[PEIRCE-L] Determination and mediation

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Jon S, Gary F, Gary R, List,


I've been thinking about Peirce's explanations of how signs represent objects 
to interpretants. In this vein, I'd like to ask a straightforward question 
about the relation of determination and the role it seems to play in his 
account of semiosis. Some have suggested that the relation of determination 
seems awfully vague--so much so that it is hard to see how it can do any 
explanatory work.


For my part, I think Peirce is engaging in a strategy of explaining richer 
sorts of relations and processes, such as representation and signification, by 
appealing to the relatively simpler relations of determination. The centerpiece 
of the account, I tend to think, is the explanation of how the object 
determines the sign, and of how the sign determines the interpretant, so that 
the object is able to determine the interpretant via the mediation of the 
sign--and via the relations that the sign bears to the object and interpretant. 
I find Peirce's explanatory strategy to be quite promising precisely because 
(1) it offers an account of what is involved in this mediation and (2), this 
process of mediation does seem to be central in understanding processes of 
representation and signification.


So, let me ask, is Peirce offering a strategy of explaining more complex sorts 
of relations and processes (i.e., mediation, representation, signification, 
etc.) by appealing to those that are relatively simpler (i.e., determination)? 
If so, is there good reason to think this might be a winning strategy?


--Jeff



Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Knowledge Bases in Inquiry, Learning, Reasoning

[Gary Richmond]

Jon, list

You asked of your analysis of the child and mother example:

JAS: Does any of this make sense?  To be honest, it all still feels highly
conjectural to me, so I am expecting (hopefully constructive) criticism.

I am sorry to say that your complex analysis does not make a lot of sense
to me; or, perhaps it would be more correct to say that it seems so "highly
conjectural" that I just can't enough sense of it to offer a helpful
critique of it. It feels to me almost like a kind of literary exegesis,
rich but somewhat fantastic. You propose several extraordinary interpretive
claims and suggestions (for example, that the child's scream may not be
sign-action at all) which seem, well, strained.

So, I'm going to leave it to others to offer constructive criticism.
Meanwhile, I'll stand by my previous analyses.

Best,

Gary R


[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*

On Tue, Feb 13, 2018 at 10:49 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  wrote:

> Gary R., List:
>
> Thank you for your characteristically thoughtful and thought-provoking
> response.  Up until now, I have been considering all of this with the
> mindset that the child's scream must be analyzed as *one *Sign.  Upon
> reflection, I realize that such an approach fails to take proper account of
> the nature of a *genuine *Sign as "something that exists in replicas" (EP
> 2:411; 1904).  What you seem to be suggesting--please correct me if I am
> misunderstanding--is that the same "thing" can be a Replica of *more than
> one* Sign.
>
> In this case, as Gary F. observed, the girl's scream is, for her,
> "primarily a natural sign," or what I have started calling a *degenerate 
> *Sign--an
> instinctive physical reflex, rather than an intentional "utterance"--such
> that all six Correlates are Existents (2ns).  As such, I get the sense that
> many of the steps in the *internal *chain of events, from the contact of
> the child's finger with the hot burner to the propagation of sound waves
> from her vocal chords--including both of those phenomena themselves--could
> conceivably be analyzed as *dynamical*, rather than *semiosic*.  Why
> should we treat the girl's scream as the Dynamic Interpretant of a
> particular neural pattern within her that represents the hot burner, rather
> than as merely the last in a series of strictly dyadic causes and effects?
> If she effectively *cannot help* but scream, is this really an example of
> Sign-action at all?  The same questions arise regarding the flight of a
> bird upon hearing a loud sound.  I have some vague notions of possible
> answers, but I am hoping that you (or someone else) can provide a clear
> explanation.
>
> For the mother, on the other hand, the scream does not produce any kind of 
> *deterministic
> *response.  Although it probably triggers certain "motherly instincts,"
> she rushes into the kitchen *deliberately*; presumably she *could *ignore
> the child if she were so inclined, as a neglectful parent might be.  From
> her standpoint, the child is the *utterer* of the Sign that is the
> scream, even if *unintentionally*; and therefore, the girl is indeed
> where we must "look" to "find" the Sign's Dynamic Object, "the essential
> ingredient of the utterer" (EP 2:404; 1907).  However, I am still not
> convinced that it is the child *herself*; typically when a Sign *has *an
> utterer, the Dynamic Object is *not *that utterer, but whatever the
> utterer (as the saying goes) *has in mind* upon uttering the Sign--in
> this case, perhaps the *pain *that the girl is sensing.  The Immediate
> Object is then the combination of attributes of *this particular scream*
> that the mother's Collateral Experience leads her to associate with
> previous *screams of pain or distress* that she has heard, both from this
> child and from others, which likely differentiates them somehow from *other
> kinds* of childish screams.
>
> This, then, takes us back to my first paragraph above.  For the mother,
> the girl's scream is a *Replica*--a Token of a Type--which it obviously 
> *cannot
> *be for the child.  The Dynamic Object of the corresponding *genuine *Sign
> is presumably something like *pain or distress in general*.  Hence the
> context-dependence of any *concrete *instance of *actual 
> *semiosis--necessarily
> involving Replicas--is quite evident here.
>
> Does any of this make sense?  To be honest, it all still feels highly
> conjectural to me, so I am expecting (hopefully constructive) criticism.
> In fact, I can already anticipate that Edwina will reject it right
> away--understandably, given her very different model of semiosis--but I am
> eager to see what you and others have to say.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - 

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Knowledge Bases in Inquiry, Learning, Reasoning

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary R., List:

Thank you for your characteristically thoughtful and thought-provoking
response.  Up until now, I have been considering all of this with the
mindset that the child's scream must be analyzed as *one *Sign.  Upon
reflection, I realize that such an approach fails to take proper account of
the nature of a *genuine *Sign as "something that exists in replicas" (EP
2:411; 1904).  What you seem to be suggesting--please correct me if I am
misunderstanding--is that the same "thing" can be a Replica of *more than
one* Sign.

In this case, as Gary F. observed, the girl's scream is, for her,
"primarily a natural sign," or what I have started calling a
*degenerate *Sign--an
instinctive physical reflex, rather than an intentional "utterance"--such
that all six Correlates are Existents (2ns).  As such, I get the sense that
many of the steps in the *internal *chain of events, from the contact of
the child's finger with the hot burner to the propagation of sound waves
from her vocal chords--including both of those phenomena themselves--could
conceivably be analyzed as *dynamical*, rather than *semiosic*.  Why should
we treat the girl's scream as the Dynamic Interpretant of a particular
neural pattern within her that represents the hot burner, rather than as
merely the last in a series of strictly dyadic causes and effects?  If she
effectively *cannot help* but scream, is this really an example of
Sign-action at all?  The same questions arise regarding the flight of a
bird upon hearing a loud sound.  I have some vague notions of possible
answers, but I am hoping that you (or someone else) can provide a clear
explanation.

For the mother, on the other hand, the scream does not produce any
kind of *deterministic
*response.  Although it probably triggers certain "motherly instincts," she
rushes into the kitchen *deliberately*; presumably she *could *ignore the
child if she were so inclined, as a neglectful parent might be.  From her
standpoint, the child is the *utterer* of the Sign that is the scream, even
if *unintentionally*; and therefore, the girl is indeed where we must
"look" to "find" the Sign's Dynamic Object, "the essential ingredient of
the utterer" (EP 2:404; 1907).  However, I am still not convinced that it
is the child *herself*; typically when a Sign *has *an utterer, the Dynamic
Object is *not *that utterer, but whatever the utterer (as the saying
goes) *has
in mind* upon uttering the Sign--in this case, perhaps the *pain *that the
girl is sensing.  The Immediate Object is then the combination of
attributes of *this particular scream* that the mother's Collateral
Experience leads her to associate with previous *screams of pain or
distress* that she has heard, both from this child and from others, which
likely differentiates them somehow from *other kinds* of childish screams.

This, then, takes us back to my first paragraph above.  For the mother, the
girl's scream is a *Replica*--a Token of a Type--which it obviously *cannot
*be for the child.  The Dynamic Object of the corresponding *genuine *Sign
is presumably something like *pain or distress in general*.  Hence the
context-dependence of any *concrete *instance of *actual *semiosis--necessarily
involving Replicas--is quite evident here.

Does any of this make sense?  To be honest, it all still feels highly
conjectural to me, so I am expecting (hopefully constructive) criticism.
In fact, I can already anticipate that Edwina will reject it right
away--understandably, given her very different model of semiosis--but I am
eager to see what you and others have to say.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Tue, Feb 13, 2018 at 6:12 PM, Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> Jon, Edwina, list,
>
> Jon, while I am tending to agree with you on much of your analysis, I
> still can't agree with you in the matter of the Dynamic Object for the
> mother. You wrote:
>
> JAS: In this case, I am wary of drawing a sharp distinction between "the
> child's semiosis" and "the mother's semiosis"; are they not continuous?
>
> I do not see the semioses as continuous which is not to say that there is
> no continuity. There's a continuity of communication, shall we say, but the
> dynamic object of each person's semiosis is different in my opinion.
>
> The mother's semiosis at that moment of its occurrence seems to me not
> determined by the oven at all, but by her daughter. So in my view the
> Immediate Object of the mother concerns the oven not at all. Rather it is
> grounded (in Peirce's sense of the ground of a sign, which he later terms
> the immediate object: 'selected' characters of the DO) in the child
> herself.Again, the ground of he semiosis cannot be the child in the
> entirety of all her characters (an impossibility), but exactly those which
> are predominant, her scream, perhaps the look on her face, etc. 

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Aristotle and Peirce

[Jon Awbrey]

Helmut, List,

I have to say I don't see all that much of consequence
riding on the “pin the tail on the category” game that
so diverts the List on so many occasions, apart perhaps
from the functional value of social cohesion it affords.
And I have come to suspect, after many many years, that
Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness are almost certainly
among Peirce's worst coinages for their liability to
upstage, trample underfoot, and generally obscure the
main insights of relational over absolutist thinking.

But never mind that now ...

As far as Aristotle goes —

Inquiry Driven Systems • The Formative Tension
http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Inquiry_Driven_Systems_:_Part_2#The_Formative_Tension



b. We describe one class of existing things as substance (ousia),
   and this we subdivide into three: (1) matter (hyle), which
   in itself is not an individual thing, (2) shape (morphe)
   or form (eidos), in virtue of which individuality is
   directly attributed, and (3) the compound of the two.

c. Matter is potentiality (dynamis), while form is realization or
   actuality (entelecheia), and the word actuality is used in two
   senses, illustrated by the possession of knowledge (episteme)
   and the exercise of it (theorein).



