le 30-avr.-07, à 20:57, John Mikes a écrit : mind is (mentality of) the unlimited TOE and its vision(s), while body (the somehow limited contraption including the tool for our thinking - call it brain tissue, physical, digital comp, or - horribile dictu: arithmetical - anyway within our limited mentality) is an aspect (partial) of it. I asked you this before: what do you mean by *our* in *our* limited mentality? Do you mean the Hungarians? The Americans? The Humans? The Apes? The Animals? The inhabitants of Earth? The inhabitants of the Solar System? The inhabitants of the Milky Way galaxy? (they are so much Milky Way Minded, you know!) or The sound lobian machines? The omega-consistent lobian machines? The consistent lobian machines? The lobian machines? ... The lobian entities? ... ? Problem: to reach the total from the limitational part - without the possession (understanding) of the missing rest of it. This is exactly, if I get your point, what I think can be done about the lobian entities, which, thanks to the mathematically describable gap between what the machine can know and what the machine can hope for (of fear for, bet, etc.) it is
Re: measure problem
Appreciate. . BM: Yes. But the L machine can see its own limitations. The UD Argument explains why we have to expect physics rising from some geometry bearing on that limitation. JM: At the 1989(?) German Complexity Conference Rainer Zimmermann had a paper on Pre-Geometrical world-origin. This instigated my idea about (MY) Plenitude, which is neither (pre?)geometrical, nor preceding a 'time' - nonexistent in it. Geometry is a consequence of spatial order, so it has to be 'invented' in a post-BigBang universe of at least spatial arrangements. In congruence with your later remark that physics stems from geometry. At least 2nd phase in my narrative. Consequence of things I am looking for.(and still predecessor to physics as you stated). * JM..:.. Is the 'mathematical' included to justify the imperfections of a LM? BM: Yes. JM now: that was a trap. Sorry. (see my next line that I did not 'really' ask that) - You probably did not realize that mathematical was said to be 'included' into something not containing it. Or is numbers-based not (really) mathematical? ((See my confusion?)) * Why did a LM not disclose 'itself' 3000 years ago? BM: I guess that happens. There are some relations between so-called mystics or inward-looking truth researchers and lobian machine. (JM: remarkable. And i can understand why those information-bits were explained in a false way: according to the general epistemic level of the era). * JM now: when I condoned the chance to be a LM it was not in your presently spelled out way: a self-referentially correct machine having enough beliefs in elementary arithmetic. because I have insufficient belief in the kind of arithmetic base (not only because of my insufficient math, but in other - rather philosophical - aspects as well), so I may consider myself a 'sort of' LM imagining a more advanced basis then numbers. In my sci-fi my 'aliens' had direct thought-transfer in meaning and concept, communication was unfettered from quantitative aspects. If I accept a 'fundamental' role of 'numbers' (I still do not know what to understand as such) it is at the - or before - 'geometrical' level, however definitely - as you said - pre-physical. But consequential - subsequent to the level I used to the formulation of universes. Generatee, not generator. John M PS: Bruno, I submit my ideas to you only to show a different position - not to beat yours. To round up' your theory in a discussion with a different stance. If you find it useless, tell me: I will stop sending them. J == On 5/3/07, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Le 02-mai-07, à 17:49, John Mikes a écrit : One wisdom above all others consists of formulating questions which by their wording eliminate the answers. Your question starts: What do you mean by ...our...? The classic reply: Who is asking? -- It is you and me and all who we can consider normal minds to converse with. * I try to be patient as long as I am around, but cannot take seriously a LM that 'knows' everything 'unknowable' and TELLS US all in an interview. It is all still in 'our' mind (imagination?) content. Why do you not 'extract' everything at once? Why piecemeal small portions of epistemic enrichment? All questions discussed on this and any other forum could be answered. Why are we so shy? (Maybe life would be intolerably boring knowing all the answers at once?) (I got it: it is the 'mathematically discernible' gap ...so is it a limitation? Yes. But the L machine can see its own limitations. The UD Argument explains why we have to expect physics rising from some geometry bearing on that limitation. and only its 'fears', 'hopes', (=suggestions, fantasies?) we(?) in our feeble mind work/content can produce similar unreal ideas.) Is the 'mathematical' included to justify the imperfections of a LM? Yes. - No, I did not really ask that. * Why did a LM not disclose 