Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 22-août-06, à 08:36, Tom Caylor a écrit :
>
> > I believe that we are finite, but as I said in the "computationalsim
> > and supervenience" thread, it doesn't seem that this is a strong enough
> > statement to be useful in a TOE. It seems that you cannot have YD
> > with
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Brent Meeker writes:
>
>
>>>If you include the computer's
>>>data in the program then it becomes an inputless system, a self-contained
>>>simulation. If
>>>you include yourself, the rock and everything else that might interact with
>>>it in one system
>>>you hav
Brent Meeker writes:
> >If you include the computer's
> > data in the program then it becomes an inputless system, a self-contained
> > simulation. If
> > you include yourself, the rock and everything else that might interact with
> > it in one system
> > you have a self-contained, inputless
As Brent Meeker has pointed out, physical theories are just models to make
predictions about how the world works. If physists get carried away and say
"this is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth" then they are
talking metaphysics, not physics.
Stathis Papaioannou
--
Peter Jones writes:
> > > All physical theories are theories of matter (mass/energy).
> >
> > True, but they are not theories of what matter *actually is*.
>
> Hence the need for a metaphysical account of
> matter-as-Bare-Substance to complement the
> physicst's account of matter-as-behaviour.
Its a fair point, given that we can't exactly define consciousness,
but doesn't it seem a tad unlikely to you?
The point is that in a Multiverse our own consciousnesses are not
equivalent to recordings is suggestive, but not conclusive, that
recordings aren't conscious.
The Maudlin/movie-graph a
Supervenience requires a token, or object in the physical world, that
consciousness supervenes. All I'm saying is that this token must
really implement all the counterfactual situations, ie exist in a
Multiverse.
Conscious experience (the inside view) will only be of one of the
histories in the
On Wed, Aug 23, 2006 at 04:15:41PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> > Physical supervenience is not equivalent to assuming a concrete
> > primitive material world. The latter is an additional assumption.
>
>
> This depends entirely of what you mean by physical. If
> "physical-supervenience"
Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:
> >
> >
> > Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> >> Peter Jones writes:
> >>
> >> > Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >> >
> >> > > I can agree. No physicist posit matter in a fundamental theory.
> >> >
> >> > All physical theories are theories of matter (mass/energy).
> >>
> >> True, bu
>
>
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>> Peter Jones writes:
>>
>> > Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> >
>> > > I can agree. No physicist posit matter in a fundamental theory.
>> >
>> > All physical theories are theories of matter (mass/energy).
>>
>> True, but they are not theories of what matter *actually is*.
- Original Message -
From: "Bruno Marchal" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To:
Sent: Wednesday, August 23, 2006 7:56 AM
Subject: Re: Rép: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Le 22-août-06, à 18:06, <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> So where is the "key" to translate number-monsters into
> "thought-mons
Bruno:
why do I have difficulties to go along
with many of you?
E.g. when you wrote (and not you brought
up the ominous "axiom"):
>"...Which axioms? Indeed, good
question, that's makes my point. >Well, I was thinking about some physical
theory the "someone" >would argue for. Anyone a
pri
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Brent Meeker writes:
>
>
>>Almost is not completely. In any case, I don't think consciousness is
>>maintained
>>indefinitely with no inputs. I think a "brain-in-a-vat" would go into an
>>endless
>>loop without external stimulus.
>
>
> That's an assumption,
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Brent Meeker writes (quoting SP):
>
>
>Every physical system contains if-then statements. If the grooves on the
>record were different, then the sound coming out of the speakers would
>also be
>different.
That's not a statement contained in
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> Le 21-août-06, à 22:49, Brent Meeker a écrit :
>
>
>>But leaving that aside, I think there is another question in play:
>>What kind of
>>computation implements intelligence? ...consciousness? Is it every
>>computation,
>>with differences only of degree? Or are ther
Stathis,
you touched the 'truth' (a word I put into "-" because I don't believe it).
Matter
cannot be an "is" - actually or virtually. Rutherford's empty atom shows the
dichotomy between 'effects' ('affects'?) and 'explanation' (more than just
words).