Dynamis can be potentiality or power.  Entelecheia as actuality
is more like actualization or realization.  Entelechy is often
rendered to mean completion or perfection but I would gloss it
as “that which contains its end in itself”.  It brings to mind
ideas of “art for art's sake”, of a game whose goal is the play
itself, of a quest whose object is the quest itself.

Another thing that struck me about Aristotle's version is the
two senses of actualization, “illustrated by the possession
of knowledge (episteme) and the exercise of it (theorein)”.
I think this nicely prefigures the Competence/Performance
distinction emphasized in our times by Chomsky and others
in generative linguistics and allied computational models.

Regards,

Jon

On 2/13/2018 11:01 AM, Helmut Raulien wrote:

Thank you, Jon! But, if matter is potentiality, and form is actuality, I still
wonder why Peirce didn't assign 1ns to matter, and 2ns to form.  But everybody,
please try not to explain, at least not if it were meant for just my sake, I
would not understand it in the moment.
Best,
Helmut

>
>

   12. Februar 2018 um 22:24 Uhr
   "Jon Awbrey" 
Helmut, List,

Here is one of my musements on
a few pertinent paragraphs from
Aristotle's treatise “On the Soul”:

Inquiry Driven Systems • The Formative Tension
http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Inquiry_Driven_Systems_:_Part_2#The_Formative_Tension

Consider especially:



We describe one class of existing things as substance (ousia),
and this we subdivide into three: (1) matter (hyle),
which in itself is not an individual thing, (2) shape (morphe)
or form (eidos), in virtue of which individuality is
directly attributed, and (3) the compound of the two.

Matter is potentiality (dynamis), while form is realization
or actuality (entelecheia), and the word actuality is used
in two senses, illustrated by the possession of knowledge
(episteme) and the exercise of it (theorein).



Regards,

Jon



--

inquiry into inquiry: https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/
academia: https://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey
oeiswiki: https://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey
isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA
facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Knowledge Bases in Inquiry, Learning, Reasoning

[Stephen C. Rose]

Hi Soren... Interesting. Peirce uses the word flummery in ref. to Hegel.
Who has examined Peirce in relation to logical positivism? He missed it
didn't he? As to finding a basis for empirically showing the impact of
ontological terms, it seems to me that the Symbol in the triad Icon(Sign)
Index Symbol amounts to a sort of laboratory for the testing of such
things. I would love to design such a study based on Peirce's understanding
of the power and ubiquity of memorial maxims.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Tue, Feb 13, 2018 at 7:29 PM, Søren Brier  wrote:

> I think all three categories are framed in the phenomenological view of
> experience as the primary reality, where he also seems to place qualitative
> mathematic. But he opens for the possibility of an outer word behind
> experience through Secondness and therefore opens for an empirical realism,
> which is what he criticize Hegel for not doing. It seem to me that when we
> get to Thirdness we already have established an inner and an outer world. I
> think that is his trick to make empirical quantitative research possible
> from a phenomenological and hermeneutical basis. Thereby he goes beyond
> logical positivism. No one else has done this*.* But I do not have quotes
> to support this. So if anybody have it I would be grateful. . More might be
> found in C. Misak’s *Verificationism.*
>
>
>
>   Best
>
>  Søren
>
>
>
> *From:* Stephen C. Rose [mailto:stever...@gmail.com]
> *Sent:* 13. februar 2018 16:33
> *To:* Peirce List 
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Knowledge Bases in Inquiry, Learning, Reasoning
>
>
>
> Thanks, Soren -- I think that clears it up.  Does phenomenology apply as a
> sort of catch-all for the various attributes of the three elements of the
> triad? Does Peirce's phenomenology deal with the ontological. I assume that
> while ontology deals with words that words themselves refer to what lies
> behind them. I find it convenient to see the words that are key grouped
> either as ontotogy (truth, beauty, freedom and so forth) or as utilities
> (will, reason, etc) I guess that is a point at which people's philosophy
> becomes individualized, almost necessarily.
>
>
> amazon.com/author/stephenrose
>
>
>
> On Tue, Feb 13, 2018 at 9:40 AM, Søren Brier  wrote:
>
> Dear Stephen and Edwina
>
>
>
> I think the entropy is a natural scientific conceptualization of
> evolutionary processes in natural science, further developed by Prigogine
> into a non-equilibrium thermodynamics but is unable to encompass
> experiential mind as it is created in a materialist-energetic ontology (not
> even an informational one) where Peirce in his philosophy includes
> phenomenology.
>
>
>
> Best
>
>Søren
>
>
>
> *From:* Stephen C. Rose [mailto:stever...@gmail.com]
> *Sent:* 13. februar 2018 15:18
> *To:* Peirce List 
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Knowledge Bases in Inquiry, Learning, Reasoning
>
>
>
> Edwina why is Firstness akin to entropy? Isn't Firstness the location of
> what we might term ontology -- things we make into words that are indeed
> Wittgenstein's unspeakables. Did Peirce believe that entropy trumped what I
> would call syntropy? If so did he then believe that logic was entropic?
>
>
> amazon.com/author/stephenrose
>
>
>
> On Tue, Feb 13, 2018 at 8:34 AM, Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>
> Gary R, Jon, list:
>
> 1. I don't think that there is an 'end to semiosis', because Firstness,
> which is akin to entropy, is as basic to semiosis as Thirdness/habits. Even
> a rock will dissipate. Also, I don't think that Mind is ever separate from
> Matter and vice versa.
>
> 2. I consider, as I outlined previously, that the situation with the
> mother, child, hot stove, burn etc is not one Sign but a plethora of
> Signs.  I don't think that a regression analysis is correct here.
> Each Sign is triggered from another Sign but I don't think you can regress
> to the One Sign. So, I continue to maintain that for the Mother, the Sign
> that she reacts to is the cry of the child [a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign].
> The hot stove is almost irrelevant to her.
>
> 3. I remain concerned about the role of 'quasi-mind'.
>
> 4. Peirce has multiple and contradictory uses of the term 'Form' and I
> certainly don't see it as akin to the formlessness of Firstness. Firstness
> is a State and has no structure.
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> *On Mon 12/02/18 10:01 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
>  sent:*
>
> Gary R., List:
>
>
>
> 1.  I am inclined to agree with you on this.  As I understand it, the end
> of semiosis--both its final cause and its termination--is the production of
> a habit; a substance is a bundle of habits; and a material substance is a
> bundle of habits that are so inveterate, it has effectively lost the
> capacity for Habit-change.  As a result, it seems to me that the behavior
> of such 

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Knowledge Bases in Inquiry, Learning, Reasoning

[Gary Richmond]

Jon, Edwina, list,

Jon, while I am tending to agree with you on much of your analysis, I still
can't agree with you in the matter of the Dynamic Object for the mother.
You wrote:

JAS: In this case, I am wary of drawing a sharp distinction between "the
child's semiosis" and "the mother's semiosis"; are they not continuous?

I do not see the semioses as continuous which is not to say that there is
no continuity. There's a continuity of communication, shall we say, but the
dynamic object of each person's semiosis is different in my opinion.

The mother's semiosis at that moment of its occurrence seems to me not
determined by the oven at all, but by her daughter. So in my view the
Immediate Object of the mother concerns the oven not at all. Rather it is
grounded (in Peirce's sense of the ground of a sign, which he later terms
the immediate object: 'selected' characters of the DO) in the child
herself.Again, the ground of he semiosis cannot be the child in the
entirety of all her characters (an impossibility), but exactly those which
are predominant, her scream, perhaps the look on her face, etc. So, again,
as I see it the Dynamic Object for the mother is the child, while those
several characters which form the ground of her semiosis (equivalent to her
immediate object) contribute to a wholly different IO-R-II-DI, and so a
different Sign, than her daughter's, again, the consequence of their
having *entirely
different* Dynamic Objects.


Edwina, while my understanding of the semioses involved here seems closer
to yours than to Jon's, I do not agree that the child's scream in the DO.
For just as the DO was the oven, while the heat (a character) from the
flaming burners led to the child's pain (a character) that grounded her
semiosis, it was the child as DO whose scream (a character for her mother)
grounded her mother's semiosis.

Jon continued:

JAS: It seems to me that there must be some semiotic connection between the
hot burner and the mother's eventual response to the child's cry, because
the one would not have happened without the other.

Well this kind of thinking would, I believe, lead to an infinite regress
going as far back as the child's conception, and probably much further back
than that. It seems to me a kind of post hoc, propter hoc version of that
regress. What you point to ("the one would not have happened without the
other") seems to me more like physical than semiotic determination.

JAS: Why regard the girl's scream as having a different Dynamic Object for
the mother than it does for the child?  Is it not the very same Sign?

I do not *at al*l see it as "the very same Sign." In my view there are two
signs, not, however, unrelated, and even intimately connected by the DI of
the child leading to the IO of the mother: but still *two distinct signs*(at
least) Here I think Edwina and I may be in at least partial agreement.

So, I think I already offered a reason in my earlier post as to why I think
our views are so different GR: ". . . in my understanding the interpretant
standing "in the same relation to the Sign's Dynamic Object as the Sign
itself does"  doesn't apply to both signs, but to the child's sign and* not
*to the mother's (as you've been analyzing the semioses).

The remainer of your analysis follows from your viewpoint which, as I see
it, goes well beyond the example into habit-change and the like which will
in my view necessarily involve more time, more semiosis, additional signs,
etc. than the discrete analysis put forth here. This is not to suggest that
the habits of the mother and the daughter will not lead to perhaps
life-changing habit change. But you yourself have noted that these will be
very different habits: not touching flames in the future for the child; not
leaving the child alone in the kitchen in the future for the mother. Again,
this stark difference in habit-change strongly suggests to me two different
signs, not one.

Best,

Gary R




[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Tue, Feb 13, 2018 at 10:30 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt  wrote:

> List:
>
> In an effort to reduce the quantity of my individual messages, I am going
> to try combining multiple replies into one post.
>
> Gary R.:
>
> 1.  I agree that even persons can lose, or deliberately set aside, their
> capacity for Habit-change.  Hopefully it is evident that I am still very
> much open to adjusting my own views on these matters.
>
> 2.  In particular, as you have observed and I have acknowledged
> previously, I tend to be a more abstract than concrete thinker; so these
> kinds of practical examples are good "stretching exercises" for me.  In
> this case, I am wary of drawing a sharp distinction between "the child's
> semiosis" and "the mother's semiosis"; are they not *continuous*?  It
> seems to me that there must be *some *semiotic connection between the 

Self-control and self-criticism, was, Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Note from List Moderator : Frequency of Posting

[Gary Richmond]

List,

This post began as my (hopefully) final note on the theme of reducing the
frequency of posts to the forum.