'itself' 3000 years ago? I guess that happens. There are some relations between so-called mystics or inward-looking truth researchers and lobian machine. with ALL the answers? Certainly not. Why still teasing us even now? A Sadist Loebian Machine! Does it have 'rules' on 'how much' to disclose in an interview? Who's rules? the Allmighty? but that is the LM itself! You see, I am confused. (ha ha) good for me. I will come back on the interview. I have to answer Mark Geddes' question on Tegmark little three-diagram first, and this could help to relate the interview and the search for a TOE. Indeed I have to explain the many nuances between the notion of computability, provability, knowability, observability, etc. All that in the arithmetical frame, ... and without being too much technical! The problem is that those nuances *are* technical! I am using technics here because our intuitions are misleading. Just note this. No Lobian Machine, even sound and ultra-powerful can ever be Allmighty. The
Re: measure problem
Dear John, Le 30-avr.-07, à 20:57, John Mikes a écrit : mind is (mentality of) the unlimited TOE and its vision(s), while body (the somehow limited contraption including the tool for our thinking - call it brain tissue, physical, digital comp, or - horribile dictu: arithmetical - anyway within our limited mentality) is an aspect (partial) of it. I asked you this before: what do you mean by *our* in *our* limited mentality? Do you mean the Hungarians? The Americans? The Humans? The Apes? The Animals? The inhabitants of Earth? The inhabitants of the Solar System? The inhabitants of the Milky Way galaxy? (they are so much Milky Way Minded, you know!) or The sound lobian machines? The omega-consistent lobian machines? The consistent lobian machines? The lobian machines? ... The lobian entities? ... ? Problem: to reach the total from the limitational part - without the possession (understanding) of the missing rest of it. This is exactly, if I get your point, what I think can be done about the lobian entities, which, thanks to the mathematically describable gap between what the machine can know and what the machine can hope for (of fear for, bet, etc.) it is possible to get some large and testable overview of the comp consequences for any TOEs based on the comp hyp. Including physical consequences. Hope this can motivate you for the interview of the L machine (or L entity), but be patient, thanks; Best, Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: measure problem
One wisdom above all others consists of formulating questions which by their wording eliminate the answers. Your question starts: What do you mean by ...our...? The classic reply: Who is asking? -- It is you and me and all who *we*can consider normal minds to converse with. * I try to be patient as long as I am around, but cannot take seriously a LM that 'knows' everything 'unknowable' and TELLS US all in an interview. It is all still in 'our' mind (imagination?) *content*. Why do you not 'extract' everything at once? Why piecemeal small portions of epistemic enrichment? All questions discussed on this and any other forum could be answered. Why are we so shy? (Maybe life would be intolerably boring knowing all the answers at once?) (I got it: it is the 'mathematically discernible' gap ...so is it a limitation? and only its 'fears', 'hopes', (=suggestions, fantasies?) we(?) in our feeble mind work/content can produce similar unreal ideas.) Is the 'mathematical' included to justify the imperfections of a LM? - No, I did not really ask that. * Why did a LM not disclose 'itself' 3000 years ago? with ALL the answers? Why still teasing us even now? A Sadist Loebian Machine! Does it have 'rules' on 'how much' to disclose in an interview? Who's rules? the Allmighty? but that is the LM itself! You see, I am confused. (ha ha) good for me. Wishing you the best John On 5/2/07, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Dear John, Le 30-avr.-07, à 20:57, John Mikes a écrit : mind is (mentality of) the unlimited TOE and its vision(s), while body (the somehow limited contraption including the tool for our thinking - call it brain tissue, physical, digital comp, or - horribile dictu: arithmetical - anyway within our limited mentality) is an aspect (partial) of it. I asked you this before: what do you mean by *our* in *our* limited mentality? Do you mean the Hungarians? The Americans? The Humans? The Apes? The Animals? The inhabitants of Earth? The inhabitants of the Solar System? The inhabitants of the Milky Way galaxy? (they are so much Milky Way Minded, you know!) or The sound lobian machines? The omega-consistent lobian machines? The consistent lobian machines? The lobian machines? ... The lobian entities? ... ? Problem: to reach the total from the limitational part - without the possession (understanding) of the missing rest of it. This is exactly, if I get your point, what I think can be done about the lobian entities, which, thanks to the mathematically describable gap between what the machine can know and what the machine can hope for (of fear for, bet, etc.) it is possible to get some large and testable overview of the comp consequences for any TOEs based on the comp hyp. Including physical consequences. Hope this can motivate you for the interview of the L machine (or L entity), but be patient, thanks; Best, Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: measure problem