The figment 'matter' is a product of 'mental
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> I think my discussion with Pete is terminological. When I say "numbers
> exist", Pete seems to think I believe in some magical realm were
> numbers exist in I don't know which sense. But when I say number exist,
> I just mean that the proposition "numbers exists" is true in
Le 23-août-06, à 03:58, Brent Meeker a écrit :
>>
>> People who believes that inputs (being either absolute-material or
>> relative-platonical) are needed for consciousness should not believe
>> that we can be conscious in a dream, given the evidence that the brain
>> is almost completely cut ou
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 22-août-06, à 12:37, 1Z a écrit :
>
> >
> >
> > Tom Caylor wrote:
> >
> >> I'd say a candidate for making AR false is the behavior of the prime
> >> numbers, as has been discussed regarding your Riemann zeta function
> >> TOE. As I suggested on that thread, it could be
Le 22-août-06, à 05:53, Russell Standish a écrit :
>> This is a very interesting remark, although I am not convinced. I have
>> also believed for a while that a material universe could be saved by
>> the way the quantum multiverse actualizes the counterfactuals.
>> But if that were true, conscio
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 22-août-06, à 18:36, 1Z a écrit :
>
> >
> >
> > Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >
> >> I can agree. No physicist posit matter in a fundamental theory.
> >
> > All physical theories are theories of matter (mass/energy).
>
> I believe so. This does not entail per se that matter is
Le 22-août-06, à 23:03, David Nyman a écrit :
> But this suggests to me that comp, in the 'instantiation-free' AR+CT+YD
> sense, *cannot* be correct, precisely because it makes 'existential'
> claims for the 'axiomatisation of indexical existence in a 3rd-person
> way'. The key issue here is sur
Le 22-août-06, à 13:45, 1Z a écrit :
>
>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Le 21-août-06, à 16:01, 1Z a écrit :
>>
>>> Exactly. And if non-phsyical systems (Plato' Heaven) don't
>>> implement counterfactuals, then they can't run programmes,
>>> and if Plato's heaven can't run programmes, it can't be run
Le 22-août-06, à 18:36, 1Z a écrit :
>
>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> I can agree. No physicist posit matter in a fundamental theory.
>
> All physical theories are theories of matter (mass/energy).
I believe so. This does not entail per se that matter is primitive.
Also I prefer to define physic
Le 22-août-06, à 18:06, <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> So where is the "key" to translate number-monsters into
> "thought-monsters"?
In front of you. Computer or universal machine, or universal numbers.
More explanation in the posts.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--~--~---
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 22-août-06, à 08:36, Tom Caylor a écrit :
>
> > I believe that we are finite, but as I said in the "computationalsim
> > and supervenience" thread, it doesn't seem that this is a strong enough
> > statement to be useful in a TOE. It seems that you cannot have YD
> > wit
Le 22-août-06, à 12:37, 1Z a écrit :
>
>
> Tom Caylor wrote:
>
>> I'd say a candidate for making AR false is the behavior of the prime
>> numbers, as has been discussed regarding your Riemann zeta function
>> TOE. As I suggested on that thread, it could be that the behavior of
>> the Riemann ze
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Peter Jones writes:
>
> > Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >
> > > I can agree. No physicist posit matter in a fundamental theory.
> >
> > All physical theories are theories of matter (mass/energy).
>
> True, but they are not theories of what matter *actually is*.
Hence the ne
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 21-août-06, à 18:55, David Nyman a écrit :
>
> >
> >> I don't think Bruno and Stathis are arguing that numbers are
> >> neceesarily
> >> the only things that exist (although a standard Platonist might argue
> >> that
> >> that they are the only things that exist necessar
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 21-août-06, à 21:12, 1Z a écrit :
>
> > If Everythingism is the combination of rationalsim (all truths are
> > necessary apriori truths) and Mathematical Monism (mathematical objects
> > exist, and are
> > all that exist), it may be self-defeating , in that the second cl
Various people write:
> blah blah ...recording... blah blah... consciousness... blah blah
But WHY can't a recording be conscious? How do I know I'm not in
a recording at the moment? True, I am surprised by my experiences
and believe I could have acted differently had I wanted to, but that
mig
Brent Meeker writes:
> Almost is not completely. In any case, I don't think consciousness is
> maintained
> indefinitely with no inputs. I think a "brain-in-a-vat" would go into an
> endless
> loop without external stimulus.