"To enjoy freedom we have to control ourselves." Virginia Woolf


This was the sum total of Gary Fuhrman's blog entry for today.
http://gnusystems.ca/wp/2018/02/of-course/

Of course each person has to decide what kinds of and how much self-control
she wants to develop in any particular context and for her life more
generally.

Woolf's words reminded me of Peirce's comment on the development of
"thoroughly deliberate" conduct.

“If conduct is to be thoroughly deliberate, the ideal must be a habit of
feeling which has grown up under the influence of a course of
self—criticism and of hetero— criticism” (CP 1.574, 1906),


So, interestingly, according to Peirce this ideal of conduct is the result
of *both* self- and other-criticism. Any thoughts on why Peirce included
the idea of "hetero-criticism" in the development of this ideal of conduct?
My own thought at the moment is that this comment prepares for his famously
non-standard definition of esthetics as "the theory of the deliberate
formation of such habits of feeling: (CP 1.574). Putting this in the
context of the normative sciences, in the 1903 Harvard Lectures Peirce had
written:

Supposing, however, that normative science divides into esthetics, ethics,
and logic, then it is easily perceived, from my standpoint, that this
division is governed by the three categories. For Normative Science in
general being the science of the laws of conformity of things to ends,
esthetics considers those things whose ends are to embody qualities of
feeling, ethics those things whose ends lie in action, and logic those
things whose end is to represent something.


Best,

Gary R


[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*

On Mon, Feb 12, 2018 at 4:16 PM, Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> Kirsti, list,
>
> Thanks Kirsti for reminding us that in most cases it is probably best not
> to, say, reply to All but only to Peirce-L. The way my email is set up,
> even if I am Cc'd I only get the Peirce-L post, but I can imagine how
> irksome it must be to get 200 Peirce-L posts in a little over a week
> *plus* additional copies.
>
> What I do in responding is to click "Reply" and then omit the name of the
> sender and replace it with "Peirce-L.," a quick and easy solution.
>
> Again, I'd like to remind folk that it is also helpful to delete all but
> the message you are responding to. I don't always remember to do this
> myself, but posters not doing so results in my often needing to scroll down
> a great distance to get to the next message as the entire thread is copied
> in that message.
>
> In short, and as I wrote in an off-list exchange with a forum member today
> ". . . the list, while not a community (rather a forum, a place) still
> requires a consideration of *all* who gather here."
>
> Best,
>
> Gary (writing as list moderator)
>
> [image: Gary Richmond]
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
> *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*
>
> On Mon, Feb 12, 2018 at 1:44 PM,  wrote:
>
>> List,
>>
>> I too second Gary Richmonds note. I'd like to add that multiple postings
>> seem to be adjunct to this problem.
>> People send to personal mailboxes in addtion to the list.
>>
>> If just that gets left out, the mass of mails would not look so awfull,
>> so hopeless.
>>
>> Best, Kirsti
>>
>>
>>
>> Ia mail is sent to the list,
>>
>>
>> Jon Awbrey kirjoitti 12.2.2018 16:40:
>>
>>> Peircers,
>>>
>>> I also have to unsubscribe periodically, as I don't have time
>>> even to scan for relevance, and many postings recently appear
>>> to move ever so agonizingly and asymptotically toward first
>>> principles without quite grasping them, much less applying
>>> them to non-trivial problems in any field beyond various
>>> folks' hermeneutically sealed bubbles -- but I digress --
>>> At any rate, one thing I find helpful, since I usually
>>> read posts first at the Web Interface, is to toggle
>>> the No Mail subscriber option on, allowing me to
>>> re-send only selected posts to my email inbox
>>> for archiving or reply.
>>>
>>> Regards,
>>>
>>> Jon
>>>
>>> On 2/12/2018 9:01 AM, Everett, Daniel wrote:
>>>
 Deletion is always a possibility. So is unsubscribing. There are
 occasionally (rarely though) useful bits in these disputations about
 meaning. As I have tried to point out, they strike me as both unPeircean
 (no practical consequences, no problem solved) and not particularly
 well-connected to the vast literature on lexical meanings or cognizant of
 the kind of “essentialist disputes” that bothers many philosophers.

 I do look through them all, however. The reason is 

[PEIRCE-L] Knowledge Bases in Inquiry, Learning, Reasoning

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Jon - I continue to disagree with your reading of  both passages.

I do not agree that as you write, "Form is 1ns (characters or
qualities signified by the Sign), ". I consider that Firstness is the
immediate unmediated experience of the Sign, not something signified
by it [which adds meaning].

Nor do I consider that the NEM passage  [I'll leave it to you to
copy it] - means what you read by it. I interpret Peirce's reference
to "Form is quality, suchness' as a reference to the holistic
wholeness of the object.  He specifically says that this 'suchness is
"not in being felt' [which thereby denies that it is a State of
Firstness because Firstness is feeling]...Instead, he says. several
times, that  "it is general" [which makes it Thirdness]. I can
understand how you arrive at this conclusion, but this description of
the categories deeply contradicts his other outlines of those
categories.

I've already outlined the terms to 'fill in the blanks'; they are
the terms Peirce uses. 

I don't see how semiosis ends when a habit is changed. When a
biological species changes its composition/habits, semiosis functions
in the new species.

I'm unsure of the reason for your focus on quasi-mind, and how it
differs from 'Mind'.

Edwina
 On Tue 13/02/18  3:32 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina, List:
 What you quoted from EP 2:304 is at the bottom of the page, where
Peirce contrasts theory (from a Sign of an Object as Matter to
Interpretants as Form to perceiving Entelechy) with practice (from a
Sign of a character as Form to Interpretants as Matter to producing
Entelechy).  For example, scientists study things and develop
theories to explain them (theory), while engineers conceive ideas and
design artifacts to embody them (practice).  The meaning of the key
Aristotelian terms  in this context is spelled out in the previous
paragraph.
 CSP:  But so far as the "Truth" is merely the object of a sign, it
is merely the Aristotelian Matter of it that is so. In addition
however to denoting objects, every sign sufficiently complete
signifies characters, or qualities ... Every sign signifies the
"Truth." But it is only the Aristotelian Form  of the universe that
it signifies ... Aristotle gropes for a conception of perfection, or
entelechy, which he never succeeds in making clear. We may adopt the
word to mean the very fact, that is, the ideal sign which should be
quite perfect, and so identical,--in such identity as a sign may
have,--with the very matter denoted united with the very form
signified by it.
 Form is 1ns (characters or qualities signified by the Sign), Matter
is 2ns (objects  denoted by the Sign), and Entelechy is 3ns (Matter
and Form united by the Sign).  Even if you are not convinced about
this passage, it is absolutely undeniable that this is how Peirce
aligns the terms with the Categories in NEM 4:292-300.  Nevertheless,
I continue to acknowledge that he uses "form" differently elsewhere,
including places where it is associated with 3ns.  However, I am
still wondering what contrasting terms you would put in the blanks to
label the Categories as _, _, and Form. 
 I do appreciate you answering my other three questions, though. 
Regarding (a), Peirce said that a Habit-change is not a Sign and thus
does not have a subsequent Interpretant, so it seems to me that
semiosis terminates at that point.  Regarding (b), I am still not
seeing a good reason to treat chemical breakdown as triadic rather
than dyadic, since it seems to me that the physical processes
involved can all be explained in terms of the latter kind of action. 
Regarding (c), I am not defining a Quasi-mind as a "thing," but as a
bundle of habits, which is precisely how Peirce characterized a 
substance (CP 1.414, EP 2:279; 1887-8); he also once described a man
as "a bundle of habits" with "the unity of self-consciousness" that
"must be given as a centre for the habits" (CP 6.228; 1898), which
sounds very much like the concept of Quasi-mind that I am exploring.
 Thanks again,
 Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer,
Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran
Laymanwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1] -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [2] 
 On Tue, Feb 13, 2018 at 11:12 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
Jon - in reply

1 My reading of EP 2.304 is different from yours. Peirce writes:

'sets out from a sign of a real object with which it is acquainted,
passing from this to its matter, to successive interpretants
embodying more and more fully its form, wishing ultimately to reach a
direct perception  of the entelechy.setting out from a sign
signifying a character of which it has an idea, passes from this, as
its form, to successive interpretants realizing more and more
precisely its matter hoping ultimately to be able to make a direct
effort, producing the entelchy'.

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Knowledge Bases in Inquiry, Learning, Reasoning

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, List:

What you quoted from EP 2:304 is at the bottom of the page, where Peirce
contrasts theory (from a Sign of an Object as Matter to Interpretants as
Form to *perceiving *Entelechy) with practice (from a Sign of a character
as Form to Interpretants as Matter to *producing* Entelechy).  For example,
scientists study things and develop theories to explain them (theory),
while engineers conceive ideas and design artifacts to embody them
(practice).  The meaning of the key Aristotelian terms *in this context* is
spelled out in the previous paragraph.

CSP:  But so far as the "Truth" is merely the *object *of a sign, it is
merely the Aristotelian *Matter *of it that is so. In addition however
to *denoting
*objects, every sign sufficiently complete signifies characters, or
qualities ... Every sign signifies the "Truth." But it is only the
Aristotelian *Form* of the universe that it signifies ... Aristotle gropes
for a conception of perfection, or *entelechy*, which he never succeeds in
making clear. We may adopt the word to mean the very fact, that is, the
ideal sign which should be quite perfect, and so identical,--in such
identity as a sign may have,--with the very matter denoted united with the
very form signified by it.


Form is 1ns (characters or qualities *signified *by the Sign), Matter is
2ns (objects *denoted *by the Sign), and Entelechy is 3ns (Matter and
Form *united
*by the Sign).  Even if you are not convinced about *this *passage, it is
absolutely undeniable that this is how Peirce aligns the terms with the
Categories in NEM 4:292-300.  Nevertheless, I continue to acknowledge that
he uses "form" differently elsewhere, including places where it is
associated with 3ns.  However, I am still wondering what contrasting terms
you would put in the blanks to label the Categories as _, _, and
Form.

I do appreciate you answering my other three questions, though.  Regarding
(a), Peirce said that a Habit-change is *not *a Sign and thus *does not*
have a subsequent Interpretant, so it seems to me that semiosis terminates
at that point.  Regarding (b), I am still not seeing a good reason to treat
chemical breakdown as triadic rather than dyadic, since it seems to me that
the physical processes involved can all be explained in terms of the latter
kind of action.  Regarding (c), I am not defining a Quasi-mind as a
"thing," but as a bundle of habits, which is precisely how Peirce
characterized a *substance *(CP 1.414, EP 2:279; 1887-8); he also once
described a *man *as "a bundle of habits" with "the unity of
self-consciousness" that "must be given as a centre for the habits" (CP
6.228; 1898), which sounds very much like the concept of Quasi-mind that I
am exploring.