Le 26-avr.-07, à 16:31, Juergen Schmidhuber a écrit : Hi Max, in this particular universe it's going well, thank you! As promised, I had a look at your paper. I think it is well written and fun to read. I've got a few comments though, mostly on the nature of math vs computation, and why Goedel is sexy but not an issue when it comes to identifying possible mathematical structures / universes / formally describable things. I think some of the comments are serious enough to affect the conclusions. Some come with quotes from papers in http://www.idsia.ch/~juergen/computeruniverse.html where several of your main issues are addressed. Some are marked by Serious. I am making a cc to the everythingers, although it seems they are mostly interested in other things now - probably nobody is really going to read this tedious response which became much longer than I anticipated. Don't worry, we are used to some long posts in this list. I am not sure you follow the list because the other things you are mentioning are just the follow up of the search of the theory of everything, except that since you leave the list, denying the 1-3 distinction, some years ago, most people who continue the discussion now are aware of the necessity to take into account that distinction between first and third person points of view, and more generally they are aware of the mind body problem (or of the 1-person/3-person pov relations). I think most of them, except new beginners, have no more any trouble with the first person indeterminacy in self-duplication experiments, etc. I have already made this clear: the hypothesis that there is a physical computable universe (physicalist-comp) is just untenable. Let me recall you the reason: obviously physicalist-comp entails what we are calling comp in this list, that is, the hypothesis that we are locally emulable by a digital universal machine. I will call it indexical comp to insist on the difference. So: PHYSICALIST-COMP = INDEXICAL-COMP Then the Universal Dovetailer Argument shows that comp entails that the physical appearances have to be justified *exclusively* by a self-duplication like first person (plural) indeterminacy: see the pdf: http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL.pdf The main idea is that INDEXICAL-COMP entails that we don't know which computations support our local states, and that they are a continuum of computational histories (computations + possible real oracles) going through those states. It can be argued that the first person physical appearances does emerge from a sum on all those computational histories, but only *as seen from those 1-person views*. But this entails that apparent physical universe are not necessarily computable objects. Actually, indexical comp entails it exists exploitable internal indeterminacies. A priori: INDEXICAL-COMP entails NOT PHYSICALIST-COMP. It gives to physics a more key role than in Tegmark's idea that the physical universe is a mathematical structure of a certain type. Comp (indexical comp) relate somehow physics to almost all mathematical structures (in a certain sense). This constitutes the main critic of both your approach and Tegmark's one in the search of a TOE. You still talk like if the mind body relation was a one-one relation, when the mind can only be associated to infinities of states/worlds. With indexical-comp there is no obvious notion of belonging to an universe. This has been discussed many times on the list with different people. And then, once you realize the fundamental importance, assuming comp, of keeping distinct the possible views that a machine has to have about arithmetical or mathematical reality, and that physics emerges from one such points of view, then it is hard not to take into account the fact that any universal machine looking inward cannot not discover those points of view; indeed they appear as inevitable modal or intensional variant of the godelian provability predicate. This makes Godel's theorems (and Lob's generalization, and then Solovay's one) key tools for extracting physicalness from number's extensions and their (lobian) intensions. And, and this is a major technical point, it makes this form of comp testable, by comparing the comp-physics with the empirical physics. Now I have discovered that those modal variant offer a transparent arithmetical interpretation of Plotinus hypostases. You are welcome in Siena in June where I will present my paper A purely Arithmetical, yet empirically falsifiable, Interpretation of Plotinus' Theory of Matter: http://www.amsta.leeds.ac.uk/~pmt6sbc/cie07.html I can send you a copy of the paper later for copyright reason. You can also consult my preceding paper: Marchal, B., Theoretical Computer Science the Natural Sciences, Physics of Life Reviews, Elsevier, Vol 2/4 pp 251-289, 2005. Available here:
Re: measure problem
Dear Bruno, I look at your 'chat' with Max and Juergen with awe: some words do sound as if representing some meaning to me, too, from my earlier accumulation of readings. My idea about your uncertainty of the application of 'comp' (and 'physical') could be (poorly) worded in your 'logician', Max's 'physicalistic' and Juergen's '???(maybe arithmetical)? positions, all pertaining to a comp in our so far developed human sense. The TOE etc. questions are way beyond that, and we all want to draw conclusions on them from experience AND methodology acquired within. 'We FORCE conclusions that are not due. The efficient 'comp', serving right the purpose sought, is 'somewhere' above the numberific etc. simplification of the features still unknown to us. Both the features and 'that' comp-quality. ((In meaning computation e.g.: Concept x function = idea?where x is not 'arithmetical' multiplying)) I tend to see the mind-body problem on this so far unachieved plane: mind is (mentality of) the unlimited TOE and its vision(s), while body (the somehow limited contraption including the tool for our thinking - call it brain tissue, physical, digital comp, or - horribile dictu: arithmetical - anyway within our limited mentality) is an aspect (partial) of it. Problem: to reach the total from the limitational part - without the possession (understanding) of the missing rest of it. This is an idea from the outskirts of your discussion, I do not vouch for it, just stated - perhaps provides some good. If not, let it fade away. John M On 4/30/07, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Le 26-avr.-07, à 16:31, Juergen Schmidhuber a écrit : Hi Max, in this particular universe it's going well, thank you! As promised, I had a look at your paper. I think it is well written and fun to read. I've got a few comments though, mostly on the nature of math vs computation, and why Goedel is sexy but not an issue when it comes to identifying possible mathematical structures / universes / formally describable things. I think some of the comments are serious enough to affect the conclusions. Some come with quotes from papers in http://www.idsia.ch/~juergen/computeruniverse.htmlhttp://www.idsia.ch/%7Ejuergen/computeruniverse.html where several of your main issues are addressed. Some are marked by Serious. I am making a cc to the everythingers, although it seems they are mostly interested in other things now - probably nobody is really going to read this tedious response which became much longer than I anticipated. Don't worry, we are used to some long posts in this list. I am not sure you follow the list because the other things you are mentioning are just the follow up of the search of the theory of everything, except that since you leave the list, denying the 1-3 distinction, some years ago, most people who continue the discussion now are aware of the necessity to take into account that distinction between first and third person points of view, and more generally they are aware of the mind body problem (or of the 1-person/3-person pov relations). I think most of them, except new beginners, have no more any trouble with the first person indeterminacy in self-duplication experiments, etc. I have already made this clear: the hypothesis that there is a physical computable universe (physicalist-comp) is just untenable. Let me recall you the reason: obviously physicalist-comp entails what we are calling comp in this list, that is, the hypothesis that we are locally emulable by a digital universal machine. I will call it indexical comp to insist on the difference. So: PHYSICALIST-COMP = INDEXICAL-COMP Then the Universal Dovetailer Argument shows that comp entails that the physical appearances have to be justified *exclusively* by a self-duplication like first person (plural) indeterminacy: see the pdf: http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL.pdfhttp://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL.pdf The main idea is that INDEXICAL-COMP entails that we don't know which computations support our local states, and that they are a continuum of computational histories (computations + possible real oracles) going through those states. It can be argued that the first person physical appearances does emerge from a sum on all those computational histories, but only *as seen from those 1-person views*. But this entails that apparent physical universe are not necessarily computable objects. Actually, indexical comp entails it exists exploitable internal indeterminacies. A priori: INDEXICAL-COMP entails NOT PHYSICALIST-COMP. It gives to physics a more key role than in Tegmark's idea that the physical universe is a mathematical structure of a certain type. Comp (indexical comp) relate somehow physics to almost all mathematical structures (in a certain sense). This constitutes the main critic of both your approach and Tegmark's