That's an assumption, but even if true it would only say somethin
Russell Standish writes:
> Not really, as conscious experience is only associated with one
> branch, but multiple branches are needed to have any conscious
> experience at all.
What does this mean?
Stathis Papaioannou
_
Be one of t
Brent Meeker writes (quoting SP):
> >>> Every physical system contains if-then statements. If the grooves on the
> >>> record were different, then the sound coming out of the speakers would
> >>> also be
> >>> different.
> >>
> >> That's not a statement contained in the physical system; it's a
Le 22-août-06, à 08:36, Tom Caylor a écrit :
> I believe that we are finite, but as I said in the "computationalsim
> and supervenience" thread, it doesn't seem that this is a strong enough
> statement to be useful in a TOE. It seems that you cannot have YD
> without CT, but if true I would lea
Le 22-août-06, à 05:32, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
> That sentence summarises the problem pretty well. We have to agree
> that there is this dichotomy before proceeding further, and I don't
> think most computationalists do.
I guess my work is not so well known and I guess I have some
r
Le 21-août-06, à 22:49, Brent Meeker a écrit :
> But leaving that aside, I think there is another question in play:
> What kind of
> computation implements intelligence? ...consciousness? Is it every
> computation,
> with differences only of degree? Or are there distinct requirements?
You
Le 21-août-06, à 22:20, Brent Meeker a écrit :
> I thought the question was not about computation, but whether a
> program was
> intelligent or conscious. I think that intelligence means being able
> to respond to a
> variety of differenet inputs. So above |CODE| might be intelligent
> but
Le 21-août-06, à 21:12, 1Z a écrit :
> If Everythingism is the combination of rationalsim (all truths are
> necessary apriori truths) and Mathematical Monism (mathematical objects
> exist, and are
> all that exist), it may be self-defeating , in that the second claim,
> ie Mathematical Monism, i
Le 21-août-06, à 22:01, George Levy a écrit :
Slight correction:
If you are sane then you're not sure that you are sane,
OK.
then you would have to be crazy to say "Yes Doctor."..
Why? You can hope. Like you can hope you are sane, and that you will remain sane after a comp-substitutio
Le 21-août-06, à 18:55, David Nyman a écrit :
>
>> I don't think Bruno and Stathis are arguing that numbers are
>> neceesarily
>> the only things that exist (although a standard Platonist might argue
>> that
>> that they are the only things that exist necessarily..)
>
> But aren't they claiming
Peter Jones writes (quoting Bruno Marchal):
> > People who believes that inputs (being either absolute-material or
> > relative-platonical) are needed for consciousness should not believe
> > that we can be conscious in a dream, given the evidence that the brain
> > is almost completely cut out f
Le 21-août-06, à 19:48, Tom Caylor a écrit :
>
> I'd rather go with Pascal. ;)
Comp has its own "Pascal wag", when the doctor said that either you
will die soon or you accept an artificial brain. Some people will
believe an artificial brain could be a last chance to ... see their
grand gran
Le 21-août-06, à 17:42, 1Z a écrit :
> The point I was trying to make was that I don't have to define
> exactly what my existence is. (Bruno's rationalism makes
> him think no question can can be settled unless it can be exactly
> defined; my empiricism makes me believe there are Brute
> Facts w
Le 21-août-06, à 16:23, 1Z a écrit :
>
>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Le 21-août-06, à 13:34, 1Z a écrit :
>>
>>
>>> If Plato's heaven doesn't exist, I can't be in it.
>>
>>
>> I can hardly not agree with that.
>>
>>
>>>
>>> If numbers do not explain my existence -- explaining
>>> how a strucuture
Peter Jones writes:
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> > I can agree. No physicist posit matter in a fundamental theory.
>
> All physical theories are theories of matter (mass/energy).
True, but they are not theories of what matter *actually is*. At
the turn of last century Rutherford showed that ato
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