Thanks again,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Tue, Feb 13, 2018 at 11:12 AM, Edwina Taborsky 
wrote:

> Jon - in reply
>
> 1 My reading of EP 2.304 is different from yours. Peirce writes:
>
> 'sets out from a sign of a real object with which it is acquainted,
> passing from this to its matter, to successive interpretants embodying
> more and more fully its form, wishing ultimately to reach a direct
> perception of the entelechy.setting out from a sign signifying a
> character of which it has an idea, passes from this, as its form, to
> successive interpretants realizing more and more precisely its matter
> hoping ultimately to be able to make a direct effort, producing the
> entelchy'.
>
> [Note: My underlinings are italics in the original].
>
>  I don't see 'form' as Firstness in this selection from Peirce.
>
>  Instead, I read the first part as a semiosic process, moving from a
> direct indexical experience of an object, to a concept of its
> Form/Type/3rdness...to reach a Final Interpretant ]Entelechy]
>
> I read the second example as a semiosic process, moving from a symbolic
> experience [idea], to a concept of its Form/Type/3rdness..to figuring out
> its matter [2ndness]...to reach the final Interpretant [entelechy].
>
> a] I read 5.476 and EP 2.418 as a change in the nature of the habits;
> i.e., a change in the nature of 3rdness.
>
> b] The breakdown of the chemical composition of a rock is triadic, where
> the habits holding together the molecules of the rock , in interaction with
> external molecules [eg, oxygen of the air, water, heat from the sun],
> become weaker and as such these molecules are free of the habits. This is
> not dyadic or mechanical, for the rock doesn't break into 'bits' - the
> habits lose their power to organize the molecules into a rock.
>
> c] No - I find your use of quasi-mind problematic. You seem to be defining
> a 'thing-in-itself'; i.e., any form of matter with the capacity for
> self-organization and interaction with other 'things'.
>
> Edwina
>

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" 

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Knowledge Bases in Inquiry, Learning, Reasoning

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Jon - in reply

1 My reading of EP 2.304 is different from yours. Peirce writes:

'sets out from a sign of a real object with which it is acquainted,
passing from this to its matter, to successive interpretants
embodying more and more fully its form, wishing ultimately to reach a
direct perception of the entelechy.setting out from a sign
signifying a character of which it has an idea, passes from this, as
its form, to successive interpretants realizing more and more
precisely its matter hoping ultimately to be able to make a direct
effort, producing the entelchy'.

[Note: My underlinings are italics in the original].

 I don't see 'form' as Firstness in this selection from Peirce.

 Instead, I read the first part as a semiosic process, moving from a
direct indexical experience of an object, to a concept of its
Form/Type/3rdness...to reach a Final Interpretant ]Entelechy]

I read the second example as a semiosic process, moving from a
symbolic experience [idea], to a concept of its Form/Type/3rdness..to
figuring out its matter [2ndness]...to reach the final Interpretant
[entelechy].

a] I read 5.476 and EP 2.418 as a change in the nature of the
habits; i.e., a change in the nature of 3rdness.

b] The breakdown of the chemical composition of a rock is triadic,
where the habits holding together the molecules of the rock , in
interaction with external molecules [eg, oxygen of the air, water,
heat from the sun], become weaker and as such these molecules are
free of the habits. This is not dyadic or mechanical, for the rock
doesn't break into 'bits' - the habits lose their power to organize
the molecules into a rock.

c] No - I find your use of quasi-mind problematic. You seem to be
defining a 'thing-in-itself'; i.e., any form of matter with the
capacity for self-organization and interaction with other 'things'. 

Edwina
 Edwina, List:
 Just to clarify, what is undeniable is that Peirce associated Form
with 1ns in those two passages (NEM 4:292-300, EP 2:304)--not as
"freshness, spontaneity," but as "quality, suchness" in one case and
"characters, or qualities" in the other.  I agree that he used "form"
to mean other things in other writings, including 3ns as you have
outlined.  I am also familiar with the various words that he
associated with each Category on different occasions; my specific
question for you is which ones for 1ns and 2ns, respectively, you
would contrast with "form" as 3ns.  Put another way, Peirce labeled
the Categories as Form, Matter, and Entelechy in those two passages;
what would you put in the blanks to label them instead as _,
_, and Form? 
 I also remain interested in getting your responses to the following,
as I continue to gain a better understanding of your views on these
matters.
 a.  What do you make of Peirce's statements in "Pragmatism" (1907)
that habit-changes as "ultimate logical interpretants" are not Signs
(CP 5.476), or that habits as "final logical interpretants" are (at
least) not Signs in the same way as the Signs that produce them (EP
2:418)?
 b.  What warrants analyzing the dissipation of a rock as (triadic)
semiosic action, rather than (dyadic) dynamical action?
 c.  Do you have any specific comments on my latest tentative
definition of "Quasi-mind" as a bundle of Collateral Experience and
Habits of Interpretation (i.e., a reacting substance) that retains
the capacity for Habit-change (i.e., learning by experience), and
thus can be the Quasi-utterer of a genuine Sign (since this requires
a  purpose) and the Quasi-interpreter of any Sign?
 Thanks,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur
Philosopher, Lutheran Laymanwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1] - 
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [2] 
  On Tue, Feb 13, 2018 at 9:54 AM, Edwina Taborskywrote:
Jon, list -

1. With regard to the example - I consider the child's scream to be
a DI, which then transforms into a DO for the mother.

2. I do not think that it is 'undeniable' that Peirce associated
Form with Firstness. Apart from that one quote - which I have, in a
separate post before I read this response from you - interpreted it
to mean 'wholeness of Type' rather than the fresh spontaneity that is
Firstness - I can't find any references in Peirce's work using Form as
Firstness. 

3. It isn't that I 'prefer' aligning Form with 3rdness, which
suggests a strictly individual interpretation - I read Peirce's work
as doing just that.

4. As for Peirce's terms for the three categories - he has provided
them throughout his work:

Firstness: spontaneity, chance, state, quality, freshness, feeling,
possible

Secondness; brute, struggle, reaction, otherness, existent,
volition, fact

Thirdness: habit,, mind, mediation, necessity, generality,
continuity 

Edwina On 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Knowledge Bases in Inquiry, Learning, Reasoning

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, List:

Just to clarify, what is undeniable is that Peirce associated Form with 1ns *in
those two passages* (NEM 4:292-300, EP 2:304)--not as "freshness,
spontaneity," but as "quality, suchness" in one case and "characters, or
qualities" in the other.  I agree that he used "form" to mean other things
in other writings, including 3ns as you have outlined.  I am also familiar
with the various words that he associated with each Category on different
occasions; my specific question for you is which ones for 1ns and 2ns,
respectively, you would contrast with "form" as 3ns.  Put another way,
Peirce labeled the Categories as Form, Matter, and Entelechy in those two
passages; what would you put in the blanks to label them instead as _,
_, and Form?

I also remain interested in getting your responses to the following, as I
continue to gain a better understanding of your views on these matters.

a.  What do you make of Peirce's statements in "Pragmatism" (1907) that
habit-changes as "ultimate logical interpretants" are not Signs (CP 5.476),
or that habits as "final logical interpretants" are (at least) not Signs in
the same way as the Signs that produce them (EP 2:418)?

b.  What warrants analyzing the dissipation of a rock as (triadic) semiosic
action, rather than (dyadic) dynamical action?

c.  Do you have any specific comments on my latest tentative definition of
"Quasi-mind" as a bundle of Collateral Experience and Habits of
Interpretation (i.e., a *reacting substance*) that retains the capacity for
Habit-change (i.e., *learning by experience*), and thus can be the
Quasi-utterer of a *genuine *Sign (since this requires a *purpose*) and the
Quasi-interpreter of *any *Sign?


Thanks,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Tue, Feb 13, 2018 at 9:54 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Jon, list -
>
> 1. With regard to the example - I consider the child's scream to be a DI,
> which then transforms into a DO for the mother.
>
> 2. I do not think that it is 'undeniable' that Peirce associated Form with
> Firstness. Apart from that one quote - which I have, in a separate post
> before I read this response from you - interpreted it to mean 'wholeness
> of Type' rather than the fresh spontaneity that is Firstness - I can't
> find any references in Peirce's work using Form as Firstness.
>
> 3. It isn't that I 'prefer' aligning Form with 3rdness, which suggests a
> strictly individual interpretation - I read Peirce's work as doing just
> that.
>
> 4. As for Peirce's terms for the three categories - he has provided them
> throughout his work:
>
> Firstness: spontaneity, chance, state, quality, freshness, feeling,
> possible
>
> Secondness; brute, struggle, reaction, otherness, existent, volition, fact
>
> Thirdness: habit,, mind, mediation, necessity, generality, continuity
>
> Edwina
>
On Tue, Feb 13, 2018 at 9:34 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

>
> List
>
> With reference to 'form', as I said, Peirce has multiple references to it.
> When I look up, in the CP index, the term 'form', besides page numbers, I
> also find 'see also Generals'...and generals are Thirdness.
>
> "originality is not an attribute of the matter of life, present in the
> whole only so far as it is present in the smallest parts, but is an affair
> of form, of the way in which parts none of which possess it are joined
> together" 4.611
>
> Peirce refers to form as 'type': "this noun is not an existent thing; it
> is a type or form, to which objects, both those that are externally
> existent and those which are imagined may conform, but which none of them
> can exactly be' 5.429.
>
> In 5.430, he refers to generals and forms...In 5.194 - he refers to the
> difference between matter and logical form
>
> In 5.550- he refers to the mathematical form..'as represents only the
> sameness and diversities involved in that state of things".  This sounds,
> to me, like 3rdness not 1stness.
>
> Then, in 6.353 and on, there is his long outline of the history of the
> distinction between matter and form. And in 6.360- a long list of the
> 'varieties of form' - something imposible within the mode of Firstness.
>
> I  am aware of that one quote referring to Form as  quality, suchness' -
> but I take that to mean only the holistic nature of Form, which is meant to
> be understood in its whole general nature rather than by its mechanical
> parts.
>
> So- I'll still maintain that Peirce's use of Form refers to its generality
> of Type and not to a state of 'freshness, spontaneity'- which is Firstness.
>
> Note- see also 1.409, with Pierce's rejection that habits will eventually
> be dominant in the world.."at any assignable date in the future there will
> be some slight aberrancy from law'.
>
> Edwina
>

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to 

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Aristotle and Peirce

[Helmut Raulien]

Thank you, Jon! But, if matter is potentiality, and form is actuality, I still wonder why Peirce didn´t assign 1ns to matter, and 2ns to form. But everybody, please try not to explain, at least not if it were meant for just my sake, I would not understand it in the moment.