Re: measure problem
Hi Max, in this particular universe it's going well, thank you! As promised, I had a look at your paper. I think it is well written and fun to read. I've got a few comments though, mostly on the nature of math vs computation, and why Goedel is sexy but not an issue when it comes to identifying possible mathematical structures / universes / formally describable things. I think some of the comments are serious enough to affect the conclusions. Some come with quotes from papers in http://www.idsia.ch/~juergen/computeruniverse.html where several of your main issues are addressed. Some are marked by Serious. I am making a cc to the everythingers, although it seems they are mostly interested in other things now - probably nobody is really going to read this tedious response which became much longer than I anticipated. 1. An abstract baggage-free mathematical structure does not exist any more than a baggage-free computer - the particular axiomatic system you choose is like the set of primitive instructions of the computer you choose. Not very serious, since for general computers and general axiomatic systems there are invariance theorems: changing the baggage often does not change a lot, so to speak. But it should be mentioned. 2. p 11: you say that data sampled from Gaussian random variables is incompressible - NOT true - give short codes to probable events (close to the mean), long codes to rare events (Huffman coding). 3. same sentence: how to test what inflation predicts? How to test whether the big bang seed was really random, not pseudo-random? The second million bits of pi look random but are not. We should search for short programs compressing the apparent randomness: http://www.idsia.ch/~juergen/randomness.html 4. p 15: Mathematical structure (MS) just exists. Is that so? Others will look at your symbols and say they are just heaps of chalk on a blackboard, and you need a complex, wet pattern recognition system to interpret them. Here's where beliefs enter... 5. p 18: mathematical structures, formal systems and computations are aspects of one underlying transcendent structure whose nature we don't fully understand But we do! I'd say there are NO serious open problems with your figure 5 - formal systems vs math vs computation is a well-explored field. More about this below. The 2000 paper (your nr 17) exploits this understanding; it turns out the most convenient way to deal with the measure problem is the computer science way (right hand corner of your figure 5). As I wrote in the 2000 paper: http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0011122 The algorithmic approach, however, offers several conceptual advantages: (1) It provides the appropriate framework for issues of information-theoretic complexity traditionally ignored in pure mathematics, and imposes natural complexity-based orderings on the possible universes and subsets thereof. (2) It taps into a rich source of theoretical insights on computable probability distributions relevant for establishing priors on possible universes. Such priors are needed for making probabilistic predictions concerning our own particular universe. Although Tegmark suggests that ``... all mathematical structures are a priori given equal statistical weight'' [#!Tegmark:98!#](p. 27), there is no way of assigning equal nonvanishing probability to all (infinitely many) mathematical structures. Hence we really need something like the complexity-based weightings discussed in [#!Schmidhuber:97brauer!#] and especially the paper at hand. (3) The algorithmic approach is the obvious framework for questions of temporal complexity such as those discussed in this paper, e.g., ``what is the most efficient way of simulating all universes?'' 6. Serious: run the sim, or just describe its program? Are you sure you know what you want to say here? What's the precise difference between program bitstrings and output bitstrings? The bitstrings generated by the programs (the descriptions) are just alternative descriptions of the universes, possibly less compact ones. You as an external observer may need yet another program that translates the output bits (typically a less compressed description) into video or something, to obtain the description your eyes want. Note that the 2000 paper and the 2002 journal variant don't really care for time evolution, just for descriptions - within the bitstrings maybe there is an observer who thinks he knows what's time, but to the outsider his concept of time may be irrelevant. (Unlike the 1997 paper, the 2000/2002 papers do not focus on a one to one mapping between physical and computational time steps, otherwise we'd miss all the universes where the concept of time is irrelevant.) Here's what I wrote at the end: After all, algorithmic theories of the describable do encompass everything we will ever be able to talk and write about. Other things are simply beyond description. 7. Serious: p 18 CUH: what's your def of computable? You mean