Best,

Helmut

 

 12. Februar 2018 um 22:24 Uhr
 "Jon Awbrey" 
 

Helmut, List,

Here is one of my musements on
a few pertinent paragraphs from
Aristotle's treatise “On the Soul”:

Inquiry Driven Systems • The Formative Tension
http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Inquiry_Driven_Systems_:_Part_2#The_Formative_Tension

Consider especially:



We describe one class of existing things as substance (ousia), and this we subdivide into three: (1) matter (hyle),
which in itself is not an individual thing, (2) shape (morphe) or form (eidos), in virtue of which individuality is
directly attributed, and (3) the compound of the two.

Matter is potentiality (dynamis), while form is realization or actuality (entelecheia), and the word actuality is used
in two senses, illustrated by the possession of knowledge (episteme) and the exercise of it (theorein).



Regards,

Jon

--

inquiry into inquiry: https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/
academia: https://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey
oeiswiki: https://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey
isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA
facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .



 




-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Aw: Re: : [PEIRCE-L] Aristotle and Peirce

[Helmut Raulien]

Thank you, Jon and Edwina. I don´t understand it, except I have a hunch that he is saying: A thing´s form is unique, and its matter is not, because other things are also made of the same material. I guess I rather want to keep my concept of form and matter, which I think is more naiive: In a piece of clay the clay is the matter, and its shape is the form. If the clay is red, this redness is a function of its matter, not of the form. Aristotle´s and Peirce´s views are too complicated for me in the moment. I am reluctant to adopt complicated concepts and give up clear enough (I think) concepts.

Best,

Helmut

 

 12. Februar 2018 um 23:29 Uhr
 "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
 


Edwina, Helmut, List:

 

The nearly 40 different types of "form" that Peirce cataloged in CP 6.360-361 (from Baldwin's Dictionary, 1902) highlight the importance of being clear about what we mean by "Form" when we talk about it; likewise "Matter."  In NEM 4:292-300 (c. 1903?), Peirce stated the following.

 


... Form is quality, suchness,--red, for example ... The peculiar suchness of the feeling, wherein is that? It is wholly in itself. The quality or form is whatever it is in itself, irrespective of anything else. No embodiment of it in this or that object or feeling in any degree modifies the suchness. It is something positive in itself. ... The suchness does not exist, but it is something definite. Neither does it consist in being represented. The being represented is one thing; the being represented such as red is represented, is another definite thing. It is general. It is an element of existing things; but it is not and has nothing to do with the element of existence. The suchness of red is such as it is in its own suchness, and in nothing else.

 

Matter, that something which is the subject of a fact, is, in every respect the contrary of form, except that both are elements of the world that are independent of how they are represented to be. Form is not an existent. Matter is precisely that which exists. (Remember, that whether corporeal, or physical matter is, or is not, the only matter is beyond my present scope.) Form is definite. Whatever red is, it is of its very essence, and is nothing else. Matter is an element of something definite. But it is in itself, as the subject of that determination, vague ... Form, as we have seen, is all that it is in itself. Matter being the subject of fact, and being nothing but the subject of a fact, is all that it is in reference to something else than itself ... (293-294)


 

The next paragraph includes what I quoted previously (294-295), and then comes the following.

 



This Entelechy, the third element which it is requisite to acknowledge besides Matter and Form, is that which brings things together. It is the element which is prominent in such ideas as Plan, Cause, and Law. The philosopher who recognizes only Form, will do best to insist that Form fulfills this uniting function by virtue of its generality. But it is not so; since Form remains entirely within its own self. (295-296)



 

Hence in this particular manuscript, it is clear that Form is 1ns, Matter is 2ns, and Entelechy is 3ns.  Similarly, in EP 2:304 (1904), Peirce stated the following.

 



But so far as the "Truth" is merely the object of a sign, it is merely the Aristotelian Matter of it that is so. In addition however to denoting objects, every sign sufficiently complete signifies characters, or qualities ... Every sign signifies the "Truth." But it is only the Aristotelian Form of the universe that it signifies ... What we call a "fact" is something having the structure of a proposition, but supposed to be an element of the very universe itself. The purpose of every sign is to express "fact," and by being joined with other signs, to approach as nearly as possible to determining an interpretant which would be the perfect Truth, the absolute Truth, and as such (at least, we may use this language) would be the very Universe. Aristotle gropes for a conception of perfection, or entelechy, which he never succeeds in making clear. We may adopt the word to mean the very fact, that is, the ideal sign which should be quite perfect, and so identical,—in such identity as a sign may have,—with the very matter denoted united with the very form signified by it. The entelechy of the Universe of being, then, the Universe qua fact, will be that Universe in its aspect as a sign, the "Truth" of being. The "Truth," the fact that is not abstracted but complete, is the ultimate interpretant of every sign.



 

Here it is equally clear that Aristotelian Form corresponds to the characters (1ns) that a Sign signifies, Aristotelian Matter corresponds to the object (2ns) that a Sign denotes, and Aristotelian Entelechy corresponds to the unity of these (3ns) that a Sign expresses.

 

Of course, whether or how these two texts have bearing on our interpretation of Peirce's other writings is another question.

 

Regards,

Re: : Re: [PEIRCE-L] Knowledge Bases in Inquiry, Learning, Reasoning

[Stephen C. Rose]

Interesting Edwina -- I would see the formation of a habit as what we are
looking at. And indeed a continual adjustment even when habits exist in
relatively stable form. A while back I took entropy to mean the dispersion
of everything with no reference to Peirce or habits or the eventual
attainment of order which I take to be an objective of CSP. Wittgenstein is
of interest I believe because he regarded most of what matters as
unspeakable. I am interested in what seems to me almost a Peirce goal to
make metaphysics a science. That would be a good move.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Tue, Feb 13, 2018 at 10:37 AM, Edwina Taborsky 
wrote:

> Stephen - I can't answer all your questions, but, to my understanding, the
> fact of Firstness - which introduces deviations from the norm, is a key
> 'cause' of the dissipation of a habit. To me - that is entropy.
>
> I have no knowledge of Wittgenstein.
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
> On Tue 13/02/18 9:17 AM , "Stephen C. Rose" stever...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Edwina why is Firstness akin to entropy? Isn't Firstness the location of
> what we might term ontology -- things we make into words that are indeed
> Wittgenstein's unspeakables. Did Peirce believe that entropy trumped what I
> would call syntropy? If so did he then believe that logic was entropic?
>
> amazon.com/author/stephenrose
>
> On Tue, Feb 13, 2018 at 8:34 AM, Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>
>> Gary R, Jon, list:
>>
>> 1. I don't think that there is an 'end to semiosis', because Firstness,
>> which is akin to entropy, is as basic to semiosis as Thirdness/habits. Even
>> a rock will dissipate. Also, I don't think that Mind is ever separate from
>> Matter and vice versa.
>>
>> 2. I consider, as I outlined previously, that the situation with the
>> mother, child, hot stove, burn etc is not one Sign but a plethora of
>> Signs.  I don't think that a regression analysis is correct here.
>> Each Sign is triggered from another Sign but I don't think you can regress
>> to the One Sign. So, I continue to maintain that for the Mother, the Sign
>> that she reacts to is the cry of the child [a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign].
>> The hot stove is almost irrelevant to her.
>>
>> 3. I remain concerned about the role of 'quasi-mind'.
>>
>> 4. Peirce has multiple and contradictory uses of the term 'Form' and I
>> certainly don't see it as akin to the formlessness of Firstness. Firstness
>> is a State and has no structure.
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>
>
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L
> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the
> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm
> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Knowledge Bases in Inquiry, Learning, Reasoning

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Stephen - I can't answer all your questions, but, to my
understanding, the fact of Firstness - which introduces deviations
from the norm, is a key 'cause' of the dissipation of a habit. To me
- that is entropy.

I have no knowledge of Wittgenstein.

Edwina
 On Tue 13/02/18  9:17 AM , "Stephen C. Rose" stever...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina why is Firstness akin to entropy? Isn't Firstness the
location of what we might term ontology -- things we make into words
that are indeed Wittgenstein's unspeakables. Did Peirce believe that
entropy trumped what I would call syntropy? If so did he then believe
that logic was entropic? 
 amazon.com/author/stephenrose [1]
 On Tue, Feb 13, 2018 at 8:34 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
Gary R, Jon, list:

1. I don't think that there is an 'end to semiosis', because
Firstness, which is akin to entropy, is as basic to semiosis as
Thirdness/habits. Even a rock will dissipate. Also, I don't think
that Mind is ever separate from Matter and vice versa.

2. I consider, as I outlined previously, that the situation with the
mother, child, hot stove, burn etc is not one Sign but a plethora of
Signs.  I don't think that a regression analysis is correct here.
Each Sign is triggered from another Sign but I don't think you can
regress to the One Sign. So, I continue to maintain that for the
Mother, the Sign that she reacts to is the cry of the child [a
Rhematic Indexical Sinsign]. The hot stove is almost irrelevant to
her. 

3. I remain concerned about the role of 'quasi-mind'.

4. Peirce has multiple and contradictory uses of the term 'Form' and
I certainly don't see it as akin to the formlessness of Firstness.
Firstness is a State and has no structure.

Edwina


Links:
--
[1] http://amazon.com/author/stephenrose
[2]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'tabor...@primus.ca\',\'\',\'\',\'\')

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Knowledge Bases in Inquiry, Learning, Reasoning

[Edwina Taborsky]

 
 List

With reference to 'form', as I said, Peirce has multiple references
to it. When I look up, in the CP index, the term 'form', besides page
numbers, I also find 'see also Generals'...and generals are Thirdness.

"originality is not an attribute of the matter of life, present in
the whole only so far as it is present in the smallest parts, but is
an affair of form, of the way in which parts none of which possess it
are joined together" 4.611

Peirce refers to form as 'type': "this noun is not an existent
thing; it is a type or form, to which objects, both those that are
externally existent and those which are imagined may conform, but
which none of them can exactly be' 5.429.

In 5.430, he refers to generals and forms...In 5.194 - he refers to
the difference between matter and logical form

In 5.550- he refers to the mathematical form..'as represents only
the sameness and diversities involved in that state of things".  This
sounds, to me, like 3rdness not 1stness. 

Then, in 6.353 and on, there is his long outline of the history of
the distinction between matter and form. And in 6.360- a long list of
the 'varieties of form' - something imposible within the mode of
Firstness.

I  am aware of that one quote referring to Form as  quality,
suchness' - but I take that to mean only the holistic nature of Form,
which is meant to be understood in its whole general nature rather
than by its mechanical parts. 

So- I'll still maintain that Peirce's use of Form refers to its
generality of Type and not to a state of 'freshness, spontaneity'-
which is Firstness.

Note- see also 1.409, with Pierce's rejection that habits will
eventually be dominant in the world.."at any assignable date in the
future there will be some slight aberrancy from law'.

Edwina
 On Tue 13/02/18  8:34 AM , Edwina Taborsky tabor...@primus.ca sent:
 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Gary R, Jon, list:

1. I don't think that there is an 'end to semiosis', because
Firstness, which is akin to entropy, is as basic to semiosis as
Thirdness/habits. Even a rock will dissipate. Also, I don't think
that Mind is ever separate from Matter and vice versa.

2. I consider, as I outlined previously, that the situation with the
mother, child, hot stove, burn etc is not one Sign but a plethora of
Signs.  I don't think that a regression analysis is correct here.
Each Sign is triggered from another Sign but I don't think you can
regress to the One Sign. So, I continue to maintain that for the
Mother, the Sign that she reacts to is the cry of the child [a
Rhematic Indexical Sinsign]. The hot stove is almost irrelevant to
her. 

3. I remain concerned about the role of 'quasi-mind'.

4. Peirce has multiple and contradictory uses of the term 'Form' and
I certainly don't see it as akin to the formlessness of Firstness.
Firstness is a State and has no structure.

Edwina
 On Mon 12/02/18 10:01 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Gary R., List:
 1.  I am inclined to agree with you on this.  As I understand it,
the end of semiosis--both its final cause and its termination--is the
production of a habit; a substance is a bundle of habits; and a
material substance is a bundle of habits that are so inveterate, it
has effectively lost the capacity for Habit-change.  As a result, it
seems to me that the behavior of such "things" can in most or all
cases be adequately analyzed in terms of  dyadic action/reaction,
rather than the irreducibly triadic action of semiosis.  In fact, I
am leaning toward seeing the latter as requiring a Quasi-mind (see #3
below), at least to serve as the Quasi-interpreter, even though
"things" can certainly serve as Quasi-utterers (i.e., Dynamic
Objects) of degenerate Signs.
 2.  Something is a Sign by virtue of having a DO, an IO, and an
II--not necessarily a DI, so I do not see the relevance of the
mother's inability (at first) to interpret the Sign (correctly, in my
view) as standing for the hot burner.  She would presumably find this
out very quickly, of course, after rushing into the kitchen.  The
Dynamic Object determines the Sign--perhaps a neural signal of
pain--of which the girl's scream is a Dynamic Interpretant;  and
every Sign determines its Interpretant to stand in the same relation
to the Sign's Dynamic Object as the Sign itself does.  Hence both the
internal neural signal and the external scream are  Indices of the hot
burner; at least, that is how I see it at the moment.  
  3.  Did you mean to say "Quasi-mind," rather than "Quasi-sign"?  My
current tentative definition of "Quasi-mind" is a bundle of Collateral
Experience and Habits of Interpretation (i.e., a  reacting substance)
that retains the capacity for Habit-change (i.e.,   learning by
experience), and thus can be the Quasi-utterer of a   genuine Sign
(since this requires a   purpose) and the 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Knowledge Bases in Inquiry, Learning, Reasoning

[Stephen C. Rose]

Thanks, Soren -- I think that clears it up.  Does phenomenology apply as a
sort of catch-all for the various attributes of the three elements of the
triad? Does Peirce's phenomenology deal with the ontological. I assume that
while ontology deals with words that words themselves refer to what lies
behind them. I find it convenient to see the words that are key grouped
either as ontotogy (truth, beauty, freedom and so forth) or as utilities
(will, reason, etc) I guess that is a point at which people's philosophy
becomes individualized, almost necessarily.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Tue, Feb 13, 2018 at 9:40 AM, Søren Brier  wrote:

> Dear Stephen and Edwina
>
>
>
> I think the entropy is a natural scientific conceptualization of
> evolutionary processes in natural science, further developed by Prigogine
> into a non-equilibrium thermodynamics but is unable to encompass
> experiential mind as it is created in a materialist-energetic ontology (not
> even an informational one) where Peirce in his philosophy includes
> phenomenology.
>
>
>
> Best
>
>Søren
>
>
>
> *From:* Stephen C. Rose [mailto:stever...@gmail.com]
> *Sent:* 13. februar 2018 15:18
> *To:* Peirce List 
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Knowledge Bases in Inquiry, Learning, Reasoning
>
>
>
> Edwina why is Firstness akin to entropy? Isn't Firstness the location of
> what we might term ontology -- things we make into words that are indeed
> Wittgenstein's unspeakables. Did Peirce believe that entropy trumped what I
> would call syntropy? If so did he then believe that logic was entropic?
>
>
> amazon.com/author/stephenrose
>
>
>
> On Tue, Feb 13, 2018 at 8:34 AM, Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>
> Gary R, Jon, list:
>
> 1. I don't think that there is an 'end to semiosis', because Firstness,
> which is akin to entropy, is as basic to semiosis as Thirdness/habits. Even
> a rock will dissipate. Also, I don't think that Mind is ever separate from
> Matter and vice versa.
>
> 2. I consider, as I outlined previously, that the situation with the
> mother, child, hot stove, burn etc is not one Sign but a plethora of
> Signs.  I don't think that a regression analysis is correct here.
> Each Sign is triggered from another Sign but I don't think you can regress
> to the One Sign. So, I continue to maintain that for the Mother, the Sign
> that she reacts to is the cry of the child [a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign].
> The hot stove is almost irrelevant to her.
>
> 3. I remain concerned about the role of 'quasi-mind'.
>
> 4. Peirce has multiple and contradictory uses of the term 'Form' and I
> certainly don't see it as akin to the formlessness of Firstness. Firstness
> is a State and has no structure.
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> *On Mon 12/02/18 10:01 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
>  sent:*
>
> Gary R., List:
>
>
>
> 1.  I am inclined to agree with you on this.  As I understand it, the end
> of semiosis--both its final cause and its termination--is the production of
> a habit; a substance is a bundle of habits; and a material substance is a
> bundle of habits that are so inveterate, it has effectively lost the
> capacity for Habit-change.  As a result, it seems to me that the behavior
> of such "things" can in most or all cases be adequately analyzed in terms
> of *dyadic *action/reaction, rather than the irreducibly *triadic *action
> of semiosis.  In fact, I am leaning toward seeing the latter as requiring a
> Quasi-mind (see #3 below), at least to serve as the Quasi-interpreter, even
> though "things" can certainly serve as Quasi-utterers (i.e., Dynamic
> Objects) of degenerate Signs.
>
>
>
> 2.  Something is a Sign by virtue of having a DO, an IO, and an II--not
> necessarily a DI, so I do not see the relevance of the mother's inability
> (at first) to interpret the Sign (correctly, in my view) as standing for
> the hot burner.  She would presumably find this out very quickly, of
> course, after rushing into the kitchen.  The Dynamic Object determines the
> Sign--perhaps a neural signal of pain--of which the girl's scream is a
> Dynamic Interpretant;  and every Sign determines its Interpretant to
> stand in the same relation to the Sign's Dynamic Object as the Sign itself
> does.  Hence both the internal neural signal and the external scream are 
> *Indices
> *of the hot burner; at least, that is how I see it at the moment.
>
>
>
> 3.  Did you mean to say "Quasi-mind," rather than "Quasi-sign"?  My
> current tentative definition of "Quasi-mind" is a bundle of Collateral
> Experience and Habits of Interpretation (i.e., a *reacting substance*)
> that retains the capacity for Habit-change (i.e., *learning by experience*),
> and thus can be the Quasi-utterer of a *genuine *Sign (since this
> requires a *purpose*) and the Quasi-interpreter of *any *Sign.
>
>
>
> 4.  I addressed this already in the "Aristotle and Peirce" thread.
>
>
>
> Regards,
>
>

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Knowledge Bases in Inquiry, Learning, Reasoning

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

List:

In an effort to reduce the quantity of my individual messages, I am going
to try combining multiple replies into one post.

Gary R.:

1.  I agree that even persons can lose, or deliberately set aside, their
capacity for Habit-change.  Hopefully it is evident that I am still very
much open to adjusting my own views on these matters.

2.  In particular, as you have observed and I have acknowledged previously,
I tend to be a more abstract than concrete thinker; so these kinds of
practical examples are good "stretching exercises" for me.  In this case, I
am wary of drawing a sharp distinction between "the child's semiosis" and
"the mother's semiosis"; are they not *continuous*?  It seems to me that
there must be *some *semiotic connection between the hot burner and the
mother's eventual response to the child's cry, because the one would not
have happened without the other.  Why regard the girl's scream as
having a *different
*Dynamic Object for the mother than it does for the child?  Is it not the
very same Sign?  I suppose that it might have different *Immediate* Objects
for the two of them, because of their different Collateral Experiences, but
I am still mulling over that possibility.  Regardless, my conjecture is
that any "individual" instance of semiosis *begins* with a Dynamic
Object--either selected for a purpose in a Quasi-mind (genuine Signs), or a
"thing" itself (degenerate Signs)--and *ends* (if it ever does) with a
Habit-change.  For the child, that termination is (I suspect) her new habit
of not touching hot burners; but her scream, as a Dynamic Interpretant, is
an external Sign that continues the semiosic process in the mother--perhaps
resulting in a new habit of not leaving her daughter alone in the kitchen.

3.  As a matter of fact, Peirce used the term "quasi-sign" at least twice.
In "What Makes a Reasoning Sound" (1903), it refers to "certain objects
more or less analogous to signs," but nothing more is said (EP 2:257).  In
"Pragmatism" (1907), it refers to something that *would* be a Sign *except*
that it lacks "the triadic production of the interpretant," and a Jacquard
loom is given as an example (CP 5.473; cf. EP 2:404).  However, I think
that there is now fairly widespread consensus, at least among those of us
who have discussed it on the List in recent years, that as long as
something is *interpretable*--i.e., has an *Immediate* Interpretant--it
qualifies as a Sign, even if it never *actually* produces a *Dynamic*
Interpretant.

4.  I agree that Edwina is using "Form" in way that better aligns with 3ns
than 1ns.  As I said in the other thread, while it is undeniable that
Peirce associated "Form" with 1ns, "Matter" with 2ns, and "Entelechy" with
3ns in NEM 4:292-300 (c. 1903?) and EP 2:304 (1904), this does not entail
that he *always* did so.  Having reread both "A Sketch of Dichotomic
Mathematics" and "New Elements" within the last few days, I noticed a few
other uncanny similarities, suggesting that he may have composed them at
about the same time and for much the same purpose.  I wonder if that is why
the online Commens bibliography dates R 4 as 1904, rather than "c. 1903?"
per CP and Robin.

Edwina:

1.  What do you make of Peirce's statements in "Pragmatism" (1907) that
habit-changes as "ultimate logical interpretants" are *not* Signs (CP
5.476), or that habits as "final logical interpretants" are (at least) not
Signs *in the same way* as the Signs that produce them (EP 2:418)?  What
warrants analyzing the dissipation of a rock as (triadic) *semiosic*
action, rather than (dyadic) *dynamical* action?  No one is advocating the
separation of Mind and Matter; the point, as always, is that Matter *is*
(effete) Mind whose habits have become so inveterate as to be effectively
invulnerable to *Habit-change*, which is the final cause of every semiosic
process.

2.  I agree that there is "a plethora of Signs" in the example, which is
why I said a while back that we have to agree on *which* Sign to analyze
before attempting to assign any of the other terms.  Right now, we are
discussing the girl's scream as a Sign; but unless you have changed your
mind, you analyze it instead as a Dynamic Object for the mother, since you
deny that there are any *external* Signs.

3.  Do you have any specific comments on my latest tentative definition of
"Quasi-mind" (see below)?

4.  In NEM 4:292-300, obviously "Form" does not mean "formlessness."  In
fact, I find it very interesting that Peirce instead characterizes it as
"something definite," in contrast to other writings where "definite" and
"vague" are antonyms, and he associates the *latter* with 1ns (e.g., CP
5.447-450; 1905).  So again, we must pay careful attention to the context
and not necessarily impose the same interpretation on a given word
throughout Peirce's (or anyone else's) writings, despite his explicit
desire to be self-consistent in his own terminology.  Since you prefer
aligning "Form" with 3ns, what corresponding terms do you 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Knowledge Bases in Inquiry, Learning, Reasoning

[Stephen C. Rose]

Edwina why is Firstness akin to entropy? Isn't Firstness the location of
what we might term ontology -- things we make into words that are indeed
Wittgenstein's unspeakables. Did Peirce believe that entropy trumped what I
would call syntropy? If so did he then believe that logic was entropic?

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Tue, Feb 13, 2018 at 8:34 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Gary R, Jon, list:
>
> 1. I don't think that there is an 'end to semiosis', because Firstness,
> which is akin to entropy, is as basic to semiosis as Thirdness/habits. Even
> a rock will dissipate. Also, I don't think that Mind is ever separate from
> Matter and vice versa.
>
> 2. I consider, as I outlined previously, that the situation with the
> mother, child, hot stove, burn etc is not one Sign but a plethora of
> Signs.  I don't think that a regression analysis is correct here.
> Each Sign is triggered from another Sign but I don't think you can regress
> to the One Sign. So, I continue to maintain that for the Mother, the Sign
> that she reacts to is the cry of the child [a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign].
> The hot stove is almost irrelevant to her.
>
> 3. I remain concerned about the role of 'quasi-mind'.
>
> 4. Peirce has multiple and contradictory uses of the term 'Form' and I
> certainly don't see it as akin to the formlessness of Firstness. Firstness
> is a State and has no structure.
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Mon 12/02/18 10:01 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Gary R., List:
>
> 1.  I am inclined to agree with you on this.  As I understand it, the end
> of semiosis--both its final cause and its termination--is the production of
> a habit; a substance is a bundle of habits; and a material substance is a
> bundle of habits that are so inveterate, it has effectively lost the
> capacity for Habit-change.  As a result, it seems to me that the behavior
> of such "things" can in most or all cases be adequately analyzed in terms
> of dyadic action/reaction, rather than the irreducibly triadic action of
> semiosis.  In fact, I am leaning toward seeing the latter as requiring a
> Quasi-mind (see #3 below), at least to serve as the Quasi-interpreter, even
> though "things" can certainly serve as Quasi-utterers (i.e., Dynamic
> Objects) of degenerate Signs.
>
> 2.  Something is a Sign by virtue of having a DO, an IO, and an II--not
> necessarily a DI, so I do not see the relevance of the mother's inability
> (at first) to interpret the Sign (correctly, in my view) as standing for
> the hot burner.  She would presumably find this out very quickly, of
> course, after rushing into the kitchen.  The Dynamic Object determines the
> Sign--perhaps a neural signal of pain--of which the girl's scream is a
> Dynamic Interpretant;  and every Sign determines its Interpretant to
> stand in the same relation to the Sign's Dynamic Object as the Sign itself
> does.  Hence both the internal neural signal and the external scream are 
> Indices
> of the hot burner; at least, that is how I see it at the moment.
>
> 3.  Did you mean to say "Quasi-mind," rather than "Quasi-sign"?  My
> current tentative definition of "Quasi-mind" is a bundle of Collateral
> Experience and Habits of Interpretation (i.e., a reacting substance) that
> retains the capacity for Habit-change (i.e., learning by experience), and
> thus can be the Quasi-utterer of a genuine Sign (since this requires a
> purpose) and the Quasi-interpreter of any Sign.
>
> 4.  I addressed this already in the "Aristotle and Peirce" thread.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Mon, Feb 12, 2018 at 7:05 PM, Gary Richmond 
> wrote:
>
>> Jon S, Edwina, list,
>>
>> For now, just some preliminary thoughts on Jon's several bullet points.
>> In response to Edwina, Jon wrote:
>>
>> 1.  It seems like we both struggle, although in different ways, with
>> talking about Signs as individual "things"--like "a stone on a sandy
>> beach," or "an organism" trying to survive--vs. talking about Signs within
>> a continuous process.  That is why I find your tendency to use the term
>> "Sign" for the entire interaction of DO-[IO-R-II] problematic, and why I
>> hoped that when we jointly recognized the  internal triad of [IO-R-II]
>> some months ago, we would thereafter conscientiously call this (and only 
>> this)
>> the Sign, while always acknowledging that there is no Sign without a DO.
>>
>>
>> My view is that while such an individual thing as a crystal has been
>> created by some semiosic process, that the semiosis is (internally) more or
>> less complete once the crystal is formed, and this is so even as we can
>> analyze aspects of the three categories present in/as the crystal (these no
>> longer being semiotic, but rather, phenomenological categories).
>>
>> John Deely, who introduced the 

[PEIRCE-L] Knowledge Bases in Inquiry, Learning, Reasoning

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Gary R, Jon, list:

1. I don't think that there is an 'end to semiosis', because
Firstness, which is akin to entropy, is as basic to semiosis as
Thirdness/habits. Even a rock will dissipate. Also, I don't think
that Mind is ever separate from Matter and vice versa.

2. I consider, as I outlined previously, that the situation with the
mother, child, hot stove, burn etc is not one Sign but a plethora of
Signs.  I don't think that a regression analysis is correct here.
Each Sign is triggered from another Sign but I don't think you can
regress to the One Sign. So, I continue to maintain that for the
Mother, the Sign that she reacts to is the cry of the child [a
Rhematic Indexical Sinsign]. The hot stove is almost irrelevant to
her.

3. I remain concerned about the role of 'quasi-mind'.

4. Peirce has multiple and contradictory uses of the term 'Form' and
I certainly don't see it as akin to the formlessness of Firstness.
Firstness is a State and has no structure.

Edwina
 On Mon 12/02/18 10:01 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Gary R., List:
 1.  I am inclined to agree with you on this.  As I understand it,
the end of semiosis--both its final cause and its termination--is the
production of a habit; a substance is a bundle of habits; and a
material substance is a bundle of habits that are so inveterate, it
has effectively lost the capacity for Habit-change.  As a result, it
seems to me that the behavior of such "things" can in most or all
cases be adequately analyzed in terms of  dyadic action/reaction,
rather than the irreducibly triadic action of semiosis.  In fact, I
am leaning toward seeing the latter as requiring a Quasi-mind (see #3
below), at least to serve as the Quasi-interpreter, even though
"things" can certainly serve as Quasi-utterers (i.e., Dynamic
Objects) of degenerate Signs.
 2.  Something is a Sign by virtue of having a DO, an IO, and an
II--not necessarily a DI, so I do not see the relevance of the
mother's inability (at first) to interpret the Sign (correctly, in my
view) as standing for the hot burner.  She would presumably find this
out very quickly, of course, after rushing into the kitchen.  The
Dynamic Object determines the Sign--perhaps a neural signal of
pain--of which the girl's scream is a Dynamic Interpretant;  and
every Sign determines its Interpretant to stand in the same relation
to the Sign's Dynamic Object as the Sign itself does.  Hence both the
internal neural signal and the external scream are  Indices of the hot
burner; at least, that is how I see it at the moment. 
  3.  Did you mean to say "Quasi-mind," rather than "Quasi-sign"?  My
current tentative definition of "Quasi-mind" is a bundle of Collateral
Experience and Habits of Interpretation (i.e., a  reacting substance)
that retains the capacity for Habit-change (i.e.,  learning by
experience), and thus can be the Quasi-utterer of a  genuine Sign
(since this requires a  purpose) and the Quasi-interpreter of  any
Sign. 
 4.  I addressed this already in the "Aristotle and Peirce" thread. 
 Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur
Philosopher, Lutheran Laymanwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1] -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [2]  
 On Mon, Feb 12, 2018 at 7:05 PM, Gary Richmond  wrote:
 Jon S, Edwina, list,
 For now, just some preliminary thoughts on Jon's several bullet
points. In response to Edwina, Jon wrote: 
 1.  It seems like we both struggle, although in different ways, with
talking about Signs as individual "things"--like "a stone on a sandy
beach," or "an organism" trying to survive--vs. talking about Signs
within a continuous process.  That is why I find your tendency to use
the term "Sign" for the entire interaction of DO-[IO-R-II]
problematic, and why I hoped that when we jointly recognized the 
internal triad of [IO-R-II] some months ago, we would thereafter
conscientiously call this (and only this) the Sign, while always
acknowledging that there is no Sign without a DO.
 My view is that while such an individual thing as a crystal has been
created by some semiosic process, that the semiosis is (internally)
more or less complete once the crystal is formed, and this is so even
as we can analyze aspects of the three categories present in/as the
crystal (these no longer being semiotic, but rather, phenomenological
categories). 
 John Deely, who introduced the idea of physiosemiosis, did not argue
for a, shall we say, vital 'process' of physiosemiosis once rocks and
the like have been formed: "Deely . . . notably in Basics of
Semiotics, laid down the argument that the action of signs extends
even further than life, and that semiosis as an influence of the
future played a role in the shaping of the physical universe prior to
the advent of life, a role for which Deely coined the term 
physiosemiosis."https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Deely [4]
 

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Knowledge Bases in Inquiry, Learning, Reasoning

[Jon Awbrey]

Neal,

I do not know if it's the one you have in mind but there is
a similar thought in a passage we discussed much in olden days
on the List.  I saved it through various sites over the years
and now find a copy here:

Logic As Semiotic
http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/User:Jon_Awbrey/Peircean_Pragmata#Logic_As_Semiotic_2

Excerpt 4. Peirce (CE 1, 173)
http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/User:Jon_Awbrey/Peircean_Pragmata#Excerpt_4._Peirce_.28CE_1.2C_173.29



How often do we think of the thing in algebra? When we use the symbol of multiplication we do not even think out the 
conception of multiplication, we think merely of the laws of that symbol, which coincide with the laws of the 
conception, and what is more to the purpose, coincide with the laws of multiplication in the object. Now, I ask, how is 
it that anything can be done with a symbol, without reflecting upon the conception, much less imagining the object that 
belongs to it? It is simply because the symbol has acquired a nature, which may be described thus, that when it is 
brought before the mind certain principles of its use — whether reflected on or not — by association immediately 
regulate the action of the mind; and these may be regarded as laws of the symbol itself which it cannot as a symbol 
transgress.


(C.S. Peirce, Chronological Edition, CE 1, 173)



Regards,

Jon

On 2/13/2018 4:45 AM, Neal Bruss wrote:

On Gary’s first point, cf. Peirce,  "matter is effete mind, inveterate habits 
becoming physical laws", discussed by
Lucia Santella, in Sign System Studies, the reference at 
https://philpapers.org/rec/SANMAE-8

I recall, and cannot find, Peirce saying somewhere something like that the 
purpose of signs for inquiry is the reduction of thinking, that is, that when 
habits are formed and deployed, they leave consciousness (my term, not 
Peirce’s) free to observe new objects (again, my terms).  Do any of you have 
the source for Peirce on this, or something like it?



--

inquiry into inquiry: https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/
academia: https://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey
oeiswiki: https://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey
isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA
facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Knowledge Bases in Inquiry, Learning, Reasoning

[Neal Bruss]

On Gary’s first point, cf. Peirce,  "matter is effete mind, inveterate habits 
becoming physical laws", discussed by
Lucia Santella, in Sign System Studies, the reference at 
https://philpapers.org/rec/SANMAE-8

I recall, and cannot find, Peirce saying somewhere something like that the 
purpose of signs for inquiry is the reduction of thinking, that is, that when 
habits are formed and deployed, they leave consciousness (my term, not 
Peirce’s) free to observe new objects (again, my terms).  Do any of you have 
the source for Peirce on this, or something like it?


From: Gary Richmond 
Reply-To: Gary Richmond 
Date: Tuesday, February 13, 2018 at 3:57 AM
To: Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Knowledge Bases in Inquiry, Learning, 
Reasoning

Jon, list,

1.  I am inclined to agree with you on this.  As I understand it, the end of 
semiosis--both its final cause and its termination--is the production of a 
habit; a substance is a bundle of habits; and a material substance is a bundle 
of habits that are so inveterate, it has effectively lost the capacity for 
Habit-change.

Nicely said. And I would suggest that to the extent that a person has 
"effectively lost the capacity for Habit-change," has become, say, 'set in his 
ways' or 'married to his theories, that he is, in a sense, to that extent 
intellectually 'hardened' or spiritually 'deadened'.

I'll be interested to see how you develop your idea that the "irreducibly 
triadic action of semiosis" requires a Quasi-interpreter. I agree that 
'things', especially those in nature, can serve as Quasi-utterers of degenerate 
Signs.

2.  Something is a Sign by virtue of having a DO, an IO, and an II--not 
necessarily a DI, so I do not see the relevance of the mother's inability (at 
first) to interpret the Sign (correctly, in my view) as standing for the hot 
burner.  She would presumably find this out very quickly, of course, after 
rushing into the kitchen.

I disagree. Whether or not the mother interprets the DI (the cry of her 
daughter) correctly or not, the cry is part of the child's semiosis, not that 
of the mother. You continue:

The Dynamic Object determines the Sign--perhaps a neural signal of pain--of 
which the girl's scream is a Dynamic Interpretant; and every Sign determines 
its Interpretant to stand in the same relation to the Sign's Dynamic Object as 
the Sign itself does.  Hence both the internal neural signal and the external 
scream are Indices of the hot burner; at least, that is how I see it at the 
moment.

I would say that the Interpretant standing in the same relation to the Sign's 
DO as the Sign does concerns the child's sign only. I see the mother as 
grounding (in the sense of semiotic 'determination') her Immediate Object for 
her, the mother's) semiosis not in the distant burner but in the cry of her 
child. So I still hold that the child is the Dynamic Object of the mother's 
Sign action (semiosis). Again, in my understanding the interpretant standing 
"in the same relation to the Sign's Dynamic Object as the Sign itself does" 
applies to a different Sign, namely, that of the child.

3.  Did you mean to say "Quasi-mind," rather than "Quasi-sign"?  My current 
tentative definition of "Quasi-mind" is a bundle of Collateral Experience and 
Habits of Interpretation (i.e., a reacting substance) that retains the capacity 
for Habit-change (i.e., learning by experience), and thus can be the 
Quasi-utterer of a genuine Sign (since this requires a purpose) and the 
Quasi-interpreter of any Sign.

Yes, of course I meant Quasi-mind and not Quasi-sign (an impossibility, I'd 
think). I'll have to reflect on your "current tentative definition of 
'Quasi-mind' " which at first blush seems quite promising.

4.  I addressed this already in the "Aristotle and Peirce" thread.

It would be helpful for me if you'd comment on my thought that Edwina may be 
using 'Form' in a different sense than Peirce such that in her sense it would 
connect more to 3ns than to 1ns. And of course I'd be especially eager to hear 
what Edwina thinks about that interpretation.

Best,

Gary R


[Gary Richmond]

Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
718 482-5690

On Mon, Feb 12, 2018 at 10:01 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
> wrote:
Gary R., List:

1.  I am inclined to agree with you on this.  As I understand it, the end of 
semiosis--both its final cause and its termination--is the production of a 
habit; a substance is a bundle of habits; and a material substance is a bundle 
of habits that are so inveterate, it has effectively lost the capacity for 
Habit-change.  As a result, it seems to me that the behavior of such "things" 
can in most or all cases be adequately analyzed in terms of dyadic 
action/reaction, rather than the 

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Knowledge Bases in Inquiry, Learning, Reasoning

[Gary Richmond]

Jon, list,

1.  I am inclined to agree with you on this.  As I understand it, the end
of semiosis--both its final cause and its termination--is the production of
a habit; a substance is a bundle of habits; and a material substance is a
bundle of habits that are so inveterate, it has effectively lost the
capacity for Habit-change.


Nicely said. And I would suggest that to the extent that a person has
"effectively lost the capacity for Habit-change," has become, say, 'set in
his ways' or 'married to his theories, that he is, in a sense, to that
extent intellectually 'hardened' or spiritually 'deadened'.

I'll be interested to see how you develop your idea that the "irreducibly
triadic action of semiosis" *requires* a Quasi-interpreter. I agree that
'things', especially those in nature, can serve as Quasi-utterers of
degenerate Signs.

2.  Something is a Sign by virtue of having a DO, an IO, and an II--not
necessarily a DI, so I do not see the relevance of the mother's inability
(at first) to interpret the Sign (correctly, in my view) as standing for
the hot burner.  She would presumably find this out very quickly, of
course, after rushing into the kitchen.


I disagree. Whether or not the mother interprets the DI (the cry of her
daughter) correctly or not, the cry is part of the child's semiosis, not
that of the mother. You continue:

The Dynamic Object determines the Sign--perhaps a neural signal of pain--of
which the girl's scream is a Dynamic Interpretant; and every Sign
determines its Interpretant to stand in the same relation to the Sign's
Dynamic Object as the Sign itself does.  Hence both the internal neural
signal and the external scream are *Indices *of the hot burner; at least,
that is how I see it at the moment.


I would say that the Interpretant standing in the same relation to the
Sign's DO as the Sign does concerns the child's sign only. I see the mother
as grounding (in the sense of semiotic 'determination') her Immediate
Object for *her, *the mother's) semiosis not in the distant burner but in
the cry of her child. So I still hold that the child is the Dynamic Object
of the mother's Sign action (semiosis). Again, in my understanding the
interpretant standing "in the same relation to the Sign's Dynamic Object as
the Sign itself does" applies to a different Sign, namely, that of the
child.


3.  Did you mean to say "Quasi-mind," rather than "Quasi-sign"?  My current
tentative definition of "Quasi-mind" is a bundle of Collateral Experience
and Habits of Interpretation (i.e., a *reacting substance*) that retains
the capacity for Habit-change (i.e., *learning by experience*), and thus
can be the Quasi-utterer of a *genuine *Sign (since this requires a
*purpose*) and the Quasi-interpreter of *any *Sign.


Yes, of course I meant Quasi-mind and not Quasi-sign (an impossibility, I'd
think). I'll have to reflect on your "current tentative definition of
'Quasi-mind' " which at first blush seems quite promising.

4.  I addressed this already in the "Aristotle and Peirce" thread.


It would be helpful for me if you'd comment on my thought that Edwina may
be using 'Form' in a different sense than Peirce such that in her sense it
*would* connect more to 3ns than to 1ns. And of course I'd be especially
eager to hear what Edwina thinks about that interpretation.

Best,

Gary R


[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*

On Mon, Feb 12, 2018 at 10:01 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  wrote:

> Gary R., List:
>
> 1.  I am inclined to agree with you on this.  As I understand it, the end
> of semiosis--both its final cause and its termination--is the production of
> a habit; a substance is a bundle of habits; and a material substance is a
> bundle of habits that are so inveterate, it has effectively lost the
> capacity for Habit-change.  As a result, it seems to me that the behavior
> of such "things" can in most or all cases be adequately analyzed in terms
> of *dyadic *action/reaction, rather than the irreducibly *triadic *action
> of semiosis.  In fact, I am leaning toward seeing the latter as requiring a
> Quasi-mind (see #3 below), at least to serve as the Quasi-interpreter, even
> though "things" can certainly serve as Quasi-utterers (i.e., Dynamic
> Objects) of degenerate Signs.
>
> 2.  Something is a Sign by virtue of having a DO, an IO, and an II--not
> necessarily a DI, so I do not see the relevance of the mother's inability
> (at first) to interpret the Sign (correctly, in my view) as standing for
> the hot burner.  She would presumably find this out very quickly, of
> course, after rushing into the kitchen.  The Dynamic Object determines the
> Sign--perhaps a neural signal of pain--of which the girl's scream is a
> Dynamic Interpretant; and every Sign determines its Interpretant to stand
> in the same relation to the Sign's Dynamic Object